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Foreword
Academic alliance as an asset for change in sport
It takes one to know one.
How else would one explain that the first prominent sport leader to publicly 
denounce endemic corruption in international sport federations, would many 
years later be forced to leave his own sport presidency in disgrace? He was named 
responsible for decades of systemic manipulation of the anti-doping efforts in his 
sport, a manipulation that was spiced up with rigged elections and ‘a tyranny of 
cash’.
It was Tamás Aján, the Hungarian president of the International Weightlifting 
Federation and an Honorary IOC Member, who shocked me when on 22 February 
2011, he spilled the beans in front of the EU Commissioner and around 450 top 
leaders from European sport and governments:
“There is no sports organisation today where the appointment to important 
posts would not be tainted by corruption,” was one of Aján's spectacular state-
ments, alleging that doping control were also affected and that he could “give 
specific examples in any area of sport”.
A decade and countless sport corruption scandals later, it is relevant to ask 
how efficient the enlightenment produced by Aján proved to be. In the light 
of the FIFA scandals revealed shortly before, you might expect that the hun-
dreds of sport and government officials became as shocked as I, rushing back from 
Budapest to immediately erase corruption.
Unfortunately, not.
It is, however, indisputable that the start of the 2010s became a turning point 
in the debate on sports governance. The taboos regarding the multiple threats to 
sports integrity were broken one by one, and the growing awareness led to global 
calls for better governance in sport.
Today, as all transnational institutions and the entire Olympic movement join 
the chorus praising good governance in sport, academics may be tempted to sing 
‘mission completed’ and turn the sheet of music to play other tunes.
That would be a fatal mistake. The public discourse has changed dramatically, 
but the realities of sport lack behind. Almost every week brings new evidence 
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about corruption and flawed management in national and international sports 
federation. The work of improving sports governance has just begun.
At Play the Game, we take pride in having been at the forefront of the sports 
governance debate through our communication and conference activities, and 
through our partnerships with researchers worldwide—including the editors 
of this book and some of the authors—that led to the creation of the Sports 
Governance Observer tools.
Fortunately, the increased academic engagement stretches out much beyond 
our own circles. This book testifies to that fact, and it only represents a fraction of 
what academics have produced in recent years.
As an outsider to the academic world allow me to ask if the academic energy is 
always used in the best interest of sport and society.
Although I do understand that developing theories is necessary and attractive 
endeavour, it would be helpful if academics raised their interest in events on the 
ground. Investigative journalism is poorly resourced, public prosecutors too—and 
although I do not regard universities as lands of milk and honey, I think academ-
ics could add much clout by joining an alliance of under-financed researchers.
Many areas linked to sport governance are desperately in need of stronger emp-
ery and creative theoretical thinking, just to mention a few:
• Models for reconstructing the autonomy of sport, balancing the fundamental 
association freedom with the need to regulate the sports industry and protect 
it from criminal infiltration
• Ways to secure the democratic values sport can and should embody, facing 
the increased engagement from authoritarian states in ownerships and major 
events
• Surveys and facts to replace mythology in explaining what motivates people 
of all ages to engage in physical activity and sport
• Best practices for preventing psychological and sexual abuse at local and 
national level
• Research to make investment in sports facilities and societal infrastructure 
movement-friendly and efficient
• Strategies to ensure more sustainable and climate-friendly sport, from the 
consumer level to the organisation of mega events
An obligation to help
Over the years, I have heard even brilliant academics explain how they could 
only criticise sport for its failures and not contribute to finding solutions. This was 
beyond their responsibility and would also compromise their objectivity.
I could not disagree more. Academics are, in my view, just as much a part of 
humanity as the rest of us, and as human beings I think we are bound by an 
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overall obligation to help each other and support our communities to the best of 
our abilities.
Besides, most academics are also dependent on public grants, and just as we 
demand that sport organisations take societal responsibility by arguing that they 
are supported by taxpayers, we can ask academic researchers to work for the 
public good.
Having said that, it is not possible to engage with stakeholders in the turbulent, 
conflict-ridden and sometimes infectious world of sport without facing ethical 
dilemmas and threats to scientific integrity.
To avoid compromising their credibility, researchers must show full and 
frequent transparency about their methodologies, their findings and their finan-
cial backing. And they must insist that this transparency is part of the contrac-
tual relations with third parties.
Any attempts to disguise the fundamental conditions of the research will 
weaken its impact and may even be counterproductive and nurture conspiracies.
The value of networking
For Play the Game, it has been of tremendous benefit to be able to cooperate with 
researchers from the very start of our activities in 1997. We have also watched 
how informal networks between researchers, journalists, whistle-blowers, sports 
leaders, athletes and other stakeholders rise at our conferences with long-term 
value for those involved.
Studying the governance of sport may lead to academic excellence, but neither 
the one nor the other are ends in themselves. But academic excellence placed in 
a policy-oriented context can help us towards better governance in sport.
Good governance in sport will not solve all the problems I have mentioned. 
But without good governance, none of the problems will be solved.
Jens Sejer Andersen is a journalist, founder and international director of Play the 
Game.
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The need for critical reflection on 
good governance in sport
Arnout Geeraert
Few observers of sport governance will be surprised to see the publication 
of an edited volume on good governance in sport. ‘Good governance’ has 
indeed assumed the status of a mantra in the world of sport, even if it only 
recently made its way into critical debates about sport governance. In 2008, the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) did much to promote the concept in 
sport when it introduced the ‘Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance 
of the Olympic and Sports Movement’ (IOC 2008). However, at that time, the 
quality of the governance of sport, and of sport governing bodies in particular, 
had already been under serious scrutiny for at least a decade. At the end of the 
1990s, sport governing bodies’ lack of serious commitment to the fight against 
doping in sport as well as the Salt Lake City corruption scandal involving IOC 
officials undermined trust in sport leaders and increased calls for transparency, 
democracy and accountability as well as more ethical conduct (Geeraert & 
Drieskens 2021). A series of governance failures and corruption scandals have 
since galvanised these demands (Henry & Lee 2004). The most significant 
ones have been the highly mediatised ethical scandals enveloping Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and International Association of 
Athletics Federations (IAAF, now ‘World Athletics’) in 2015 (Chappelet & 
Mrkonjic 2019).
Governmental actors and the sport world have labelled this broad agenda in 
terms of ‘good governance’.1 At the international level, for instance, the European 
Union institutions, the Council of Europe and UNESCO have all called upon 
sport bodies to implement principles of good governance (e.g. Council of Europe 
2016; European Parliament 2015; Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe 
2018; UNESCO 2015). The sport movement has responded to this external pres-
sure. The IOC introduced the aforementioned Principles of Good Governance in 
response to increased regulatory threats by the European Union (Chappelet 2016). 
In 2016, following the FIFA and IAAF corruption scandals, the Association of 
Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF), an association of the 28 
international sport federations that are part of the Summer Olympic Programme, 
introduced the ‘Key Governance Principles and Basic Indicators’ (ASOIF 2016). 
This attention for good governance at the international level has trickled down to 
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the national and local levels. Good governance policies in sport at these levels are 
also inspired by similar, long-standing initiatives relating to the business, culture 
and volunteering sectors. In sum, good governance is now firmly on the agenda 
of an increasing number of public and sport authorities at all levels. They are 
introducing codifications of principles of good governance in sport organisations 
as well as specific policies to induce implementation (ASOIF 2016; Chappelet & 
Mrkonjic 2019; EU Expert Group Good Governance 2013; Geeraert 2019; IOC 
2008; Walters & Tacon 2018).
Despite its salience in sport policies and governance discourse, good govern-
ance in sport remains a somewhat underexplored research topic (Parent & Hoye 
2018). This book engages in critical reflection on good governance in sport in 
two ways. First, it seeks to outline and critically reflect on key theoretical perspec-
tives that lead to different conceptualisations and prescriptions of governance. 
Second, it aims to question and challenge different practical strategies that have 
been employed to achieve the implementation of good governance principles in 
sport organisations. In doing so, it aims to take a first step towards filling impor-
tant gaps in the sport governance literature.
Identifying the knowledge gaps
There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with the recent trend towards 
improving the quality of governance in sport. Introducing good governance pol-
icies in a sector that is traditionally rooted in amateurism and autonomy can 
help ensure private governance for the common good (Chappelet 2010; Geeraert 
2020). For instance, scholars argue that the governance structures of interna-
tional sport organisations have important deficits, which prevent these private 
bodies from dealing effectively with public issues like corruption, environmental 
sustainability, match-fixing and doping (Forster 2016; Geeraert & Gauthier 2018; 
Henry & Lee 2004; Katwala 2000; Pieth 2014). In addition, their lack of demo-
cratic structures has been a major source of conflict, as stakeholders have increas-
ingly been seeking legal redress to ensure their rights. Recent academic reports 
demonstrate empirically that a significant number of sport organisations operat-
ing at both the international and national levels have serious deficiencies indeed, 
in terms of transparency, democracy and internal accountability (Chappelet & 
Mrkonjic 2013; Geeraert 2015, 2018a, 2018b).
However, preliminary evidence indicates that good governance initiatives 
in sport may produce sub-optimal or downright negative outcomes such as cos-
metic reforms without substantial change, organisational disruption, excessive 
administrative burdens, flawed knowledge systems, misguided enforcement 
policies and misinformed shaming or legitimating of governance practices (e.g. 
Chappelet 2017; Geeraert 2018a, 2019; Parent & Hoye 2018; Pieth 2014). At the 
heart of this problem lie three knowledge gaps relating to conceptual vague-




First, significant uncertainty follows from the conceptual vagueness of ‘governance’ 
and ‘good governance’. A review of governance conceptualisations proves a kalei-
doscopic experience, as they provide for “an endless number of contextual inter-
pretations” (Ansell & Torfing 2016, p. 4). In a broad, descriptive sense, governance 
can be understood as any pattern of ordered rule (Meuleman 2008). More specif-
ically, governance encompasses politics (i.e. power relations and actor constella-
tions), polity (i.e. the institutional setting) as well as policies (i.e. the modes and 
substance of political steering) (Treib, Bähr & Falkner 2007). It thus comprises 
structures, processes as well as policy content. ‘Good’ governance, then, refers to 
a normative framework that allows for judging structures, processes and/or pol-
icy content and outcomes. The qualifying prefix ‘good’ indeed implies that good 
governance frameworks are both employed as a benchmark for evaluating govern-
ance and as a prescriptive standard for governance. Yet because governance can 
refer to many different elements of ordered rule, so can good governance.
Conceptualisations and codifications of good governance in fact emerge from 
different academic traditions and societal sectors. Though normative think-
ing about governance dates back several centuries, contemporary codifications 
emerged under the rubric of ‘corporate governance’ in the corporate sector, where, 
in the wake of corporate failures, insights from micro-economics informed insti-
tutional designs that were initially aimed at protecting shareholder investment 
(Cobbaut & Lenoble 2003). In the sphere of public governance, scholarly interest 
in institutional design coincided with a growing awareness that solid (public) 
institutions—referred to as good governance—are a precondition for (economic) 
development (Gisselquist 2012). The term good governance gained further steam 
when, at the end of the Cold War, it became more acceptable to promote the 
implementation of democratic principles in societies across the world (Woods 
1999). Standards of good governance have since been developed for a wide range 
of polities and organisations that operate at the international, national and local 
levels, and in different sectors (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra 2009; Gisselquist 
2014). They are commonly rooted in abstract principles such as accountability, 
transparency, effectiveness, efficiency and ethical behaviour. Particularly within 
the context of public governance and member-based organisations, they include 
principles of democratic governance such as participation, deliberation, open and 
competitive elections and equity and diversity.
Codifications and indicators of good governance in sport draw on this diverse 
landscape (Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2019; Geeraert 2018b). As they are often intro-
duced to prevent (financial) wrongdoings and increase effectiveness, they are par-
ticularly inspired by corporate governance principles (Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2019). 
Nevertheless, because sport bodies also exercise state-like (i.e. executive, legislative 
and judicial) functions, are member-based and benefit from public funding, they 
additionally face pressure to implement principles of good governance that apply to 
the public and voluntary sectors. The diverse and broad range of good governance 
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principles that apply to sport organisations breeds considerable confusion. Adding 
to this confusion, the specific elements of governance that are associated with these 
principles not only pertain to institutional input, processes and output, they can 
also subsume structural, cultural and personal factors. Consequently, though some 
form of consensus has emerged around the importance of transparency and democ-
racy, there is no single accepted framework for good governance in sport. Different 
scholars and authorities propose different key principles and advance different crite-
ria for implementation and measurement (Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2019).
Unclear implementation rationale
A second, and related, knowledge gap concerns the uncertainty about the rationale 
for implementing particular principles of good governance. Sport federations, their 
stakeholders and sport authorities, as well as public authorities are not only unsure 
about what constitutes good governance, they are often even unaware of what it 
can achieve and, thus, why sport federations should implement it in the first place. 
Chappelet and Mrkonjic (2019, p. 11) lament that most existing frameworks of good 
governance in sport “do not explain why they chose certain principles and not oth-
ers, where these principles came from, and why they are set out in the way they are”. 
In other words, it is unclear when and why governance principles qualify as ‘good’.
A useful distinction can be made between instrumental and moral rationales 
for implementing specific governance principles. The instrumental rationale sees 
good governance as a means towards achieving a desired end, such as enhanc-
ing effectiveness or resistance to corruption. This appears to be the dominant 
approach, for instance, with regard to international sport federations, where imple-
menting good governance is primarily encouraged to reduce the risk of corruption 
and mismanagement (ASOIF 2016; Council of Europe 2016; European Parliament 
2015). However, the linearity of the relationship between particular elements of 
good governance and their impact on sport organisations is often unclear. Parent 
and Hoye (2018) indeed find that very little research has been conducted on the 
actual impact of principles of good governance in sport organisations. Thus, on 
one hand, public and sport authorities at different levels increasingly regard good 
governance as some kind of panacea to deal with sport’s multiple and diverse fail-
ures of governance (Henry & Lee 2004). On the other hand, the proliferation of 
good governance codifications and policies can better be understood as a tendency 
to prescribe medicines without a clear diagnosis and without knowledge about 
possible side effects. Misunderstanding the relationship between means and ends 
can result in both, resistance to implement particular principles and unanticipated 
(negative) effects (Geeraert 2019; Parent & Hoye 2018).
Focusing on means rather than ends, instrumentalist approaches to good 
governance do not provide insights in the moral desirability of good govern-
ance principles. The moral rationale, in contrast, regards implementing good 
governance as an end in itself because it is ‘the right thing to do’ when related 
principles reflect applicable moral values. But what values should principles of 
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good governance reflect? The classic juxtaposition between the cosmopolitanist/
universalist and communitarianist/contextualist approaches to moral values 
serves as a useful heuristic. Cosmopolitanists argue that existing universally valid 
norms should apply to all human beings, regardless of context (Fukuyama 1991; 
Rawls 1971). This implies that where principles of good governance reflect uni-
versal values, they should be implemented regardless of the particular cultural 
context. Stressing the importance of tradition and social context for establish-
ing values and norms, however, communitarianists/contextualists argue that our 
moral judgement should be shaped by and negotiated in specific communities 
(MacIntyre 1984; Walzer 1983). According to this approach, principles of good 
governance should therefore reflect the moral consensus that exists in the cul-
tural context in which they are implemented. The fact that most principles asso-
ciated with good governance (in sport) emerge from a Western-Liberal context is 
therefore seen as problematical (Hyden, Court & Mease 2004).
Ultimately, the (implicit) choice between the cosmopolitan and communitarian 
approach has important policy consequences. It is, however, not a neutral one as 
it is informed by political ideology. The sport governance literature falls short of 
providing insight into the moral grounds for promoting particular principles of good 
governance and the consequences thereof. There is nonetheless a tendency towards 
universalism with regard to good governance in sport. The IOC refers to ‘universal’ 
principles of good governance (Ghadami & Henry 2015), and the International 
Partnership against Corruption in Sport (IPACS), a cooperation between govern-
mental actors and sport bodies, recently issued 50 recommendations to serve as a 
common standard of governance in sport (IPACS 2020). It is unclear what uni-
versal values these principles reflect and, thus, why they are morally appropriate. 
Moreover, echoing a communitarianist argumentation, Ghadami and Henry (2015, 
p. 991) even question the universality of the IOC’s ‘universal’ principles and stress 
the importance of “allowing the expression or realization of local political and cul-
tural priorities”. This raises new questions about the formation of local values and 
how they would translate into principles of good governance in sport.
Unclear impact
A third and final gap in our knowledge about good governance in sport pertains 
to the governance effects of different reform strategies. Put simply, just as there is 
ambiguity about the meaning, justification and implications of principles of good 
governance, there is uncertainty about the effects of means and methods employed 
by public and private actors to achieve the implementation of principles of good 
governance in sport. A distinction can be made between external and internal 
practices. Regarding the former, NGOs, academics, public authorities and sport 
organisations aim to induce and guide the implementation of good governance 
by sport organisations through a range of specific actions. These can be summed 
up by the generic concepts of external monitoring and assessment, self-regulation, 
education, enforcement and consultancy. Scholars have only recently started to 
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question some of these strategies, including compliance strategies (Geeraert 2019) 
and codifications of good governance (Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2019). With regard 
to internal practices, sport organisations are increasingly engaging in organisa-
tional practices associated with principles of good governance. They establish 
specialised bodies and functions and implement specific processes, procedures 
and codes of conduct (e.g. De Waegeneer, Devisch & Willem 2017). Yet, given 
both their relatively recent introduction and the idiosyncrasies of the sport sector, 
much is still unknown about the challenges and dilemmas as well as the undesired 
consequences that are inherent to all these undertakings (Parent & Hoye 2018).
Scope and content of the book
Two broad yet fundamental questions emerge from the above. First, what consti-
tutes good governance in sport and what are the instrumental and moral justifi-
cations for implementing it? Second, what are the challenges, dilemmas and risks 
associated with both inducing and guiding the implementation of good govern-
ance in sport and implementing specific practices in sport organisations? Aiming 
to take the first steps to address these questions in a systematic manner, this 
book brings together practitioners and academics to outline and critically reflect 
on theoretical perspectives on good governance in sport as well as current good 
governance policies. It thus presents itself in two parts.
Part I is theory-driven. It offers critical reflections on different theoretical per-
spectives on good governance. In doing so, it aims to shed light on the complexity 
and nuances of good governance. It thereby takes the first step to fill knowledge 
gaps in the meanings and justifications of good governance in sport.
In Chapter 2, Arnout Geeraert argues that the majority of the principles of 
good governance in sport implicitly build on the core assumption of the rational 
choice approach to social theory, which argues that instrumental rationality 
drives individual behaviour. His critical examination of the approach and its 
implications for good governance in sport reveals that it holds significant bene-
fits in terms of clarity and simplification. This makes the approach attractive for 
those who implement good governance with the aim of achieving specific organ-
isational outcomes. At the same time, however, the rational bias in codifications 
of good governance in sport may lead to over-confidence in rules and structures 
to prevent wrongdoing, to over-regulation and distrust, and to neglect of moral, 
ideational and personal aspects of governance.
In Chapter 3, Maarten van Bottenburg shifts the angle of vision away from inter-
nal characteristics of organisations and organisations in isolation. Drawing on figu-
rational sociology, his systemic perspective emphasises that interdependencies and 
power relations between organisations within the transnational sport governance 
system are co-determining as well as a condition for good governance. This implies 
that governance failures in sport are not merely caused by individuals or individual 
organisations who do not follow the principles of governance. Instead, more atten-
tion should be paid to the way sport is organised and governed as a system.
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In Chapter 4, Frank van Eekeren examines the relationship between good 
governance and public values. His analysis discerns three perspectives on good 
governance in sport. The first sees good governance as a means to create pub-
lic value through organisational and partnership processes. The second regards 
good governance as public value and, thus, an end in itself. The third and final 
perspective considers good governance a process of managing tensions between 
(public) values. What the three perspectives have in common is a communitarian/
contextualist understanding of (public) values as a relative, evolving and culturally 
defined aspiration. In other words, what constitutes good governance depends on 
cultural context and is more about processes than formal rules and procedures.
In Chapter 5, Inge Claringbould, Annelies Knoppers and Ramon Spaaij also 
challenge cosmopolitanist/universalist perspectives on good governance in sport. 
Employing two particular feminist approaches, they both call into question the 
neutrality of knowledge and science and present an alternative to exclusionary 
notions of ‘good governance’. On one hand, they emphasise dialogical relations 
as essential for gaining insight into the heterogeneity of knowledge through crit-
ical self-reflection on personal positionality and understanding multiple points 
of view. On the other hand, they propose ‘ethics of care’ as an underlying ‘value 
of doing’ in governance practices. This implies that, instead of focusing on self- 
interest and strategy, those involved in ‘doing’ governance should base their 
action on the care for others in a broad sense.
In Chapter 6, Leonie Heres examines the underexplored role of leadership, and 
especially ethical leadership in good governance in sport. Focusing on ideational 
as well as personal aspects of governance, she makes the case that codifications of 
good governance must be accompanied by ethical leadership, if they are to effec-
tively and sustainably safeguard the moral values and norms of sports, both on 
and off the field. Effective ethical leadership in sports requires visible role model-
ling, two-way communication about ethics, and consistent and just reinforcement 
of norms and values.
In Chapter 7, Vassil Girginov makes the case that organisational culture is a 
key yet neglected aspect of governance of sport organisations. He interrogates the 
relationship between good governance and organisational culture, questions the 
current culture of codification of governance and explores how organisational 
culture is employed as a means for achieving effectiveness. His reflection chal-
lenges the cosmopolitanist/universalist approach to good governance, since it 
fails to recognise that organisations constitute mini societies that are grounded in 
their own ideologies, beliefs and values. Dialogue is therefore necessary to ensure 
that abstract principles of good governance are operationalised in accordance 
with different (organisational) cultures.
Part II is practice-driven. Focusing on questioning and challenging policies 
and practices, this section aims to clarify the limits and opportunities of different 
practices for both inducing and implementing good governance. Consequently, 
this part takes the first step towards enhancing knowledge and understanding of 
good governance policies and practices in sport. It presents itself in two sections. 
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Chapters 8–10 are written by insiders who have been involved in good govern-
ance reforms in sport federations. They have been asked to write their reflections 
in narrative style. Chapters 11–18 provide academic reflections on good govern-
ance policies.
In Chapter 8, Kate Corkery and Geoff Schoenberg engage in a critical reflec-
tion on the approaches and methods Sport Australia has implemented to guide 
and induce good governance in sport federations. Drawing on their experiences 
and observations as senior staff members, they provide a unique practitioner per-
spective on the successes and failures of Sport Australia’s relatively long-standing 
good governance policies. In particular, they identify a number of lessons. These 
include the importance of the change process, centring compliance on outcomes 
and development, complementing policy with support and education and ensur-
ing that any policy is consistent and easily accessible. This shows that designing 
and implementing good governance policy should be a joint process that requires 
constant interaction and adjustment.
In Chapter 9, Rowland Jack draws on his 17 years of professional experience to 
question and challenge the role of consultants in achieving good governance in 
sport bodies. He argues that the traditional consultancy model can be a highly 
effective reform strategy. Yet, a combination of external pressure on the organisa-
tion and internal will for change can further increase the likelihood of significant 
reform. Consultants also face a number of risks. They can be assigned a scope of 
work that allows limited opportunity for improving governance or go too far to 
accommodate a client’s wishes in the conclusions reached. Jack argues that these 
risks can be reduced when consultants are commissioned not by the sport body 
itself but by an external organisation to which it is accountable.
In Chapter 10, Miguel Maduro and Joseph H.H. Weiler critically reflect on 
the 2016 FIFA governance reforms. Drawing on their experience as Chair and 
Member of the Governance Committee, they narrate some episodes that demon-
strate that the dominant culture at FIFA was stronger than the formal institu-
tional safeguards put in place by the governance reforms. Their contribution 
alerts us to the limits of both self-regulation and a rule-based approach to good 
governance. It also seriously questions FIFA’s ability to reform itself.
In Chapter 11, Michel van Slobbe confronts one assumption that underpins 
indicators and codes of good governance in sport: that enhancing diversity will 
by itself increase the performance of boards. Drawing on the concept of the 
‘established and outsiders’ advanced by Norbert Elias and John Scotson, he anal-
yses the power dynamics related to the enforced transition towards an ethnically 
mixed club board. This in-depth case study paradoxically reveals how enforced 
diversity may ultimately not lead to an ethnically mixed board, when the formerly 
‘established’ board members no longer feel at home and all key positions end up in 
the hands of the former ‘outsiders’. While these findings do not question diversity 
as a principle of good governance as such, they demonstrate that intervening in 
the social composition of sport governance can have the unintended effect of 
triggering us–them divisions as well as deteriorating social relations.
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In Chapter 12, Arnout Geeraert explores the opportunities and limits of assess-
ing good governance through indicators. Employing the concepts of validity 
and reliability, he demonstrates that the methodological dilemmas and tensions 
inherent to the construction of governance indicators also apply to indicators of 
good governance in sport. His brief case study of the National Sports Governance 
Observer indicators reveals that even when deliberate attention is paid to validity 
and reliability, necessary trade-offs with functionality and inescapable subjectivity 
render governance indicators inherently flawed. These inherent shortcomings of 
governance indicators should inspire a critical attitude towards the use of govern-
ance indicators and the interpretation of governance indices. Though measuring 
good governance can be meaningful, openness about contingent methodological 
choices is required to provide insight into the meaning and implications of indi-
cator and index scores.
In Chapter 13, Lisa Kihl challenges the effectiveness of good governance strat-
egies in sport for their piecemeal and lack of holistic approach. Instead, she pro-
poses an alternative, systemic approach to safeguarding integrity within national 
sport governing bodies. Promoting integrity, tackling integrity violations and 
minimising integrity risks require a sport integrity system comprised of actors, 
internal components (integrity management) and external accountability com-
ponents (regulatory and social environments). It furthermore requires coordina-
tion, capacity building and ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of the system 
as a whole as well as its individual components. This approach opens a range of 
opportunities for research into integrity systems, including mapping different sys-
temic configurations, assessing the performance of specific systems and exploring 
the instruments that make up an effective integrity management infrastructure.
In Chapter 14, Milena Parent, Russell Hoye, Marijke Taks, Michael L. Naraine 
and Benoît Séguin challenge the tendency to present a one-size-fits-all approach 
in good governance codifications, arguing that there is no one ideal type of good 
governance for all sport organisations. Through a case study of Canadian national 
sport organisations, they build the case for an empirical approach to determine 
key governance guidelines/indicators that build on ideal types of sport organisa-
tions. It consists of using a cluster approach that allows deriving good governance 
principles from real data rather than theory. This allows for considering the scale 
and context of the specific sport organisations of interest.
In Chapter 15, Ian Henry presents a critical reflection on the transferability 
of Western principles and values in the governance of sport. Emphasising that 
modernity is not a homogeneous phenomenon, he questions the inevitability of 
the emulation by the non-west of ‘progress’ achieved and enjoyed within sport 
governance in the West. Because local features persist in aspects of governance 
that have undergone ‘’modernisation’, subtle formal differences exist in different 
local contexts, which are modern but not uniform. The author contends that, 
rather than imposing definitive sport governance principles per se, there is there-
fore greater promise in promoting agreement concerning the processes through 
which such principles should be decided.
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In Chapter 16, Bram Constandt and Annick Willem critically examine the 
adoption of codes of ethics by sport organisations. This practice constitutes a 
core principle in most frameworks for good governance in sport and, as such, is 
increasingly adopted by sport organisations of all kinds to prevent and counteract 
unethical behaviour. Building on an extensive literature study, they outline the 
do’s (i.e. points of attention) and don’ts (i.e. pitfalls) of creating, implementing 
and enforcing codes of ethics in sport organisations. Through a case study of 
FIFA, they demonstrate how ethical leadership and external controls and pres-
sures are required to fully translate the policies of a code of ethics into the actual 
practices of a sport organisation.
In Chapter 17, Richard Tacon and Geoff Walters focus on the current trend 
towards codification of governance in sport by examining what happens when 
national sport federations formally adopt codes of governance. They find that 
code adoption constitutes ‘external legitimacy work’, in that board of sport feder-
ations initially decide to adopt codes of governance as a means of demonstrating 
credibility to external stakeholders. The risk is, then, that a focus on formal adop-
tion and compliance will prevail over a substantive approach that seeks to embed 
principles. Moreover, by seeking legitimacy from funders and commercial sponsors 
by appearing more ‘business-like’ in their governance arrangements, sport feder-
ations risk alienating many of their (grassroots) members. The authors conclude 
that a ‘tricky balance’ must be struck between obtaining external legitimacy by 
adopting a code of good governance and avoiding divisions within the existing 
structures of sports, which can ultimately harm organisational effectiveness.
In Chapter 18, Michael Mrkonjic draws attention to the emergence of multiple 
newly associated functions within the sports system as a result of the implementa-
tion of good governance principles. He demonstrates that they can be executive 
or managerial and strategic or operational and can be integrated into different 
organisational units. Effectively performing these functions requires specific 
and general, technical or social competencies. By outlining types of governance 
structures and functions as well as the associated management competencies, the 
author takes the first step towards developing a skills-based approach to good 
governance in sport that benefits scholars as well as practitioners.
Finally, in the closing chapter of this volume, Frank van Eekeren reflects on 
ten years of research into good governance in sport. Systematically exploring the 
ontological–epistemological positions that underpin the contributions in this 
book, he lays out the path for the research field to move from puberty into adult-
hood by means of five concrete recommendations.
Note
 1. Following Chappelet (2011) and Chappelet and Mrkonjic (2013), some sport gov-
ernance scholars refer to ‘better governance’ because no organisation is governed 
perfectly. We are sympathetic to these arguments yet stick to the term good govern-
ance since it has universal appeal and is recognisable to both the wider academic 
community and lay audiences.
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A rational choice perspective 
on good governance in sport
The necessity of rules of the game
Arnout Geeraert
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would 
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men 
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the govern-
ment to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the 
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions.
James Madison, Federalist no. 51 (1788)
Introduction
James Madison would not have been surprised by the continuing relevance of his 
above quote in defence of the adoption of the United States constitution. True, 
the self-interested behaviour exposed by some political leaders is so blatant that it 
seems to defy even the constitutional safeguards that are meant to control it. But 
Madison would argue that even the noblest of leaders are no angels simply by vir-
tue of their humanity. As such, when delegated authority, they must be controlled 
in order to prevent abuses and ensure proper institutional cooperation.
At the heart of Madison’s famous quote lies a pessimistic view of human 
nature: individuals are self-interested and therefore must be constrained in their 
execution of authority. This is done by institutional rules and in order to protect 
the interests of the collective (Petracca 1991). This line of thinking is character-
istic to what has later become known as the rational choice approach to insti-
tutions. The core rational choice assumption is that, because human nature is 
essentially self-interested, individuals rank their goals and choose the behavioural 
route that they expect maximises their utility in terms of power and/or welfare 
gains (Weingast 2002). However, institutions can be designed to discourage self- 
interested behaviour (Petracca 1991; Snidal 2013). They thus function as “rules 
of the game” that ensure delegated authority in service of the common interest 
(North 1990, p. 3).
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The rational choice approach has had a strong impact on the design of differ-
ent types of institutions including sport organisations. Emerging from classical 
micro-economics, it naturally underpins the bulk of governance mechanisms that 
have been introduced under the rubric of ‘corporate governance’ to prevent cor-
porate wrongdoings (Cobbaut & Lenoble 2003; Jensen & Mecking 1976). But the 
approach has also directly influenced the design of political institutions (Petracca 
1991; Weingast 2002) and, more recently, non-profit organisations (Hopt & Von 
Hippel 2010). Particularly in the past decade, rational choice assumptions have 
also wiggled their way into debates about good governance in sport organisations. 
On one hand, corruption scandals in international sport organisations have 
increased demands for institutional constraints on corrupted sport officials. The 
European Parliament, for instance, has called “upon all sports governing bodies 
to commit to good governance practices […] in order to reduce the risk of fall-
ing victim to corruption” (European Parliament 2015). The Council of Europe 
likewise holds that “[t]he mainstreaming of good governance principles in the 
management of sports bodies is seen as an appropriate way to prevent and mit-
igate unethical behaviours including corruption” (Council of Europe 2016). On 
the other hand, the principles enshrined in codes and indicators of good gov-
ernance in sport organisations are often (implicitly) inspired by rational choice 
assumptions. They are often derived from corporate governance, when they focus 
on preventing wrongdoings, and political governance, when they centre on bal-
ancing authority.
The strong influence of rational choice on principles of good governance in 
sport organisations is not problematical per se. The approach holds many benefits, 
including theoretical clarity and analytical parsimony (Snidal 2013). Yet all social 
theories make reductionist assumptions in order to deal with the complexities of 
social life. Rational choice assumptions are always “true” “by logical derivation” 
in an abstract theoretical setting (Snidal 2013, p. 94). However, their validity, 
when applied to real-world situations, has been seriously questioned (Marnet 
2007; Pollack 2006). Functioning as a coloured “lens”, moreover, any social theory 
highlights certain aspects of reality while downplaying others (Dunne, Kurki & 
Smith 2010, p. 27). While rational choice scholars indeed do not claim to paint 
a complete picture of reality (Pollack 2006; Snidal 2013), the dominance of the 
approach entails that good governance policies have an implicit rational bias and, 
thus, tend to overlook important (cognitive–ideational) aspects of human behav-
iour and social interaction. The problem is that practitioners do not always under-
stand the benefits and limits of rational choice assumptions. They are often even 
unaware of the influence of the rational choice approach on principles of good 
governance (Petracca 1991). The consequential risk is that well-intentioned good 
governance policies inspired by rational choice thinking might very well have a 
negative impact on the governance and output of sport organisations.
Taking up the task to reflect critically on the opportunities and limits of the 
rational choice approach to good governance in sport organisations, the chapter 
continues as follows: The second section explores the core assumptions of the 
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rational choice approach and their relevance for good governance. The subse-
quent section demonstrates how these assumptions explain the importance of 
three dimensions of good governance that are at the heart of the debate in sport: 
transparency, democracy and accountability. The fourth section centres on the 
benefits and limits of the approach for achieving good governance. The final sec-
tion summarises the discussion and offers practical advice for both scholars and 
practitioners.
Rational choice and good governance
This section first outlines the key assumptions about human behaviour that 
are common to the rational choice approach to social theory. Subsequently, it 
explains how institutions structure behaviour by providing incentives and con-
straints for self-interested individuals and how these insights influence concep-
tions of good governance.
The core assumptions of the rational choice approach
Rational choice is not a substantive theory in that it does not make causal claims 
about specific variables. Rather, it has been considered “a broad approach to social 
theory” (Pollack 2006, p. 31) or, similarly, “an approach to social inquiry” (Jupille, 
Caporaso & Checkel 2003, p. 11). The main characteristic of the approach is a 
set of assumptions about human nature or, more specifically, assumptions “about 
what motivates the individual” (Petracca 1991, p. 294). Though there is remarka-
ble diversity among rational choice analyses, most share a general assumption of 
instrumental rationality. This means that individuals use the available informa-
tion to rank available courses of action following a rational estimation of expected 
outcomes. Subsequently, they choose the course of action that best achieves their 
objectives. Put simply, “individuals want things, and they act in such a way as best 
to obtain what they want (to the best that they can discern this and subject to the 
constraints they face)” (Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel 2003, p. 12). This implies 
that human behaviour follows a ‘logic of consequences’ (March & Olsen 1989).
The assumption of instrumental rationality stands in contrast with a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’, in which social norms drive behaviour (March & Olsen 1989), 
as well as with a ‘logic of arguing’, in which truth-seeking actors deliberate and 
change their preferences in accordance with the better argument (Pollack 2006; 
Risse 2000). It also implies that the rational choice approach is characterised by 
‘methodological individualism’: it treats individuals, rather than society, as the 
basic units of social analysis. Nonetheless, the approach is considered particularly 
valuable for explaining collective behaviour, which is assumed to be shaped by 
the aggregation of choices made by individuals. Even if some individuals may not 
be motivated by instrumental rationality, rational choice scholars assume large 
groups to be unlikely to follow the same aversion (Tsebelis 1990, p. 34–38). In addi-
tion, rational choice work often focuses on collective agents such as organisations, 
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bodies within organisations, or entities within a polity rather than individuals. 
While aggregating individual preferences into a single collective preference is 
considered problematical, such collectives are commonly “anthropomorphised” 
in the sense that they are assigned interests and preferences and act strategically 
in relation to other collective agents (Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel 2003, p. 12). 
It thus often makes more sense to speak of ‘actors’ rather than ‘individuals’ in the 
context of the rational choice approach.
It should be stressed that there is considerable variation among rational choice 
analyses regarding the precise qualities of human nature. Most rational choice 
scholars have abandoned the idea of the ‘homo economicus’, who does not face 
constraints in information or cognition. Much rational choice work instead covers 
situations in which intentionally rational actors do not have (instant) access to all 
relevant information or face cognitive constraints in processing relevant informa-
tion. In other words, most scholars implicitly or explicitly assume ‘bounded ration-
ality’ rather than ‘hyper-rationality’ (Simon 1957). This implies that actors, while 
intendedly rational, are not necessarily behaving as utility maximisers. For instance, 
actors develop ‘beliefs’ about the expected payoffs of courses of action on the basis 
of the available information, but these beliefs may be wrongheaded (Geeraert & 
Drieskens 2021). They may also be satisfied with a sub-optimal status quo when the 
payoffs of alternative courses of action are (very) uncertain (Simon 1957). However, 
the most extreme departure from the canonical model occurs when rationality is 
narrowed down to mere goal-seeking behaviour and these goals are not (neces-
sarily) aligned with self-interest (Ferejohn 1991). The latter implies that actors are 
not necessarily driven by a desire to maximise their own utility but may seek to 
fulfil even altruistic goals in an instrumental manner. Yet, according to Abell (2014, 
p. 320), self-interest is still “construed as a ‘natural’ assumption whereas other ori-
entations are not”. Put simply, actors are typically assumed to have at least the 
intention to maximise their own utility in terms of power and/or welfare gains.
While seeking to maximise their utility, actors do not only face cognitive and 
information constraints. They are also forced to deal with the strategic and insti-
tutional setting in which they operate. When individual choice is interdependent, 
meaning that payoff depends on the choices made by others, actors by necessity 
behave strategically by factoring in the expected behaviour of others (Jupille, 
Caporaso & Checkel 2003; Pollack 2006). However, institutions also incentivise 
and constrain actors and this is the most relevant aspect for the present purpose.
The rational choice approach and institutions
While a single definition of the term does not exist, scholars’ interpretation of 
‘institution’ usually depends on their research agenda (Shepsle 2006). According 
to Ostrom (2005, p. 3), “institutions are the prescriptions that humans use to 
organise all forms of repetitive and structured interactions”. In her interpretation, 
institutions are rules that structure the situation by affecting “the opportunities 
and constraints individuals face in any particular situation, the information they 
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obtain, the benefits they obtain or are excluded from, and how they reason about 
the situation” (Ostrom 2005, p. 3). More concisely, North (1990, p. 3) famously 
refers to institutions as the “rules of the game”, that is, “humanly devised con-
straints that shape human interaction”.
Rational choice work approaches the relationship between instrumental 
rationality and institutions both from an explanatory and a normative angle 
(Elster 1986). Regarding the former, rational choice assumptions allow predict-
ing particular actions and consequences by “logical derivation” (Snidal 2013, 
p. 93). Explanatory rational choice analyses have consequently contributed to 
our understanding about how institutions “channel individual choices into ‘insti-
tutional equilibria’” (Hawkins et al. 2006; Pollack 2006, p. 33; ). They also help 
to explain why particular institutions are chosen or created, assuming that they 
are the intentional product of strategic interaction by ‘boundedly’ rational actors 
(Hawkins et al. 2006).
The rational choice approach also lends itself to normative aims because its 
behavioural assumptions “tell us what we ought to do in order to achieve our 
aims as well as possible” (Elster 1986, p. 1). Focusing on means rather than ends, 
however, it is not a moral philosophy that tells us what these aims should be. For 
instance, rational choice does not dictate that we ought to decrease corruption. 
Yet if our chosen aim is to decrease the likelihood of corruption, an appropriate 
institutional design (i.e. one that alters the incentives of individuals away from 
corrupt practices) can logically be derived on the basis of rational choice assump-
tions (Rose-Ackerman 1978). In other words, rational choice allows for establish-
ing what constitutes ‘good governance’ in terms of an institutional design that 
incentivises and constrains self-interested actors towards the fulfilment of some 
stated objective, such as decreasing corruption. In corporate governance, the 
(implicit) objective is often maximising economic value and, more recently, cre-
ating stakeholder and broader societal values. The broad underlying goal in public 
governance is mostly protecting the common interest, as difficult as it is to define.
Accordingly, rational choice analyses have provided a normative justification 
for certain governance mechanisms that are consequently considered ‘good gov-
ernance’. The next section explores how rational choice assumptions may provide 
a normative justification for three key dimensions of good governance in sport.
Good governance in sport: A rational choice approach
This section starts by employing the rational choice approach to define some 
potential and known problems involving sport governing bodies and their offi-
cials and staff. Next, it demonstrates how institutional design can mitigate these 
problems. For the sake of generalisation, the elements of institutional design 
discussed here are treated at a high level of abstraction. The section therefore 
explores how the rational choice approach can explain the importance of now 
widely accepted dimensions of good governance: transparency, democracy and 
internal accountability.
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The demand for rules of the game
Sport governing bodies can be said to act on behalf of a diverse range of sport 
stakeholders and governmental actors (Geeraert 2016). They have the authority 
to exercise functions on behalf of their member organisations and a range of 
internal stakeholders, including athletes. They also act on behalf of governments 
where they perform public functions by explicit or implicit delegation (Geeraert 
& Drieskens 2021). With the growing commercialisation and complexity of 
organised sport, the demand for coordination has increased, making it beneficial 
for stakeholders to allow sport governing bodies to expand their authority. These 
bodies consequently adopted a number of functions in addition to the governance 
of fundamental competition rules, including marketing commercial rights, mak-
ing and enforcing disciplinary rules on matters such as doping and match-fixing, 
settling disputes and promoting social inclusion and a healthy lifestyle.
The rational choice approach holds that, though delegation of authority to a 
central body might entail functional gains, it always comes at a cost as well. More 
specifically, it predicts that a sport governing body will minimise its efforts on 
behalf of its stakeholders or pursue its own interests at the expense of its stake-
holders when it has both motive and opportunity to do so (Hawkins et al. 2006, 
p. 8). Regarding motive, there are at least four reasons why the preferences of the 
sport governing body and its stakeholders may not always coincide. First, officials 
and key staff may be well-intentioned but, given bounded rationality, lack the 
information and knowledge required to implement effective policies on behalf of 
their principals. The rational choice approach, however, assumes that individuals 
are self-interested and thus do not always have their stakeholders’ best interest 
at heart. For instance, and this is the second reason, officials and staff simply 
may not want to invest the time and effort required to search for, deliberate, and 
implement effective policies. Third, anticipating relatively higher benefits, they 
may also be incentivised to serve the interests of one particular stakeholder or 
group of stakeholders at the expense of the common interest (Mattli & Büthe 
2005). Sport governing bodies indeed face diverging demands from a large and 
diverse group of stakeholders. To illustrate, a common charge levelled against 
international sport governing bodies, in particular, is the prioritising of commer-
cial interests above the public interest (Geeraert & Drieskens 2021). Fourth, offi-
cials and key staff may be motivated by their own material interests. The litany 
of corruption scandals in international sport governance indeed demonstrates 
that sport governing bodies’ accumulation of wealth and authority provides an 
incentive for sport officials to either use money to obtain power or use (decision- 
making) authority to obtain money (cf. Huntington 2002).
With regard to opportunity, stakeholders do not have the same access to infor-
mation as officials and key staff. These information asymmetries provide oppor-
tunity for the latter to engage in behaviour that is undesired by their stakeholders 
(Hawkins et al. 2006). For instance, stakeholders may simply be unaware of ongo-
ing corruption in the sport governing body. Of course, they can be expected 
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to control the sport governing body when its behaviour diverges too far from 
their preferences. Governments can, for instance, control sport governing bod-
ies through laws and increased oversight and sport stakeholders can form advo-
cacy groups or seek recourse before public courts (Geeraert & Drieskens 2015). 
However, all these measures are quite costly, as they require time and effort.
A more cost-effective option for stakeholders is to ‘optimise’ the institutional 
design of sport governing bodies. Institutions may alter the expected costs or 
benefits of a particular course of action. The goal is, then, to implement rules that 
increase the expected costs of undesired behaviour for the decision-makers and 
key staff in these bodies. If effective, the stakeholders need not invest a great deal 
of resources to actively control the sport governing body and its key institutional 
actors: institutions will function as ‘rules of the game’ and constrain and incen-
tivise behaviour. This explains why pushing for institutional reform following 
failures of governance in sport is such an attractive strategy for governments and 
stakeholders. It allows them to continue to benefit from the functional gains of 
delegating authority while reducing the time and effort necessary to control the 
sport governing body. After all, the more institutions adequately constrain and 
incentivise the behaviour of officials and key staff, the less need there is for exter-
nal control. The following explores how implementing three dimensions of good 
governance might alter the incentives in self-interested sport governing bodies 
(i.e. collective agents) to that effect.
Transparency
The first dimension concerns transparency. Transparency refers to rules and prac-
tices that ensure that information is made available about an actor “allowing 
other actors to monitor the workings or performance of this actor” (Meijer 2014, 
p. 511). In practice, it entails establishing (statutory) reporting requirements and a 
stable practice of reporting on strategy, operations, budget and finance in a timely 
and comprehensible fashion (Meijer 2014).
The major benefit of transparency is the decrease of information asym-
metries between the sport governing body and its stakeholders so that there 
is less opportunity to conceal undesired behaviour (McCubbins & Schwartz 
1984). Transparency thus has an important accountability function: it increases 
the likelihood of experiencing negative consequences in the case of undesired 
behaviour. In relation to corruption, for instance, it decreases the likelihood that 
unethical behaviour will go unnoticed (Rose-Ackerman 1978). The availability 
of information indeed allows stakeholders and third parties such as NGOs, the 
media and individual whistle blowers to detect wrongdoings or the potential for 
such (McCubbins & Schwartz 1984).
More generally, however, the likelihood of experiencing negative consequences 
motivates individuals to perform their tasks to the best of their abilities (Bovens 
2007). Indeed, transparency may lead to sanctions such as disciplinary measures 
or failure to win re-election for officials, but it can also function as an effective 
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standalone sanction because it can lead to public shaming. Finally, transparency 
increases trust because it decreases uncertainty about governing activities and 
policy processes (Meijer 2014).
Democracy
The meaning of democracy, the second dimension, is subject to endless debates 
about meaning and definition. In line with the literature on representative, par-
ticipatory and deliberative democracy, the notion of democracy here entails a sys-
tem of rules that establishes competition (electoral competition between political 
alternatives), participation (affected actors’ influence over collective decisions) 
and deliberation (fair and open debates). While this literature focuses on the 
moral desirability of related procedures, the rational choice approach provides 
specific instrumental arguments in favour of democratic structures. The focus is 
on three key mechanisms.
First, free, fair, recurrent and competitive elections provide opportunity for vot-
ers to screen and select representatives. When candidates standing for election 
present their skills and agendas openly and against each other, voters are provided 
with “reliable signals” of the underlying qualities of interest and capabilities of 
potential agents (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991, p. 30). They consequently have a 
higher likelihood of selecting representatives that will act in their interest. Once 
elected, underperforming elected officials risk being voted out. This incentivises 
them to act in line with their constituents’ interests (Fearon 1999). Elections thus 
perform an accountability function as they make governing elites “sensitive” to 
their constituents’ judgement (Della Porta 2013, p. 8).
Second, participation entails that all significantly affected constituents have 
equal access to participation in decision-making processes while exclusion and 
marginalisation are avoided (Young 2000). The distribution of related procedural 
rights and powers allows internal stakeholders (such as member organisations and 
athletes) to monitor decision-makers, which decreases the likelihood that unde-
sired behaviour will go unnoticed (Warren 2014). In addition, participation makes 
decisions more informed and, thus, more effective because stakeholders provide 
expert information that decision-makers themselves may not have (Smith 2009). 
It thus also allows for the introduction of new, important issues into debates about 
policies (Della Porta 2013). Finally, participation enhances stakeholder trust by 
decreasing uncertainty about the actions and interests of decision-makers.
Third and last, rules and practices that ensure fair and open debates with 
stakeholders and within the organisation increase the distribution of informa-
tion (Elster 1998). An even distribution of information across all levels creates 
awareness of the actions of others, making it more difficult to hide or manipu-
late information on one hand and more likely that undesired actions provoke 
open disapproval or reporting on the other. Besides this accountability function, 
deliberation also has a positive impact on the quality of decisions as a result of 
information brought into the process (Della Porta 2013, p. 64).
A rational choice perspective 23
Internal accountability
The third dimension, accountability is often defined as “a relationship between 
an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to jus-
tify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the 
actor may face consequences” (Bovens 2007, p. 450). This definition comprises both 
internal and external accountability. For the present purpose, a narrower, internal 
institutional perspective on accountability is adopted. It consists of two interrelated 
components: (1) a clear separation of executive, judicial, and supervisory powers 
and (2) an internal compliance system that enables independent entities to monitor 
decision makers’ compliance with administrative procedures and rules of conduct.
The first component, the separation of powers in the institutional structure 
of the organisation, rests on the premise that no person or entity by them-
selves retains absolute decision-making control. It dates back to the writings 
of Montesquieu and Locke. In political science, it primarily refers to the con-
stitutional separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches. Each branch is given motives and means for preventing abuses by the 
other ones with the overarching goal of preventing abuse of power by politicians 
at the expense of their constituents (Persson, Roland & Tabellini 1997). The 
corporate governance literature adopted this idea, advocating that a functional 
separation of power increases decision-making oversight by separating “the rati-
fication and monitoring of decisions from initiation and implementation of the 
decisions” (Fama & Jensen 1982, p. 302). Separation of powers in sport governing 
bodies takes shape in independent bodies with judicial or oversight functions, 
including a clear separation of the board’s decision-making powers on one hand 
and the general assembly’s power to ratify and monitor decisions on the other. 
This component also entails the separation of executive functions, performed by 
management, and strategic functions, exercised by the board.
The second component, a compliance system, pertains to a system of rules 
which ensures “that employees and others associated with the [organisation] do 
not violate applicable rules, regulations, or norms” (Parsons Miller 2018, p. 981). 
Such ‘compliance systems’ were introduced to corporate governance because the 
separation of power in itself does not suffice to prevent abuses (Fama & Jensen 
1982). They entail rules that constrain the behaviour of officials and staff by defin-
ing procedures and norms they must follow while conducting their tasks (Kiewiet 
& McCubbins 1991). These systems install specialised committees—nomination, 
audit, remuneration and ethical committees—that provide independent over-
sight and ensure as well as enforce compliance with these rules.
Taken together, these two components of internal accountability function to 
deter undesired behaviour by increasing the likelihood of negative consequences. 
They do so in three ways. They (1) provide mutual oversight, (2) limit the dis-
cretion of officials and staff, preventing the monopolisation of power and scope 
for abuse, and (3) they ensure that where internal behavioural rules are violated, 
individuals face sanctions.
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A critical reflection on the rational choice 
approach to good governance
The rational choice approach lends itself to application in a variety of situations. 
As such, it has produced diverse testable context-specific hypotheses (Pollack 
2006; Snidal 2013; Weingast 2002). One of its key feats is its capacity for hypoth-
esising about the impact of institutions on individual behaviour. This provides 
the foundation for its normative influence on conceptions of good governance. 
Though rational choice certainly is not the only approach capable of dealing with 
governance and institutions, Shepsle (2006, p. 32) argues that it discerns itself 
by doing so with “abstraction, simplification, analytical rigor, and an insistence 
on clean lines of analysis”. According to Weyland (2002, p. 61), rational choice 
indeed “has a better-integrated logical structure than many other approaches, 
whose assumptions are often vague and whose propositions are more loosely con-
nected”. He continues that it is this “simplicity and elegance that are among 
its major attractions” (Weyland 2002, p. 63). It is thus not difficult to see why 
rational choice has been so influential in the institutional design of a variety of 
organisations, including sport governing bodies.
As the old saying goes, a big tree attracts the woodsman’s axe and certainly, 
the rational choice approach has faced serious and continued criticism. Much 
of this criticism relates to its reductionist assumptions about human behaviour. 
Critics consider these insufficient at best and hold that they result in “inaccurate 
renderings of the empirical world” at worst (Pollack 2006, p. 35). Rational choice 
scholars acknowledge that the approach does not paint a complete picture of 
empirical reality, but contend that such “ontological blind spots” (Pollack 2006, 
p. 35) are “the price of making simplifying assumptions” (Snidal 2013, p. 89). 
They argue that, more often than not, rational choice assumptions lead to more 
powerful predictions of actor behaviour than those of alternative approaches 
(Pollack 2006; Weingast 2002). Rather than taking a stance in these debates, the 
remaining paragraphs discuss a number of ontological limitations and biases of 
the rational choice approach and their potential implications for conceptions of 
good governance.
First, as mentioned, the rational choice approach does not constitute a moral 
theory that informs appropriate behaviour. Focusing on means rather than ends, 
it simply does not deal with moral issues as such: (structural) inequality, justice 
or democratic legitimacy (Petracca 1991). It even has great difficulty in defin-
ing what constitutes the common interest. Neutral theorising is of course one 
of the key aims and arguably even one of the strengths of the approach. But it 
does imply that a rational choice bias can lead to moral deficits in codifications 
and shared understandings of good governance. For instance, rational choice 
does not dictate the extent to which different stakeholders should be involved in 
decision-making policies, which can lead to power imbalances.
Second, rational choice models are often overly simplistic in that they 
neglect important intervening variables. This may result in over-confidence in 
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institutional design to prevent undesired behaviour. For instance, while it is true 
that transparency decreases information asymmetries, it does not automatically 
lead to external accountability. The latter requires the presence of external actors 
willing and able to interpret the available information and to hold the reporting 
entity to account (Marnet 2007). In addition, the assumption of (self-interested) 
instrumental rationality overlooks a set of motivational factors that are crucial to 
explaining social behaviour. Cognitive and ideational variables, for instance, may 
impede rational behaviour. Behavioural economists draw from cognitive psychol-
ogy to emphasise the psychological limitations to rationality including loss aver-
sion, hyperbolic discounting, and framing effects (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). 
Even more profoundly, sociological approaches to organisation studies argue that 
ideational variables may influence actors’ conceptions of “what it means to be 
rational” (Greenwood et al. 2008, p. 3). For example, individuals who regard cor-
rupt practices as the ‘normal’ way of doing things may not anticipate potential 
repercussions (Geeraert 2018).
This brings us to a third ontological limitation of the rational choice approach, 
namely its blindness for ideational variables as drivers of human behaviour. Such 
variables are nonetheless important determinants for both individual and collec-
tive behaviour and, thus, governance outcomes. Rational theories generally do 
not account for how actor preferences can be determined by “supra-individual, 
collective factors” such as the cultural–ideational environment (Weyland 2002, 
p. 75). Instead, they tend to treat actor preferences as static or incorporate 
mechanisms of preference formation by borrowing from other (constructivist) 
approaches (Geeraert & Drieskens 2021). One of the most fundamental charges 
levelled against instrumental rationality consequently comes from sociological 
institutionalists, who argue that individuals follow internalised norms of appro-
priate behaviour without or in spite of rational calculations of costs and benefits 
(March & Olsen 1989). In other words, they are assumed to act in accordance 
with a logic of appropriateness rather than a consequential logic. Prescriptions 
of appropriate behaviour are determined by the institutional context in which 
actors—individuals and organisations—operate. In its sociological conception, 
institutions constitute “more-or-less taken-for-granted repetitive social behaviour 
that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that 
give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-reproducing social order” 
(Greenwood et al. 2008, p. 4–5). From this perspective, the institutional con-
text can have a much more profound impact on behaviour than merely setting 
incentives and constraints. It can directly shape individuals’ identities, interests 
and preferences through a process of internalisation via social (dis)approval. As 
an example, an individual may refrain from corruption, not because institu-
tional design decreases her opportunity to do so, but because she has internalised 
anti-corruption norms via social interaction with her environment (Barr & Serra 
2010). Similarly, a stable governance practice based on trust rather than monitor-
ing and sanctioning may foster a culture of mutual trust and cooperation through 
social interaction.
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Related, and finally, the rational choice approach, and particularly its insti-
tutional application, tends to focus on formal rules. The above has shown, how-
ever, that besides structural material factors, ideas and cognitive factors are also 
important determinants of governance outcomes. Certainly, the same applies to 
human agency and personal aspects of governance. Where institutional actors 
are not motivated by self-interest, moreover, many rules associated with good gov-
ernance may even be superfluous and therefore unnecessarily increase the admin-
istrative burden put on institutional actors. Institutional safeguards may, in fact, 
restrict the autonomy of decision-makers and staff so much that they undermine 
their capacity for flexibility, innovation and taking responsibility. They may even 
establish a culture of surveillance and box-ticking that ultimately incentivises 
self-interested behaviour by institutionalising distrust (Marnet 2007). Such rules 
are thus prone to defeating their very own purpose.
Conclusion
The rational choice approach has clear explanatory and normative merits for 
good governance in sport. First, it explains why good governance is high on the 
agenda in sport governance. Implementing institutional reforms is a relatively 
cost-effective way for stakeholders to ensure that sport governing bodies, their 
officials and key staff act in stakeholders’ interest. Second, the approach’s pessi-
mistic view of human behaviour as ‘boundedly’ rational and self-interested tells us 
that we ought to establish institutions that constrain and incentivise behaviour 
by influencing the distribution of information and altering the benefits and costs 
of potential courses of action. Simply put, without rules of the game that estab-
lish some form of transparency, accountability and democracy, rational choice 
predicts that unconstrained self-interest and limited access to information will 
almost certainly lead to governance failures.
It is clear that human behaviour is much more complex than its stylised 
rational choice form. While that does not mean that rational self-interest cannot 
explain a range of human behaviours, it is certainly not always a valid assumption 
in real-world circumstances. This implies that the rational choice approach to 
institutions has important blind spots in relation to good governance. In its base-
line form at least, it does not consider cognitive, ideational or moral elements and 
it tends to focus on material structures rather than human agency and personal 
factors of governance. This leads to a number of recommendations for researchers 
and practitioners.
More empirical research is needed into the positive and negative impact on 
sport organisations of principles of good governance that are (implicitly) under-
pinned by rational choice assumptions of human behaviour. Yet, focusing on 
rational choice-inspired principles alone risks sustaining the implicit dominance 
of the approach. Consequently, more theoretical and empirical work is needed 
on the other aspects of good governance in sport organisations and on the moral 
fitness of specific governance principles and practices.
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Practitioners can benefit from rational choice’s clean lines of analysis to reflect 
on matters of institutional design. Nonetheless, they should be aware of the limi-
tations of the approach. This means that they should not be overconfident in the 
ability of rules of the game to structure behaviour and prevent wrongdoings. They 
should also avoid a fixation on formal rules and procedures. Not only may this 
lead to unnecessary administrative burdens. A strong focus on rational choice’s 
pessimistic view of human nature in governance practices also risks encouraging 
mutual distrust and preventing innovation and creativity. A reflexive approach 
is required to strike an appropriate balance between institutional control, on one 
hand, and trust-based governance with room for individual autonomy, on the 
other hand. Attention should therefore also be paid to moral, cognitive, idea-
tional and personal aspects of good governance. Even if doing so is challenging, 
and arguably more difficult than simply implementing rules, awareness of the 
multi-faceted aspects of governance will lead to a better understanding of the 
implications of related policies and, thus, to more satisfactory outcomes for all 
those involved.
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Chapter 3
A relational and processual 
perspective on good 
governance in sport
Tackling the deeper problem
Maarten van Bottenburg
Introduction
This chapter criticises the current approach to good governance in sport and the 
underlying rational actor theory for two shortcomings. (1) De-contextualisation: 
the focus is on the internal characteristics of organisations while ignoring the 
influence of the social context in general and inter-organisational power relations 
in particular. (2) De-historisation: attention is overly focused on the consequences 
that come with certain governance practices. This one-sided focus overlooks the 
social origins of those practices. As a result of these shortcomings, sport organisa-
tions remain subject to the same dynamics that cause government failures in the 
first place. As a consequence, these failures repeat themselves despite the codifi-
cation of principles of good governance and the recurrent replacement of failing 
officials and key staff members.
To overcome these shortcomings, an additional theoretical perspective is 
needed; one that takes into account social and cultural conditions of governance 
practices and helps explain these practices stemming from inter-organisational 
power relations. Sociology offers various starting points for such a theoretical per-
spective, such as Diane Vaughan’s situated action theory, Pierre Bourdieu’s theory 
of practice and Norbert Elias’ figuration theory. These scholars not only raise 
valid objections against the rational choice perspective in their work but also 
offer alternative theoretical notions that make it possible to better understand 
and explain why organisational misconduct and governance failures in sport 
organisations keep repeating, even as good governance codes are put into practice 
and failing executives are replaced. What these theories have in common is the 
integration of the micro (individual), meso (organisational) and macro (societal) 
levels of analysis. They also move beyond the dualism of structure and agency. 
Moreover, they analyse organisational practices as dynamic, on-going processes 
that are intertwined with a variety of other processes of change.
The chapter is structured as follows: First, it will illustrate the two points of 
criticism geared at the current approach to good governance. It connects these 
with a critical analysis of the underlying rational choice perspective. Then, based 
on the works of Vaughan, Bourdieu and Elias, and compatible governance and 
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organisation theories, it lays out key components of a relational and processual 
approach that can broaden and enrich the theoretical perspective on good gov-
ernance in sport. After that, it will discuss the implications of this additional 
theoretical lens for the analysis and approach of organisational misconduct and 
governance failures in the field of sport. Finally, it summarises the most important 
insights and reflect on the opportunities and limitations that the findings offer for 
further research as well as for application in practice.
A critique of the good governance benchmark
The first point of criticism concerns the focus on internal characteristics of sport 
organisations. Reform strategies, i.e. codes and indicators of good governance 
tend to address intra-organisational aspects of governance.
This can be illustrated with the Sports Governance Observer (SGO). The 
SGO is a benchmarking instrument that consists of a set of indicators of good 
governance. It has been developed to assess the governance of international 
sport federations. The aim is to employ this benchmarking instrument in order 
to provide an objective, reliable and holistic overview of which elements of 
good governance are implemented by these federations and which ones are not 
(Geeraert 2018).
In this benchmarking instrument, the notion of good governance is broken 
down into four sub-dimensions, namely transparency, democratic processes, 
internal accountability and control, and societal responsibility. ‘Transparency’ 
refers to the reporting of the organisation’s own internal workings. ‘Democratic 
processes’ refer to having free, fair and competitive elections and open internal 
debates within the organisation. ‘Internal accountability and control’ refers to the 
separation of powers within the organisation’s governance structure and to a sys-
tem of rules and procedures that ensures staff and officials’ compliance with inter-
nal rules and norms. Finally, ‘societal responsibility’ refers to deliberately directing 
the organisation to have a positive effect on internal and external stakeholders and 
society at large (Geeraert 2018).
These four dimensions are divided into 57 principles and 309 indicators, which 
require no further discussion. The four dimensions in themselves already show 
that the emphasis is clearly on the assessment of internal characteristics of indi-
vidual organisations and independently of other organisations and the wider con-
text. The fact that the SGO assumes an intra-organisational orientation is seen 
as an inevitable corollary of the underlying theory of the instrument (see also 
Chapter 12 by Geeraert on good governance indicators in this volume). This is, 
however, problematic considering that some of the issues which good governance 
in sport must tackle—the fight against corruption, doping, match fixing, human 
trafficking and money laundering—must be viewed in conjunction with the com-
plex transnational sport governance system in which they operate as well as the 
social context in which organisational practices are formed.
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The second point of criticism concerns the focus on the consequences of gov-
erning failures ignoring underlying field dynamics. In other words, the current 
focus on (good) organisational governance fails to address the roots of many 
governance failures in sport, namely the social context in which individual and 
organisational behaviour and practices are formed, inter-organisational govern-
ance of global sport and the power relations that are characteristic for this gov-
ernance structure. Examples related to FIFA and the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA) can illustrate why this is problematic.
Of all the 35 Olympic international federations that were the subject of a 
study in the 2018 SGO, FIFA achieved the highest SGO 2018 index score as 
well as the highest scores associated with transparency, internal accountability 
and control, and societal responsibility. This achievement reflects the governance 
reforms FIFA had undertaken after 2011 (Geeraert 2018). Nevertheless, corrup-
tion and controversy have been ubiquitous ever since, particularly so in football. 
To illustrate, a report from the European Commission in July 2019 concluded 
that: “Professional football’s complex organisation and lack of transparency have 
created fertile ground for the use of illegal resources. Questionable sums of money 
with no apparent or explicable financial return or gain are being invested in the 
sport. (…) Member States should consider which actors should be covered by the 
obligation to report suspicious transactions and what requirements should apply 
to the control and registration of the origin of the account holders and the bene-
ficiaries of money” (European Commission 2019, p. 5, 18).
Apparently, the improvement of good governance in the international umbrella 
federation, in this case FIFA, has not prevented the problem of money laundering 
from taking on ever greater proportions. A check on compliance with the prin-
ciples of good governance does not yet provide a grip on the underlying process 
that drives this problem. Theoretically, this should come as no surprise. Since 
the 1990s, scholars in political science, organisational science and public admin-
istration have convincingly argued that policy outcomes are not the product of 
actions by one single actor, but the consequence of the interaction of a network 
of interdependent actors. Their interaction patterns result in the institutionali-
sation of power relations and rules of behaviour that influence all actors involved 
(Klijn & Koppenjan 2012). This also applies to the world of sport (Geeraert 2019; 
Henry 1999; Jedlicka 2018b).
The Russian doping scandal is a case in point. As one of the stumbling blocks 
in tackling this scandal, many have pointed to WADA’s poor governance. The 
US government warned WADA that future funding from the United States 
could depend on the organisation’s governance and enhanced transparency. The 
Institute of National Anti-Doping Organisations recommended the adoption of 
best governance practices, including organisational revisions leading to greater 
independence and transparency.
In a special issue of the International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, several 
sport policy scholars reflect on this critique of WADA’s poor governance. They 
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sum up and analyse a variety of factors that challenge the effectiveness and legit-
imacy of WADA. However, they also conclude that “the fight against doping in 
sport is much stronger and more effective than in the 1990s” (Houlihan et al. 
2019, p. 200), that “powerful interests have actively sought to undermine the effec-
tiveness of WADA” (Houlihan et al. 2019, p. 194), and that there is an “apparent 
lack of regime effectiveness” which can partly be explained by “under-resourcing 
of anti-doping activity in some countries”, “the lack of commitment by key stake-
holders”, and “the largely unsupportive environment” in which WADA has to 
“operate” (Houlihan & Hanstad 2019, p. 203).
Here too, the question is whether an assessment of an organisation’s compli-
ance with good governance principles will get to the heart of the problem. In 
order to expose the underlying problem, WADA’s governance failure must be 
related to developments in the broader organisational environment and to the 
changing power relations between organisations in that environment.
A critique of the theoretical model 
underlying good governance
Interestingly, these two criticisms of the good governance model are closely 
related to criticisms of the theoretical perspective that underlies this model. As 
Arnout Geeraert explains in Chapter 2 of this book, the principles enshrined in 
codes and indicators of good governance in sport organisations are often (implic-
itly) inspired by rational choice assumptions. His chapter clearly explains what 
the core assumptions of the rational choice approach are and how this approach 
translates into a regulatory system to promote good governance in sport organisa-
tions. Geeraert’s argumentation needs no further clarification, but related to the 
present criticism, this author would like to highlight two key points.
First, rational choice theory is based on methodological individualism. It treats 
individuals, rather than social groups or societies as the basic units of analysis 
and tries to explain collective behaviour as the aggregation of choices by individ-
uals. Collectives, i.e. organisations can be considered individual actors in rational 
choice theory just as much as actual individuals can be. An organisation can thus 
be the basic unit of analysis in relation to good governance. According to rational 
actor theory, the governance of sport as a whole can be improved if principles 
of good governance influence the behaviour of an individual organisation. It is 
therefore understandable that the focus is on intra-organisational characteris-
tics in order to influence governance practices in the field of sport as a whole. 
Doing so, it should tackle wider problems that sport organisations face. However, 
this focus separates governance failures in sport organisations from their broader 
social and inter-organisational context.
Second, rational actor theory views individuals and organisations as con-
forming to bounded rationality and self-interest. Governance failures will persist 
unless the expected costs of undesirable behaviour exceed the expected benefits. 
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To avoid misconduct, therefore, rules must be established to constrain and 
incentivise the execution of authority. They do so by influencing the distribu-
tion of information and altering the benefits and costs of an action. It is being 
assumed that negative sanctions should deter and thus prevent individuals and 
organisations from acting in an undesirable manner. This theoretical lens por-
trays executives and their organisations as ‘amoral calculators’ whose misbe-
haviour is motivated by a purely rational calculation of costs and opportunities. 
It pinpoints the cause of governance failure in an actor’s rational calculations 
of the consequence of behaviour while ignoring its genesis. As such, it not only 
disregards the social context of governance practices but also overlooks their 
social origins.
A processual and relational approach 
as alternative model
Rational choice theory assumes that all human behaviour is ultimately inter-
est-driven action. Sociology tells us, importantly, that this is too one-sided an 
emphasis on one mere dimension of meaningful action. Max Weber (1978) dis-
tinguished between goal-oriented rational action (calculation), value-oriented 
rational action (principle), traditional action (convention) and action from emo-
tional or affective motivations (impulse). Following Weber, we can assume that 
people will often be guided in their behaviour by a varying mixture of these four 
types of social action.
This behaviour does not come about in a social vacuum. The institutional 
and organisational environment in which people are embedded influences cog-
nition, narrows options and shapes preferences, as Diane Vaughan showed in her 
famous research on the fatal decision in 1986 to launch the Challenger Space 
Shuttle (Vaughan 1996). Research on organisational decision-making supports 
her finding. “The weighing of costs and benefits does occur, but individual choice 
is constrained by institutional and organisational forces” (Vaughan 1998, p. 29). 
Decision-making is not only based on cost-benefit calculation but also influenced 
by external contingencies, political battles, unacknowledged cultural beliefs, 
organisational routines and intuition based on past experience. Moreover, as 
James March and Johan Olsen argued in their ‘garbage can model’: decision-mak-
ing in complex situations can be so dynamic and unpredictable that the outcome 
is driven more by accident, timing and choice opportunity than it is by careful 
analysis and deliberate choices (March & Olsen 1979).
Based on her study, Vaughan (1998) proposes an alternative model that starts 
with contextualising decision-making and articulating social life as situated 
action. Social life produces tacit knowledge, habits, assumptions, routines and 
practices from which calculation and action emerge. This is in line with socio-
logical institutionalism, which argues that decision-making may be rational, yet 
is affected by institutionalised categories of structure, thought and action, which 
shape preferences and direct choice towards some options rather than others.
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Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice can be of help to further develop this model 
(Bourdieu 1977). He argues that social action cannot be reduced to rational 
choices because the conditions for rational calculation are often lacking: time 
is limited, information scarce, the alternatives are poorly defined and practical 
matters often require quick decisions. Instead of the product of rational calcula-
tion, Bourdieu postulates social action as resulting from a sens pratique, a “socially 
constituted ‘sense of the game’” (Wacquant 1989, p. 42). This practical sense helps 
people to quickly understand the enormous multiplicity and complexity of pos-
sible goals, means and consequences. Based on previous experiences in similar 
situations, this enables them to make intuitive choices, such as the tennis player 
who suddenly ‘decides’ to enter the net or the football player ‘deciding’ to chip the 
ball over the goalkeeper (Bourdieu 1988).
To take a next step in developing an alternative model, we must widen the 
context of governance practices in organisations. Each organisation is embed-
ded in a broader, inter-organisational and even transnational governance struc-
ture characterised by interdependencies and power balances, which influences 
organisations and individuals that operate within this structure. Norbert Elias’ 
figurational sociology offers basic theoretical notions to elaborate on this. Elias 
uses the term figuration to express that human beings are fundamentally depend-
ent on each other. They form interdependent relationships with unequal and 
variable power balances. Elias postulates that the behaviour of individual people 
and the problems of social life can only be understood properly by way of analy-
sis of the asymmetrical interdependencies in the figurations that they form with 
each other, and thus, only by studying people in the plural and not in the singular 
(Elias 1978).
The same applies to organisations. Organisations are figurations of people, 
and at the same time, they form part of wider figurations of organisations (Elias 
1983). “Just as human individuals only exist in relations of interdependence and 
power within organisations, the same is true of organisations themselves, which 
are also constitutively bound up in relations of interdependence and power with 
other organisations and figurations” (Van Krieken 2019, p. 163). This implies that 
good governance should not be investigated for organisations in the singular, 
but in the plural. Each sport organisation should be considered in conjunction 
with the transnational figuration of interdependent sport organisations and their 
stakeholders, in particular governments and business organisations, with their 
formative asymmetrical power balances. This figurational perspective differs fun-
damentally from rational choice theory, which does not explain organisational 
behaviour in relation to the wider figuration, but the wider figuration as the sum 
of the behaviour of individual organisations. From a figurational perspective, it 
follows that good governance issues cannot be properly understood if they are 
reduced to the sum of internal elements of organisations. They must be under-
stood by studying these issues in their development (and thus by placing them 
in a historical context) and in conjunction with wider inter-organisational and 
societal developments.
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Theoretical implications for good governance
A relational and processual theoretical perspective contends that the interde-
pendencies and power relations between governmental, commercial and sport 
organisations within transnational sport governance are co-determining. As 
such, they form a condition for compliance to good governance principles within 
organisations (see Figure 3.1).
In an analytical sense, this means that good governance should not only be 
seen as the independent variable; as cure for corruption and other issues in sport. 
It should also be regarded as a dependent variable: namely the product of a par-
ticular transnational institutional arrangement that has produced institutional-
ised codes and mores about ‘how it works’ in sport politics and sport governance; 
a product that also has an impact on organisational and individual behaviour and 
practices (cf. Jedlicka 2018a, 2018b).
In a normative sense, this means that additional principles should be devel-
oped for the impact of inter-organisational interdependencies on organisations 
and individuals. Concrete proposals for this have already been made in relation 
to network governance (Geeraert 2014; Geeraert, Scheerder & Bruyninckx 2013; 
see also Chapter 13 by Kihl in this volume).
For example, in the current model of good governance in sport, corruption 
is a problem because it deviates from the way organisations should behave and 
thereby undermines the integrity of sport. It should, however, also be approached 
as a result of weakening errors in the governance of the world of sport as a whole. 
Figure 3.1  A theoretical model of a relational and processual approach to good governance
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Sport organisations are not just a set of isolated, loosely bound organisations 
(Jedlicka 2018a, 2018b). They form a transnational figuration of organisations 
and are interdependent of each other and other stakeholders with varying power 
differences.
Following Ian Henry and Ping-Chao Lee (2004), this theoretical implication 
of a relational and processual perspective can also be expressed in a different 
way. The present theory and practice of good governance is too limited to pass as 
what they label as ‘organisational governance’. This term is primarily concerned 
with normative, ethically informed standards of managerial behaviour within 
organisations. An important step forward from organisational governance would 
be to relate good governance to governance as networks (systemic governance) 
and governance as steering (political governance). Governance as networks is 
concerned with the competition, cooperation and mutual adjustment between 
organisations in the complex environment in which an organisation operates. 
Governance as steering relates to the processes by which governments or govern-
ing bodies seek to steer the sport system to achieve desired outcomes.
Henry and Lee (2004) define good governance as a normative approach, which 
requires sport organisations to conform to wider societal expectations of good 
practice. It also has implications for managers of such organisations. It can, how-
ever, be argued that this holds for systemic and political governance as well. As 
such, it would urge the need for cooperation between sport organisations and 
their stakeholders to tackle power positions and dependency relationships that 
provide incentives for governance failures and organisational misconduct.
The development of additional principles of good governance can be achieved 
by linking these governance approaches with a relational and processual socio-
logical approach that connects behaviour at the network (macro) and organisa-
tional (meso) level to behaviour at the individual (micro) level. This will require 
more than just the application of governance network theory. It should not only 
put the behaviour of organisational actors in the context of inter-organisational 
power relations. It should also articulate decision-making as situated action; and 
thus pay attention to the often implicit institutionalised ‘rules of the game’ that 
direct individual behaviour within sport organisations.
A relational and processual perspective on good governance also sheds light 
on the knowledge gaps that Geeraert addresses in his introduction to this book. 
First, this perspective makes it understandable that working with a static intra- 
organisational focus leaves room for cosmetic reforms without substantial change. 
Adjustment of purely intra-organisational characteristics is insufficient to tackle 
the deeper problems of organisational misconduct and governance failures. This 
requires adhering to codes and changing attitudes, standards and mores. Such 
an ambition would require an additional approach aiming to alter the ‘sense of 
the game’.
Second, a relational and processual perspective makes it understandable why 
good governance codifications proliferate. This can be seen as a typical example 
of isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Organisations adopt characteristics 
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of an organisational model that is seen or defined as desirable. They might do 
so without a clear diagnosis of the problem and without substantiated knowl-
edge about the effects of means and methods they employ to tackle the problem. 
Nonetheless, they still invest time and energy in adhering to good governance 
principles, as they feel forced to do so or try to enhance their status and legit-
imation. This may strengthen their position in the field, but will not affect the 
underlying problem.
Practical implications for good governance
When looking through a relational and processual theoretical lens, it becomes 
clear that codification of good governance principles coupled with punitive, 
deterrent strategies will not suffice to improve the world of sport.
First, good governance policy should go beyond code compliance. In essence, 
it is about the question to what extent individual and organisational behaviour 
and practices do change, and where this change results from. To build on Weber’s 
typology: Which routines are ingrained in organisations and to what extent are 
they changing? Which values are adhered to in the organisation, and to what 
extent do they change? What goals are pursued and what means are considered 
justified for this purpose? On which tacit knowledge and practical sense of ‘how it 
works’ in sport politics and sport governance are behaviour and decision-making 
based? Which ‘rules of the game’ do organisations adhere to?
Second, punitive, deterrent strategies will not suffice to improve the world of 
sport. Vaughan (1998) points to the fact that the rational choice model focuses 
on the responsible individuals and organisations to solve governance problems. 
This is done, for example, through ethics training, punishment, forced resigna-
tion and so forth. Such strategies are appropriate: people must be held responsi-
ble and accountable for action resulting in social harm. But these strategies are 
incomplete: they leave the social context untouched. As a result, the problem 
will not be solved once the responsible person is punished, and organisational 
misconduct and governance failures will be reproduced. “If the social context of 
decision making is not altered, the next position incumbent’s decision making 
will be subject to the same organisational contingencies” (Vaughan 1998, p. 50).
Third, a punitive strategy should be augmented with an approach that works 
towards institutional reform (Vaughan 1998). Such an approach will only be suc-
cessful if it is not only targeted at intra-organisational characteristics but also at 
inter-organisational interdependencies and thus the governance network in the 
field of sport as a whole. This calls for attention to the question of how organisa-
tions deal with their dependencies on other (public and private) organisations and 
what that means for all dimensions of good governance within their organisation.
Fourth, a relational and processual perspective requires an extension of the 
organisational governance model with a political and systemic governance focus. 
In this respect, the question is which principles the transnational sport govern-
ance figuration must adhere to in order to stimulate good governance within the 
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organisations that are part of this figuration. It must also be worked out how, by 
whom and to whom reporting will take place on the dynamics and impacts of 
intra-organisational relationships in this figuration, as well as how organisations 
are accountable for this to their own stakeholders.
Conclusion
The current approach to good governance in sport falls short for two reasons. It 
overlooks both the social context and the social origins of governance practices 
within and by sport organisations. A relational and processual sociological per-
spective is needed to overcome these limitations. This perspective can help to 
contextualise organisational misconduct and governance failures at the micro, 
meso and macro levels.
At the micro level, a relational and processual perspective directs the attention 
to the practical sense of the rules of the game in the world of sport. Individual 
actors will develop this sense on the basis of previous experiences in comparable 
positions and circumstances. At the meso level, this perspective situates organ-
isational action in social life, indicating that the individual actor is influenced 
by institutionalised beliefs, routines and social norms. At the macro level, this 
perspective points to the fact that organisational misconduct and governance 
failures cannot be solved by focusing solely on improving good governance within 
organisations. The focus should also be directed to the interdependencies within 
the transnational sport governance system and between sport organisations, gov-
ernments and business organisations. Good systemic governance and good politi-
cal governance are co-determining good organisational governance.
The implication of this perspective at the micro level is that an approach to 
good governance should go beyond code compliance. The deeper question is how 
individual and organisational behaviour and practices are formed and whether 
they change. This will require to ‘unpack’ often implicit, institutionalised codes 
about the ‘rules of the game’ that ‘simply’ apply in politics and ‘cannot be ignored’. 
At the meso level, a punitive, deterrent strategy should be augmented with an 
approach that works towards changing the social and institutional context of 
decision-making. If this is neglected, individual actors will remain subject to the 
same dynamics. This is crucial to tackle sport’s biggest problem with respect to 
today’s good governance: organisational misconduct and governance failures 
keep repeating, even where good governance codes have been put into practice 
and failing executives have been replaced. Finally, at the macro level, additional 
principles should be developed for relationships between sport organisations and 
between sport organisations, government organisations and commercial organi-
sations. Organisational misconduct and governance failures in sport cannot be 
solved by focusing solely on improving good governance within organisations.
The challenges posed by these implications are not easy to deal with. More 
attention should be paid to changing personal attitudes, moral standards, organ-
isational mores and institutionalised codes underlying decision-making in sport 
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organisations. However, those topics are difficult to grasp. In addition, the devel-
opment of new good governance principles for political and systemic governance 
is still in its infancy. We can take this a step further by connecting relational and 
processual sociological theories to governance network theories.
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The value of a public 




In today’s world, it is not easy to express when an organisation qualifies well gov-
erned. It is no longer enough to frame ‘good’ only in terms of financial perfor-
mance, effectiveness and efficiency. A private organisation such as Shell cannot 
suffice with creating financial value for its shareholders. The oil company realises 
that they are judged by how they act and how they live up to public values of 
honesty and integrity lest their reputation suffers near irreparable damage (Shell 
International Limited 2014). Public organisations, such as hospitals and munic-
ipalities, not only focus on result-oriented values such as effectiveness, and effi-
ciency, but are also publicly assessed primarily on their contribution to the public 
sphere, such as a healthier and safer society (De Graaf, Huberts & Smulders 2013). 
It can be argued that organisations, be they public or private, are expected by 
their stakeholders to contribute to the good of society (Benington 2011).
This contribution to the good of society can be described as ‘creating public 
value’ (Moore 1995). In a world in which, in addition to price and quality, distin-
guishing oneself from competitors is becoming increasingly important, it is more 
and more common to argue that organisations must have a purpose of ‘public 
value’ (Hollensbe et al. 2014; Van der Wal, De Graaf & Lasthuizen 2008). Some 
authors even argue that the lack of public value creation by an organisation will 
lead to the marginalisation of said organisation (Bilolo 2018; Talbot 2011). As a 
result, the concept of public value is receiving increasing attention in the debate 
on good governance, both in the public and private sectors (Perry et al. 2014; Van 
der Wal, Nabatchi & De Graaf 2015; Williams & Shearer 2011).
Sport organisations cannot outrun this development. They can no longer do 
with developing sport, promoting elite sport performances and creating business 
value for their sponsors and financiers. It can be argued that traditional sport 
organisations have historically added to the public sphere by addressing social 
issues, but currently, sport organisations seem to have an increased motivation 
to act socially responsible and pay attention to doing good (Van Eekeren 2013). 
The great number of social projects run by professional sport clubs, often framed 
as corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Breitbarth et al. 2015), is an example of 
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this, but the growing attention to good governance can be regarded as a way to 
create public value too. The motivation to create public value—although CSR or 
good governance actions are rarely described as such—comes partly from within, 
but is also encouraged from outside sport organisations.
An important driver behind the attention for public value creation is the pro-
fessionalisation and commercialisation of sport in recent decades. It has inher-
ently challenged the ‘traditional’ nature of sport organisations by embracing 
business-oriented management concepts (Beech & Chadwick 2013), such as CSR 
and good governance. Another important driver is the recognition of sport hav-
ing social meaning as well as its potential to positively contribute to social issues. 
Sport is increasingly recognised by politicians, policy makers, sponsors, media 
and the general public as a means or catalyst to promote public values, such as 
health, inclusion and sustainability (Coalter 2010; Van Eekeren 2016). In the 
dominant discourse of policy makers, sport is not so much valued for its own sake, 
but rather for its potential to cure or prevent social ills (Vermeulen 2011), and 
sport organisations are expected, and sometimes forced, to contribute actively to 
this. Finally, scandals in sport, such as sexual harassment, doping and match fix-
ing, and the negative publicity that came with these scandals, are a driver for the 
aim to create public value, or, at the very least, to counter negative public value 
(NOC*NSF 2019). In short: sport organisations are explicitly held accountable 
for their social involvement and social responsibility and they are trying to add 
value to the public sphere in addition to the value for their athletes and their 
sponsors and financiers (Van Eekeren 2016; Waardenburg, Van den Hombergh & 
Van Bottenburg 2019).
Sport organisations are also increasingly being held to account for public val-
ues that can be directly linked to good governance, such as lawfulness, integrity, 
equality, transparency, participation, legitimacy and accountability (Chappelet 
& Mrkonjic 2013). This stems from the coming of age of the sport sector, the 
increasing public significance and public funding it holds and receives. Sport, 
just like the energy sector or the health care sector, is thus subject to (formal and 
informal) requirements for good governance, and sport organisations are mak-
ing frantic efforts to draw up codes of good sport governance1 and to develop 
measuring instruments with the help of academics. The latter include definitions, 
descriptions and guidelines to create and measure the aforementioned public 
values2.
All this means that sport organisations, although traditionally organised pri-
vately—from associations to public limited companies—can be characterised as 
hybrid organisations with characteristics of both private and public organisations 
(Henne 2015; Lucassen & Van der Roest 2011). They deal with both the public 
value issues of a private organisation such as Shell (‘how do we act honestly and 
with integrity?’) and those of public hospitals or municipalities (‘how do we con-
tribute to social issues, such as health, social cohesion and safety?’). The questions 
that can be raised from this are: To what extent can good governance in sport 
enable or support public value creation? Can theoretical findings from a public 
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value perspective provide new or different insights regarding good governance 
in sport?
This chapter will reflect on the advantage of a public value perspective as one 
that does justice to the normative aspects of ‘good’ governance and as an alterna-
tive for prevailing approaches that are dominant in current practice and research. 
First, the chapter explains the origins of public value theory and introduces two 
of its approaches. It subsequently explains why the public value perspective can 
be relevant for sport organisations and how public value theory can actually affect 
implementation of good governance in sport. Afterwards, the limits and oppor-
tunities that derive from the public value perspective for good governance in 
sport will be discussed. The chapter concludes with the main insights and specific 
implications for researchers and practitioners.
Public value theory
Public values can be considered as one of the oldest issues in political thought as 
well as administrative practice (Beck Jørgensen & Rutgers 2015). Nevertheless, 
now, in the early 21st century, there is an increased, renewed interest in the 
study of public values, especially in public administration (Lindgreen et al. 
2019). According to Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg (2014), it is a response to the 
challenges of a networked, multisector, no-one-wholly-in-charge world and the 
shortcomings of previous public administration approaches. The contemporary 
interest in public values counters an instrumental, managerial focus on public 
administration (Andersen & Beck Jørgensen 2011) and a dominating neoclassical 
political economy (Bozeman 2007). While efficiency has been the main concern 
of traditional public administration (Noordegraaf 2015), values beyond efficiency 
and effectiveness are being pursued, debated, challenged and evaluated in the 
newly emerging public values approach.
It was Harvard professor Mark Moore who generated renewed attention to pub-
lic values in the mid-1990s. Since then, the publication of many studies has seen 
public administrators elaborate, define and discuss the concept. Moore’s ideas 
have been further developed and debated by various scholars in public value the-
ory who draw on theoretical and epistemological foundations that differ from 
traditional public administration (e.g. Alford 2008; Benington 2009; Boyte 2011; 
Bozeman 2007; Denhardt & Denhardt 2011; O’Flynn 2007; Stoker 2006).
Defining public value
Moore (1995) introduces public value as the contribution that organisations make 
to society and that is perceived by a wide audience. Talbot (2011) simply describes 
public value as ‘what the public values’, but to be a little more precise: public value 
provides an alternative and improved construct to explain the contribution of 
an organisation to the welfare of the society through contribution to the public 
sphere—the space where public values are explored and contested, and public 
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value are created (Bryson et al. 2017; Habermas 1964). Public values are generally 
considered contributions that go beyond those of mere market economic consid-
erations. They are made by organisations to society and/or the public sphere in 
relation to complex social issues. Examples are health, sustainability and integrity 
(Benington 2011; Leisink et al. 2013; Moore 1995).
At the same time, it is generally difficult to determine what public value is, 
what has public value, how it can be created and with whom (Meynhardt 2009). 
There appears to be no unequivocal opinion about what public value exactly is 
or which action is deemed to have public value. Public value depends on the pre-
dominant view in society of what is valuable (Talbot 2011). Benington (2015) has 
argued that public value is connected with the contests, debates and dialogues 
in a democratic society. In this sense, public value is a “contested democratic 
practice” (Benington 2015, p. 29) or, as Rhodes and Wanna (2007, p. 172) argue: 
“public value is highly contested territory, in which competing and conflicting 
interests can only be negotiated”. Public values are therefore a constant subject of 
debate and there are different views on it.
Public value and good governance: Two approaches
In addition to the question of what public value is, a lot of research focuses on 
the question of how public value can be created. A resulting question concerns 
the relationship between good governance and public value or its creation. Two 
approaches can be distinguished in this context: good governance as a means to 
create public value and good governance as a public value in itself.
In the first approach, good governance can be regarded as the independ-
ent variable and public value as the dependent variable. Perry et al. (2014) for 
instance regard good governance as that which contributes to the good of society. 
Importantly, public value is not static or inherent here. Instead, it is achieved 
through the organisation’s governance, which is presented in terms of normative 
aspirations for a ‘good society’. In this approach, public value is a desirable out-
come of good governance and there is good governance when sport organisations 
implement governance structures that are instrumental to the creation of certain 
public values. In relation to sport, frequently mentioned public values are health, 
social cohesion and social safety (Coalter 2010; Van Eekeren 2016; Waardenburg 
2016), as is environmental sustainability to an increasing extent (McCullough 
& Kellison 2018). This approach implies that good governance principles in 
sport—f.e. transparency, democracy and accountability—should be viewed as 
means towards desirable ends—f.e. social cohesion, health and environmental 
sustainability— rather than administrative ends in themselves.
In the second approach, good governance can be seen as a public value in itself 
and some of its principles can be regarded as public values. This approach implies 
that the implementation of certain elements of good governance thus becomes 
a goal in itself. Various attempts have been made by scholars to define good gov-
ernance principles as public values. Huberts and Van Hout (2011, p. 57) even 
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speak of a “cacophony of values”. Yet within this cacophony, three value clusters 
can be distinguished. Cluster 1 focuses on fair governance. This concerns values 
such as lawfulness, integrity and equality. Cluster 2 focuses on responsive gov-
ernance. It concerns values such as transparency, participation, legitimacy and 
accountability. Cluster 3 concerns result-oriented management with values such 
as effectiveness, efficiency and professionalism (De Graaf, Huberts & Smulders 
2013). While many of these public values definitions were originally developed in 
other sectors, quite a number of them are reflected in attempts to define universal 
good governance principles for sport (e.g. Alm 2013; Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2013; 
Geeraert 2016).
Good governance in sport from 
a public value perspective
When we take a look at good governance in sport from a public value perspec-
tive, there is one question that has to be answered first. Is good governance a 
means to an end or is it an end in itself? Do we consider it a tool that con-
tributes to the good of society and, if so, do we assess this tool in terms of the 
degree to which it creates public value as perceived by a wide audience? Or is it 
rather good governance itself that we see as a public value? Do we see associated 
values— f.e. transparency, democracy and accountability—as public values in 
themselves? And is the question that we therefore have to ask above all else how 
we create such values? What are the criteria they would have to fulfil?
Good governance as a means to create public value
When good governance is seen as a means to create public values, such as health, 
social cohesion and safety, two things are important: (1) making the pursued 
values explicit and (2) making the relationship between the pursued values and 
good governance explicit.
First, sport organisations and their stakeholders should be explicit about what 
the public values they pursue are, how they can be defined and how they can be 
demonstrated. At the same time, they must realise, in accordance with public 
value theory, that they do not determine these values themselves. Instead, public 
values are defined and demonstrated in a continuous process with the relevant 
stakeholders. After all, public values cannot be objectively defined and estab-
lished, and moreover, they are not static. Many sport organisations use good gov-
ernance to focus on public values such as sportsmanship and respect, safety and 
the prevention of corruption, match fixing, doping and sexual harassment (e.g. 
IOC 2008; NOC*NSF 2019; UK Sport and Sport England 2017). Public value 
theory teaches that what can be meant by public values is determined by the 
sport organisations with their stakeholders in their specific context. The ultimate 
‘game’ of defining and demonstrating public values takes place in an arena of 
stakeholders, each of whom occupies different positions and puts forward their 
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interests in the arena (Van Eekeren 2016). The process of public value creation 
can be characterised as a struggle that cannot be separated from the sources of 
power available to stakeholders.
Second, based on public value theory, it should be clear what the explicit 
relationship is between good governance as a means and public value as an end. 
In many cases, good governance in sport is presented as a means of legitimising, 
safeguarding or restoring trust in sport, and good governance must try to prevent 
abuses in sport. All of this sounds like an approximation of good governance 
as an independent variable and public value as a dependent variable. However, 
practice has shown that the focus is mainly on the implementation of good gov-
ernance principles (as an end) where the relationship with the ultimate goal 
(public value) is not clear. For example, in the discussion about the new code of 
good sport governance in the Netherlands, public value creation is mentioned 
as the highest goal, but at the same time, its relationship with the principles of 
good governance (transparency, democracy and accountability) is not explicit 
(NOC*NSF 2019).
Good governance as a public value
Most implementation aimed at good governance in sport focuses on good gov-
ernance principles that are seen as public values and are therefore goals in them-
selves. The underlying idea is often to maintain or increase the quality of and 
the confidence in sport through the administrative structure and functioning of 
sport organisations. The good governance principles are usually enshrined and 
elaborated in codes, such as those of UK Sport and Sport Vlaanderen, and in 
measuring instruments, such as the Sport Governance Observer. From the per-
spective of public value theory, there are two important points of interest in this 
approach: (1) contextuality and (2) the use of multiple value clusters.
First, public value theory makes it clear that defining and establishing public 
values in terms of good governance principles is not universal, while good govern-
ance codes usually end with a list of abstract public values no one could oppose 
(De Graaf & Paanakker 2014). It appears that abstract principles, such as democ-
racy and transparency, can be put to good use in many parts of the world and in 
many sectors, but the meaning and effect may differ per sector, country, region 
and sport. The various codes and measuring instruments mentioned above have 
made the good governance principles contextual for sport. This means that these 
codes and measuring instruments, in addition to general principles such as trans-
parency and democracy, pay attention to social responsibility (Alm 2013) and the 
autonomy of sport (Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2013). But both the codes and meas-
uring instruments are quite static. Once established by researchers, experts and/
or stakeholders, they acquire an ‘absolute’ character—all the while public value 
theory makes clear that the meaning of values such as transparency, democracy 
and accountability as well as social responsibility and autonomy are contestable, 
contextual and subject to change. Public value theory emphasises the normative 
48 F. van Eekeren
aspirations of ‘good’ governance, which means a continuous debate with all stake-
holders is necessary to define and construct what the public values are.
Second, as argued before, public value theory in relation to good governance 
makes it clear that different value clusters can be distinguished: public values 
aimed at fair governance, responsive governance and result-oriented govern-
ance. The developed good governance principles in sport, such as in the Basic 
Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement 
(IOC 2008) and Principles of Good governance in Sport (EU Expert Group Good 
Governance 2013), mainly fall within the second cluster. They emphasise values 
such as transparency, democracy and accountability, appropriate for responsive 
governance. This raises the question of whether codes and measuring instruments 
in sport should not pay more attention to fair governance and its related values 
such as legality, integrity and equality, and to performance-oriented governance 
and its related values such as effectiveness, efficiency and professionalism.
Opportunities and limits of a public value perspective
A public value perspective offers various opportunities to critically reflect on the 
current practice of good governance in sport and to propose new quality criteria. 
At the same time, this perspective also has a number of limitations.
Critical reflections on good governance in sport
First of all, the public value perspective makes it clear that although there is a 
lot of talk about (public) values in sport in practice and in policy, there is hardly 
an explicit debate about what is meant by these public values or whether good 
governance is regarded as a means or as an end. This can lead to an unfocused 
debate about the implementation and effectiveness of good governance in sport. 
For example, sport organisations and researchers often refer to good governance 
as a means of creating public values. However, in the implementation stage, the 
approach to good governance as an end winds up being used in most cases. It 
also happens that both approaches are intertwined in practice. An example for 
this is the Sport Governance Observer. It presents three dimensions (democracy, 
transparency and accountability) that represent public values in themselves, and 
a fourth (social responsibility) that focuses on preconditions for the creation of 
public value around social themes such as inclusion and sustainability.
Second, using public value theory as a lens reveals that good governance in 
sport can be more context and process oriented—whether good governance is 
seen as a means or as an end. Public values can be regarded as multidimensional 
constructs and involved actors create the strength of these constructs through 
the trust they have in each other and in an honest approach (O’Flynn 2007). It is 
about collective sense-making by stakeholders and the use of existing knowledge 
and experiences outside the network so that a broader assessment is made of pos-
sible public values. This means that the implementation of good governance in 
The value of a public value perspective 49
sport must be seen as a continuous debate, in which organisations must be able to 
deal with diversity in views. In this way, sport organisations can do justice to the 
specific context of the (national, regional or local) sport. As a consequence, this 
means that sport organisations must create the right conditions for the process of 
both defining and determining public value(s).
Third, from a public value perspective, good governance by a sport organisa-
tion concerns the creation of different types of public values. These public values 
can potentially conflict with each other. A subsequent and recurrent issue in pub-
lic value theory is that not all of these values—however desirable they are—can 
be achieved at the same time (De Graaf & Paanakker 2014). Public value theory 
makes it clear that different value clusters can clash and that it is important to 
recognise the ambiguous and contested nature of good governance principles in 
the implementation of good governance. Moreover, many oft-mentioned ‘global’ 
good governance principles such as transparency, rule of law and government 
effectiveness (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2008) may be conflicting or con-
tradictory in policy and management decisions. Sport organisations must find a 
way to deal with the possible tensions or contradictions between, for example, 
efficiency and transparency, or between effectiveness and equality.
Another consideration is that sport organisations must also create other types 
of values, such as sportive values and business values. These values can in turn 
conflict with public values (Van Eekeren 2016). A mixed public/private profile of 
the sport organisations can produce contradictory incentives. Public tasks, for 
instance, do not obey the logic of the market, and the specific organisational 
culture of a sport organisation can be in conflict with entrepreneurship (Van 
Montfort 2008). This means that, in addition to the approach of good governance 
as a means to create public value and good governance as a public value in itself, 
a third approach is applicable: good governance defined as managing tensions 
between values, public or otherwise (Perry et al. 2014).
In this third approach, good governance occurs when multiple values are suc-
cessfully combined in an organisation. In other words: the existence of good gov-
ernance is determined by way of dealing with the conflicting values from these 
different clusters. Good governance ensures that a debate about value creation 
takes place and leads to the production of (potentially) conflicting values (De 
Graaf & Van der Wal 2010). How this process is carried out in the stakeholder 
arena can be laid down in a number of quality criteria that approach the univer-
sal principles of good governance. An example could be involving everyone in 
a democratic process, being transparent about the procedure and ensuring clear 
supervision of the process.
Critical reflections on a public value perspective
Criticism of public value theory often arises from the complexity and ambiguity 
of public value as a theory and framework. For example, there are many public 
values (e.g. Andersen et al. 2012; Bozeman 2007; Meynhardt 2009) and they are 
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not a settled or stable matter. Also, it is unclear “what the public values are” and 
“what adds value to the public sphere” (Hartley et al. 2016, p. 40) often caus-
ing tension. From its complexity and ambiguity, a public values approach has a 
number of limitations with regard to the implementation of good governance in 
sports.
First, this complexity and ambiguity has resulted in public value theory not 
providing concrete handles for implementation of good governance in organi-
sational practice. This means that every organisation must determine in its own 
context which public values they attach to good governance and how they intend 
to implement this. A blueprint approach is not possible from a public value theory 
standpoint; it concerns a contextual and continuous process. At the same time, 
public value theory does not provide concrete tools for structuring the process 
either, although there is increasing knowledge about public value management 
(Stoker 2006), public value co-creation (Bryson et al. 2017) and creating public 
value through smart partnerships (Van Eekeren 2016).
Second, the ambiguity and complexity of public value theory makes assess-
ing the outcomes of good governance in terms of public value very difficult. 
Determining objective, universal public values is not possible. This means, among 
other things, that public values once created cannot be examined in an unambig-
uous way and that comparison between different organisations and situations is 
extremely complex. This issue persists even despite the development of tools like 
a Public Value Scorecard (Lindgreen et al. 2019; Meynhardt 2015).
Conclusion
Sport organisations are expected to create public value, for example by contribut-
ing to social issues such as health, social cohesion and environmental sustainabil-
ity. At the same time, they are expected to be governed in an honest and decent 
manner, by paying attention to certain values such as transparency, democracy 
and accountability. Now that these types of public values are increasingly seen 
as important benefits in sport organisations, a public value perspective offers the 
opportunity to use public values as a starting point for good governance in sport, 
rather than a marginal consideration (Beck Jørgensen & Rutgers 2015). From 
a scientific point of view, there are two elements at the basis of the concept of 
public value: (1) being valuable and (2) enjoying trust from the perspective of the 
general public (Lindgreen et al. 2019; Moore 1995). A public value perspective on 
good governance in sport ensures that the implementation of good governance is 
more focused on the social outcomes and thus contributes to the legitimacy and 
public trust in sport and its organisations.
Based on the analysis in this chapter, it is important to be explicit, both in 
practice and in research, how the relationship between good governance and 
public values is viewed. At least three approaches are possible: (1) good govern-
ance as a means to create public value, (2) good governance as public value and 
an end in itself, (3) good governance as a process of managing tensions between 
The value of a public value perspective 51
(public) values. Each approach gives practitioners and researchers a specific per-
spective on good governance in sport that can help sharpen the debate on both 
implementation and research.
At the same time, it can be concluded that public value theory doesn’t provide 
concrete handles for policy makers and managers due to its ambiguity and com-
plexity. A managerial approach based on a blueprint does not fit the public value 
perspective. This might warrant a rethinking of the instrumentality of many of 
the current approaches and good governance codes, and puts a focus on processes 
instead of procedures and regulations. Sport organisations consequently should 
not spend a great deal of time, energy and resources on meeting compliance 
obligations, but rather on embedding good governance values in the hearts and 
minds of their organisations and partnerships. Managing good governance from 
a public values perspective is to a large extent addressing the intrinsic motivation 
of the organisation aimed at the higher social goal.
By its very nature, public value theory doesn’t provide robust methodologies to 
assess public value as an outcome of good governance. A public value perspec-
tive requires that scholars draw from different theoretical and epistemological 
foundations. The positivist idea of one coherent theory of everything does not go 
well with public value theory, but a social-constructivist approach does. This also 
means that approaches other than the currently prevailing methodological ones 
are required; approaches that allow empirical research to give insights into the 
processes of public value creation in the arena of stakeholders on one hand, and 
the performance of organisations in terms of good governance related to public 
values on the other.
Two ways for further research can be recommended. First, research could exam-
ine whether and how public value is constructed in and by sport organisations, 
whether and how it is argued for by different agents and groups, in what organi-
sational, institutional and social contexts, and what type of perceived outcomes 
this yields. Research questions could focus on where and how value is added 
through organisational and partnership processes and how public value is often 
co-produced with citizens and other partners and stakeholders in sport. Second, 
while performance management scholars have examined activities and outputs 
from public organisations, there has been less research about the value created (or 
destroyed) in terms of legitimacy, trust, social justice and so on. To make public 
value measurable, Meynhardt (2015) developed a scorecard that measures the 
public value of each project, decision or transaction along five dimensions: social, 
moral, aesthetic and utilitarian. It may be interesting to investigate whether this 
scorecard can be made applicable for good governance in sport.
Finally, it is striking how, now that sport organisations, governments, and 
other stakeholders all over the world feel the need to promote good governance 
in sport, the concept of public value and public value theory remain underex-
posed in the debate. It can be argued that a public value perspective does justice 
to the normative aspects of ‘good’ governance. A public value perspective requires 
that policymakers, managers and researchers alike consider good governance in 
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sport as a relative, evolving and culturally defined aspiration (Evans 2012). It also 
provides alternatives for the limitations of the prevailing instrumental and posi-
tivist approaches towards good governance in sport that are dominant in current 
practice and research.
Notes
 1. e.g. A Code for Sports Governance by UK Sport and Sport England (2017) and 
the Code of Good Governance in Flemish Sport Federations by Sport Vlaanderen 
(2016).
 2. e.g. The Sport Governance Observer (Geeraert 2015).
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Chapter 5
Feminist perspectives on good  
governance in sport
It is the care that guides the doing
Inge Claringbould, Annelies Knoppers,  
and Ramon Spaaij
Introduction
From a theoretical and empirical perspective (see other chapters in this volume) 
a lot of thought is given to ‘good governance’ both within and outside sport. 
Unfortunately, feminist perspectives have rarely been applied to the notion 
of good governance (Merry, Davis & Kingsbury 2015; Parent & Hoye 2018). 
Attention is paid to feminist theories in sport policy, such as good governance, 
primarily when the subject matter is gender (Knoppers & McLachlan 2018). In 
contrast, the results of a scoping review of research in the area of sport govern-
ance by Parent and Hoye (2018) reveal that gender is not a topic directly associ-
ated with principles of good governance. Although studies have been published 
that focus on the importance of gender quotas on sport boards or on the need 
for gender equity (Henry & Lee 2004), the need for feminist perspectives on the 
subject of good governance are not mentioned.
Feminist perspectives often question positivist notions of objectivity and truth, 
and therefore also the neutrality of good governance. Ideas about ‘good govern-
ance’ are usually drawn up and executed by persons with relatively high levels of 
freedom, rights and influence. These ideas are therefore not neutral but reflect 
the social positions of those who created norms about good governance. This may 
mean that underlying power relations between groups involved in doing good 
governance remain hidden. A feminist perspective might analyse who performs 
practices of good governance, how and from what interest or position, and what 
the consequences of these practices are in terms of reconstructing and reproduc-
ing power relations. For example, Puwar (2004) describes how white male bodies 
remain unmarked in most public spaces, and thus continue to dominate and set 
norms without being questioned about their white male dominance. They tend to 
think their stance is neutral, while non-white and/or female bodies are constantly 
supervised and scrutinised for how they position themselves in society. They are 
thus marginalised when norms and standards are created.
These processes have an enormous impact on everyday interactions and on the 
ways policies, management and institutions are constructed. Connell (2009) sees 
such a worldwide ‘gender order’ as a continuing pattern. Substantially harming 
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women’s rights and input in society and continuing white heterosexual men’s 
voices and perspectives as dominant in all societal domains.
The aim of this chapter is to elaborate feminist perspectives that can be applied 
in conceptualising and realising good governance and thus shed a new light on 
the current dialogue on good governance in sport. The central question that 
guides this chapter is: How can feminist theory contribute to scholarly and policy 
debates on good governance in sport?
The following sections elaborate and discuss two particular feminist approaches.
The first is standpoint theory attributed to the work of Dorothy Smith (1987, 
1990). We draw on this perspective to show that the question of what is ‘good’ 
in good governance can never be answered in a universal way. Feminist stand-
point theory offers a further deepening of this perspective, since it is based on 
the assumption of positionality of all forms of knowledge and experience, thereby 
calling into question the neutrality of knowledge and science. This perspective 
not only challenges the neutrality of good governance criteria, but also stresses 
that ignoring different voices and standpoints of stakeholders, undermines the 
‘good’ in good governance.
The second approach is ‘ethics of care’, derived from the work of Carol Gilligan 
(1982). We choose this perspective to present an alternative to exclusionary 
notions of ‘good’ governance. Ethics of care offers such an alternative. Here ‘care’ 
is an ethical principle, reflecting an underlying value and way of doing, which can 
be applied to reflections on the ‘good’ in good governance. Both perspectives may 
offer alternative guidelines for current conceptualisations of good governance. 
Contrary to other (dominant) conceptualisations of good governance, these per-
spectives take marginalised ideas into consideration and assume organisations 
have an ethical obligation to do so. Such feminist perspectives may not only be 
seen as an ethical consideration for doing good governance, but also as an overar-
ching principle and guarantee for practicing good governance.
Theoretical perspectives
Although feminist perspectives are so diverse that they can hardly be summarised 
under one rubric, they all have in common that they question positivist notions 
of objectivity and truth (Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis 2002). They assume that what 
is understood to be universal knowledge and truths are presented and accepted as 
common sense and neutral; consequently, the gendered and hegemonic basis of 
such knowledge remains unmentioned and marginalised experiences and other 
ways of knowing are easily overlooked. In this way, existing social inequalities 
are effortlessly reproduced and mask and legitimate a hegemonic masculinist 
positioning (Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis 2002). As Haraway says: “Despite their dif-
ferences, they [feminist perspectives] have all challenged the god-trick of seeing 
everything from nowhere” (Haraway 1991, p. 189), with which she criticises the 
neutrality of knowledge and states that knowledge is always linked to a certain 
position. Moreover, she indicates that knowledge is situated, but not necessarily 
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subjective. Rather, positionality offers the opportunity to acquire certain knowl-
edge that is related to the power position someone has in society.
The relevance of feminist perspectives on good governance therefore, is that 
they question the neutrality of good governance criteria, and offer insight into 
power positions and processes in the creation of these criteria.
Feminist standpoint theory
Although standpoint theory may have originated in the work of Hegel and Marx, 
who portrayed the views of unequal groups (social classes) in society (Hekman 
1997), feminist representatives of standpoint theory have focused on gender ine-
quality. Feminist standpoint theory essentially posits that all knowledge and truths 
are produced from multiple standpoints. Smith (1997) said: “We know as a matter 
of doing” (p. 395). She denies universal and neutral considerations, and assumes 
that social situations fundamentally determine the knowledge individuals acquire 
and thus the way they are positioned/position themselves in society. Feminists 
such as Dorothy Smith (1987, 1990), Nancy Hartsock (1983), Patricia Hill Collins 
(1990, 1997), Donna Haraway (1991) and Sandra Harding (2004), have used this 
perspective to show how knowledge is anchored in gender. Subsequently they 
broadened the issue to other social groups, based on race, social class and other 
social factors, and illustrated how the prevalence of dominant standpoints can 
serve as the basis for maintaining social and structural inequalities.
Positionality
Standpoint theory assumes that people acquire knowledge from a variety of soci-
etal positions. Individuals are positioned in different ways based on how they are 
socially categorised in terms of power relations such as gender, race, (dis)ability, 
sexuality, etc.
This means that taking a position pertains to the physical presence of the body 
and to the material layout of the space. Someone is physically part of a setting and 
is therefore always part of a local practice in which positions relate to each other 
and realise institutional power structures (Puwar 2004). For example, the position 
of a black female speed skater is very different from that of her white female trainer, 
even when they are in the same ice rink. They not only have different positions, 
but will have different experiences and perceptions of what happens in the space 
as well, due to their history/experiences of being black/white or woman/man. 
Hartsock (1983) asserts that such experiences limit an understanding of social rela-
tions, because reality will be perceived differently as local practices and positions 
differ. Collins (1997) gives the example of a black feminist academic who is in the 
unique position that she acquires knowledge from two standpoints: the privileged 
academic world and also that of black women. She originates from a marginalised 
group, but operates in the field of a dominant group although she may still be also 
marginalised within that dominant group. Puwar (2004) calls such a position a 
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‘space invader’. Collins’ social position meant she gained knowledge of underlying 
power processes associated with both standpoints (dominant and marginalised). 
These multiple positions enabled her to develop a strategy to survive within the 
academic world. In contrast, non-marginalised groups tend not to need or develop 
such awareness or knowledge. Members of non-marginalised groups tend to identify 
more often with the assumption of neutrality of knowledge since they are generally 
not aware of their dominant position; they see it as obvious or as common sense.
Standpoint theorists are convinced that not one group can claim neutrality, 
since all knowledge is situated. Therefore, assumptions about the neutrality of 
knowledge will mainly contribute to the maintenance of a hegemonic standpoint. 
Ignoring the partiality and situatedness of knowledge, by labelling it as neutral, 
also means depriving those marginalised groups of having a voice in society.
Situated knowledge
People come to knowledge by participating in social processes, so these (local) 
settings determine what kind of knowledge and experiences people acquire. 
Standpoints may not be uniform even in the same setting, but depend on the 
social and cultural context (Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis 2002). Settings therefore 
do not have the same meaning for participants, since social groups may acquire 
different knowledges about a situation due to their own position (Stoetzler & 
Yuval-Davis 2002). People who share the same location, for example, may have 
completely different experiences and knowledge of a situation, dependent on 
their power position: if the person serves coffee or is giving a lecture; is a black 
male athlete or a white female athlete listening to a speaker; is a promising young 
academic or an older person taking care of the operation of devices. All gain 
different knowledge about who is present in the space, who has the right to speak 
about what is happening there. In other words, social location and standpoint 
cannot be reduced to each other but people generate situated knowledge through 
their interpersonal interactions.
Situated knowledge is perceived and experienced differently depending on 
the positions someone takes. Positions of individuals or groups may be diverse, 
intersectional, contradictory and subject to change. Each position has major 
consequences for the restraints or freedom of action that accompany it, and for 
the meanings they assign to the situation. Consider a 14-year-old elite gymnast 
who is aggressively manipulated by her male coach to perform exercises that are 
physically painful. The gymnast is afraid her sport career will suffer if she does 
not always obey his instructions. How differently do both experience the space? 
While he may appropriate the situation due to his position, she feels constantly 
threatened, because of the way the setting is organised. Her knowledge of what 
happens in the space is completely different from his. Smith (1990) has defined 
the settings or situations as:
“The actualities of our everyday world are already socially organised. Settings, 
equipment, environment, schedules, occasions, and so forth, as well as our 
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enterprises and routines, are socially produced and concretely and symbolically 
organised prior to the moment at which we enter and at which inquiry begins” 
(p. 23).
Standpoint theory
Standpoint theory focuses on the social conditions and interactions that con-
struct standpoints of different groups. As Hartsock (1983) states, these groups 
have material conditions that structure and limit their understanding and knowl-
edge of standpoints and interactions.
Although standpoints are developed over time, they are not essentialist nor a 
given. For example, speed skating has predominantly been a white sport, which 
does not mean that it will always that way. Consequently, standpoints in the field 
of sport about speed skating and race are also subject to change. Standpoints are 
embedded in a structure-agency perspective. They refer to ethical, institutional 
and political constructions of groups having shared histories that may be char-
acterised by long standing patterns of gender, class and/or racial marginalisation 
on the one hand and they shape individual life-experiences and practices on the 
other (Weeks 1998). Collins (1997) uses this structure-agency perspective to argue 
that not the individual but the group serves as a unit of analysis of a standpoint. 
Collins stresses that individuals belonging to corresponding social groups may 
share similar experiences, but there is at the same time always room for individ-
ual agency due to multiple and/or intersectional positionalities. “Although stand-
points construct and shape experiences and perception of individuals, they do not 
determine them in terms of causality and predictability” (Collins 1990, p. 326).
According to Collins (1990) criteria for social groups, such as race, gender, age 
are not descriptive categories of identity, but elements of a social and political 
power structure. In other words, social criteria are used to create social groups 
and the power relations between them. Standpoints become visible almost every-
where in the public domain, for example in sport and recreational facilities, 
health care systems and education. Changes herein may take place in relation 
to broader societal changes and/or as a result of policy measures and/or of social 
political movements.
Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis (2002) stress that knowledge from dominant/hegem-
onic standpoints need to be explored and made explicit, since most political deci-
sions that affect the largest number of people are taken from these hegemonic 
standpoints. This and views from the margins should be taken into consideration 
when we apply standpoint theory to a critical analysis of good governance in sport.
Power
Standpoint theory was conceptualised by Collins (1997) as a perspective that 
shows how knowledge always remains central to systems of power that are to 
the advantage of the interests of dominant groups in society. According to 
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Hartsock (1983) dominant groups create positions of power by labelling their 
perspective as ‘real’ and rejecting or ignoring other definitions. After all, 
dominant groups have an interest in suppressing or replacing certain knowl-
edge of subordinate groups, because this rejection gives them the opportunity to 
continue and control their own dominance.
Smith (1990) asserts that there is no clear division between dominant or mar-
ginalised groups since individuals may represent multiple standpoints. People typ-
ically may have no trouble defining themselves as marginalised, while at the same 
time contributing to the marginalisation of others. For example, white women 
do not always realise the privileges they have compared to black women. Since 
Collins (1990) assumes that each group has knowledge of, and shares knowledge 
from its own point of view, that knowledge is never complete, nor neutral, but 
each has its own partial perspective on reality. This partial knowledge is therefore 
essential for their position in society. After all, knowledge is positional. The mul-
tiplicity of standpoints and their associated knowledge gives people the opportu-
nity to understand other standpoints, yet always from a person’s own standpoint. 
Expressing knowledge without having a suitable position is usually less credible 
and convincing, for example when a man talks about what it is like to be a woman.
In summary, standpoint theory is very helpful to analyse and make explicit 
the interests and positions of those involved in and/or excluded from doing good 
governance. However, this perspective does not inform the ethics necessary for 
doing good governance.
Ethics of care
In social science, philosophers have focused on the question of which ethical 
principles people should hold in order to create a just society (e.g. Rosenberg 
2016). Ethics of care can be seen as such an approach.
Ethical principles
Ethics are often based on principles, or combinations thereof. These principles 
may emphasise individual autonomy, rights and obligations, call attention to 
pragmatism, or stress the need for social contracts. Kant for example, assumes 
the autonomy of a person and a person’s rights and obligations constitute a basic 
principle for a just society.
Kant (Morrell 2006; Rosenberg 2016) assumes that there are certain moral rules 
that are a priori and universally true. He argues that one should never use human 
beings as a means to a certain goal, but should treat them as autonomous persons.
In contrast, Mill (Morrell 2006; Rosenberg 2016) focused on the usefulness and 
consequences of decisions as basic principles for a just society. He believes that 
the answer to moral questions should be weighed based on their usefulness (such 
as happiness, satisfaction, well-being) to those involved. In that case, the greater 
the general advantage of an action, the better it is. Regardless of whether such 
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considerations of utility can be made neutrally/impartially, they may violate peo-
ple’s autonomy. Finally, Rawls (Rosenberg 2016) assumes that a just society should 
be based on a social contract, a mutual consent. This is based on the so-called ‘veil 
of ignorance’, the principle that an agreement is a just agreement, when the out-
come is based on a consensus between actors when they do not know in advance 
what position they will occupy. For example, how could the question be answered 
whether it is right that men as trainers in elite sport earn much more than women 
with equal qualities without taking gender positionality into account? Of course, 
this situation is fictitious because every person involved knows their position, but 
the fictitious situation means that an agreement or contract can be reached that 
is acceptable and just to everyone involved, because all conceivable positions can 
be taken into account. In such a situation Kant would probably plea for equal pay-
ments, given the assumed equal autonomy of both men and women, while Mill 
would probably look at the consequences of such a decision for the benefit of most 
people involved. In other words, the decision on what ‘good’ is, is taken differently 
based on different ethical principles and considerations.
However, these three principles (autonomy, benefit and justice) are not the 
only possibilities for ethical guidelines. A fourth feminist principle named ‘ethics 
of care’ (Gilligan 1982) has evolved as an ethical theory since the 1980s, although 
it has probably implicitly guided many people’s actions throughout history.
Ethics of care
Ethics of care distinguishes itself from principles of autonomy, benefit and justice 
by emphasising concrete human relationships instead of abstract principles that 
enforce ethical actions and decisions (Baier 1994; Benhabib 1992). “While an 
ethics of justice proceeds from the premise of equality – that everyone should be 
treated the same – an ethic of care rests on the premise of nonviolence – that 
no one should be hurt” (Gilligan 1982, p. 174). In the 1970s, Gilligan developed 
this emphasis in response to the stepwise/phase model of moral development 
developed by Lawrence Kohlberg. He asserted that an individual has reached 
maturity when s/he can see moral issues in terms of rights and rules. Gilligan 
argued that Kohlberg’s model was written from a male perspective on morality. In 
her research, Gilligan discovered that women and men generally interpret moral 
problems differently. Women may see a “moral problem as a problem of care and 
responsibility in relationships” as opposed to men who may see it “as one of rights 
and rules” (1982, p. 73). According to Gilligan, women’s positionality means they 
often approach moral issues in terms of empathy and compassion, and men’s posi-
tionality means their approach to issues is often allied with rationality and logic. 
Her research led Gilligan to question the assumed neutrality of moral principles. 
She explicates that ‘female’ values and considerations were missing in the exist-
ing discussions on ethical behaviour.
Gilligan’s ethics of care has been criticised however. An ethics of care pertaining 
only to women reinforces the traditional image and stereotype of women as being 
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caring and empathetic. Gilligan’s work was also seen as essentialist (Grimshaw 
1986; Tong 2009) and her methods deemed weak (Greeno & Maccoby 1986). The 
idea of caring has also been critiqued for being too diffuse to be useful and subject 
to various interpretations (Broughton 1983).
The idea of an ethics of care has also received support, however, due to the 
realisation that qualities associated with women were generally underestimated 
and devaluated in society (Tong 2009). Others (Bartky 1990; Kittay 1999) stated 
that care and the ethics of care could have a broader social meaning and should 
no longer be labelled as a typical feminine quality, as opposed to masculine 
qualities, but rather as a responsibility of men and women embracing an ethics 
that should be expressed in both the private and the public/corporate sphere. 
An ethics of care assumes everyone is part of webs of relationships rather than 
being an independent human being. As such, ethics of care is assumed to serve 
as an addition or correction to existing perspectives (Bartky 1990; Tong 1993). 
An ethic of care therefore centres relationships in contrast to common, often 
masculinised, notions of the self as an autonomous individual (Machold, Ahmed 
& Farquhar 2008).
Ethics of care has further been developed by others such as Nel Noddings 
(1984), Virginia Held (1993, 2006) and Joan Tronto (1993). Held (1993, 2006), 
Tronto (1993) and Sevenhuijsen (2003) indicate that ethics of care not only 
applies to interpersonal relationships, but also to the social and political domain 
making it applicable to human relationships in the public sphere including the 
development of ideas about good governance in organisations (e.g. Machold, 
Ahmed & Farquhar 2008). In sport, ethics of care has been applied as a theoret-
ical framework in sport for development studies (e.g. Debognies, et al. 2019). In 
these studies, the principle of ethics of care was used to challenge the common 
top down management of sport programs and their assessment criteria based on 
effectiveness and efficiency. An ethics of care means relational processes are cho-
sen as the starting point for the (co-)construction and assessment of projects. 
After all, care can only be realised in social relations.
Beyond Gilligan
Although ‘ethics of care’ can be seen as an ethical obligation within relationships 
(Noddings 1984), it is based on daily moral experiences and problems. Noddings 
emphasised that the provision of care comes from ethical considerations, from 
the source of compassion, based on relationships. The correctness of our actions 
is therefore essentially based on the care for others in a broad sense. It is not based 
on abstract and generalised notions of equality, equity and relationships “but situ-
ates caring for others in relationships in actual situations, in specific contexts, and 
takes cognizance of feelings and emotions in moral reasoning” (Machold, Ahmed 
& Farquhar 2008, p. 670).
Ethics of care is best expressed “(…) as an activity, the activity of care” (Tronto 
1987, p. 648). Tronto (1993) further distinguishes between four phases of care. 
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The first phase concerns attentiveness: recognising the need and necessity for 
care. The second concerns responsibility or taking responsibility for providing 
care. The third is about competence; that is, offering the right expertise for the 
provision of care. The final phase is the responsiveness phase, in which the care 
recipient responds to the care received. Tronto assumes that these four phases 
must be properly connected to fulfil care in an ethical sense.
Ethics of care is essentially not an isolated criterion, but rather an underlying 
organisational persuasion, responsibility, commitment and form of action that 
is lacking in so many (sport) organisations. Steward (2020) writes in her Black 
feminist critique about the logics of higher education institutions’ response to 
COVID-19: “Institutions are bureaucratic and care is not the ethic of institutions; 
the ethic of the institution is productivity and preservation” (Steward 2020, p. 5). 
This ‘logic’ may also count for sport organisations. The use of an ethics of care 
could therefore support executives and board members of sport organisations in 
their thinking about new logics of good governance and the legitimacy of their 
action.
What constitutes good governance
The question of ‘what is good governance’ is essentially based on what one should 
or should not do in governance, a question that generates normative answers 
based on ethical principles. Although the question in itself thus includes ele-
ments of both ethical reflection and the search for practical answers, when it 
comes to ‘good governance’ in current discussions this question seems to focus on 
defining indicators (Davis, Kingsbury & Merry 2015). In many ways, governance 
is based on laws, rules and norms about how to act in certain situations. However, 
ideas and regulations change over time, which implies that the ways in which 
laws, rules and standards must be applied are continuously discussed and renewed.
This brings us to the question: Is there such a thing as a basic principle or a 
moral standard from which to determine what ‘good governance’ entails?
Standpoint theory and good governance
From the perspective of standpoint theory, thinking about current criteria for 
good governance would focus not so much on the criteria in themselves (such 
as accountability, transparency, efficiency, effectivity, equity, democracy, respon-
sibility: e.g. Dowling, Leopkey & Smith 2018; Henry & Lee 2004), but rather to 
how such guidelines for good governance can be measured and formulated as 
uniform, neutral and objective. From a feminist standpoint perspective, criteria 
currently used for ‘good governance’ are always linked to a certain viewpoint 
or standpoint, and therefore depend on different backgrounds and power posi-
tions of those involved in creating criteria for good governance. Feminist would 
frame criteria for good governance as partial knowledge, and criticise them for 
suggesting they are uniform and universal and for not linking them to a specific 
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standpoint. If the positioning of knowledge from which these principles origi-
nate is hidden, good governance is formulated as neutral and generally valid and 
strengthens those in dominant positions.
This assumed neutrality enables dominant groups to dismiss other knowl-
edge, e.g. from marginalised groups as being subjective and therefore invalid (see 
the introduction by Geeraert in this volume). Standpoint theory is a powerful 
approach to understand, analyse, discuss and criticise the so-called neutrality of 
actions of good governance. The contribution of this theory to good governance, 
therefore is that it would obviously take the voices of marginalised groups and 
underlying power processes into account in the development of policy for good 
governance. However, this perspective does not address guiding principles for 
doing ‘good’ governance in various situations, as Carol Gilligan (1982) does with 
her ‘ethics of care’.
Ethics of care and good governance
Ethics of care is a moral and idealistic position and at the same time a relatively 
new guideline for the way governance is done. Ethics of care may be defined as a 
relational, situational and contextual practice of care within the domain of gov-
ernance matters (Surie & Ashley 2008). It is also an important correction of the 
dominance of technocratic, abstract and rationalist thinking, so often expressed 
in terms of advances and utility that tends to dominate public discussions of good 
governance (Merry, Davis & Kingsbury 2015). The implementation of ethics of 
care as a practice for good governance requires a deeper understanding of situ-
ations, through self-reflection and dialogue about institutional contexts, stand-
points, interests and asymmetry of power relations. Ethics of care focuses on the 
ethical principle of “care” and assumes that this principle guides the ‘doing’ in 
all cases. It “recognises a multiplicity of actual and potential relationships with 
varying degrees of asymmetry of power distribution, within which there is an 
obligation of care” (Machold, Ahmed, Farquhar 2008, p. 673).
Former considerations about good governance (criteria as mentioned above) are 
still valuable and do not necessarily need to be replaced by ethics of care. Rather, 
an ethics of care can be seen as an overarching and guiding moral principle that 
ensures people are not exploited or taken advantage of in unequal power relation-
ships (Machold, Ahmed, Farquhar 2008; Morrell 2006) or vice versa, that people 
will not abuse public services. For example, the stress on achievement in sport 
should never lead to the abuse of athletes. Their voice should be heard through 
dialogue (standpoint theory) and should be taken into account and responded to 
(ethics of care). In other words, ethics of care is much more than a set of criteria 
for doing good governance. It is based on a web of relationships in which ‘care’ 
can be seen as an underlying life/organisational attitude, on the basis of which 
more or less continuously changing laws, rules and standards can be calibrated or 
adjusted. Standpoint theory assumes multiple standpoints are possible and can be 
taken into consideration through dialogue.
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Reflection
Most governance theories tend to overlook and/or continue to marginalise the 
construction of gender and other societal (e.g. racial, social class) inequalities all 
of which constitute societies. This chapter on feminist perspectives on good gov-
ernance stressed the importance of the representation and integration of these 
standpoints into good governance. Standpoint theory stressed that dominant 
standpoints tend to define their perspectives as neutral, general and in everyone’s 
interest, and may thus oppress marginalised standpoints. Additionally, ethics of 
care showed that a focus on formal rules, criteria and measures to do good gov-
ernance is not enough. Ethics of care applies to every situation and deeply sup-
ports the governance of democratic societies to survive and thrive. Therefore, it is 
questionable whether ‘good governance’ can be realised as being ‘good’ enough, as 
long as the power practices of dominant groups continue to prevail without being 
subject of discussion about whose interests are at stake.
Yet, it is important to recognise that the perspectives outlined here involve 
dilemmas. Perspectives that contribute to the realisation of good governance 
should always involve the representation of different standpoints, including mar-
ginalised standpoints. Yet, it is not always easy to determine whether all relevant 
standpoints are included/heard.
In a similar way, ethics of care can be used as an ethical base/principle for the 
construction and implementation of good governance, but the dilemma is: what 
do care and the responsibility for care mean? After all, the provision of care is 
complex and context dependent. Therefore, different care needs and care respon-
sibilities can be defined from different standpoints. Answering these questions is 
part of the dialogue and assumes a universal answer will not emerge.
Collins (1997) argues that hierarchical organisations easily end up in a dynamic 
of mutually opposed relationships, where a dialogue focusses on being right, 
instead of mutual care. She said: “Within hierarchical power relations, it seems 
reasonable that groups disadvantaged by systems of power might see their strength 
in solidarity and collective responses to their common location and subjugation. 
In contrast, it seems equally plausible that those privileged by these types of group 
placements might want to do away with notions of the group altogether, in effect 
obscuring the privileges they gain from group membership” (Collins 1997, p. 380).
In such an organisation a dialogue may take place, but since the positions 
are characterised by conflicting interests, mutual care is absent. In other words, 
although dialogue is crucial for understanding different points of view, there is 
still a risk that mutual care will be ignored or neglected.
However, the aforementioned dilemmas should never be a reason to solve prob-
lems in a general and instrumental way and not conduct a dialogue from various 
standpoints. After all, the absence of a multi-voice dialogue suggests that every-
one should adhere to rules, laws and manners, while the dominant standpoint 
only represent the interests of a few. Consequently, good governance continues to 
be determined by those in positions of power in society.
Feminist perspectives 67
Conclusion
Yuval-Davis (2011) describes the concern of care as an openness and awareness 
of individuals and institutions that influences compassion, avoiding harm, and 
sustaining relationships and affects public life. Since ethics of care guides the 
dialogue this principle is of crucial importance. While the dialogue is a practical 
opportunity to achieve mutual understanding of different positions, ethics of care 
represents the intention of mutual understanding and accordingly, acting on this 
basis. Such an approach operates at both the structural (institutional) level, and 
the individual. Ethics of care may also be seen as an overall life attitude for those 
involved in doing good governance. Yet, caring assumes the understanding of 
social positionality. The merging of standpoint theory with ethics of care may be 
seen as an alternative to the current, so-called ‘neutral’ focus on rational think-
ing, universal indicators for political decisions or technological solutions elabo-
rated by experts in the field. Good governance should always be considered from 
the perspective of different standpoints and within an ‘ethics of care’, since care 
should under all circumstances guide the doing.
Implications for scholars
Both feminist perspectives on good governance elaborated in this chapter require 
further research. With regard to standpoint theory, it would be worthwhile to 
examine the process of constructing codes and indicators of good governance 
and the dialogues of sport directors (in terms of tasks, responsibilities and behav-
iours) that construct them, since these may reproduce or change existing power 
relations, including their impact on sport.
Similarly, how might a person’s position on a board (in terms of gender, race, 
validity, sexual orientation, etc.) impact how an ethics of care is implemented 
in sport boards. Where, when, why and how do sport boards deal with ‘different 
voices’ in their governance for example, and how does this contribute to inclusion 
or exclusion in sport? Further research into the meaning of standpoints and ethics 
of care, will provide a better insight into the value of these feminist perspectives 
for practicing and theorising good governance in sport.
Implications for practitioners
Applying an ethics of care means not only listening to and actually hearing the 
standpoints or perspectives of those marginalised but also making decisions based 
on favouring the least advantaged members of the community and ensuring they 
are unharmed by the consequences of decisions. This implies that practition-
ers or policy makers need to see athletes, participants, stakeholders, colleagues 
in the organisation as individuals, with their own needs and as part of a wider 
web of relationships with friends and relatives. It means that those involved in 
sport governance need to recognise and reflect on their own role as providers and 
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facilitators of opportunities for sport participation and governance and also their 
role as agents that contribute to the well-being of a (sport) community.
Practicing a feminist perspective on good governance is about developing critical 
self-reflection on personal positionality and understanding multiple points of view 
of policy makers and others involved in doing good governance. Dialogical relations 
are therefore, crucial for gaining insight in the heterogeneity of knowledge (Collins 
1990). Collins argues that a dialogue between people of different positions is the 
only way to “approximate truth”. It facilitates an ability to imagine or understand 
each other’s standpoints, although without owning them. Another standpoint the-
orist, Elsa Barkley Brown (1989) is convinced that: “All people can learn to center 
in another experience, validate it, and judge it by its own standards without the 
need of comparison or the need to adopt that framework as their own. In such 
dialogues, ‘one has no need to ‘decenter’ anyone in order to center someone else; 
one has only to constantly, appropriately, ‘pivot the center’” (Brown 1989, p. 922).
According to Collins (1990), dialogue as an approach is essential to reform par-
tial knowledge into shared knowledge and to ensure marginalised groups have a 
place in society. In a democratic society, that is precisely the job of those responsible 
for realising (the creation and implementation of) good governance. This does not 
only mean conducting relevant dialogues, but also to embedding the representation 
of marginalised groups in bodies that construct and express good governance in 
organisations. In such organisations mutual and contextual relationships between 
stakeholders pivot around the care for each other, instead of focusing on their own 
achievements and interests and ensuring these are met through competitive nego-
tiations. If this succeeds, ethics of care is no longer an individual practice, but is 
embedded in the structure of organisations as part of good governance.
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An ethical leadership perspective 
on good governance in sport
From star players to team sport
Leonie Heres
Introduction
At the professional and non-professional level alike, ethical scandals have rocked 
the world of sport. Along with an increasing need for more effective sport man-
agement, these scandals have given rise to persistent calls for good governance 
(e.g. Constandt, De Waegeneer & Willem 2018; Geeraert, Alm & Groll 2014; 
Loyens et al. 2021); and not without reason. For sport to fulfil both its societal 
and commercial functions, it is critical that the integrity of athletes, coaches, 
referees, and sport organisations be beyond question and that the game itself can 
be trusted at face value (Forrest, McHale & McAuley 2008; Gardiner et al. 2017; 
Numerato 2016). In recent years, sport governing bodies and sport organisations 
such as FIFA or the Dutch NOC*NSF have thus invested in creating extensive 
ethics infrastructures, implementing numerous procedures, ethics codes, rules and 
regulations, as well as structures to monitor, report and sanction. Nevertheless, 
moral transgressions in sport remain at the front pages of our newspapers.
One explanation for why unethical behaviour in sport keeps coming to light, 
is that the notion of good governance has yet to be fully incorporated into the 
day-to-day practices of sport leaders. To date, both research and practice in sport 
emphasise formal-legal structures, policies, and bureaucratic instruments to coun-
ter unethical behaviour (Geeraert & Drieskens 2015). Studies beyond the realm 
of sports, however, consistently show that, while formal-legal measures, ethics 
programs, codes, training and the like have an important role to play in curb-
ing unethical behaviour (Treviño & Nelson 2016), they are unlikely to have 
much effect on ethical decisions and behaviour if they are not embodied by the 
words and deeds of those in positions of power (e.g. Constandt, De Waegeneer & 
Willem 2019; Treviño et al. 1999). Followers look to leaders to understand what 
‘the organisation’ truly values, recognises and rewards (Heres 2014). Hence, where 
leadership fails to show visible support for such formal ethics and compliance 
measures, and implicitly prioritises organisational goals and performance indi-
cators over moral values, the credibility and validity of such instruments of eth-
ics is undermined. Ultimately, this can render compliance and ethics measures 
ineffective, while leaders lose moral authority and followers become increasingly 
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cynical (Bird & Waters 1989; Treviño, Brown, & Hartman 2003). In fact, unethi-
cal behaviour may actually increase under such circumstances: in organisations 
with extensive formal ethics management and governance structures, a leader’s 
lack of ethical responsiveness and guidance may stand out even more because it 
deviates from the explicitly communicated expectations and norms for behaviour. 
This creates especially ambiguous situations for followers wherein the leader may 
be seen to actively reject an ethical stance (Quade et al. 2020). In turn, follow-
ers are likely to become less persistent in their support for ethics and unethical 
behaviour ultimately increases (Greenbaum et al. 2015; Quade et al. 2020). In 
short, only when ethics programs are translated into actual practices at different 
levels of leadership within sport organisations can such programs truly prevail 
(Constandt 2019; De Waegeneer & Willem 2016; Treviño et al. 1999).
Because of the effects of leadership on followers’ sense-making and their per-
ception of the meaning and value of formal compliance and ethics measures, 
it is critically important to ensure ethical leadership as a precondition to good 
governance. Ethical leadership enhances the moral awareness and decision- 
making of followers (e.g. Brown, Treviño & Harrison 2005; Steinbauer et al. 2014). 
And by improving the ethical climate and psychological safety, it fosters followers’ 
voice and speak-up behaviour (Hu et al. 2018; Kim & Vandenberghe 2020). As a 
consequence, ethical leadership reduces counterproductive, deviant and outright 
unethical behaviour and heightens not just commitment and prosocial behaviour 
in organisations but also task performance (Bedi, Alpaslan & Green 2016; Peng 
& Kim 2020). But while scholars produced an impressive amount of research on 
ethical leadership, its effects, and its antecedents in the last 15 years (Bedi et al. 
2016), research on ethical leadership in sport remains decidedly less capacious 
(Constandt et al. 2020).
This chapter aims to highlight how research on ethical leadership can further 
our understanding of and practices towards good governance in sport. To this 
end, it first draws on more general administrative and business ethics research 
to set out the key components that prevailing perspectives on ethical leadership 
distinguish. It then provides a brief discussion of research on ethical leadership in 
sport. The following section offers a critical commentary on the limits of taking 
an ethical leadership perspective on good governance in sport. These insights are 
subsequently used to delineate key indicators of good governance from an ethical 
leadership perspective. The concluding section summarises the discussion and 
lists some important implications for both research and practice.
Ethical leadership explained
Current ethical leadership research has its roots in social and organisational psy-
chology and draws heavily on social learning theory (Bandura 1977, 1986), social 
exchange theory (Blau 1964; Gouldner 1960) and social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner 1986; Turner 1975). In their seminal work on the topic, Brown et al. define 
ethical leadership as “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct 
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through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion 
of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, 
and decision-making” (2005, p. 120). Underlying this definition is the distinction 
between the moral person and moral manager component (Treviño, Hartman 
& Brown 2000). The ‘moral person’ component is typically understood in terms 
of the personal character and motivation of the leader herself. It highlights the 
importance of leaders’ own moral values, their concern for ‘doing the right thing’, 
moral traits such as authenticity, reliability, and trustworthiness, high levels of 
moral awareness, and ethical decision-making (Kalshoven, Den Hartog & De 
Hoogh 2011; Kaptein 2003; Treviño et al. 2000). ‘Moral management’, in con-
trast, focuses on the leadership process and involves the proactive, socially salient 
efforts to safeguard and promote ethics among others. Recently, Kaptein (2019) 
added a third component to ethical leadership, arguing that ethical leaders must 
also be ‘moral entrepreneurs’ who proactively contribute to the development of 
new moral norms. While the moral person component remains a vital and neces-
sary part of ethical leadership (Treviño et al. 2003), it is not a sufficient condition 
for ethical leadership. Rather, it is the moral management and moral entrepre-
neurship that differentiate ethical leaders from amoral (i.e. ‘ethically neutral’ 
rather unethical) management that focuses on efficiency, effectiveness, and bot-
tom-line results and fails to provide followers with ethical guidance (Greenbaum 
et al. 2015; Quade et al. 2020).
Moral management consists of three key aspects: (1) role modelling ethical 
behaviour in a visible manner, (2) reinforcement of moral values and norms, and 
(3) two-way communication about ethics (Brown et al. 2005; Kalshoven, Den 
Hartog & De Hoogh 2011; Yukl et al. 2013). Role modelling is the first and perhaps 
most critical aspect: without it, all other efforts to promote ethics quickly lose cred-
ibility. Followers look to the behaviours that leaders exhibit in order to understand 
what behaviours are or are not acceptable, appropriate and valued in the organisa-
tion. It follows that a leader’s decisions and behaviours must be sufficiently visible 
and salient to be observed by followers “against an organisational backdrop that is 
often ethically neutral at best” (Brown & Treviño 2006, p. 597). Yet, followers’ per-
ceptions of leadership are interpretations of what they see and as such, they are far 
from neutral: perceptions are shaped by both the context in which the behaviour 
occurs and by the more general experiences, expectations, ideals, and assumptions 
of followers themselves (Heres 2014; Quade et al. 2020). Ethical leaders therefore 
must not only avoid behaviours that could be perceived as inconsistent with moral 
values and norms, but also undertake efforts to learn how their decisions and behav-
iours are interpreted by followers, and they must proactively provide followers with 
insights into the reasoning behind their decisions and behaviours (Weaver, Treviño 
& Agle 2005). At the same time, ethical leaders are not without flaws. It is precisely 
in how they show vulnerability and account for their own mistakes, acknowledging 
those mistakes and using them as valuable learning experiences for themselves and 
others, that ethical leaders lower the threshold for followers to be open about their 
dilemmas and mistakes as well (Heres 2014).
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A second aspect of moral management consists of clear and consistent rein-
forcement of the normative standards of the group. In other words, ethical 
leaders make sure to support, acknowledge and reward those who adhere to nor-
mative standards and compliment those who do ‘the right thing’, while holding 
those accountable who commit moral transgressions. Here, informal rewards 
such as recognition, trust and status, and informal sanctions like ostracism 
by peers and leaders, can be quite powerful instruments (Grojean et al. 2004; 
Treviño 1992). Conversely, while formal reinforcement such as demotion or sus-
pension may prove necessary for recurring or severe cases, too strong a focus on 
formal consequences may actually lower followers’ independent moral reason-
ing and foster goal displacement (Bartol & Locke 2000; Baucus & Beck-Dudley 
2005). Either way, consistent reinforcement is key because it allows the wider 
group to use the experiences of their peers to vicariously and anticipatorily 
learn what is and what is not considered ‘normatively appropriate behaviour’ 
(Brown et al. 2005; Mayer et al. 2009; Treviño 1992). As with role modelling, 
however, such learning can only occur when leaders make rewards and punish-
ments sufficiently visible to other followers as well (Treviño et al. 2000). The 
importance of vicarious learning furthermore underscores the importance of 
using a fair and proportionate amount of authority; not punishing too harshly 
or too lightly. Otherwise, what is meant as a message that transgressions of 
moral norms are not tolerated may actually result in resentment and cynicism 
(Johnson 2005).
Communication about ethics is the third and final aspect of moral manage-
ment (Brown et al. 2005). It includes an explication of the leader’s own moral 
decision-making processes, clarification of norms and role expectations, and guid-
ance on appropriate action (De Hoogh & Den Hartog 2008; Treviño et al. 2003). 
At the same time, it is about being approachable, listening to followers, having 
open discussions about the group’s values, and facilitating joint reflections on the 
moral dilemmas and implications of the decisions and tasks at hand (Grojean et 
al. 2004; Huberts, Kaptein & Lasthuizen 2007; Van den Akker et al. 2009). By 
engaging followers in the moral decision-making processes and allowing them 
to voice their own perspectives and concerns, ethical leaders stimulate them 
to view things from different perspectives, to question their assumptions, and 
to think independently and creatively about moral issues (Heres & Lasthuizen 
2012; Resick et al. 2006). Such empowerment of followers helps them to further 
develop their own, independent moral reasoning and judgement (Den Hartog & 
De Hoogh 2009; Resick et al. 2006).
Recently, Kaptein (2019) argued that ethical leadership involves not just a 
moral person and moral management component, but also moral entrepreneur-
ship. As Kaptein explains: “whereas the moral person is oriented toward who 
the leader is and the moral manager toward how the leader influences others, 
the moral entrepreneur is focused on what norms to establish” (2019, p. 1140). 
Applying a social development perspective to ethical leadership, he emphasises 
that ethical leaders should not just comply with and reinforce existing ethical 
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standards, but instead are “frontrunners in ethics” (2019, p. 1143) by proactively 
leading the development of new moral norms and insights. Particularly in sit-
uations where existing moral norms are incomplete or inadequate, there is an 
opportunity for leaders to not just lead with ethics, but to actually lead in ethics 
as well. Under such circumstances, Kaptein (2019) suggests, ethical leaders must 
draw on their high levels of moral awareness, moral reasoning skills and moral 
identity to develop new moral perspectives and sound moral arguments to sub-
stantiate their own proposed norms. While further empirical research on moral 
entrepreneurship is necessary, ethical leaders’ proactive, indeed leading role in the 
development of moral norms seems an important aspect to consider.
In addition to the components of moral person, moral manager and moral 
entrepreneurship, it is important to consider the foundation upon which eth-
ical leadership is built, namely the quality of the leader-follower relationship. 
Although not generally considered a component of ethical leadership per se, lead-
ers’ decisions and behaviours inevitably affect their relationship with followers 
and thereby their ability to influence their followers’ (ethical) decision-making 
and behaviour (Heres & Lasthuizen 2012). As such, the quality of the socio-emo-
tional exchange between leaders and followers provides an important moderating 
mechanism through which leaders can foster ethics (Peng & Kim 2020). By being 
open, respectful, trusting, fair and loyal towards followers, ethical leaders build 
high-quality relations with their followers (Brown et al. 2005; Mayer et al. 2009). 
Followers are likely to then reciprocate with positive, pro-social behaviour and 
refrainment from unethical behaviour that may hurt the leader or the group (e.g. 
Neubert et al. 2009; Walumbwa & Schaubroeck 2009). Moreover, treating fol-
lowers in a fair and just manner reinforces the credibility and moral authority of 
leaders and enhances followers’ motivation to emulate the leader’s ethical behav-
iour (De Schrijver et al. 2010; Neubert et al. 2009). The effectiveness of ethical 
leadership is thus in part based on the ability of leaders to maintain high quality 
relations and interactions with their followers.
Ethical leadership in sport
As in other sectors, high-profile scandals over the past two decades have pushed 
calls for more ethical leadership in sport. Sport forms a preeminent context 
in which moral issues are likely to arise and where the behaviours of coaches, 
managers, and board members can have profound effects on others (Constandt 
et al. 2020). Practitioners and scholars look to leaders as a link between good 
governance policies and good governance practices because of their critical role 
in creating and safeguarding an ethical climate in sport clubs and federations 
(e.g. Burton et al. 2017; Thompson & Dieffenbach 2016). Where leadership is 
amoral or even outright unethical, moral transgressions in sport governance are 
likely to persist (cf. Tomlinson 2014; Welty Peachey et al. 2015). Unethical and 
amoral leadership can create moral ambiguity and reduce followers’ persistence 
in speaking up and raising moral issues, thereby undermining the workings of 
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internal control systems aimed at enhancing integrity, transparency and democ-
racy (cf. Greenbaum et al. 2015; Quade et al. 2020). Many thus consider ethical 
leadership essential to ensure that the moral risks inherent to sport are mitigated 
and that the positive societal impact of sport prevails (e.g. Constandt 2019).
Against this background, the dearth of research on ethical leadership in 
sport seems all the more surprising (Constandt et al. 2018; Welty Peachey 
et al. 2015). To date, only a handful of conceptual and especially normative 
contributions exist. These mostly underscore the need for ethical leadership 
(e.g. Lumpkin & Doty 2014; Roby 2014), discuss what is ‘normatively appro-
priate’ for ethical leaders in sport (e.g. Constandt et al. 2020; Sagas & Wigley 
2014), or draw on sport experiences to illuminate virtues that may be important 
to ethical leadership (Bischak & Woiceshyn 2016). Some emphasise that sport 
is a specific context with its own unique characteristics, such as its governance 
structures, that may pose unique challenges to ethical leadership (Staurowsky 
2014; Welty Peachey et al. 2015). Nevertheless, insights from both business and 
administrative ethics are recognised as promising starting points to further 
our understanding of what ethical leadership in sport entails (Constandt et al. 
2020; Lumpkin & Doty 2014).
While few in number, the available empirical studies on ethical leadership 
in sport support the value of incorporating administrative and business ethics 
insights into sport and sport governance research. Hamilton and LaVoi (2017, 
2020), for instance, show how coaches’ ethical role-modelling can impact the 
moral development, voice behaviour and performance of athletes. And Wells 
and Walker (2016) found the aspect of transparent communication of ethi-
cal leadership to be especially important in organisational change processes 
in athletic departments. Providing more direct support for the relevance and 
generalisability of ethical leadership research to sport settings, Yukhymenko-
Lescroart, Brown and Paskus (2015) report that ethical leadership can positively 
stimulate athletes’ perceptions of an inclusive team climate as well as their satis-
faction.1 Subsequent studies show that ethical leadership can promote positive 
organisational behaviour from staff members within athletic college depart-
ments (Cotrufo 2014), improve ethical climates and affective commitment to 
sports clubs (Constandt et al. 2018), reinforce and strengthen the effects of 
ethics codes (Constandt et al. 2019), and stimulate a sense of accountability 
among athletes. All of these increase voice behaviours as well as individual and 
team performance (White & Rezania 2019). Meanwhile, empirical studies that 
identify unique practices, antecedents, consequences and boundary conditions 
of ethical leadership in sport are non-existent. In fact, contrary to the notion 
that (ethical) sport leadership may differ because of the influence of fans and 
alumni (Welty Peachey et al. 2015), research by Constandt and colleagues 
seems to suggest that fans do not only have no specific concern for ethical 
leadership (unless it affects them); the impact of fans on internal sport leader-
ship processes may actually be quite limited in practice (Constandt, Parent & 
Willem 2020).
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Good governance in sport: An ethical 
leadership perspective
Taking an ethical leadership perspective on good governance in sport shows us that 
any assessment of the quality of governance in sport must necessarily include assess-
ment of the extent to which leaders at different levels of sport organisations and 
sport governing bodies are perceived as moral people, moral managers, and moral 
entrepreneurs. Such an assessment in and of itself is far from sufficient, however. This 
author proposes that assessing the quality of governance from an ethical leadership 
perspective requires an in-depth examination of at least three indicators: (1) long-
term stakeholder perceptions of ethical leadership practices, (2) psychological safety 
and ethical climate, and (3) the structural embeddedness of ethical leadership.
Indicator 1: Long-term stakeholder perceptions of ethical leadership prac-
tices. Consistent and visible ethical leadership of sport organisations and sport 
governing bodies is key. Assessments of ethical leadership must examine per-
ceptions of leaders at different hierarchical levels from the viewpoint of a broad 
stakeholder group, and not just from that of prospective follower perceptions 
(cf. Constandt et al. 2020; Heres 2015). Within-group and between-group dif-
ferences in such perceptions provide important information on specific areas of 
improvement of ethical leadership practices. Likewise, strong fluctuations in per-
ceptions over time may indicate that ethical leadership is not consistently embod-
ied in practice and requires more attention.
Indicator 2: Psychological safety and ethical climate. On the one hand, eth-
ical leadership is important because leaders’ decision-making power is generally 
greater than that of followers and often represents the sport organisation as a 
whole. On the other hand, the leaders’ role in good governance is precisely to 
lead others in following them to do the right thing in the right way. Assessing 
the quality of governance from a leadership perspective, hence, also involves an 
assessment of the extent to which leaders actually succeed in fostering an envi-
ronment in which followers behave ethically. Perceptions of the general ethi-
cal climate and discussability of moral issues (cf. Constandt et al. 2018; Kaptein 
2008), followers’ psychological safety and tendency to speak up, voice critiques 
and provide feedback (cf. Hu et al. 2018; Walumbwa & Schaubroeck 2009), and 
their ethical decision-making and behaviour (cf. Kuenzi, Mayer & Greenbaum 
2020) are thus key aspects to consider when assessing the quality of governance.
Indicator 3: Structural embeddedness of ethical leadership. A final ques-
tion in assessing the governance of sport organisations is whether ethical lead-
ership is actually likely to emerge, sustain and succeed in the long-term. Here, 
it is important to consider (i) the criteria by which sport leaders are selected, 
trained, acknowledged and promoted, (ii) the resources (e.g. time, policies and 
instruments) available to practice ethical leadership, and (iii) the practices of oth-
ers who act on behalf of the organisation and, as such, can both strengthen and 
undermine the leaders’ messages to employees, such as in HR and legal depart-
ments (e.g. Greenbaum et al. 2015; Heres 2016).
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A critical reflection on an ethical leadership 
perspective on good governance
The ethical leadership perspective on good governance in sport holds much 
promise. Foremost, it directs our attention away from the macro- and meso-level 
good governance structures and to the micro-level behaviours of actual actors 
involved in sport and sport organisations. It can shed light on why and under 
which conditions good governance measures are more or less likely to succeed, 
and how we can move from policies’ intentions to actual everyday practices. Yet, 
we must recognise that there are also risks involved in looking at good govern-
ance from a leadership perspective. Three risks in particular must be taken into 
account when applying it to good governance in sport.
A first risk has to do with the narrow focus that a leadership perspective tends to 
put on individual leaders as either omnipotent heroes, incompetent failures or evil 
villains. Leadership is often—erroneously—equated with the person of the leader 
(Stech 2008). Ethical leadership is not built on star players, however: it is a team 
sport that requires solid systems and structures to safeguard, support and reinforce 
it. Too strong a focus on individual leaders can easily result in an excessive focus on 
the characteristics and behaviours of formal leaders, and a general neglect of the 
social, interactive processes through which leadership takes places or potentially 
can take place. Successes and failures of ethical leaders are not merely the result 
of knowledge, skills and motivation or a lack thereof on the leader’s part. For one, 
coaches’ ethical leadership is partly shaped by the ethical leadership of boards and 
managers (Constandt & Willem 2019), while the opposite is also true: top-level 
ethical leadership is dependent on support and emulation by lower-level leaders 
to effectively communicate their ethics agenda (Heres 2016). Moreover, as implied 
above, ethical leadership is more likely to sustain and be effective when it is sup-
ported by followers, when it is acknowledged and rewarded in the organisation, and 
when it is facilitated, trained and reinforced by the wider ethical climate and more 
generic HR and governance systems that also affect, for instance, how employees 
are hired and treated by the organisation (e.g. Greenbaum et al. 2015; Heres 2016). 
Lastly, as organisational culture and structure are closely intertwined and mutually 
interdependent, systemic measures such as procedures, compliance systems, risk 
analyses, clear and safe reporting systems, and monitoring systems remain vital fea-
tures of any healthy infrastructure with integrity (Hoekstra & Heres 2016). While 
ethical leadership may be a critical, necessary condition for good governance, it is 
by no means a sufficient one. An ethical leadership perspective hence will only ever 
be able to provide a partial picture of the quality of governance in sport.
Another risk relates to the subjective, temporal and equivocal nature of any 
assessment of ethical leadership. Moral values and norms are inherently dynamic 
and contextual. Moreover, followers respond not to a leader’s behaviour but to 
their own perceptions and interpretations thereof (e.g. Heres 2014 for a more 
extensive discussion). Given that norms, perceptions and interpretations partly 
depend on attributes of both the context and followers themselves, no one style of 
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ethical leadership will fit all (Heres 2014), and no objective assessment of ethical 
leadership can be made. Furthermore, an assessment of ethical leadership requires 
us to examine and weigh not only the perceptions of followers. As stakeholders 
such as fans, media, sponsors, and government play an important role in the 
social construction of what is ‘normatively appropriate’ for leadership in sport, 
their perceptions of ethical leadership provided by sport leaders is relevant as 
well (Constandt et al. 2020; Constandt, Parent & Willem 2020; e.g. Loyens et al. 
forthcoming). Finally, judgements on the quality of ethical leadership provided 
are bound to fluctuate over time as experiences change, leaders leave organisa-
tions and moral norms in society continuously develop. Taken together, it is thus 
important to keep in mind that understanding good governance from a leader-
ship perspective necessitates not just an assessment of ethical leadership per se, 
but also insight into the organisational systems and structures that ensure ethical 
leadership is maintained in the long term and under ever-changing circumstances.
Lastly, we must bear in mind that ethical leadership is merely distinguished 
from things such as risk management, learning cultures, or diversity and inclusion 
programs in an analytical sense. In practice, good governance requires all of these 
and more at the same time. While explicit and deliberate attention to the moral 
aspects of decisions, behaviours, tasks, and structures is key to raising awareness, 
recognition and handling of such issues (e.g. Bird & Waters 1989) we must caution 
that analytical distinctions do not become too neatly separated fields of attention 
in practice. It would otherwise only result in discussions of ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ 
too far removed from day-to-day work decisions, practices, and situations. And 
when ethical leadership is not viewed in direct relation to core tasks and pro-
cesses, as well as other developments in the organisation and sector (e.g. diversity 
management), ethics and integrity easily become ‘yet another’ of the many aspects 
demanding leaders’ attention, as something ‘extra’ that is reserved for when leaders 
have sufficient time and less workload (cf. Heres 2016; Heres & Lasthuizen 2012). 
Good governance hence requires an integral approach in which leaders’ attention 
to ethics and integrity is not only embedded in day-to-day operations but is also 
practically and explicitly connected to other focal points of good governance.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed what good governance in sport involves from a leader-
ship perspective. It argued that ethical leadership especially is a pillar of good 
governance that helps translate macro- and meso-level systems and policies to 
everyday moral practices. Good governance requires a sport leader to be a moral 
person that is reliable and trustworthy, a moral manager that proactively and vis-
ibly demonstrates, communicates about, and reinforces ethical behaviour (Brown 
et al. 2005), and a moral entrepreneur that contributes to the development of new 
moral norms (Kaptein 2019). Absent ethical leadership, amoral management or 
even unethical leadership may undermine more structural or systemic efforts to 
secure good governance (Tomlinson 2014; Welty Peachey et al. 2015). But ethical 
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leadership is not a panacea and cannot be adequately considered apart from the 
context in which it is set to take place (Heres 2014). The embeddedness of ethical 
leadership in wider governance structures is key to its emergence and sustainabil-
ity, as is support and reinforcement from others. It is thus the team —not the star 
player—that creates ethical leadership success.
Implications for research abound. Above all, it highlights the importance of 
studying good governance by centring not just on the structural, institutionalised 
governance measures and systems that organisations have in place, but also on 
the expectations, experiences, understandings and perceptions that both internal 
and external stakeholders have of the extent to which good governance is embod-
ied in the everyday practices of both sports leaders and their followers. Relevant 
questions for instance include how expectations and perceptions of ethical lead-
ership are shaped by institutional conditions such as the commercialisation of 
sport, and how to ensure ethical leadership in amateur sport where volunteer 
coaches may already be hard to come by and resources are scarce. Furthermore, 
researchers should consider expanding both the selection of respondents and 
methods used to examine sport governance. Incorporating and juxtaposing mul-
tiple stakeholder perspectives and expectations helps in identifying the complex-
ities and dilemmas leaders face in realising good governance. This requires richer 
methods such as interviews, participatory observation, and Q-methodology in 
addition to the more dominant quantitative methods used in ethical leadership 
today (Constandt et al. 2020; Heres & Lasthuizen 2012).
For practitioners, the implications lie foremost in the realisation that good gov-
ernance can only be materialised in and through the practical actions of those 
involved—with sport leaders at the forefront. From coaches to board members, 
from amateur to professional sport, leaders must step up to the plate and pioneer 
the fostering of safe, ethical climates in which good governance is both valued and 
practiced. Simply expecting leaders to provide ethical leadership, however, is not 
enough. Ethical leadership takes a collective and deliberate effort. For ethical lead-
ership to emerge and be sustained, sport organisations and sport governing bodies 
must encourage, train and facilitate ethical leadership skills while simultaneously 
investing in the moral decision-making abilities of athletes and staff as well as in 
HR policies, instruments and structural governance measures to support said indi-
viduals (e.g. Constandt et al. 2018). This includes freeing up time and resources to 
further develop the reflective, communicative and analytical skills of leaders and 
leader-to-be, to monitor the psychological safety that athletes, staff and other fol-
lowers experience, and to take an honest and critical look at the incentives that 
sport leaders and their followers are exposed to and that drive their moral behaviour.
Note
 1. Interestingly, Yukhymenko-Lescroart, Brown and Paskus (2015) also find that eth-
ical leadership does not affect athletes’ perceptions of their teammates’ willingness 
to cheat when abusive supervision is controlled for. They interpret this result as an 
indication that the relative influence of each leadership style depends on alignment 
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in the valences (positive or negative) between the leadership behaviours and out-
comes. In other words, positive, ethical leadership had a strong effect on positive 
outcomes compared with the negative style of supervision while abusive coaching 
behaviour more strongly predicted the negative outcome (willingness to cheat) 
compared to ethical leadership.
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A relationship perspective 
on organisational culture and 
good governance in sport
Vassil Girginov
Introduction
Despite over 50 years of research, the concepts of organisational culture and good 
governance have not lost their currency and continue to intrigue researchers and 
practitioners. A search on ‘organisational culture’ in the Web of Science data base 
returned 19,096 articles including 1,501 published in 2020 alone. The search for 
‘good governance’ showed 18,397 articles of which 2,035 were published in 2020.
It is generally accepted that governance is concerned with steering collective 
actions towards achieving certain results. Injecting the adjective ‘good’ in front of 
governance serves as a qualifier of whether it is effective or not and implies value 
judgement which takes the discussion into the realms of culture and ethics. Sport 
organisations come in different shapes and sizes and what tells them apart is the 
specific culture they subscribe to.
Extant literature on sport governance focuses mostly on improving organisa-
tional structure and practices but culture-informed analyses of governance are 
almost absent or peripheral at best: Numerato (2010) addresses how different 
sport governance cultures promote social capital; Li, MacIntosh and Bravo (2012) 
focus on the intercultural management in sport organisations; Sotiriadou and 
De Haan (2019) explore the role of gender equity strategies in creating a gender 
equitable governance culture; and Geeraert (2018) suggests that culture could 
be an obstacle to good governance. Shilbury, Ferkins and Smythe’s (2013) study 
shows the emergence of commercialisation culture in sport organisations as a 
major contributing factor for the acceptance of corporate governance codes in 
sport. It is also worth mentioning that the authoritative governance audit carried 
out by the Association of International Summer Olympic Federations does not 
even include organisational culture as an indicator despite the explicitly stated 
aim “to promote a better culture of governance” (ASOIF 2017, p. 3).
What most studies tend to overlook is that the implementation of any concep-
tion of good governance inevitably requires, in the first place, a change in the 
value system that underpins the culture of the organisation. For this change to 
take place it ought to address the deeply rooted values and believes of the mem-
bers of the organisation so they can internalise the principles of good governance 
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and enact them in their daily routines. This chapter interrogates the relation-
ship between good governance and organisational culture. It argues that both 
good governance and organisational culture are mutually constructive normative 
concepts which promote a particular view of what ought to be regarded as pub-
lic good. However, this tends to be an unequal relationship because the current 
belief in the power of good governance to enhance the effectiveness of sport 
has become an ideology promoting isomorphism through a universal model of 
organisational culture imposed by governmental and other agencies nationally 
and internationally.
The chapter proceeds as follows: the first and second sections interrogate the 
concepts of organisational culture and good governance, respectively. Section 
three examines the constructive relationship between the two concepts, followed 
by a review of culture of codification of governance and its framing as synony-
mous with effectiveness, and finally some reflections and implications for research 
and practice are discussed.
Culture and organisational culture
Decades of research have not resulted in establishing an agreement on the defi-
nition of organisational culture and good governance and conceptual approaches 
continue to proliferate. In 1952, one of earlier anthropologists, Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn’s critical review of concepts and definitions of culture produced a list 
of 164 different definitions. More recently, Jung et al. (2009) identified 48 vali-
dated instruments for measuring organisational culture.
Most research on culture explicitly acknowledges the linguistic challenges 
in defining this concept. Williams (1989) famously opined that culture is one 
of the two or three most complicated words in the English language. He also 
elucidated that “a culture has two aspects: the known meanings and directions, 
which its members are trained to; the new observations and meanings, which are 
offered and tested” (p. 6). This is an important observation as it allows to dis-
tinguish between two main approaches to organisational culture. The first is its 
conceptualisation as something organisations have also referred to as the objec-
tivist-functionalist view. According to Alvesson (2002), this perspective usually 
conceives culture as an organisational attribute, which can be operationalised 
and studied empirically. This turns culture into a variable and the main concern 
then becomes to understand its relationship with organisational outcomes such 
as effectiveness, performance, and productivity.
The second perspective (symbolic interactionism) sees organisations as cul-
tures. It corresponds to William’s interpretation of culture as the creation and 
testing of meaning by organisational members and the processes that facilitate the 
understanding of this meaning and its enactment. From this perspective, organi-
sational culture is not a variable but a root metaphor (cf. Smircich 1983). Morgan 
(1997) has developed eight root metaphors to describe organisations including 
one of organisations as cultures. According to this metaphor, organisations can 
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be viewed as mini societies grounded in their own ideologies, beliefs, and values. 
Members of organisations then are engaged in a constant construction process 
of shared systems of meaning that are accepted, internalised, and acted upon at 
every level of an organisation and that allow them to understand events, actions 
and situations in a distinctive way. Morgan (1997) refers to this process as the 
enactment of culture. This interpretation of organisations as culture is much 
more difficult to quantify and study empirically.
A related interpretation is Feldman’s (1986) culture-as-context approach to 
management, which stresses the role of symbolic forms including concepts, the-
ories, plans and goals in determining what is changing in organisations. Those 
forms, together with sport organisations’ structures, rules, policies, and symbols 
perform an interpretative function, because they act as primary points of refer-
ence for the way people think about, and make sense of, the context in which 
they work. Thus, sport managers’ key role is that of the management of meaning.
An important contribution to the objectivist-functionalist view of organi-
sational culture is Martin’s (1992) three perspectives on organisations. Martin 
argues that organisations do not have homogeneous cultures rather there are 
always three perspectives present in an organisation. These perspectives are 
reflective of the hierarchical structure of organisations and include integration, 
differentiation and fragmentation that correspond to the top management of 
the organisation, the middle/departmental level, and the front-line staff level, 
respectively.
Maitland, Hills and Rhind’s (2015) systematic review of organisational culture 
in sport utilised Martin’s perspectives and identified 33 studies published between 
1995 and 2013. The authors made three important observations including that: 
(i) some 75% of the studies came from North America and Australia; (ii) 70% 
of studies employed the integration perspective (i.e. culture is consistent across 
the environment), (iii) in contrast to wider organisational culture literature, 
research in sport tends to assume that culture was a variable to manipulate in an 
organisation.
A cultural perspective on good governance
Like culture, the concept of governance (from Greek ‘kybernetes’ which means 
steersman) is equally hard to define. For a start, governance does not translate 
in many languages, which raises the question of how it is possible to define a 
concept when there is no word for it. Offe (2009) even asks whether governance 
was an empty signifier. While the roots of governance can be traced back to the 
first forms of human existence, its codification in the form of ‘good governance’ 
is a relatively new phenomenon. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra’s (2009) exam-
ination of 196 distinct codes of good governance issued by 64 countries notes 
that the first country code of good governance was issued in 1978 in the United 
States, followed by Hong Kong in 1989, Ireland in 1991 and the UK in 1992. The 
first global code of good governance in sport was adopted by the International 
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Olympic Committee (IOC) congress in 2009 and was modelled on the practices 
of the corporate sector.
Nonetheless, commentators generally agree that the concept is concerned with 
the steering of collective action. It is also widely accepted that governance is a 
Western, and an Anglo-Saxon product (Hofstede 1993). This acknowledgement 
points out to the cultural origins of the concept to which we return later in the 
analysis. While a cultural perspective on governance is important, it is not enough 
to appreciate its complexity. Căjvăneanu (2011, p. 73) offers an extensive review 
of the emergence of the concept of governance. She elucidates that: “The rise of 
the concept of governance has been largely stimulated by the increased political, 
economic and social diversity. Throughout the 1904’s, -1990s’ it has explicitly 
recognised two interrelated failure of the state and the market to address com-
plex social issues. But the diversity of interests and needs is also reflective of an 
ever-increasing cultural diversity rooted in different values and world ontologies. 
Both in the European and the world context, governance has emerged mainly as 
an economic concern (i.e. economic conditionality)”.
Thus, like culture, governance is a social construct and at its core, governance 
is a political theory concerned with the relationship between the state and society 
(Treib et al. 2007). This relationship has been marked by the simultaneous failure 
of the state and the market to deliver public value, so there was a need for an 
alternative approach that would recognise the limits of traditional government 
and the market to deal with uncertainties. What emerged, according to Rhodes 
(1996, pp. 652–653), is “a change in the meaning of government, referring to a 
new process of governing; or changed condition of ordered rule; or a new method 
by which society is governed”. Rhodes’ definition of governance illustrates the 
political interpretation of the concept, which is one of its two main meanings. 
The second main meaning of governance is the administrative one concerned 
with “the setting of rules, the application of rules, and the enforcement of rules” 
(Kjær 2004, p. 10).
Conceptualisations of governance in sport have drawn from both inter-
pretations as demonstrated by Jean Camy, pointed out to the ontological and 
deeply rooted cultural foundations of the concept: “When thinking about Good 
Governance we shall not focus too heavily on procedures. Good Governance has 
most and foremost to deal with a way of being, organizing and thinking!” (Camy, 
cited in ISCA 2013, p. 9).
Hofstede (1993) highlights the significance of culture to management theory 
and practices by simply noting that “management theories are human” (p. 82). He 
develops a model for analysing and measuring culture and applied it to examine 
management in different cultural settings. Hofstede points out to three idiosyn-
crasies typical for US management theories that are not shared by the rest of the 
world including a stress on market processes, and on individual, and a focus on 
managers rather than on workers.
What follows from the Hofstede is that we ought to concede the possibility 
that the notion of good governance can be underpinned by different ontologies. 
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Khan (2012) highlights one such alternative ontology by distinguishing between 
the dominant liberal ‘market-enhancing’ approach to governance, and ‘growth- 
enhancing’ governance appropriate for developing countries which draws on the 
historical evidence of catching up. Khan concludes “good governance as it has 
been defined cannot plausibly be a precondition for development” (p. 52). Khan’s 
point applies not only to ‘developing countries’ but equally to developed ones as 
it highlights the importance of organisational capabilities as well as the domi-
nant resource distribution policies as a precondition for sport development in any 
country.
Ultimately, the dominant neoliberal conception of good governance is con-
cerned with greater organisational effectiveness. This view is echoed by most 
national and major international organisations including the IOC, as illustrated 
by the European Union’s expert group on good governance (2013). In addition to 
recognising good governance both as a framework and a culture, the expert group 
also explicates that “… it is important to underline that good governance essen-
tially comprises a set of standards and operational practices leading to the effective 
regulation of sport” (p. 5). This interpretation of governance sees it as a means to 
an end, where good governance is positively correlated with greater effectiveness 
of sport organisations, and thus mirrors the model promoted by the corporate 
sector. Spencer-Oatey (2012) offers a useful summary of 12 main characteristics of 
culture, which complement the two approaches to organisational culture outlined 
above by highlighting its main properties. These characteristics are juxtaposed 
with good governance in the next section.
Organisational culture and good governance  
as social constructs
Scholars have interrogated the link between good governance and organisational 
culture and there is a limited research addressing this issue in sport as well. The 
two concepts of culture and governance exemplify Morgan’s (1997) metaphors of 
organisations as culture and political system, respectively. As he has noted, culture 
has a tacit political dimension, which does not allow grasping the real importance 
of culture through the culture. This is because the metaphor of organisations as 
political system draws attention to a myriad of patterns of competing personal 
and group interests, power struggles, conflict resolution, individual and institu-
tional censorship, and leadership inherent in any organisational setting.
Culture and governance permeate the five basic social institutions guiding 
human existence including the family, government, economy, education, and 
religion. Regardless of the culture in which social institutions are nested, as 
Koskinen (2014) observes, their core function is consistent and is concerned with 
determining and regulating membership and ownership, legitimising power, and 
controlling and socialising young generation. That is, they exist to govern.
Culture and governance share another important similarity. Both represent 
nomos-building activities as they seek to reduce uncertainty and to confer order 
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(Girginov et al. 2006). Thus, interpretations of governance are cultural con-
structs underpinned by core assumptions and values held by members of profes-
sional communities in different countries. The evolution of modern sport from 
a pass time of the privileged few to a politically and economically sanctioned 
activity for the masses supports this conclusion (Horne, Thomlinson & Whannel 
1999). Its role in the development of societies has been recognised at the highest 
political level including the 2007 Lisbon Treaty of the European Union and the 
UN Millennium Sustainable Goals (United Nations, 2016). Evidently, sport has 
been democratised as it has become more widely accessible to different groups in 
society. As a result, its systems of governance have also evolved to accommodate 
the increasing diversity of participants and practices as well as to ensure its con-
tribution to society. Thus, both culture and governance have been constructed 
through an ongoing strive for external adaptation and internal integration. This 
is also what makes them normative concepts as they are concerned with regulat-
ing and controlling organisational and human behaviours.
The evolution of the UK code of good governance in sport provides an illus-
trative case. The first major impetus in its development was ideological and polit-
ical and came in the late 1990s when the newly elected labour government of 
Tony Blair introduced the modernisation agenda of society. It entails that sport 
organisations who receive public funding must improve their effectiveness, so 
they become a fit partner to the government in delivering its wider social and 
economic agenda (Houlihan & Groeneveld 2010). National Governing Bodies of 
sport (NGB) were also expected to become more fiscally responsible, transparent, 
democratic, and professional. The conceptual underpinning of modernisation 
was provided by the tenets of New Public Management with its insistence on 
strategy, key performance indicators and effectiveness (Houlihan & Green 2009; 
Lusted & O’Gorman 2010). Several successive measures have marked the roll out 
of good governance across the UK sport sector including the launch in 2004 of 
the first code by UK Sport, a national strategy towards a better governance in 
sport in 2012, and the latest Code for Sport Governance in 2016. Walters and 
Tacon’s (2018) examination of the codification of governance in the UK sport 
sector concludes that the initial adoption of the code was done to create external 
legitimacy for the organisation, which was then used for its internal legitimacy 
and to reinforce members’ perceptions that the Board was providing sound steer-
ing. The authors also make another important point that members perceived the 
codes as often constraining the autonomy of the Board.
In sum, following Spencer-Oatey’s (2012) 12 main characteristics of culture, 
several points of converge with governance can be identified. First, culture and 
governance are manifested at different layers of depth including national, organ-
isational, and group for culture, and global, national, and organisational princi-
ples for governance. Second, both culture and governance affect behaviour and 
interpretations of behaviour. Third, culture and governance are associated with 
social groups such as organisations or teams. Forth, both concepts have universal 
(etic, i.e. global sport culture and governance principles) and distinctive (emic, 
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i.e. sport-specific culture and Board governance practices) elements. Fifth, cul-
ture and governance are learned through a process of socialisation and represent 
social constructs. Finally, culture and governance are subject to gradual change.
A culture of codification of good governance
There has been a proliferation of good governance codes (GGC) in all sectors 
of society. For example, the website of the European Corporate Governance 
Institute (ECGI) provides an extensive list of GGC topped by the UK with 
53 codes. Earlier, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) reported that in 2008, 
UK and USA had both 25 GGC each compared with an average of 1.5 codes 
per country for the rest of the world. The correlation between national culture, 
as represented by the country issuing the GGC, and the number of those codes, 
is an important one as it points out to the presence of a relationship between the 
dominant culture of a country and the extent to which it embraces the spirit and 
practices of GGC.
Haxhi and Van Ees (2010) have tried to explain diversity in the worldwide 
diffusion of GGC using a sample of 67 countries. The authors conclude that “the 
dimensions of culture that reflect norms and beliefs in society about the integra-
tion of individuals into groups, the equality and the distribution of power, and the 
tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity, correlate with the issuance of codes and 
the identity of the issuing organizations. We find that individualist cultures have 
a stronger tendency to develop codes” (p. 722). In answering the question ‘how 
and why sport issues turn into politics?’ Seippel et al. (2018) conclude that regard-
less of national cultural specifics, “(…) the culture framing of sport issues could be 
decisive in how they might develop as political issues. We see, more specifically, 
how our sport cases live and develop differently within various cultures” (p. 680).
Cuervo-Cazurra and Aguilera’s (2004) pioneering study of 72 codes in 49 coun-
tries offers two main theoretical explanations for the diffusion of GGC including 
efficiency and legitimation.  The two theoretical explanations are closely con-
nected with the essence of governance as positively correlated with effectiveness 
and efficiency for the former, and organisational culture, being shaped by the 
strive for external adaptation and internal integration, as expressed through legit-
imacy, for the latter.
A cultural belief: Good governance equates  
greater effectiveness
The diffusion of the GGC across different cultures has largely been driven by a 
belief that good governance leads to a greater organisational effectiveness and 
performance. Girginov (2019) questions this assumption and points out to two 
issues concerning what is understood by effectiveness and how we measure it.
Thus, any discussion on effectiveness ought to account for an organisation’s 
culture and its governance structure and practices. Several large-scale studies 
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have explored the link between organisational culture and effectiveness. One of 
the most comprehensive attempts to interrogate this link is the theory of organ-
isational culture and effectiveness developed by Dennison and Mishra (1995). 
The authors propose a model based on four organisational culture traits including 
involvement, consistency, adaptability, and mission. They submit that the “cul-
ture may indeed have an impact on effectiveness. Each of the four cultural traits 
showed significant positive association with a wide range of both subjective and 
objective measures of organisational effectiveness, as well as interpretable link-
ages between specific traits and specific criteria of effectiveness” (p. 28). Dennison 
and Mishra also note the role of organisational size where culture and effective-
ness are more closely linked in larger firms due to the coordinating effect of cul-
ture in complex systems.
A 47-nation study by Smith, Peterson, and Schwartz (2002) on the role of 
cultural values as sources of guidance and their relevance to managerial behav-
iour provides strong evidence that values do predict reliance on those sources of 
guidance.
Cuervo-Cazurra and Aguilera’s (2004) and Haxhi and Van Ees’ (2010) studies 
reveal that the issuers of codes fall in three groups including coercive; normative 
and mimetic promoted by stock exchange and investors’ groups, government and 
professional associations, and managers’ associations respectively. These con-
clusions tend to suggest that national and corporate cultures exert significant 
influence on governance practices and that the wider diffusion of GGC tend to 
promote greater convergence.
However, as the analysis in previous section has illustrated, what really matters 
is which characteristics and traits of culture are associated with the principles of 
good governance and how they interpret them. The dichotomy between organ-
isational culture and governance is elucidated by Niedlich et al. (2019) where 
organisational culture becomes the framework within which good governance 
takes place. This is because all reasoned action is based on a logic of appropriate-
ness or an understanding of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good. At 
the same time, as the norms of good governance are becoming internalised by the 
organisation, they start shaping its culture as well.
Sport scholars have also explored the links between good governance, organi-
sational culture, and effectiveness. A systematic review on the impact of govern-
ance principles on sport organisations’ governance practices and performance by 
Parent and Hoye (2018) reveals the lack of robust empirical research on which 
governance principles should sport organisations adopt and implement to opti-
mise their governance performance. This finding supports the conclusions by 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Aguilera (2004) and Haxhi and Van Ees (2010) that the 
GGC promote different forms of isomorphism. The lack of evidence for positive 
correlation between GGC and performance suggests that those codes have been 
adopted under coercive, normative, or mimetic pressure and often in the absence 
of knowledge about the presence of such positive correlation. Mrkonjic’s (2016) 
analysis of nine governance codes issued by various international organisations 
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reinforces the above observation. He finds that there was a lack of commonly 
agreed principles, and that several codes were marked by a low level of enforce-
ment and the lack of implementation.
A rare study by Malagila et al. (2020) on corporate governance and perfor-
mance of the UK premier leagues echoes the above conclusions that the size of 
the organisation does matter. Papadimitriou and Taylor (2000) also confirm that 
the size and external liaisons of the NGB’s Board are key factors for the effective 
governance along with the interests of different stakeholders, internal processes, 
strategic orientation, and science support.
Chaker’s (2004) survey of good governance in Europe provides some clues as 
to why organisational culture and governance diverge. The survey reveals prin-
ciple differences in state regulation of sport in Europe where some states take 
an interventionist approach by providing 95% of NGB’s funding (i.e. Croatia, 
Georgia, Lithuania), whereas others take more non-interventionist approach, as 
in Finland, with only 25% of sport organisations’ funding coming from the state. 
Some states also tend to take a more centralised approach to the distribution of 
lottery finding than others.
The new UK Code for Sport Governance (Sport England/UK Sport 2016) pro-
vides an illuminating example for coercive isomorphism and the promotion of a 
new governance culture. The foreword to the Code, makes this clear: “We intro-
duce this code, then, confident that the sports sector is well-equipped, and well 
positioned to use it as a tool to further nurture the growing culture of good gov-
ernance we already see on a daily basis” (p. 4). The Code further stipulates that 
“Unlike most other Governance Codes, this is a mandatory set of requirements 
for those organisations seeking public funding” (p. 6). At the end of 2017, 55 of 
58 (95%) NGB were compliant with the Code. However, concerns were raised by 
many officials that the implementation of the Code was very time consuming, 
entailed greater administrative cost, its mandatory character has been a deterrent 
for recruiting talent to serve on Boards, and it was seen by some sports as ‘one size 
fit all’ approach and thus, a ‘tick box’ exercise (Walters & Tacon 2018). The impli-
cations for state-sport organisations relationship are that in less-interventionists 
countries, members of the NGB will have a greater autonomy in the governance 
of their organisations compared to the more interventionist one.
Another comprehensive report on the status of good governance in inter-
national summer Olympic sport federations (IF) shows significant variations in 
their scores ranging from 84 to 187 (out of 200, ASOIF 2020). Of the six highest 
scoring IF, three—FIFA, International Cycling Union (UCI) and International 
Equestrian Federation (FEI)—are headquartered in Switzerland, the International 
Tennis Federation is based in London and the World Rugby is in Ireland. Only 
one IF, BWF (Badminton World Federation), has its headquarters in Malaysia. 
Four of the six IF are also in the group of five IF earning more than CHF 50 m/
year and employing over 120 staff. Thus, the size and location of a sport organi-
sation appear to be key factors in determining its level of good governance as it 
will be subjected to the influence of the prevailing culture in the country. This 
A relationship perspective 95
conclusion is supported by studies in the business sector (Mudashiru 2014; Smith 
et al. 2002), and as Peterson and Smith (1997, p. 934) elucidate ‘‘the link between 
nation and culture tends to occur because people prefer to interact with other 
people and be guided and politically governed by institutions consistent with 
values and beliefs with which they identify’’.
Conclusion: On the limits and opportunities for a cultural  
perspective on good governance
The analysis of the relationship between organisational culture and good govern-
ance suggests that these two concepts are mutually constructive. However, sev-
eral fundamental differences between the concepts were also revealed meaning 
that equally, there is a parallel process of divergence as well.
First, culture is a descriptive not an evaluative concept. It either describes what 
an organisation has (i.e. functionalist perspective) or what is (i.e. interpretative/
metaphor perspective) (Alvesson 2002; Smircich 1983). Good governance is 
essentially an evaluative concept as it primary function is to evaluate the extent 
to which an organisation is governed well or not and to confer legitimacy over it. 
Second, good governance subscribes to the functionalist and humanistic inter-
pretations of culture. According to Stocking (1966, p. 868) humanist culture is 
plural and progressive, and its traditional usage distinguishes between degrees of 
‘culture’ in much the same way as we distinguish between degrees of good gov-
ernance according to the score obtained. The humanist interpretation of culture 
became associated with the ‘civilization process’ with which the West has justified 
its attempts to conquer the world (cf. Girginov 2010), so in this regard, culture 
bears striking similarities with the domination of the Anglo-Saxon model of good 
governance. A functionalist/humanist perspective on governance fails to recog-
nise organisations as mini societies grounded in their own ideologies, beliefs, and 
values, who actively interpret the reality and try to make sense of it. Finally, 
good governance promotes coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism sup-
ported by the deliberate efforts of international sport organisations, national gov-
ernments, and professional associations. This isomorphism runs counter to the 
essence of culture which is to discriminate (Kopytoff 1986) as different sports and 
groups try to assert their identities by distinguishing themselves from others. The 
fundamental values on which culture is based represent differences that cannot 
be randomly added or combined in a code, they can only be reconciled through 
interactions and meaning construction.
The above reflections allow for drawing some implications for researchers and 
practitioners. The application of the culture concept to the study of good govern-
ance helps to interrogate the interplay between universal codes (i.e. etics) and the 
myriad of locally meaningful interpretations (i.e. emics), which may result in less 
abstract and more practical GGC. Practitioners will benefit from developing cul-
turally meaningful definitions of good governance and their operationalisation 
based on ongoing dialogue with various constituencies.
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policies and practices




Towards ‘good’ good 
governance policies in sport
Lessons from Australia
Kate Corkery and Geoff Schoenberg
Introduction
Sport Australia, legally known as the Australian Sports Commission (ASC), 
is the Australian Government agency responsible for supporting and investing 
in sport in Australia. The Commission is comprised of Sport Australia and the 
Australian Institute of Sport (AIS). Sport Australia is responsible for supporting 
and investing in participation sport, physical activity, and industry growth; the 
AIS has responsibility for high performance sport.
In addition to Sport Australia’s sector wide vision, the organisation plays 
a critical role as the primary funder for most national sporting organisations 
(NSOs). This funding role includes both support for operations that deliver par-
ticipation outcomes as well as supporting high performance athletes and teams. 
As Sport Australia is a government agency, the funding distributed comes from 
the Australian taxpayer, meaning there is an obligation to ensure this pub-
lic money is being spent effectively and in accordance with acceptable public 
standards.
In Australia, NSOs are, for the most part, not-for-profit companies overseen by 
a voluntary board of directors (Shilbury 2013). This board of directors holds the 
ultimate responsibility for the organisation and is responsible for ensuring the 
organisation pursues its objects in accordance with its legal duties and respon-
sibilities (Hoye & Doherty 2011). One of the key responsibilities of the board, 
therefore, is to ensure effective and efficient expenditure of taxpayer money that 
is invested in NSOs by Sport Australia. For this reason, Sport Australia has had 
a long-standing focus on the effective governance of NSOs.
In this chapter, we focus on the intersection of these three ideas: the need for 
effective NSOs, Sport Australia’s responsibilities as a funding body investing tax-
payer money, and the importance of effective governance. More specifically, we 
examine how Sport Australia has attempted to facilitate the improvement of gov-
ernance practices in Australian sport. We begin by providing an overview of the 
different strategies, documents, methods, and practices used by Sport Australia 
with a focus, primarily, on the period from 2012 to 2020. Following this descrip-
tion, we analyse the effectiveness of Sport Australia’s approach and outline how 
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the lessons learned from 2012 to 2019 influenced the development of the most 
recent strategy for influencing governance in the sector—Sport Australia’s new 
Governance Framework.
Sport Australia’s interest in improving sport governance is, compared to many 
other nations, a relatively long-term and iterative process. The nature of the 
Australian sport system—both its structure and culture—has been an impor-
tant factor in contextualising Sport Australia’s role in improving governance. 
Culturally, for example, the involvement of government in sport is not only 
tolerated but also expected. There have been examples where the community 
have expected the Government to intervene. However, given Sport Australia’s 
long-standing efforts and experience, a critical reflection about its past and pres-
ent policies could still provide valuable insight to governments and other fund-
ing bodies who are investing in governance reform process. Additionally, this 
practical reflection can help contextualise and inform academic studies about 
achieving sport organisations’ compliance with good governance standards 
(Geeraert 2019).
The purpose of this chapter is not a theoretical or academic analysis of the 
Sport Australia approach. Rather, we draw on our experiences and observations 
to provide a narrative and insight from a practitioner perspective. In our posi-
tions as Sport Australia staff members,1 we played leadership roles in facilitat-
ing a sector-wide co-design process to create the new Sport Australia framework. 
This experience means we developed the rationale for the development of the 
framework and have intimate knowledge of the successes and failures of the Sport 
Australia approach which led to the development of a new framework. Where 
possible, we support our claims and reflections with documentation but have had 
to redact or keep private some documentation given the nature of the relation-
ships between Sport Australia and Australian NSOs.
Background: Sport Australia and the Australian  
sport structure
Over time, Sport Australia has published its vision for the sport sector in the 
form of various strategic plans including Australia’s Winning Edge (Sport Australia 
2012a), Play.Sport.Australia (Sport Australia 2015b), and, most recently, Sport 
2030 (Sport Australia 2018b). In each of these sector-wide strategic documents, 
Sport Australia has highlighted the importance of good governance, with the 
most recent strategic vision specifically observing:
The best governance systems will better position our sports for a changing 
world, enabling them to focus their energy, time and revenue on driving 
international performance, strengthening the pathways system, creating 
greater commercial opportunities and increasing participation rates among 
more Australians.
(Sport Australia 2018b, p. 3)
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With its broad mandate described in Winning Edge, Play.Sport.Australia, and 
Sport 2030, Sport Australia has regularly outlined its views on the importance of 
sport governance. Sport Australia expects well-governed NSOs to be more likely 
to attract the best calibre people, as board members and executives; facilitate safe 
and well-developed grass roots participation and pathways; and ultimately, deliver 
high-performance results. In the long term, for athletes to succeed and achieve 
their full potential, they need their sports to succeed as organisations.
The acceptance of the importance of good governance is fairly universal in 
both theory and practice. However, in its role as a distributer of public fund-
ing, Sport Australia has additional responsibilities to taxpayers. Consequently, 
Sport Australia went beyond stating the importance of good governance but 
also identified that “sports will be required to demonstrate good leadership, 
governance and administration as part of the annual investment and review 
process” (Sport Australia 2012a, p. 6) thereby using its power and authority to 
tie funding to a range of specific criteria including, but not limited to, govern-
ance practices. However, the federated model of Australian sport,2 the inde-
pendent legal status of NSOs, and practical considerations limit the extent to 
which Sport Australia uses its authority to withdraw or reduce funding. There 
are some inherent compromises due to the tension between a desire to not 
detrimentally affect athletes for poor administration but not invest in poorly 
governed organisations. This is exacerbated because many NSOs funded by 
Sport Australia have limited sources of funding outside of Sport Australia and 
would face significant challenges to their long-term viability should funding be 
reduced or removed.
Most NSOs who receive funding from Sport Australia operate under a fed-
erated model where eight state and territory sporting organisations (SSOs) are 
an NSO’s voting members (Shilbury 2013), and where eight individuals, the 
presidents of the SSOs cast the votes which elect and remove the Directors. As 
SSOs typically provide comparably a small percentage of funding to the NSO, 
this leads to an incongruence between the ‘ownership’ of an NSO (its members) 
and its funding (Sport Australia). This incongruence between ownership and 
funding of NSOs creates barriers for the ability for Sport Australia to enforce 
its mandate. For example, an NSO may attempt to change its constitution to 
align with Sport Australia good governance requirements. However, changes 
to an NSO constitution (usually) requires endorsement of at least 75% of the 
members, which means SSOs can block the change from being made. This 
leads to a situation where Sport Australia must balance its relationship with 
an NSO that is actively seeking to improve its governance practices while the 
federated model, via the SSOs, prevents this from occurring. Furthermore, any 
efforts by Sport Australia to enforce its mandate through a reduction in funding 
will often have a direct effect on athletes, making this an unappealing course 
of action.
Generally, Australia’s federated model means sport is over-governed, mean-
ing funds and other resources (including time and energy) are not able to be 
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applied efficiently and effectively towards the growth of the sport and the ath-
letes. Instead, they are spent on overlapping processes and layers of management 
and governance.
Sport Australia’s approach to setting governance policy
Sport Australia released its first Sport Governance Principles in 2002—as best 
practice guidelines for sporting organisations to operate under—and revised these 
in 2007 (Sport Australia 2007). However, it was the significant revision in 2012 
(Sport Australia 2012b) which made the principles a focal point of conversation 
about governance in the sector. These principles kick-started the contemporary 
conversation and practice of sport governance in Australia and serve as a funda-
mental reference point for the sector. Partially due to the 2012 principle, building 
capacity and capability in sport governance is now viewed as a sector-wide pri-
ority, and good governance considered a key enabler for successful, sustainable 
entities.
The increased attention to governance practices and the evolving discourse 
on the subject drove Sport Australia to develop a suite of governance materials 
aimed to complement and extend the Sports Governance Principles. The suite 
of documents (Governance Publications) iteratively published between 2012 
and 2020 included the Sports Governance Principles (Sport Australia 2012b), 
Mandatory Sports Governance Principles (Sport Australia 2015a), Governance 
Reform in Sport—June 2016 (Sport Australia 2016a), Governance Reform in 
Sport: Discussion Paper (Sport Australia 2018a), Unified Behaviours—Creating 
Success (Sport Australia 2016c), Integrity guidelines for directors and leaders of 
sporting organisations (Sport Australia 2016b), as well as a set of practical tools 
including a board evaluation tool and a template constitution. Additionally, 
Sport Australia staff were allocated to provide guidance and support to NSOs on 
governance matters.
Of the documents listed above, the two most critical and influential were the 
Sports Governance Principles (SGPs) and the Mandatory Sports Governance 
Principles (MSGPs) as these were broader in scope compared to the narrower 
focus of the other documents.
The SGPs advocated strengthening structures that support good leadership and 
decision-making, ensuring sound and effective governance. The resource took 
the form of six major principles: Board composition, roles and powers (1.1–1.13); 
Board processes (2.1–2.6); Governance systems (3.1–3.10); Board reporting and 
performance (4.1–4.6); Stakeholder relationship and reporting (5.1–5.4); and 
Ethical and responsible decision-making (6.1–6.3). The target audience of the 
SGPs was ambiguous with specific references to NSOs but also references to ‘the 
sporting landscape’ and ‘all sporting organisations’. This caused confusion within 
the sector as to what organisations were subject to the SGPs. Within the sector, it 
was also unclear as to the extent this was a federal initiative (i.e. Sport Australia) 
or a collaborative approach with the State and Territory governments.
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The MSGPs were specifically targeted at Sport Australia funded NSOs. They, 
as the name suggests, were intended to be mandatory for the 23 NSOs most 
highly funded by Sport Australia although all NSOs were assessed against the cri-
teria. The MSGP were structured in three sections: Structure of Sport (1.1–1.3); 
Board Composition and operation (2.1–2.11); and Sport transparency, reporting 
and integrity (3.1–3.7). All funded NSOs were measured against the MSGPs as 
part of Sport Australia’s Annual Sports Performance Review3 (ASPR) process. 
In recognising both the contributions and limitations of the era defined by the 
SGPs and MSGPs, Sport Australia recognised the potential need for change, par-
ticularly given the inclusion of unified governance behaviours and contemporary, 
best practice governance models in the Sport Australia Sport 2030 strategic plan 
(Sport Australia 2018b). In addition to examining the potential for change, Sport 
Australia’s increased attention to governance, the resources it has made availa-
ble, and the prescriptions of governances practice meant a comprehensive review 
and assessment of the currency and efficacy of Sport Australia’s sport governance 
materials was timely. In seeking to achieve the Sport 2030 targets, the review of 
the 2012–2019 period determined simply producing an updated document which 
refined and consolidated all current resources and documents would be insuffi-
cient. More change was needed.
In August of 2020, Sport Australia overhauled its governance policy with the 
release of its new Governance Framework (see Table 8.1). The framework is a 
new approach that links existing, updated, and new Sport Australia governance 
policies into one overarching structure. The framework has four primary com-
ponents including: Governance Principles, Education and Resources, Evaluation 
and Assurance, and a structured and formalised Sport Australia Advisory service. 
The framework is accessible online so, rather than an extensive description, we 
will only include a brief summary of each component.
The revised Governance Principles include nine specific principles. Each 
principle follows the same structure including the principle itself, benefits of 
the principle, questions to promote reflection, expected behaviours and actions, 
recommendations, and a summary to explain key parts of the principle. The 
Table 8.1 The new Sport Australia Governance Framework
Governance 
Principles
Educational and accessible principles for the whole sector with 
an increased focus on behaviours
Education and 
Resources
Interactive, digital and adaptable resources integrated within the 




Outcomes-based governance standards to evaluate funded 
NSOs governance maturity and develop Governance 
Improvement Plans and enhance public reporting
Sport Australia 
Advisory Service
Direct advisor relationships with funded NSOs to assist 
implementation of Governance Improvement Plans and general 
governance advice
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Education and Resource component provides a set of templates and tools which 
are directly linked to the Sport Governance Principles. The Evaluation and 
Assurance component is, primarily, a set of 37 outcome-based standards across 
the nine principles to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of governance sys-
tems and processes. Finally, the Advisory Service is a team of Sport Australia 
governance advisors who work directly with NSO boards and CEOs on govern-
ance matters through a formalised process.
The launch of the new framework marked a further evolution in Sport 
Australia’s approach to governance policy. In the next section we reflect on our 
experience in developing and delivering the new Governance Framework. These 
are drawn from the conversations and observations we had throughout the design 
process and includes our own experience within the sector as well. These are 
offered with the intention to help other bodies develop effective sport governance 
policy.
Lessons learned
The process of change is almost as important as the output
The methods by which the significant update of the SGPs in 2012 and the 
MSGPs in 2015 were introduced to the sector may have produced an unintended 
consequence. The sector, generally, appreciates that the SGPs and MSGPs were, 
overall, appropriate and reflective of the needs of the sector and contained endur-
ing components. However, the process of design and introduction was alleged by 
some of not being consultative of the entire sector and created a risk of setting 
arbitrary boundaries for a sector with a high level of complexity and variation. 
More specifically, the language referring to NSOs throughout the documents cre-
ated the possibility of inconsistency in governance standards between NSOs and 
SSOs, with SSOs generally taking the view that the SGPs did not apply to them. 
Given the connectivity between sporting organisations, with SSOs being the 
members of NSOs, it was important that all organisations within a sport devel-
oped, implemented, and maintained a robust system of governance that fitted 
the circumstances of their sport. While some sports made progress, there was 
shortcomings in this regard.
In designing the new framework, Sport Australia deliberately took a more con-
sultative and collaborative approach. This included partnering with state gov-
ernment sport agencies and key sector stakeholders in three distinct phases of 
co-design. Phase one was a series of face-to-face workshops in every state and 
territory (153 individuals from 52 sports). Phase two was a series of online jams4 
which engaged over 300 individuals from more than 70 sports. Phase three 
included three design labs structured to provide deep dives into specific content 
areas with a diverse selection of experts and stakeholders.
The co-design process was invaluable in the way in which it harnessed the 
extensive experience, competence, and unique variations of the Australian sport 
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sector. The output, the new Governance Framework, was the result of countless 
contributions incorporating national, state, and local experiences across more 
than seventy sports. This process of co-design inclusivity created two marked 
positives. The first outcome was an evolved framework which was accessible, edu-
cational and fit-for-purpose as determined by the end user. By being involved at 
each stage, the sector was critical in shaping the content and language to reflect 
the needs and views of the sector. The second outcome was a shared sense of own-
ership. Members of the sector identified their contributions in the final product, 
there was trust in the process, and they have, thus far, become advocates for the 
framework.
The approach to compliance should be focused  
on outcomes and development
The previous approach of the MSGPs and the ASPR created a culture in some 
NSOs of implementing governance practices for compliance rather than for 
improved governance outcomes. Our consultation with the sector during the 
development of the evolved framework identified that NSOs, despite the inten-
tion of Sport Australia, perceived the MSGPs and ASPR as an annual box-ticking 
activity, binary in nature, and simply a compliance requirement. These percep-
tions were grounded in a level of praxis.
As staff members at Sport Australia, we witnessed several NSOs who scored 
at the highest end of the measurement scale experience significant governance 
crises. For example, one non-Olympic sport scored above 95% on its ASPR for 
governance, but, in practice, there have been constant detrimental governance 
issues that are challenging to measure because as they predominantly relate to 
issues of culture and behaviour. This includes six director changes in less than 
four years, an incumbent chair standing for re-election being removed from the 
board, calls from member organisations for special general meetings to change 
the constitution without consulting the NSO, special working groups established 
to address the issues, and clearly fractured relationships between key parties.
While this particular case is an extreme example of the disconnect between 
the assessed compliance with the MSGPs and governance in practice, it was, in 
our opinion, reflective of an overall issue. What particularly translates from this 
case to other NSOs is the inability of the MSGP assessment to capture the rela-
tionships between member organisations (usually the SSOs) and an NSO. These 
relationships are, in many ways, fundamental to good governance in the federated 
model of Australian sport.
In addition to the validity of the MSGPs as a measuring tool, it is also worth 
understanding the Sport Australia approach to implementing the MSGPs. In 
practice, the MSGPs were mandatory to report to, and governance was a factor 
when determining public funding, however, it was only one factor considered 
alongside many others. Additionally, detailed reporting was kept confiden-
tial between Sport Australia and NSOs with a public document “Sports Tally” 
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produced (now no longer available) which provided more surface level insight on 
NSO governance performance.
The theory behind Sport Australia’s introduction of the MSGPs and the corre-
sponding reporting was to force NSOs to adopt structures, policies, and practices 
which, generally, are associated with good governance. In general, the approach 
was successful in achieving structural change. However, this approach did not 
account for issues such as behaviours and group dynamics which are increasingly 
shown to be important factors in effective governance (Schoenberg, Cuskelly, & 
Auld 2016, 2020).
First, the nature of the MSGPs was output focused. To illustrate this, we high-
light MSGP 2.2—A nominations committee that nominates directors for vacancies 
upon which the members vote. In assessing compliance with this requirement, 
measurement focused on whether there was a nominations committee or not; 
there was no evaluation of the effectiveness of the nomination committee. While 
most funded NSOs did introduce a nominations committee as a result of the 
MSGPs, the approach to compliance meant it is unclear as to whether these com-
mittees have had any impact. Anecdotally, there are several examples of voters 
rejecting the recommendations of a nominations committee.
Second, reporting compliance with the MSGPs could be completed by an 
executive with the board having no input or oversight. For example, in a few 
NSOs, the board was not even aware of the process or the reporting being 
completed making it difficult for the board to contemplate meaningful change. 
With the report being completed by a small group (i.e. Chair and CEO) without 
board discussion, there was limited awareness of potential areas for improve-
ment. Furthermore, Sport Australia kept the detailed reporting private. This 
means there was limited accountability or transparency to NSO members or 
other key stakeholders on whether an NSO was meeting the Sport Australia 
requirements.
The feedback from the co-design process guided a shift in the Sport Australia 
approach to compliance and measurement. The previous measurement approach, 
through MSGPs and the ASPR, effectively became compliance for compli-
ance sake whereas the new approach is focused on using compliance as a tool 
for improving governance. This new approach is underpinned by the new Sport 
Governance Standards.
Each of the 37 new standards contains four measures which are tied to out-
comes rather than outputs. This process has built on the “implemented, adopting, 
or not implemented” scale of the previous process by developing measures which 
provide increased description and detail about the different outcomes available 
within each standard. These measures provide more nuance in the evaluation 
of governance by examining what the outcomes of governance practices have 
been. In the new approach, simply having a nominations committee would not be 
sufficient as the top score requires the nominees put forward by the nominations 
committee to be elected to the board.
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Furthermore, Sport Australia has integrated transparency and accountability 
into the compliance process. The new approach requires NSOs to publish an 
annual governance statement outlining their performance against the standards 
along with commentary (i.e. “if not, why not”) against any deviation or lack of 
achievement of the standards. This report is to be made available to both Sport 
Australia and an NSO’s members. Sport Australia expects that, by requiring 
NSOs to report to members, the board will be more involved and understanding 
of the process.
This new approach to compliance reflects the commentary from the sector that 
the MSGPs did not acknowledge that, due to different factors, organisations have 
different needs and certain governance practices may fit one organisation but not 
another. Using the standards as an organisational governance evaluation tool, 
Sport Australia will be able to identify, advise, support, resource, and educate 
partners and, in turn, work with the NSOs, State Government Agencies for Sport 
and their SSOs and Clubs for a whole-of-sector approach to continually improve 
governance systems and processes.
Policy needs to be complemented with support
Sport Australia, from 2012 to before the launch of the new framework in August 
2020, provided effective leadership in the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of good govern-
ance, but provided limited public information on the ‘how’. The language and 
approach of the pre-framework materials (e.g. SGPs) was often very technical 
and not accessible to directors without a governance background. Boards and 
executives of sport organisations drafted policy and processes in accordance with 
the principles but, without an understanding of the purpose or use of these pol-
icies, they were not referred to or used by the organisations (e.g. boards have a 
Board Charter to ensure compliance, but the directors do not discuss, refer to, 
or update it). Thus, whilst the policies and systems previously mandated by Sport 
Australia are predominantly in place at national and state level, NSOs have not 
achieved the intended outcomes.
Throughout the process of developing the new framework, the sector was uni-
fied and consistent in its demand for resources that are accessible, educative, and 
practical. Two components of the new framework—Education and Resources 
and the Advisory Service—were designed specifically with this in mind. The 
Education and Resources component provides a set of templates and tools 
which are tied to specific principles to help organisations. Additionally, there is 
a ‘Governance 101’ section at the start of the principles which introduces gov-
ernance and key terminology to help new directors—often passionate volunteers 
within a sport, but with limited governance background—understand their role 
and expectations.
The Advisory Service will consist of Sport Australia continuing to invest in 
direct relationships with sports to support governance improvement plans over 
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three phases. The intention is to continue to provide specialist internal capability 
to work closely with Boards and CEOs to improve their governance practices, to 
provide directors with the soft skills and general knowledge they need to get up 
and running, and to facilitate connections to assist directors in learning from 
their peers. This service will be tailored to each NSO and is focused on imple-
mentation and the ‘how’ of good governance.
The service is, partially, modelled on previous success Sport Australia had 
achieved supporting NSOs through bespoke projects. Sport Australia had identi-
fied a range of concerns about the administration of an Olympic sport in Australia 
particularly in the areas of governance, finance, legal, strategy and member pro-
tection. Following a comprehensive review led by Sport Australia, a list of over 20 
recommendations was made to enhance the sport in Australia which effectively 
outlined the blueprint for its future success. Over the past five years, this sport has 
undergone a significant transformation and is now operating as a highly effective 
and capable NSO which is delivering outstanding outcomes both on and off the 
field-of-play. Within this case, Sport Australia played a significant role during this 
process, providing support, guidance, and resourcing to allow the sport to achieve 
substantial reforms in its operation.
Disaggregated policy is confusing—Provide a ‘one-stop shop’
Prior to the release of the framework, governance policy regarding Australian 
sport was disaggregated and occasionally inconsistent. Sport Australia had pro-
duced numerous publications on the topic, but it was unclear as to how these 
all related and what to do in the case of contradictions. In addition to Sport 
Australia, each state government had their own approach to governance along 
with industry bodies producing governance guidance and advice as well. This 
created a confusing landscape for directors and executives to navigate.
In addition to the amount of governance material produced within the 
Australian sport sector, it was not always clear how to manage the different con-
texts of each organisation. The sport industry has undergone, in a significant way 
for some sports and still at the starting gate for other sports, a transition from vol-
unteer-driven amateur sport to professionally managed and delivered sport sup-
ported by volunteers. The pressure of mandatory requirements for associations, 
SSOs, and some NSOs was seen to paralyse the effectiveness of the Board as 
policy requirements become overwhelming and disaggregated.
Overall, there was a sector desire for the principles to be tailored or adapted for 
all sport organisations regardless of size, location, or maturity in order to create 
consistency within sports and across sports. This required the consolidation of 
existing materials into a new set of principles would provide a single resource for 
the sector.
From the Sport Australia perspective, this is now in-place. Previously, tem-
plates and tools were available in different places on the Sport Australia website 
and state government websites. These tools are now found on the same page as 
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the principle to which they are aligned, on a single landing page for the Sport 
Australia Governance Framework.
The co-design process, described earlier, helped to develop the framework in 
a way that accounted for the needs of most Australian sport organisations—at 
least the national and state bodies. At the time of writing, it is too early to know 
whether Sport Australia’s Governance Framework will become the ‘one-stop 
shop’ and replace the materials produced by other key partners, however early 
indications and interest from the sector indicate this may well be the result. At 
the very least, Sport Australia has been able to produce singular place for all its 
policy and guidance on sport governance.
Change through policy is attainable
Perhaps the most important lesson is that government policy and actions can 
create change. For all the challenges Sport Australia has had embedding good 
governance outcomes underpinned by the SGPs and MSGPs throughout this 
chapter, the SGPs and MSGPs have objectively shifted process and policy in the 
sector with respect to good governance. This was primarily connected to com-
pliance and funding, but it also created much stronger ‘peer pressure’ for NSOs 
to be governed well as they started to compare (and be compared). There was a 
shift in the culture of Australian sport towards the notion that good governance 
was important, and it should be given priority. The evolution further leverages 
the social persuasion (Geeraert 2019) with expectation of public reporting of gov-
ernance outcomes.
As evidence of the effectiveness of the MSGPs, Sport Australia undertook 
formal assessments against them in 2016 and 2018 as a part of the ASPR pro-
cess. The ASPR, within a governance context, captured the MSGPs: struc-
ture for sport, board composition and operation. The ASPR process required a 
NSO to submit a self-evaluation to Sport Australia indicating their compliance/
non- compliance with the MSGPs. Despite the identified challenges there was 
improvement against all Mandatory Standards between 2016 and 2018 except for 
gender balance (MSGP 2.6). Despite the validity of the MSGPs as an effective 
measuring tool for good governance being questionable, NSOs began adopting 
good governance practices that had not currently been in place.
Overall, the work of Sport Australia in the 2012–2020 period created change. 
Rightly or wrongly, government agencies and their policies on governance can 
lead to meaningful change in the sector.
Discussion and conclusion
The learning described above, while subjective, provide insight for the effective-
ness of the Sport Australia approach to sport governance policy. In consider-
ing and contextualising the reflections above, there are a few high-level themes 
which may be generalisable to other contexts.
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Policy cannot be separated from context. Within Australia, the effectiveness 
of Sport Australia policy is affected by the historic organisational model for 
sport in Australia. The traditional federated structure of most Australian sports 
means that most NSOs are controlled by SSOs (members) who provide a very 
small share of an NSO’s funding. The bulk of NSO funding comes from Sport 
Australia. Given Sport Australia’s reluctance to withdraw or reduce funding to 
NSOs, due to the fear of negatively affecting athletes, SSOs can act in ways to 
maintain, consolidate, or increase their control of the NSO which can conflict 
with Sport Australia policy. In Australia, the most recent framework was deliber-
ately co-designed with partners to help ensure the policy meets the needs of the 
sector demonstrating an understanding of the complications which arise from 
tensions between government policy and federated sport governing bodies.
Policy does lead to change. While evaluating an organisation on compliance 
with the MSGPs provided limited insight into the effectiveness of governance, 
the evaluation process revealed that, across the sector, the MSGPs did pro-
duce change in governance practices. These changes varied in significance but 
included change in legal structures and changes to organisation’s constitutions; 
indicative of the impact the MSGPs had on structural changes. These changes 
shift the question from ‘can governance policy create change’ to ‘how can gov-
ernance policy create impactful change’—an evolution which is captured in 
the policy growth as Sport Australia has moved from disaggregated policies and 
support services to a singular framework which explicitly links the components 
together.
Developing and optimising good governance policy takes time. Sport Australia 
has been producing and refining governance guidelines of some form for over 
fifteen years. The iteration is not done in isolation, it is a product of the context 
of the sector and collaboration with other key partners in the sector. The new 
framework represents a consolidation of all experiences and feedback of the par-
ticipants in the sector who are accountable and responsible for good governance. 
To achieve the recent framework required collaborative iteration of policy and 
socialisation of Sport Australia’s facilitative leadership in the sector over time. 
Broadly, the complexity and the maturity of the recent framework demonstrate 
how governance policy has advanced within Australian sport through compari-
son with the policy which came before.
Perhaps most critically when considering the role of policy in contributing to 
effective governance is the purpose of governance itself. Governance exists on 
behalf of stakeholders to ensure an organisation delivers on its objects. Thus, 
within sport, governance is a key means to facilitating safe and sustainable par-
ticipation and performance in sport. If government policy starts focusing on 
governance for governance sake through a purely compliance focused lens, sport 
organisations may struggle to deliver the primary purpose of the organisation. 
Within Australia, the transition from a compliance-focused MSGP reporting 
program to an outcome-focused set of standards should support organisations in 
meeting their goals.
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In conclusion, in reflecting on our involvement in the Australian sport sector 
and our roles at Sport Australia, we identified some clear lessons on designing 
and implementing sport governance policy. These include: the importance of 
the change process, centring compliance on outcomes and development, com-
plementing policy with support and education, and ensuring policy is consistent 
and easily accessible. There is no single way to achieve improved governance 
but inducing and guiding the meaningful implementation of good governance 
is more arduous than simply a government agency stating what principles should 
apply. A combination of co-designed clear accountabilities that are adjusted and 
iterated as lessons are learned as well as education and evaluation applied consist-
ently and with discipline over time will create meaningful improvement.
Notes
 1. Ms Corkery is still, as of writing, an employee of Sport Australia. Dr Schoenberg left 
Sport Australia prior to involvement with this chapter.
 2. In the Australian context the clubs or individual members are the voting members 
of the state sporting organisations and the state sporting organisations are the vot-
ing members of the national sporting organisation.
 3. The ASPR process covers more than just governance and is part of how Sport Aus-
tralia ensures accountability for NSOs receiving public funding.
 4. Online jams used a combination of video conferencing and live polling to allow 
people to see and interact with real-time responses (e.g. up vote or down vote) from 
colleagues all around the country to questions put forward by the Sport Australia 
team.
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For those who believe that sport can bring benefits to society and individuals, the 
governance of sport matters. In order for sport to achieve its maximum impact, 
the resources available to the sector must be managed effectively, efficiently and 
honestly.
As explained elsewhere in this book, there are a number of different actors in 
the sector who can influence sport governance, ranging from sport federations 
themselves to governments, social scientists, journalists, NGOs, commercial 
partners and others. I will consider the role that consultants can play in pro-
moting better governance in sport, acknowledging that their involvement offers 
benefits, while also posing risks.
The organisations that govern international sport, such as the not-for-profit 
associations known as International Federations, arguably have the most direct 
responsibility. A number have embarked on governance reform projects in recent 
years, such as FIFA (FIFA 2016). However, the fact that there are limits to self- 
governance is well-recognised (Geeraert 2019).
Governments, a vital or dominant source of funding for sport in many coun-
tries, increasingly often take an interest in sport governance. Indeed governments 
are among the stakeholders in the International Partnership Against Corruption 
in Sport (IPACS), a multi-stakeholder platform (IPACS 2017). The over-riding 
objectives for governments in this area are to protect public investment and to 
obtain the best possible return for the funding provided. The leverage of control 
over funding can give governments power to impose monitoring processes and 
to drive change. While the evidence suggests that government involvement is 
growing, governance of relatively small sport bodies will rarely be a top priority. In 
many countries, the government department responsible for sport also has limited 
capacity and appetite to act.
Academic research has played an important role in the evolution of sport gov-
ernance. For example, university research is naturally vital in the anti-doping 
field. When academics with relevant expertise are consulted, they can provide 
guidance on a broad spectrum of governance topics. The key constraint on the 
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influence of university researchers is that, in most cases, there is no obligation 
on sport federations or other actors to seek input from them, nor necessarily to 
implement advice that is received. It is only in quite specific circumstances that 
the academic sector can influence governance in sport directly.
Many of the highest profile sport governance scandals in recent years have 
been uncovered by the work of investigative journalists. There is no doubt that 
investigations into FIFA from the late 1990s onwards by journalists including 
Jens Weinreich, Andrew Jennings and Thomas Kistner (among others) have had 
a significant impact on sport governance. An active, thriving media industry 
with the freedom to ask difficult questions makes a vital contribution in this 
sector, as in many others. However, media outlets and individual journalists have 
limited resources and will naturally tend to focus on the most outrageous cases. 
More mundane, everyday reverses or improvements in governance are unlikely to 
attract much media attention.
The role of consultants
I believe there is also an important role for consultants specialising in sport gov-
ernance, a group consisting of an assortment of individuals and small organisa-
tions who have become more prominent and more numerous since about 2010.
I made my own entry into sport governance consultancy in 2013. I had spent the 
prior 15 years of my career entirely in the sport sector, including stints with a gov-
ernment sport agency in the UK, an International Federation in Switzerland and a 
number of years in communications consultancy, working mostly on Olympic clients 
related to the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Beijing, Vancouver and London.
By 2011 I had become concerned about poor governance in international sport 
and began actively researching the field both out of personal interest and with the 
belief that there could be a commercial opportunity.
My perception was that failures and vulnerabilities were being uncovered regu-
larly, particularly by investigative journalism, but there was only a limited amount 
of activity to attempt to rectify the issues identified.
After 18 months of planning, I set up I Trust Sport Ltd in 2013. A second 
company with a slightly different focus, Governance United Ltd followed in 2018, 
established with two other co-founders.
In this chapter, I will make the case that the consultancy approach shows promise 
and offers several benefits as one of an array of tools for reforming sport governance. 
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that it is also possible for consultants to 
hinder efforts at reform if the inherent risks are not managed adequately.
Argument
My observation is that consultancy projects have made an important contribu-
tion to changes in sport governance. Federations including World Athletics (for-
merly the IAAF) and the International Biathlon Union (IBU) have overhauled 
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their constitutions and ways of working as a result of commissions that were led 
by external consultants (IAAF 2016a; IBU 2019). I should mention that I Trust 
Sport was not involved in either of these projects.
In both cases high-profile crises and leadership changes provided impetus for 
fundamental reforms and then independent consultants with specialist expertise 
contributed significantly to the technical work.
The IAAF appointed a consultant with experience serving on of the federa-
tion’s committees as chair of the IAAF Governance Structure Reform Working 
Group. The final set of recommendations arising from the working group (IAAF 
2016b) was ultimately accepted in a vote by the IAAF Congress. Measures included 
changes to the authority and composition of the Executive Board, which has sub-
sequently seen the introduction of some independent directors, plus the creation of 
the independent Athletics Integrity Unit. The Integrity Unit oversees all doping 
and other integrity matters, including the investigation and prosecution of cases.
In 2018 the IBU appointed a senior lawyer with experience in international 
sport as chair of its External Review Commission (IBU 2018). The set of reform 
proposals approved by the IBU Congress the following year included the intro-
duction of term limits for the Executive Board and the delegation of ‘judicial’ 
decisions to an external authority, namely the relevant divisions of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport.
I argue that advisory projects of this type, following the traditional consul-
tancy model, are one method of promoting better governance in sport that can 
be highly effective, in the right circumstances.
Forms of consultancy in sport governance
It is worth considering the term ‘consultancy’ and what it involves. Definitions of 
consultancy tend to describe it as a professional practice that gives expert advice 
within a certain field. An individual consultant or consultancy firm usually pro-
vides expert advice on a particular subject to an organisation (generally known as 
the client) for a fee (Institute of Consulting 2020).
In order to provide an effective service, the consultancy firm should have 
relevant expertise, which may include individuals with specific qualifications. 
Typically, the consultant or company will provide a service that the client lacks 
or is unable to fulfil. Being external to the client organisation, the consultant can 
potentially offer a more objective point of view, and with greater freedom than an 
individual employee or internal team.
The client organisation may decide to appoint a consultant to gain an objec-
tive perspective, or to help take difficult decisions. In addition, it may be more 
efficient in cost and time to appoint a consultant than to use internal resources, 
especially for a one-off project.
Thinking about the sport governance sector in particular, a consultant could 
theoretically supply a service to any of a number of stakeholders. The client could 
be an organisation or an individual within the sector, such as a sport federation/
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association, league or club. Alternatively, the client could be an organisation to 
which sport bodies are accountable in some way (Pielke 2013). There are hierar-
chical organisations that sport bodies are directly accountable to, such as govern-
ment agencies and other bodies with a regulatory role. Funders of sport are also 
potential clients, again including government agencies as well as sponsors and 
broadcasters. A third category of possible client consists of organisations with 
public reputational impact on sport, ranging from international institutions to 
non-governmental organisations and activists.
A personal observation in the sport governance sector is that the main poten-
tial consultancy opportunities seem to divide between (1) audit and (2) advisory 
approaches. Traditionally, an ‘audit’ is an opinion given based on examination of 
financial statements. However, the term can also be used in a wider sense.
Michael Power (1999) describes the conceptual elements of audit. In the first 
instance, there is a clearly defined objective, such as measuring compliance with 
regulations. An individual or organisation that has some independence from the 
matter being audited conducts technical work to gather evidence. The auditor 
then expresses a view based on the evidence.
Audit is typically required when there is an accountability relationship of some 
type. It is intended as a risk reduction exercise.
Advisory governance consultancy, by contrast, fits the traditional consultancy 
model in which a consultant is appointed to provide an external, more independ-
ent perspective, or to help take difficult decisions.
There may be individuals or groups within an organisation who want to reform 
governance but face resistance or are wary about making the case because they 
perceive risks in doing so. In these circumstances, appointing a consultant may 
be the preferred option.
One strength of the advisory consultancy approach is that findings and recom-
mendations which an organisation has commissioned itself may be more likely 
to be addressed and adopted (as in the example of World Athletics cited above). 
External intervention is not a pre-condition, although pressure from outside may 
on occasion provide motivation for the decision to hire a consultant.
In the following paragraphs I move to consider some examples of how consul-
tancy in sport governance functions, plus the related benefits and risks.
The ASOIF case
I Trust Sport’s most prominent work has been the provision of an external, 
semi-independent governance audit service. In my experience, this can be a pro-
ductive approach for reforming sport governance because it creates incentives and 
a pathway for incremental improvement.
A client project worth highlighting is the Association of Summer Olympic 
International Federations (ASOIF) governance study. ASOIF has conducted 
three assessments of international federations in 2017, 2018 and 2020, all with 
support from I Trust Sport.
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The assessment, which is overseen by an appointed committee, takes the form 
of a self-assessment questionnaire distributed to the International Federations 
that consists of 50 indicators, each scored on a scale from 0 to 4. Indicators are 
divided equally among five broad themes: transparency, integrity, democracy, 
development and control mechanisms. Each score for every indicator has a sepa-
rate definition to make the assessment as objective as possible.
As an example, one indicator in the Transparency section assesses the extent 
to which General Assembly documents are published on the organisation’s web-
site. If there is only a press release announcing decisions made after the event, 
the score would be 1. For a score of 3 a full set of documents should be published 
openly. To earn a maximum score of 4 extra information should be provided, such 
as an archive of minutes and/or a video recording of the meeting.
The federations fill in their scores and provide justification, such as a reference 
to the relevant section of their statutes or a link to a webpage. I Trust Sport then 
moderates the completed questionnaires, adjusting scores up or down, where nec-
essary, with explanatory comments. The objective is to be consistent and fair to 
each participating International Federation.
The resulting data can be analysed in different ways, looking at single indica-
tors across a set of International Federations or changes in the scores of individual 
federations from one review to the next. After three assessments there is now 
evidence of improvements over the course of time.
In the review published in April 2017 (ASOIF 2017), 18 out of 28 International 
Federations studied had published at least one set of audited financial accounts. 
By the time of the third assessment, published in June 2020, this number was 
up to 25 out of 31 International Federations that were analysed (ASOIF 2020). 
Regarding term limits for elected officials, 13 out of 28 International Federations 
had some type of term limit in place in April 2017. This had increased to 22 out 
of 31 by early 2020.
While it is inevitably difficult to show that specific measures such as increased 
financial transparency and term limits for elected officials in themselves reduce 
risks of governance failings, these are examples of recommendations which tend 
to be found consistently in good governance codes.
The governance audits and associated meetings and support materials that 
were part of the project are of course only one of the drivers of various positive 
changes in International Federation governance in recent years. However, the 
official status of the project and the knowledge that the assessment would be 
repeated have evidently encouraged federations to adopt reforms specifically to 
meet standards defined in the ASOIF assessment process.
In several cases, the external impetus appears to have helped internal advo-
cates for change, easing the progress of governance reforms that might otherwise 
have taken longer or not happened at all.
The case has been made that consultancy can make a useful contribution to 
improving sport governance, particularly in combination with reformers inside 
the organisation. By its nature, consultancy offers some opportunities that 
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distinguish it from other actors in the sector, such as academics and journalists. 
There are also associated risks.
Opportunities of consultancy
An important and perhaps under-recognised advantage of the consultancy 
approach is that there are limited barriers to entry. Each year, a number of indi-
viduals with significant experience in the sport sector continue to establish them-
selves as consultants, including some who focus on governance. There should 
be no call on public funding, nor any need to persuade a larger organisation to 
allocate scarce resources.
Compared to other types of legal entity, the structure of a privately-owned 
limited company provides considerable flexibility. It is perfectly possible for the 
same company to adopt a traditional consultancy model or to meet demand that 
might exist for training materials, technology tools or a variety of other products 
and services, with few restrictions.
In addition, a fair degree of experimentation is feasible. Proactive approaches 
can be combined with responses to requests for proposals. At least in the early 
stages, a small consultancy company can explore opportunities with some free-
dom, learning where there might be a gap in the market.
It is no surprise that consultancies specialised in other sectors and law firms 
have also become active in sport governance as it requires only a limited invest-
ment. The modest size of the overall market has perhaps limited the extent of 
their involvement to date.
In my particular case it soon became apparent that there was a need and an 
opportunity for governance audits, most often commissioned by organisations 
with an explicit or de-facto regulatory role (i.e. an organisation that provides 
supervision in some way).
Audit offers potential value as a consultancy approach for improving sport gov-
ernance. It may be contracted centrally for a number of organisations, which 
brings benefits in the form of a degree of independence from the organisations 
being audited and the potential to make comparisons. In addition, it may be 
repeated at intervals, providing the means to track progress over time.
There is an obvious potential conflict when a single supplier works on both 
advisory and audit projects for the same client. In general, I Trust Sport has 
tended to concentrate on the audit side.
By contrast, governance advisory work is more likely to be commissioned by 
the sport body itself, posing risks (of which more below), and only at occasional 
intervals, perhaps following a change of leadership or negative publicity.
One of the other aspects of the consultancy opportunity to consider is the 
diversity of potential clients.
As referenced above, consultants can either work with sport bodies or with 
stakeholder organisations. When sport bodies are the client it is important that 
there is some degree of openness to an external view and an appetite for change. 
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When appointed by stakeholders, the work is more likely to be effective if the 
client has genuine leverage over the organisation in question.
Until now it has appeared that the majority of the governance consultancy 
projects in international sport have been commissioned by sport bodies them-
selves or by organisations with at least a partial regulatory role.
Governments and inter-governmental bodies have contracted occasional 
pieces of work but rarely on a significant scale. This is an area that may see growth 
in future.
In the case of not-for-profit organisations, such as grant-giving organisations 
with a relevant purpose, any funding available is often heavily over-subscribed, as 
in the case of the European Union’s Erasmus+ programme. Until or unless there 
is a well-funded organisation with a specific interest in sport governance, it is dif-
ficult to see such bodies commissioning substantial consultancy work. Of course, 
it is an advantage for the consultancy approach that seeking grants is only one of 
several possible avenues for funding, and not the most significant.
There remains potential for some of the more independent stakeholders in 
sport to hire governance consultants. Sponsor activism in sport governance has 
tended to be limited to isolated cases, with one example being the withdrawal 
of T-Mobile from its sponsorship of a professional road cycling team in 2007 fol-
lowing negative publicity in relation to doping (Austen 2007). In future there 
may be more significant activity from sponsor brands, private equity groups and 
broadcasters that have an interest in seeing improvements in sport governance.
A personal observation is that sponsors have tended to react to governance 
crises in organisations or individuals they fund in a binary way: either the com-
mercial relationship is cancelled, as in the case of T-Mobile, or else no action is 
taken, at least as far as is known publicly.
A third way should be possible, in which brands demonstrate to their share-
holders, customers, employers and other stakeholders that they are acting respon-
sibly, acknowledging reputational or even legal risks in their relationship with 
sport properties and acting in an appropriate way to try to deal with the issues. 
Cooperation between sponsor brands with similar interests might be one approach 
to consider if individual companies are reluctant to act alone.
Risks of consultancy
It would be remiss at this stage not to consider the risks associated with con-
sultancy, which can limit its effectiveness in the sport governance field or even 
actively hinder progress towards reform.
1 Competence
The first and perhaps most obvious risk is that the consultant may be unsuited 
to the task, whether through lacking relevant expertise, professionalism or 
even integrity. Indeed, in the new and evolving sector of sport governance, it 
is far from clear what the ‘right’ skills are.
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However, the same is ultimately true of all consultancy and of many roles 
within organisations (e.g. integrity officers). It seems unlikely that wholly 
incompetent or unscrupulous consultants would be able to continue in the 
market for long. Provided that consultants are perceived to add value in other 
sectors, there is no reason to believe they cannot do so in sport governance.
2 Need for a paying client
It is inherent in the nature of most consultancy, beyond pro bono projects, 
that there must be a paying client. In contrast to a staff journalist or tenured 
academic who might have some latitude to choose a subject which looks 
interesting and worthy of study, a consultant can only work if a client is 
willing and able to pay.
In some types of consultancy, such as financial audit, there is a regulatory 
requirement that creates a market for the service, or at least a well-estab-
lished niche that consultants serve.
By contrast, in the case of sport governance, the sector was scarcely recog-
nised and the market hardly existed until about 2010. A consultant seeking 
to improve sport governance, therefore, has to offer a service which a client 
chooses to pay for. As a result, there are intrinsic conflict of interest risks in 
the relationship between client and consultant, which do not usually apply in 
the case of a wholly external actor, such as a journalist or academic researcher.
Almost all consultants seek to leave key client contacts and the organisa-
tion feeling that the project has been worthwhile. In some cases, the piece 
of work may clearly be a one-off. In other cases, the possibility of repeat 
work exists, either explicitly or implicitly. In aiming to please the client, the 
consultant should obviously be aware of the risk of steering too far towards 
outcomes or recommendations that are hard to justify in the particular cir-
cumstances of the project.
3 Scope of work risks
In engaging with a potential or actual client the first risk relates to the scope 
of work for the project. In the absence of a regulatory requirement or easily 
defined parameters, it may not be straightforward to determine what aspects 
of governance should be covered. Some clients are prescriptive about the 
terms of reference (e.g. revising an organisation’s code of ethics), while oth-
ers are fairly vague (“meet best practice standards”). The consultant may be 
able to influence the scope of work, either in the process of trying to secure 
the client, or through persuasion once appointed. Nevertheless, the final 
decision on the scope of work rests with the client. Should the project be 
restricted or mis-directed in a way which the consultant finds unacceptable, 
the responsibility lies with the consultant to walk away. In fact, comparable 
risks apply regarding the scope of work for an internal member of staff with 
governance responsibilities.
As an example, in the case of a governance audit study similar to the 
ASOIF governance project it would be possible for the client to seek to 
remove potentially sensitive topics from the assessment questionnaire, such 
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as the existence of term limits for officials in sport bodies. If a client made 
such a demand, the consultant would have to choose between going ahead 
with an exercise of reduced value or abandoning the work.
An additional risk on a similar theme is that the client and consultant may 
have very different views about what amounts to good practice in a particular 
aspect of governance. One example is the topic of quotas regarding gender 
balance in leadership roles. It is perfectly possible to make a strong case both 
for and against the use of quotas. If the disagreement is truly fundamental, 
finding a practical resolution may be a challenge.
Incidentally, the gradual maturing and evolution of sport governance may 
prove helpful in defining an appropriate scope of work for consultants. Once 
specific tools and methods become accepted as industry standards then it will 
be easier for clients to commission a project.
4 Being used as an instrument
Even if the consultant is satisfied that the scope of work is appropriate, a 
related risk is that the client may have a clear objective from the start (or 
even a vested interest) in the project reaching a specific conclusion. In some 
cases, a client seeks external validation for an idea that is already being con-
sidered internally, which is recognised as one of the motivations for appoint-
ing consultants.
A plausible scenario is that a sport body under new leadership commis-
sions a governance project with the aim of justifying a desired change in the 
way the organisation operates.
In the circumstances, the consultant may reach a similar conclusion to the 
client but a risk obviously arises if the consultant in their professional judge-
ment believes, after due process, that a different recommendation is appropri-
ate, or else that the right course of action is debatable. Confronted with this 
situation, much will depend on the consultant’s powers of persuasion and the 
willingness of the client to engage in meaningful dialogue. Provided that the 
client has good intentions, a reasonable compromise will often be possible. 
An internal member of staff might have an even more difficult task to win 
over the organisation’s leadership in the same scenario.
In determining how much to compromise, it is reasonable for the consult-
ant to take into account what is realistic in the circumstances. If reforms will 
have to be approved by a vote at a General Assembly, for instance, there may 
be limits to the extent of changes that will be acceptable to members. In such 
cases, an effective engagement campaign by the organisation’s leadership and 
external pressure can obviously help win over the doubters.
A risk of a slightly different type arises when a client body seeks to legiti-
mise aspects of the organisation to external stakeholders, perhaps even gloss-
ing over significant failings. One method of doing so may be by trying to 
direct or instrumentalise a ‘brand name’ consultant to reach a desired con-
clusion. A university department or team may be appointed with the same 
intention.
124 R. Jack
In appointing a ‘brand name’ consultant as an instrument in this way, the 
client hopes to borrow their reputation just as a commercial brand may look 
for a reputational benefit from the association with a popular sport property 
that it sponsors.
It is obviously the responsibility of the consultant to determine what 
findings are appropriate and legitimate. Consultants should be wary about 
projects that seem mainly intended to justify the client’s preferred course of 
action.
A related reputational issue arises when an organisation or interest group 
seeks to commission an ‘attack’ project with the aim of exposing poor prac-
tice or damaging another interest group either within the same entity or 
elsewhere. The consultant must decide whether both the potential client 
and their grievances are credible. Even if they are, there may be a trade-off 
between potential dangers and rewards.
The risks described above all relate to consultancy projects involving a 
sport body directly as the client, where there are inherent potential conflicts 
of interest. Some of these hazards are mitigated if the work is commissioned 
by a regulator or other external entity rather than by the organisation to be 
studied.
However, there conflicts of interest can still arise. For example, even a 
well-intentioned regulator may be uncomfortable about a consultation survey 
producing findings that are critical of the regulator itself.
5 Limitations of audit
In relation to governance audit work, an important risk to consider relates to 
the limitations of the audit process itself.
Former financial auditor Michael Power describes audit as the level of a 
folk craft or art (Power 1999). Historically, there has been an iterative cycle 
relating to financial audit where audit is seen to fail when a high-profile scan-
dal occurs and the audit process is revised. A period of stability follows for a 
few years, until the next failure.
He describes several compromises which he argues are inevitable in any 
audit exercise.
Perhaps the most significant is the ‘expectations gap’ between what society 
believes audit should do (namely, correctly identifying when an organisation 
is in financial trouble or instances of serious malpractice) and what it can 
actually achieve. The stated objectives of the auditor for the audit of financial 
statements of a company in the UK, the legal form of most national sport fed-
erations, are “(…) to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial 
statements as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether due to 
fraud or error, and to issue an auditor’s report that includes the auditor’s opin-
ion” (Financial Reporting Council 2016, p. 1).
Expensive and intrusive financial audits, which are required by law and 
highly regulated, still sometimes fail to uncover serious issues, as repeated 
cases in business and other sectors including sport attest.
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A second important compromise concerns the relative benefits of prox-
imity and independence. While people inside an organisation will usually 
have more knowledge of how it actually operates, they lack independence. 
In contrast, external auditors are more independent (although the risks iden-
tified above regarding the relationship between client and consultant apply) 
but they are limited to using sampling and other methods to gain a partial 
understanding of the organisation.
The next trade-off relates to the merits of individual judgement compared 
to common standards. A completely fair and objective assessment would take 
account of each specific characteristic of any organisation studied. However, 
this would be very difficult. At the other end of the scale, there is value in 
agreeing common standards to enable a degree of comparison (‘one size fits 
all’). A compromise is therefore needed between conducting an audit which 
is perfectly tailored to the organisation and using a methodology which is 
consistent and comparable to the extent that it will be recognised as valid. 
Ideally, the process should also be repeatable.
This particular trade-off is apparent in the ASOIF governance project. 
A uniform methodology was adopted to assess 31 International Federations 
despite the fact that they range in staff numbers from fewer than 10 to many 
hundreds. Perhaps inevitably, scores on some of the indicators tended to be 
higher among the larger organisations. In order to compensate, the partic-
ipating Federations are provided with information about how their results 
compare to others of similar size.
A further risk relates to the resources needed to conduct the audit. The 
level of investment in audit clearly has to be proportionate. A more sophis-
ticated and costly process might lead to a more thorough analysis but there 
is a practical limit. A compromise therefore exists between expenditure and 
the level of assurance.
6 Need for judgement
In my experience, it is usually feasible in consultancy work to find an accept-
able compromise which allows the client to benefit from the project they pay 
for and the consultant to maintain integrity. In practical terms, organisations 
which are very poorly governed are unlikely to commission governance con-
sultants, just as they are unlikely to give capable staff the authority to make 
significant changes. There have been a small number of occasions when I 
have declined potential opportunities due to associated reputational risks.
For a consultant specialised in sport governance, maintaining integrity is 
of course an absolute priority. A consultant must accept that complaining 
openly about a client or about rejection by a potential client will not be feasi-
ble (with rare exceptions) and therefore it is important to consider all of the 
factors carefully before taking on a client assignment.
In general, it is incumbent on the consultant to act in a responsible way 
and think about longer-term consequences of any decisions made. Once a 
certain degree of credibility has been earned, there is associated power in 
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advice and recommendations which are offered. As is often stated, reputa-
tions can take years to build but only a moment to lose.
It is evident that consultancy presents considerable opportunities for tack-
ling issues in sport governance but a range of risks must also be managed. 
Some are inherent to any type of consultancy whereas others relate to the 
limitations of audit as a technique.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued, informed by my own experience, that consultancy 
offers a promising and perhaps under-rated set of tools to the various approaches 
to tackling failures of sport governance.
Consultancy projects have contributed to important changes in sport govern-
ance in recent years, for example in organisations such as World Athletics and 
the IBU. Governance audit work, including the projects I Trust Sport has been 
involved in with ASOIF, can steer sport bodies towards incremental improve-
ments. Both advisory and audit consultancy techniques are more likely to influ-
ence significant reform when there is a combination of external pressure on the 
organisation and internal political will for change.
Consultancy presents a number of benefits compared to the options open to 
some of the other actors seeking to improve sport governance, including the lack 
of dependence on public subsidy, low barriers to entry and flexibility. Various cat-
egories of organisation could potentially be clients and there are few restrictions 
on the type of work that could be undertaken.
As for consultancy in any sector, it is vital that the individuals who do the work 
have the necessary expertise and take care to maintain their professional integ-
rity. As explained above, in an immature market it is not obviously apparent what 
the right skills are. While several vocational courses and qualifications exist, it 
seems too soon at this stage for industry standards or a professional body.
Naturally, risks and limitations apply that have to be managed. The need for 
a client that is willing to pay is an important barrier, particularly in the absence 
of many specific activities that are either required by regulators or accepted as 
an industry standard. It is incumbent on the consultant to be aware of and mit-
igate the risks associated with the client–consultant relationship. Such risks 
range from being prescribed a scope of work that allows limited opportunity for 
improving governance (or even ignores key issues), to the consultant going too 
far to accommodate a client’s wishes in the conclusions reached. Dilemmas are 
often manageable, provided that key individuals within the client organisation 
are genuine in their intentions. For example, a good consultant can help steer a 
client towards a deliverable and worthwhile scope of work in the situation where 
the original request is vague (“improve governance standards”), working within 
limitations of timetable and budget.
It is also important that expectations are realistic, recognising that an exter-
nal consultant cannot implement significant changes on their own, and that a 
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governance audit will not necessarily uncover all of the underlying issues in an 
organisation. Responsibility is shared between the commissioning organisation 
and the consultant. For instance, a consultant should dampen client hopes of a 
radical transformation of an organisation’s reputation in a short period of time. 
Meanwhile, a client giving a briefing should be honest about the openness of the 
leadership for change. Drawing from relevant case studies and previous experi-
ence can help in setting parameters.
Many of the risks can be reduced—and the incentive for a sport body to reform 
increased—when consultants are commissioned not by the sport body itself but 
by an external organisation to which it is accountable.
An important implication is that consultants could do more to help improve 
sport governance if other actors that have leverage over sport bodies become 
more active in working with consultants, most notably governments and com-
mercial partners. While governments and funded public agencies are now gradu-
ally taking a closer interest in the sector, there have been limited examples so far 
of active engagement by the commercial partners.
One avenue to consider for further research would be to gauge the potential 
appetite among governments and commercial partners for appointing consultants 
to support or monitor the governance of sport bodies over which they have lever-
age. It would also be useful to understand the barriers to doing so.
In the area of governance audit, it is possible that there are lessons for sport to 
learn from other sectors where measurement and assessment are routine, such as 
health and education. A study of comparable audit regimes might be instructive.
In commenting on the opportunities for sport governance consultancy, it is only 
fair to acknowledge that the market in its current form exists because of diligent 
and often thankless work by whistleblowers, journalists and researchers over a 
period of years. Many individuals and organisations such as Play the Game uncov-
ered governance failings within sport bodies. Pioneering academics and others have 
developed approaches and methods to tackle some of the weaknesses, including 
tools which lend themselves to consultancy projects. Along with other consultants 
active in the sport governance field, I owe a debt to the work that has gone before.
At least until the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the market for sport 
governance consultancy was established and maturing, even if it is a relatively 
small niche. It is to be hoped that the recent focus on governance remains amid 
the dramatic and inevitable changes to the sporting landscape that are resulting 
from the crisis.
References
ASOIF 2017, ASOIF First Review of International Federation Governance, ASOIF, Lausanne.
ASOIF 2020, ASOIF Third Review of International Federation Governance, ASOIF, 
Lausanne.
Austen, I 2007, ‘Cycling’s Drug Problem Leads T-Mobile to End Sponsorship’, New York 
Times, 28 November.
128 R. Jack
FIFA 2016, FIFA Congress Approves Landmark Reforms, FIFA, Zurich.
Financial Reporting Council 2016, Description of Auditor’s Responsibilities, The Financial 
Reporting Council Limited, London.
Geeraert, A 2019, ‘The limits and opportunities of self-regulation: Achieving interna-
tional sport federations’ compliance with good governance standards’, European Sport 
Management Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 520–38. doi:10.1080/16184742.2018.1549577
IAAF 2016a, Overwhelming Vote for IAAF Reform Delivered by Membership, IAAF, Monaco.
IAAF 2016b, Time for Change, IAAF, Monaco.
IBU 2018, International Biathlon Union Appoints External Review Commission, IBU, Salzburg.
IBU 2019, Historic Extraordinary IBU Congress Marks Beginning of New Era for IBU, IBU, 
Salzburg.
Institute of Consulting 2020, What is Consulting?, Institute of Consulting, London.
International Partnership Against Corruption in Sport 2017, About IPACS, IPACS.
Pielke, R 2013, ‘How can FIFA be held accountable?’, Sport Management Review, vol. 16, 
no. 3, pp. 255–67. doi:10.1016/j.smr.2012.12.007
Power, M 1999, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003172833-10
Chapter 10
‘Integrity’, ‘independence’ and 
the internal reform of FIFA
A view from the trenches
Miguel Maduro and Joseph H.H. Weiler
Introduction
If a Martian were to inspect the constitutions of say, the USSR or Poland before 
the fall of the Berlin Wall or other such regimes, a glowing report would be 
beamed back to Mars. All the right things were there, including human rights 
and other paraphernalia of good governance. A farce, since the principal problem 
was not in the formal scheme or in the written document, but in the reality of 
its actuation and in the political culture and institutional ethos of those polities.
It is not our intention to add to the growing literature identifying the structural 
problems of FIFA and the rather conspicuous failure of the 2016 Reform efforts of 
FIFA. Instead we want to relate to the reader, narrative style, some episodes (all 
one way or another part of the public record) resulting from our experience as 
Chair and Member of the Governance Committee that help explain why those 
reforms failed. As members of the Governance Committee we were part of that 
reform effort. We experienced how the dominant culture at FIFA was stronger 
than the formal institutional safeguards put in place by the governance reforms. 
This experience taught us that FIFA cannot adequately reform itself.
The FIFA Governance Committee
The FIFA Governance Committee had a broad remit to ensure integrity and good 
governance in the operation of FIFA. It was responsible, among other things, 
for the oversight of the elections, including deciding on the eligibility of those 
running for elections (for the FIFA Presidency and its Council). The latter was 
based on integrity tests conducted by the Review Committee, composed of three 
independent members of the Governance Committee. This Review Committee 
(in practice, part of the Governance Committee) would also conduct broader 
integrity tests for a variety of positions in FIFA Committees. The Governance 
Committee was also empowered by the new FIFA Governance rules to put for-
ward proposals for better governance at FIFA.
The importance of the Governance Committee in the overall reform scheme 
was underscored by the fact that the appointment of its members was reserved to 
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Congress as a whole and the requirement that no less than half its members be 
‘independent’ with no ties to the world of football (other than, perhaps, the love 
of the game).
Independence has a variety of meanings in the world of FIFA. It might mean the 
overall independence of FIFA from politics—a formal requirement when it comes 
to the officers of FIFA. It means, however, too, the independence of the oversight 
Committees such as Governance or Ethics from internal pressures from within the 
organisation. After all, various officers and organs of FIFA might be the object 
of oversight by those same committees. Interference or pressure on their decision- 
making process would be akin to, say, a member of the executive branch of a State 
government such as a Minister or senior administrator putting pressure on a judge 
or court of law or public prosecutor investigating a case pertaining to that very 
government or to anyone that may be favourable or opposed to such government.
Integrity is a broad concept which defies very precise definition. A little bit 
like the proverbial definition of pornography—you know it when you see it. The 
absence of integrity in the process of governance can take egregious forms—like 
the taking of bribes, but also more subtle forms of malfeasance or even simply 
to be in a position of conflict of interest. Given the history of FIFA the required 
ethos of oversight would be to err on the side of strict scrutiny as both a reflection 
of, and catalyst for a change of institutional culture which appeared at least tol-
erate corruption for decades. This history all taught, all and sundry, that ‘crimes 
of omission’—keeping silent, averting one’s eyes, looking in the other direction—
can be as harmful as crimes of commission.
The 2015/2016 reforms seemed promising on paper and not only on paper. In 
the process of our own appointment to the Governance Committee we were 
impressed by the thorough background check conducted. Even more so, we were 
impressed by the assurances we had by the highest officers of the ‘new’ FIFA 
that this time it was ‘for real’. That they were seriously interested in meaningful 
reform of the very institutional ethos and culture of the organisation. We were 
convinced by the apparent sincerity of these assurances.
The Committee initiated its role committed to its task and energised to deliver 
results in a short period of time. The blow suffered by FIFA reputation required 
it. In only a few months the Committee implemented a variety of reforms and 
put others in motion. It started by adopting guidelines on how it would conduct 
the integrity and eligibility tests. This was aimed at providing legal certainty to 
those subject to such tests, making it clear the Committee’s commitment to the 
rule of law. In the past, such kind of ethical and integrity assessments had often 
been instrumentalised, applied selectively, and placed at the service of the pow-
ers that be. It was crucial to be transparent and consistent in the application of 
such tests. The Committee also adopted a series of procedural guidelines to be 
respected by the Confederations in their electoral processes so as to guarantee 
the integrity and the free and fair character of such elections. Another set of 
guidelines, to be further discussed below, regarded preventing gender discrimina-
tion in the elections. In addition, the Committee drafted a FIFA Human Rights 
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Policy and put forward a series of proposals aimed at furthering its own independ-
ence and that of the other independent Committees. The latter where expected 
to be discussed by the FIFA Council in the meeting that, ironically, put into 
question such independence and, ultimately, led to our departure from FIFA.
In fact, the disabuse was rapid. Within less than a year in mid-2017 the Chair 
of the Governance Committee was not ‘reappointed’ (that was the official term, 
on what was, for all purposes, a ‘sacking’). This led to the departure of a majority 
of the Committee independent members that resigned.
The letter of resignation of Navi Pillay (2017) speaks for itself:
Such a trenchant statement coming from a distinguished South African judge 
and the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is self-explanatory.
But as lawyers know, it is the human detail, the narrative, which gives law and 
high principles (such as independence and integrity) or the lack thereof real life 
and meaning. And that is the purpose of the following short tales of commission 
and omission: To give life to the stories behind the collective resignation of the 
majority of independent members of FIFA’s Governance Committee less than a 
year after their appointment. They are only examples. Several others could be 
given from only a few but intense months immersed in FIFA’s governance culture.
The Vitaly Mutko affair
Vitaly Mutko at the time Minister of Sport and Deputy Prime Minister of the 
Russian Republic was put forward to UEFA as a candidate in the elections 
for a position on the FIFA Council. Mutko achieved notoriety for his alleged 
Email from Navi Pillay to Fatma Samoura, Secretary General, FIFA, 17 May 2017
Dear Secretary General of FIFA, Thank you for your call to me, sharing some of your 
thoughts on the termination of membership of the chair of the GC. I indicated my dissat-
isfaction with the reasons you gave; but promised to consider my continued membership 
seriously. I have now done that. As you know, all of us, holding office in FIFA, including 
you and me, were required to complete the online course on Ethics. I wish to draw your 
attention to the prohibition, in the rules, of improper interference, exercise of influence 
or pressure, and the need to disclose these approaches, if we had been subjected to them, 
rather than maintaining secrecy. In compliance with this regulation, the facts of undue 
influence exerted on the Chair to change a recommendation made by the GC, were made 
known to me. As a judge and former UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, I adhere 
to principled conduct at all times; and cannot countenance serving in an Institution, 
whose officials violate the norms and standards of good conduct, that they themselves 
adopted. I remain concerned that the GC’s independent functioning will not be respected. 
Kindly accept my resignation from the Governance Committee of FIFA.
Navi Pillay (Ms)
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involvement as Minister of Sport in the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) doping scandal, allegations which he strenuously denied. His appointment 
required a Nulla Osta from the Governance Committee as regards his ‘eligibility’ 
in accordance with the various regnant standards. The Governance Committee 
decided that questions of proof and due process aside the matter of his involve-
ment or otherwise in the doping scandal was moot since he failed egregiously 
the test of the Duty of Neutrality in accordance Article 14 of the Code of Ethics 
(FIFA 2018): “(…) Persons bound by this Code shall … remain politically neutral, 
in accordance with the principles and objectives of FIFA(…)”.
This reflects the general principle of political neutrality enshrined in FIFA’s 
Statute. FIFA has applied such principle to suspended national football associa-
tions on several occasions. Kuwait was suspended in October 2016 because FIFA 
claimed that new national legislation meant that the country’s football associa-
tion would no longer be able to carry out its activities in full independence. FIFA 
has claimed such political interference even with respect to decisions issued by 
courts. The Nigerian Football Federation (NFF) was also suspended in 2014 after 
a court ordered the minister of sports to appoint a civil servant to run the feder-
ation. The NFF was later reinstated, but only after the court order was revoked. 
There are multiple other cases, many where the threat of suspension was enough. 
A recent case involved Spain when the National Independent Sports Council 
order the repetition of the elections for the Spanish FA, following formal charges 
of corruption and fraud on the incumbent President and suspicions of electoral 
fraud. FIFA accused the Spanish State of political interference and threaten to 
exclude the country from the World Cup.
You would think that with such an assertive use by FIFA of the principle of 
political neutrality to suspend Football Associations, whenever the legislator or 
courts attempt to regulate them, holding political office, while being a FIFA offi-
cial, would be an easy case, open and shut: How could a serving deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Sport claim to be politically neutral?
Well, think again. Despite a unanimous decision by the Independent Members 
of the Governance Committee, the FIFA steamroller went into action. Huge 
pressure was brought to bear on the Chairman of the Governance Committee 
starting with the President of FIFA and downwards. Letters were written, emis-
saries were sent, including surreal meetings. No serious argument of principle was 
put before the Committee in these attempts to make it change its decision. It was 
politically unacceptable. It would derail the Moscow Mundial et cetera.
The Committee stood its ground. Its view was that, at the minimum, the 
position of member of government is structurally in conflict with the duty of 
neutrality with respect to government institutions since, by definition, a gov-
ernment member cannot be neutral with respect to the government of which 
he or she is a member. The Committee considered the possibility that he or she 
might recuse himself or herself from any decision affecting his or her country. 
However, this possibility would not provide a viable solution since the political 
interests of a government are not restricted to matters directly involving their 
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country but also on many matters involving other States. Having a Government 
Minister that is at the same time a FIFA official can, additionally both directly 
affect the relations between FIFA and such government and indirectly entangle 
FIFA in unrelated controversies associated with this or that government. The 
Committee also considered that other political functions might be incompati-
ble but decided to proceed gradually, starting with the clearest cases, involving 
cabinet members.
The Committee was well aware of the political sensitivity of such a decision 
on the verge of the Russian World Cup but it had to make clear that, contrary to 
the past culture, the application of the rules could not depend on their political 
opportunity and/or the power of those affected them. But the dissatisfaction of 
the FIFA hierarchy with the Committee and its Chair was palpable and enduring. 
We suspected that at some point payday would arrive. But we had a small hope 
that maybe this could be the defining moment in which the shift in culture would 
occur. We had conveyed the message we were there to introduce a real rule of law 
culture and would not vow under pressure. Maybe the message would be heard. It 
probably was heard, but definitely not accepted.
The irony cannot escape you. Not only were we asked to throw out the prin-
ciple of political independence of football governance, but in doing so the inde-
pendence of the Committee from internal pressure was called into question. A 
few months later, when payback time arrived, it was definitely thrown out of the 
window too.
Special elections of CAF in May 2017
In May 2017 just before the FIFA Congress the African Football Confederation 
(CAF) held a special election for one seat on the FIFA Council. There were even-
tually two candidates: An Egyptian and a Cameroonian. As is the Custom, the 
Governance Committee sends two Election Supervisors to guarantee the integ-
rity of the elections. In the lead up to the election the Cameroonian candidate 
approached the Governance Committee election supervisors with serious allega-
tions. He alleged that in the week before the election all CAF voting delegates 
were invited to three-day ‘Victory Party’ (celebrating the victory of the newly 
elected President of CAF) in Cairo held by the Egyptian FA of which the Egyptian 
candidate for the FIFA Council chaired. This was a five star all expenses paid 
shindig according to the allegations. Subsequently, the delegates who attended 
were flown directly from Cairo to Bahrain in a private jet.
Until proven allegations are just that—allegations. But if proven, it would 
be hard not to conclude that the integrity of the election (which the Egyptian 
won by a vote of 50/4) would be seriously called into question. After all, presents 
in kind might be just as nefarious as envelopes stuffed with cash. The electoral 
supervisors informed, in real time, the Secretary General of FIFA of the allega-
tions. They agreed that the elections should take place pending an investigation 
of the allegations.
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To our knowledge no such investigation was conducted or at least none was 
reported and if such did take place, no report was made public. The matter was 
buried. Since four of the independent members of the Governance Committee 
resigned shortly afterwards, we do not know of any action taken by the Governance 
Committee. The matter was subsequently reported to the Investigative Chamber 
of the Ethics Committee but it seems that it was buried there too.
There are two ‘take aways’ form this tale. If true, it is an indication of an insti-
tutional culture which would allow the delegates of a confederation to accept 
such an invitation organised by a Member standing for election by those very 
participants.
Institutionally speaking, this is a telling story of “crimes of omission”. If as we 
suspect the matter was never fully investigated—and if it were, why should such 
be conducted in camera—nurturing a culture of secrecy, shutting one’s eyes and 
making a mockery of procedures put in place, on paper at least, to ensure the 
integrity of governance in general and elections in particular.
Gender discrimination and the 2019 AFC (Asian 
Football Confederation) elections—The scene  
and behind the scene
On January 21, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) announced its decision 
in the appeal of Marian Mohamed (CAS 2021). CAS found, inter alia, that the 
procedure adopted in the elections for a position on the Executive Committee of 
AFC violated the prohibitions on Gender discrimination mandated both by FIFA 
and AFC Statutes.
The facts are simple enough. Among the reforms adopted in 2016 was a require-
ment for each member confederation to elect at least one woman to the FIFA 
Council.1 It clear that this requirement is a minimum, and it is certainly not a max-
imum number of female representatives. If it were to be a maximum, it would serve 
not to promote female representation in FIFA, but to limit such representation and 
discriminate against women. It became apparent to the Governance Committee, 
however, that certain confederations had adopted, or were intending to adopt, 
electoral procedures that were discriminatory against women by creating a specific 
female position to which all female nominees were candidates. This transformed 
a rule that was aimed at guaranteeing that at least one woman was elected into a 
rule that limited women to a single position. In order to facilitate and guarantee 
the requirement that at least one female serve on the Executive Committee of 
the various confederations, while making it possible for more than one woman 
to serve, the Governance Committee provided guidelines for electoral procedures 
to ensure just that. AFC failed to implement such guidelines in fact ensuring that 
only one female candidate would be elected rather than ‘at least’ one.
One could be forgiven for thinking that the villains in this story were only 
the election officials of the AFC which undermined the progressive policy of 
FIFA of striving towards gender equality in the governance of football at the 
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confederation and FIFA levels. That is true. But here, too, there is a behind the 
scene narrative which clouds that black and white image.
Already in 2016/17 the Governance Committee noted the discrepancy between 
its guidelines and their implementation by the electoral procedures of the AFC. 
It actually had to threaten not to recognise the eligibility of any of the officials 
elected by AFC under such discriminatory electoral procedures, leading AFC to 
cancel its elections in 2016. After the departure of the majority of the independ-
ent members of that Governance Committee, AFC continued, however, with 
its discriminatory practice against women in the elections. A practice that has 
now been clearly disavowed and censured by CAS.2 What is sad is that a recent 
article by the New York Times reveals that FIFA and the current Governance 
Committee not only did not identify anything wrong with the elections, but actu-
ally intervene in the case on behalf of AFC (Panja 2021).
The only signs of hope in this case come from the CAS decision (albeit claim-
ing it cannot provide any effective remedy to Ms Mohamed) and the courage 
of Ms Mohamed, herself. As the facts proved in the case demonstrate she was 
subject to all kinds of pressures but persevered in standing for what she believed, 
and knew, was right. This is rare because, in football, anyone that challenges 
the powers that be becomes a pariah. This is why it was so important for the 
Governance Committee to preserve its independence and exercise its role force-
fully in protecting the integrity of the electoral process. And that’s probably, also, 
why that was not allowed to happen.
Conclusion: A not so happy ending
As we have written somewhere else, our experience at FIFA taught us that the lat-
ter is not reformable from within (Pillay, Maduro & Weiler 2017). FIFA works as a 
political cartel with a high concentration of power at the top. Such power requires 
checks and balances. This is supposed to be the role of independent committees. 
But how can their independence survive being dependent on those whom they 
are supposed to control?
One of the central planks of the 2016 Reform was to be the enhanced role of 
independent oversight committees within FIFA governance. They failed because 
the dominant culture at FIFA was stronger than the institutional safeguards put 
in place by those reforms. You now have some detail behind Navi Pillay’s poign-
ant letter of resignation (2017).
As a judge and former UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, I adhere to 
principled conduct at all times; and cannot countenance serving in an Institution, 
whose officials violate the norms and standards of good conduct, that they themselves 
adopted.
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In what the Financial Times called the Night of the Long Knives FIFA demon-
strated its limited tolerance of true independence and oversight replacing three 
chairs of the most critical oversight committees (Ahmed 2017). The human con-
dition being what it is, one cannot but rue the chilling effect that this must have 
on the current committees: The real and present danger of dismissal if independ-
ence goes too far.
And as an epilogue, as if to give some credibility to this fear of chilling 
effect, these and similar incidents were reported in a formal complaint to the 
Investigative Chamber of the Ethics Committee to be buried without trace.
Notes
 1. Article 22(3)(b) of FIFA Statutes (FIFA 2019); Article 70.3 of the FIFA Governance 
Regulations (FIFA 2016).
 2. Full disclosure: both of us participated as expert witnesses, on behalf of Ms Marian 
Mohamed, in the CAS proceedings.
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Institutional enforced board 
diversity in sport clubs as 
trigger of us–them divisions
Michel van Slobbe
Introduction
Over the course of the past two decades, there have been many attempts to bolster 
diversity in governance bodies, in both the private and the public sector. These 
attempts have been guided by the general expectation that enhancing diversity 
will bring about more equity and multivocality, better representation of the peo-
ple being governed and diverse perspectives which provide better ideas (Callen, 
Klein & Tinkelman 2003). Accordingly, recent codes of good governance in sport 
and related indicators seem to assume that diversity in board compositions leads 
to better governance per se, e.g. National Sports Governance Observer (Geeraert 
2018), Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport (Chappelet 
& Mrkonjic 2013), The Principles of Good Governance for Sport and Recreation 
(Sport + Recreation Alliance 2017) and Conceptual model for the corporate gov-
ernance of sport (McNamee & Flemming 2005). These codes of conduct and 
indicators as institutional products make this claim on the positive outcome of 
diverse board composition self-evident. Hence, we should ask ourselves the follow-
ing: Is diversity in board compositions positive a priori and which power dynamics 
occur when diversity is enforced by institutional interventions? This contribution 
reflects on these two questions and argues that reform strategies aimed at diversity 
in board compositions should consider a political perspective to avoid paradoxical 
effects. It argues that well intended policies aimed at diversity can lead to unin-
tended consequences, namely social exclusion and decreasing policy legitimacy.
This chapter describes and reflects on a reform strategy enforced by the munici-
pality of Utrecht, the Netherlands aimed at the transition from an all-white Dutch 
board towards an ethnically and gender diverse board of an amateur football club. 
The case of this local football club represents broader issues that deal with the 
real and alleged meanings of sport for social integration in the Netherlands and 
elsewhere as well as with good governance reforms and their meanings (Van 
Slobbe 2019). In recent years, Dutch policymakers have embraced the idea that 
sport is both device and locale for promoting an inclusive society. This corre-
sponds to wider-held views about sport as ‘the great social leveler’ (Donnelly 1996) 
and about the masculine white ‘hegemony’ in sport boards (Atkinson 2011). 
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Expectations are high concerning sport’s potential for bridging social differences 
and removing inequality. In particular, this is reflected in the desire to achieve 
greater diversity in sport boards as part of good governance reforms.
Ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, including the Moroccan Dutch, have 
established their own football clubs as far back as the 1960s. However, current 
public opinion and policy emphasise the need to create so-called ethnically 
mixed clubs. Ethnically ‘separate’ or ethnic-specific clubs are considered unde-
sirable, as they allegedly hinder the social integration of ethnic minority groups 
into wider Dutch society. Comparable discussions about ethnic minority clubs are 
found in England about British Asian amateur football clubs (Burdsey 2009). At 
the same time, many individuals from ethnic minority groups opt for membership 
of what can be described as ‘established’ Dutch football clubs. These clubs are 
becoming increasingly ethnically ‘mixed’. For the most part, the board of these 
clubs remains in the hands of white Dutch men. Hence, in their effort to promote 
inclusive sport, institutional actors like governments (national and local), sport 
federations, consultants and researchers encourage and enforce board diversity in 
sport organisations.
Studies of board structures and composition represent a popular area of cor-
porate governance research and there is still relatively little attention paid to 
the dynamics of how such groups actually work, or to potential solutions when 
dynamics break down (Durisin & Puzone 2009). Considering this gap, the present 
contribution examines how board members of a sport club enacted an enforced 
transition towards a diverse board composition and analyses the power dynamics 
involved.
Argument
In the endeavour to realise effective boards, accountability to, and engagement 
with stakeholders, and driving sustainable practices, ‘diversity’ is incorporated in 
good governance codes. This institutional process carries the danger of reifica-
tion, making diversity a naturally, fixed ‘thing’ and a goal in itself. Sport organisa-
tions are increasingly held accountable and will feel compelled to adjust, at least 
numerically, their board composition. At the same time, we know little about 
enforced diversity, related power dynamics in the board rooms and the inter-
play with the organisation as a whole. In this study, power is understood as a 
dynamic and interdependent social relation, in which individuals and groups to 
a greater or lesser extent are able to define the social norm and impose their will 
on others. Dynamics occur when an actor does not abide by his inferior posi-
tion and seeks improvement. This subsequently endangers the superior position 
of the other actor or can at least be perceived as such. So, enforcing diversity in 
the board compositions of sport organisations is not entirely unproblematic and 
power dynamics will play a role. This raises the question how diversity in real life 
boardroom situations relates to effectivity, transparency, accountability, engage-
ment and sustainability. To be clear, the present does not question diversity in 
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itself. Instead, it argues that reformers should be aware of how shifts in the bal-
ance of power, as a result of changing board composition, may lead to competition 
instead of cooperation.
The sport club board as established-outsider figuration
In the Netherlands, ethnic minorities increasingly participate in boards of sport 
organisations, notably in amateur football clubs run by volunteers. These minori-
ties are often considered as ‘space invaders’, as Puwar (2004) terms it. Sport clubs 
encounter new contestations from ‘outsiders’ invading the club’s boardroom space 
and from policies aimed at diversity and inclusive sport. According to Cohen 
(1985), sport clubs, are symbolically constructed communities of people who share 
common understandings. Those who belong to the community share the abil-
ity to use, interpret and understand the communal symbols. As Cohen argues, 
people become ‘most sensitive’ to their own shared meanings and symbols when 
they encounter ‘others’ (1985, p. 70). When people feel that the base of their com-
munity is undermined as a result of the interactions with ‘others’, people tend to 
reinforce the symbolic boundaries of their community (Cheska 1984).
For the analysis of the power dynamics related to the enforced transition 
towards an ethnically mixed club board, I turned to the concept of ‘established 
and outsiders’, as presented by Norbert Elias and John Scotson (Elias & Scotson 
2008). In Elias’ established-outsider theory, the concepts of ‘mutual dependency’ 
and ‘balance of power’ play a central role. According to Elias, people are to be 
understood in their mutual dependency; what he terms, a ‘figuration’ (Elias 1978). 
Interdependencies are related to power, which Elias sees as relational and recipro-
cal, with the more powerful group dependent on the less powerful group and vice 
versa. The key issue in a figuration is that within such a social network, different 
valuations are assigned to the separate groups. For Elias, the existing balance of 
power is a result of the search for the order in which both groups are mutually 
dependent. In their study of the power relationships between ‘established’ and 
‘outsiders’ among resident groups, Elias and Scotson found that the longer indi-
viduals live in the neighbourhood (what they call ‘oldness of association’) the 
more this enables the ‘established’ to develop greater cohesion relative to the 
outsiders. This then enables them to monopolise key positions in local associa-
tions (Elias & Scotson 2008; cf. Lake 2011). Consequently, the ‘established’ are 
able to define the local rules of the game and reproduce a historically grown 
position of power. In such a ‘figuration’, the established group aims at maintaining 
its position and the ‘outsiders’ strive to improve their position in the balance of 
power. According to Elias and Scotson, ‘stigmatising’ and ‘the possession of key 
positions’ appeared to be the main sources of power in the contest between the 
two resident groups (Elias & Scotson 2008).
No figuration—whether sport in general or sport club boards in particular—
are fixed entities with unmovable boundaries. On the contrary, the symbolic 
understandings and the identities these produce are always contested. Moreover, 
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figurations are shaped in the relationships among established members and out-
siders and in the relationships between both groups. Following Elias, this contri-
bution conceptualise both sport clubs and their boards as interacting figurations 
in which members make claims about difference and similarity, and construct 
divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’.
The club board as arena
Understanding institutional influence on established-outsiders relationships in 
sports club boards as a voluntary setting requires an analysis, in which attention 
is paid to both formal processes (goal rationality, roles, policy and plans) and the 
dominant informal processes (personal relationships, preferences and differences of 
interest). The arena model offers a suitable framework for analysis for this because 
it can be described in terms of both, process and system (Verweel 1987). Turner 
(1974) speaks of controversial acts that are fought out in the arena. He defines the 
arena as “a bounded spatial unit in which precise, visible antagonists, individual or 
corporate, contend with one another for prizes and/or honor” (1974, p. 132). Turner 
sees the arena as an explicit framework where people’s choices are visible to every-
one, people are outspoken and actions have definitive and direct consequences.
Verweel (1987) further elaborated on Turner’s arena model for insight into 
power dynamics in boards and emphasises the invisible governance processes. 
He defines the political arena as “the dynamic inclusion and exclusion structure, 
including regulation, which functions as a focal point for the competitive inter-
action of practices” (ibid, p. 96). As structuring elements of the arena, Verweel 
distinguishes the arena as the demarcated space of the battle, the positions of the 
players and parties, the rules of the game (meeting conventions), the weapons 
and the power relations between the players (Verweel 1987, p. 96). According to 
Verweel, these elements structure the dynamics in board interactions of the war-
ring parties. The arena model implies, as Elias and Scotson (2008) also indicates 
with his concept of ‘balance of power’, a changeable balance of power, which will 
start negotiations again.
Regarding the power relation with a diversity-enforcing government, it should 
be noted that vulnerable sport clubs like the football club studied are dependent 
on municipal support. These clubs tend to follow the institutional expectations 
and ‘go public’ instead of staying private (Meijs 1997). Therefore, the government 
is regarded as the third actor intervening on the power balance of the estab-
lished-outsider figuration for the purposes of this study.
The case: The making of an ethnically  
diverse club board
This chapter emerged from ethnographic research on the enforced transition 
from an all-white Dutch board towards an ethnically diverse board of an ama-
teur football club. Ethnography, both as an epistemology and as a method, is 
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appropriate for trying to grasp interpretations and understanding of complex pro-
cesses and actions that are characteristic of local settings (Blommaert & Jie 2010). 
Lake argues that the relatively autonomous nature and established hierarchical 
structure of voluntary sport clubs “provide excellent locations for analyzing power 
relations between members, and how social status and cohesion are emphasised” 
(2011, p. 9).
During the fieldwork, I collected data through participant observation of natu-
rally occurring events, informal talks and interviews. My role is best described as 
‘participant-as-observer’ (Bryman 2008). That is, during my research I was func-
tioning as a member of the social setting at the football club. For three years, I 
participated in the club board with an administrative role and was responsible for 
the membership records and fees, among other things. Members of the football 
club were informed about my research. The collected data provided insight into 
the ways through which the board members of the football club interacted and 
enacted the enforced transition towards an ethnically diverse board.
Before presenting three key incidents in which power dynamics occurred and 
the balance of power within the board turned, the municipal intervention will 
be introduced.
The municipal intervention
In 2008, amateur football club Onder Ons (Among Ourselves) was experiencing 
financial distress and became dependent on the municipality. The club (founded 
in 1948), located in an ethnically diverse neighbourhood in the city of Utrecht, 
was close to bankruptcy, as a result of chaotically fluctuating membership, unsta-
ble income and stable fixed costs. In a ‘club saving’ meeting, a municipal official 
declared:
The meeting resulted in a twofold intervention. The club was given a lifeline, 
when a substantial part of its debts was paid off by the municipality. Along with 
this financial assistance, the municipality imposed a condition on the club. The 
municipality installed two external professionals who, together with two estab-
lished board members, would form a task force, i.e. a temporary board. The task 
force assignment involved stabilising the club financially; organising volunteers 
Onder Ons is having some troublesome years, for both management and finance 
and also in organizing the youth section. With the social problems in that specific 
neighbourhood of the city, with its young dropouts, we see this club as one of 
the most important clubs. In that part of Utrecht, the need for organised football 
is enormous… This club is needed there. But at the moment it is organised and 
managed poorly. Eventually, the club and its management should also represent the 
population of the neighbourhood.
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and voluntary management, making a policy plan and nominate a new represent-
ative board, at least a Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer.
The municipal intervention was far-reaching and the autonomy of the club 
decreased. The club was hooked up to a ‘municipal drip’, as it were. By consent-
ing to the municipal condition, the established board members, were forced 
to embrace the strategy of ‘going public’, thus capitalising on the public value 
ascribed to football club Onder Ons (Meijs 1997).
Both the municipal official and the task force assignment speak of ‘representa-
tion’ by the new diverse board. This purpose fits within a municipal policy aimed 
at voluntary sport clubs becoming more open, removing membership restrictions 
and implying an ethnically mixed board, consisting of both ‘established’ members 
and the more recently arrived residents of the neighbourhood, the Moroccan 
Dutch. The premise here is that better representation of different ethnical back-
grounds in the club board (comparable to the social composition of the neigh-
bourhood) contributes to a sport environment in which everyone feels at home.
The municipal authority no longer merely formed part of the ‘supralocal space’ 
of the club figuration, but also entered and influenced the club’s political arena 
as a third actor enforcing board diversity (Elias & Scotson 2008). The following 
three key incidents show how well-intended acts can lead to unintended conse-
quences. As will be seen, the municipal intervention acted as a catalyst for gener-
ating a clear us–them division.
Giving a voice to social inequality
At an annual membership meeting, the ‘voice’ of the Dutch Moroccan mother of 
a youth member challenged the position of established members. It turned out to 
be a prelude to a shift in the balance of power in the recently installed task force.
This first key incident shows the contestation of meanings between the ‘estab-
lished’ and the ‘outsiders’ attached to particular practices and artefacts in the 
club’s organisational culture. It relates specifically to the selling of food and drinks 
in the club’s canteen. In the canteen, a prominent place was reserved for the bar 
with two beer taps and lightened signboards with beer brands. Shortly after the 
task force had started its work, the external professionals encountered the ‘sym-
bolic boundaries’ and ‘us–them divisions’ of everyday club life. The task force 
organised a members’ meeting to present itself, learn about the club’s daily chal-
lenges and listen to members. For voluntary sport organisations, the annual mem-
bers’ meeting is an important manifestation of its democratic principle.
At the members’ meeting, Fatima, a Moroccan Dutch mother of one of the 
youth players, raised the issue of selling tea in the club’s canteen. At the crowded 
meeting, she stood up and asked the taskforce: “Can’t we buy a cup of tea here?”. 
At that time, tea was not served in the canteen. The tea box had been missing 
for two weeks and left without replacement by the canteen volunteers. Most of 
the Moroccan Dutch members were Muslim and did not drink alcohol. Instead, 
they had coffee or soft drinks. They welcomed the idea of serving tea. Frank, 
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the chairman of the task force, promised to talk to the canteen manager, Ari, 
to arrange for the sale of tea. Two weeks later, after a task force meeting, Frank 
went to Ari, an active and appreciated volunteer, who fiercely countered the idea 
and shouted to Frank: “We will not sell tea or halal food in our canteen. Over my 
dead body!”.
Despite Ari’s objections, shortly after this confrontation, the tea box reap-
peared in the bar and ‘Moroccan’ tea was served. Furthermore, a Moroccan 
Dutch canteen volunteer started to sell halal meat. However, these actions were 
not without resistance. Although several white Dutch members started to appre-
ciate the Moroccan tea, several others questioned the ‘unnecessary’ investment 
in an extra halal deep fryer and explicitly doubted whether this would benefit the 
club financially. The municipal official, when informed about the development, 
acknowledged the resistance to selling Moroccan tea in the canteen. In an inter-
view, he argued that he and his colleagues were worried about the club’s financial 
situation: “Here [at the club], parents only drink Moroccan tea and that does not 
generate enough turnover. You just need members who drink beer”.
However, it is arguable whether the profit on tea is lower than on beer, know-
ing that herbs and water for Moroccan tea are very inexpensive. When this was 
brought into discussion, the official reinforced the notion that selling and drink-
ing beer is an essential component of football culture—the ‘third half of the 
match’—and would therefore be an unquestionable source of income for Onder 
Ons. At the club, the issues of alcohol and halal food did not articulate religious 
differences, but it marked the Moroccan Dutch members as outsiders.
By standing up publicly and asking about the tea, Fatima gave voice to a feel-
ing of social inequality and uneven power relations shared by other Moroccan 
Dutch members at the club. Through her act, she explicitly claimed a part of 
the canteen’s space. The beer taps, the painting on the wall, the photos of white 
Dutch teams and the possession of key positions in the canteen symbolise the 
‘oldness of association’ of the white Dutch members. The historically grown posi-
tion of power gave them the opportunity to decide about the food and drinks 
in the canteen. In line with Cohen’s (1985) arguments, the white Dutch mem-
bers became ‘most sensitive’ to their own shared meanings of drinking beer when 
they encountered Moroccan Dutch who abstained from drinking alcohol and 
preferred to drink tea. The attendance of many Moroccan Dutch members at the 
membership meeting and the task force chairman’s promise to arrange the selling 
of tea symbolised a change at the club; arguably, they represented a shift in power. 
Both Fatima’s question and Ari’s fierce reaction shows mutual dependency and 
articulated an us–them division, between the tea drinking ‘outsiders’ and the beer 
drinking ‘established’ members.
The candidacy of Fatima for a board position
The second key incident concerns the internal resistance by task force members 
towards the candidacy of Fatima for the new mixed board. In the second half 
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of the season 2008–9, Fatima presented herself as a candidate for treasurer in 
the new ‘representative’ board that was to be installed as part of the task force’s 
mission. She had financial experience as a member of the youth board, worked as 
a financial assistant for a bank and studied Financial Management. Fatima, then 
43 years old, raised and educated in the Netherlands and recently divorced, lived 
with her only son of nine years old, in an apartment facing the club. However, two 
established members of the task force resisted her candidacy. At a board meet-
ing they argued that Fatima was unable to commit herself to the club in the 
long term. They portrayed Fatima as an opportunistic person. Task force member 
Henk, for instance, argued: “Fatima will certainly leave the club when her son is 
accepted by another club. Besides, she is not willing to commit herself for three 
years”.
Fatima’s candidacy stimulated other Moroccan Dutch members and parents 
to become more involved with the club. More parents entered the canteen, they 
became members and players in senior teams and they took on voluntary work. 
The involvement of Moroccan Dutch volunteers also led to the refurbishment of 
the canteen. Even a few of the old team photos were replaced by photos of the 
current mixed youth teams. Actions such as these suggest that the ‘culture’ of the 
club was changing. However, task force member Henk wrote an email in which 
he expressed his unease about the developments at the club (i.e. the changing 
power relations). He accused Fatima of being part of a ‘coup’, in which she tried 
to convince Aziz, another Moroccan Dutch member, to stand as a candidate for 
the board as well: “(…) a secret talk between Aziz and Fatima (…) looks like a 
conspiracy to take over the club, from which I would like to distance myself”.
At a subsequent task force meeting, Henk insisted on looking for other candi-
dates for the new board. He threatened to leave the task force if others decided to 
support the candidacy of Fatima. In order to ensure Fatima was not elected, Henk 
also stood candidate for treasurer, under the condition that he would not have 
any formal board responsibilities. In a private conversation between task force 
members and the intended new chairman, Martin, it was decided that Fatima 
should be advised not to nominate herself. Task force chairman Frank was tasked 
with advising her of this, arguing that she was unable to commit herself for three 
years. A few days later Fatima told one of the members that she had had a meeting 
with Frank in which he had discouraged her nomination. She was disappointed, 
but informed the task force that she still intended to pursue her nomination argu-
ing that “there are enough members who support me”.
Henk and other club members argued that they doubted Fatima’s commitment 
to the club. Although she had been a volunteer for four years, the interactions 
demonstrate that she was still considered an ‘outsider’. Fatima, who had expressed 
her willingness to work for the club, encountered a negative attitude, while Henk, 
unwilling to take full responsibility, did not encounter any resistance. Henk’s 
petitioning was an attempt to stigmatise Fatima. Like the act of resistance by 
Ari, described in the first incident, Henk also gave voice to a sense of community 
‘loss’. This illustrates how, when the transition unfolded, the established position 
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of the white male Dutch members and their ‘symbolic boundaries’ were at stake 
(Cheska 1984).
In June 2008, notwithstanding the resistance by the ‘established’ members 
(using stigmatising efforts as well as their key positions), both Fatima and Aziz 
were democratically elected by the majority of the members as new board mem-
bers. Together with one white Dutch established member and an externally expe-
rienced white Dutch club manager as the new chairman, they formed the new 
ethnically mixed board of Onder Ons. From outside, the intervention seemed to 
have been a success. However, along with the board transition, the club’s power 
balance had changed. This was not without consequences, which are discussed 
in the final key incident.
The exclusion of the last remaining all-white Dutch team
The name of the club works illustratively in this case. ‘Onder Ons’ (Among 
Ourselves) refers to Dutch ideas of familiarity, of being together in a friendly, 
intimate and safe atmosphere. These ideas were expressed on the club’s website: 
“Onder Ons is a small, intimate and cozy football club where you can always enter 
the canteen and coffee is always ready”. However, the phrase ‘onder ons’ also 
indicates a clique that excludes others. In 2010, two senior teams were playing in 
the regional football league. Onder Ons I started that year with predominantly 
Moroccan Dutch players and Onder Ons II was the only remaining all-white 
Dutch team. The latter consisted mainly of established players who were children 
of elder members. In a meeting with the new mixed board, the potential new 
coach for the ‘established’ team declared: “I do not want to desert these lads”. As 
a former player, trainer and board member, he was a renowned club member. At 
the end of the meeting, he reiterated that he was willing to take up the coaching 
position, but under the condition of receiving improved support from the club’s 
board. Somewhat surprisingly, he then blatantly expressed his disdain for the 
‘outsiders’ and the (not present) new board member Aziz when he emphasised: 
“And I am not communicating with that Moroccan, only with you guys”.
The new chairman, Martin, reacted with surprise: “You mean Aziz?”. The 
coach confirmed non-verbally and the chairman failed to show his disapproval 
subsequently. When Aziz heard about the tacit agreement with the coach, a major 
conflict in the new board unfolded. Comments and enactment such as these, 
though not representative of all the respondents, do demonstrate the inveter-
ate and institutionalised ‘us’ and ‘them’ dynamic within the club and its board. 
During the season, six of the players of the ‘established’ team lost their jobs in 
construction work due to the economic crisis. They stopped paying their mem-
bership fees and, moreover, grew very agitated: “Onder Ons is not the club it used 
to be”. After several quarrels with players and fans of opposing (also white Dutch) 
teams, the Dutch Football Association fined the club and banned the players 
involved. Finally, the club board forced the second team to leave the league. Its 
players and other club members reacted angrily and planned to go to another club. 
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Though it was a board decision, the opinions in the board differed strongly, and 
dissensus and ongoing conflict finally led to the breakup of the newly installed 
mixed board.
When the municipal official was informed about the potential exit of the team 
and the breakup of the recently installed mixed club board, he was certainly 
not amused, as he saw the potential for ‘white flight’ across the club. Indeed, as 
expected, as white players of Onder Ons II left the club, so too did most of the 
remaining white Dutch members and volunteers. Despite the club’s financial bet-
terment, its increasing youth membership, the participation of Moroccan Dutch 
parents and the representative board members, the municipal official seemed to 
conclude that the intervention had failed.
The final key incident shows how the balance of power in the football club and 
in its board had turned. The domination of the established club’s culture did not 
prevent the exclusion of the white Dutch team and white board members. The 
‘oldness of association’, as the predominant source of power of the ‘established’, no 
longer connected to the positions in the club’s board.
Conclusion
The three key incidents demonstrate how the board of an amateur football club 
functioned as a political arena after a municipal intervention. In the club board 
of Onder Ons both established members and newcomers strived to maintain and 
gain key positions to validate themselves and the member groups they represent. 
The board meetings and members’ meeting functioned as the demarcated spaces 
of the battle between established members and outsiders with changing posi-
tions of ‘outsiders’ Fatima, Aziz and volunteers. The rules of the game (majority 
votes), ‘stigmatising’ and ‘key positions’ were used as weapons during the transi-
tion (Verweel 1987). We return to the two questions raised at the beginning of 
this chapter: Is diversity in board compositions positive a priori and which social 
dynamics occur when diversity is enforced by institutional interventions? The 
following can be concluded.
Based on the findings, I argue that the enforced transition towards an ethni-
cally diverse board led to a shift in the balance of power in the club board and 
in the club as a whole. ‘Parachuted’ by the municipality and by means of the 
task force and its assignment, the external professionals changed the interde-
pendencies and provided the outsiders with formal positions that gave them the 
opportunity to break through the existing dominant informal order. The rela-
tions within the task force became increasingly strained leading to an increase 
in mutual stigmatisation. The positions of the outsiders in the board improved 
and the positions of the established members grew feeble. The balance of power 
tipped and ultimately, no ethnically mixed board emerged with all key positions 
ending up in the hands of the former outsiders. As a result, the formerly estab-
lished board members no longer felt at home and left the club amid conflict and 
a feeling of dissatisfaction.
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According to Elias, the core problem in a social figuration is an unequal balance 
of power and the tensions embedded therein (Elias & Scotson 2008). Changes in 
interdependent relationships of individuals lead to power shifts and imbalance. 
The balance may shift from one end to the other from a seemingly stable equi-
librium and the more equitable the positions of groups in the balance of power, 
the greater the tensions will be. The case Onder Ons shows how an institutional 
intervention aimed at board diversity acts on this local balance of power and 
leads to unintended power dynamics and exclusion. The municipal intervention 
triggered us–them divisions that impede the process of establishing an effective, 
creative, transparent and sustainable club board. When an ethnically diverse 
board was eventually installed, the us–them divisions continued to exist.
I conclude that apparent equity in terms of shared participation in the club 
board does not necessarily lead to bridging ethnic differences. Instead, us–them 
divisions may lead to mutual stigmatisation and finally, exclusion of members. 
Despite this, diversity in board compositions ideally brings about more social 
equity, better representation, more creativity and effectiveness as assumed in good 
governance codes.
In conclusion, the municipal intervention at football club Onder Ons did con-
tribute to the survival of an amateur football club in the neighbourhood, but 
unintentionally did not improve board diversity. This highlights a policy par-
adox, which results from the lack of insight into the power dynamics between 
members in an established-outsider figuration. In addition, the government 
ambition to achieve more board diversity, in fact, led to an increase in ten-
sions, because “the need and the ambition to achieve self-esteem is expressed 
in a universal tendency to increase the value of the individual group, at the 
expense of that of other groups” (Elias & Scotson 2008). From a power per-
spective, ‘social equilibrium’ has another meaning than is often assumed in the 
diversity paradigm. Ethnic equity cannot simply be achieved by changes in the 
formal positions at the board level, as this would neglect the informal day-to-day 
processes in sport organisations and power dynamics that are related to individ-
ual position improvement as well as to position preservation. The numerical rep-
resentation of ethnic minority groups in sport boards does not necessarily mean 
the acceptance and integration of outsiders, especially when board positions are 
concerned. Outside interventions which aim at establishing diversity and equity 
between groups may result in a situation in which the players change, but the 
game remains the same.
Reform strategies aiming at inclusive sport and diversity in board compositions 
need a political (established-outsiders) perspective to avoid paradoxical effects, 
such as social exclusion and related decreasing policy legitimacy. Governments, 
sport federations, consultants, researchers and other institutional actors should 
consider the impact of their interventions on the dynamic balances of power 
in organisational boards. Contemporary board members of sport organisations 
should consider the impact of enforced diversity in their boardroom. They should 
be aware of their interdependent relationships, the respective superior and inferior 
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positions of the established and the newcomers. Ultimately, they should avoid 
either becoming outsiders.
Intervening in the social composition of sport governance can have the unin-
tended effect of triggering us–them divisions and deteriorating social relations. In 
such boardroom circumstances, equity and multivocality are difficult to realise. 
Further research is needed to understand the power dynamics in different board 
compositions and contexts, the extent to which voluntary, nonprofit differs from 
a profit-based organisational context and ways in which social divisions (educa-
tion, ethnicity, gender, age, income) work differently in board dynamics.
The case presented in this chapter shows a municipal reform strategy which 
enforced board diversity externally. It would be conducive to this discussion to 
learn how the power dynamics develop in a diverse board that is constituted 
according to the needs of diverse club member groups. Would it be possible for 
a diverse board to create any kind of ‘Onder Ons’? What are the enabling and 
constraining factors? And what can policy makers and intervening actors learn 
from it? Research that seeks answers to these and related questions would make 
a valuable contribution to finding ways how to better achieve the intended out-
comes while avoiding negative ones.
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Having authored the Sports Governance Observer 2015 and 2018 (Geeraert 2015, 
2018a), the National Sports Governance Observer (NSGO) (Geeraert 2018b) and 
the National Anti-Doping Governance Observer (Geeraert 2021), I am happy to 
see that these sets of indicators are increasingly applied across different fields to 
benchmark good governance in international sport federations, national sport 
federations, and national anti-doping organisations, respectively. Yet, I can state 
with certainty that they are all flawed: none of them provide a completely valid 
and reliable quantification of good governance. I do not think, however, that 
this is problematical per se. No measurement of governance is or will ever be 
perfectly reliable and valid. I do feel that these (inherent) limits are not always 
well-understood, particularly in the field of sport, where indicators that aim to 
assist and inspire good governance have been mushrooming in recent years with-
out much critical reflection. As a result, indicators of good governance in sport 
organisations, including those I developed, risk inducing seriously misguided good 
governance policies.
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to question and challenge the devel-
opment and use of indicators of good governance in sport organisations. Adding 
to the aforementioned instruments, a few other influential initiatives should be 
mentioned. Chappelet and Mrkonjic (2013) developed the ‘Basic Principles of 
Governance in International Sport’ (BIBGIS), the first academic attempt to for-
mulate a comprehensive set of indicators for assessing good governance in inter-
national sport federations. The Olympic and sport movement promotes three 
particular sets of indicators. In 2008, the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) introduced the ‘Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of 
the Olympic and Sports Movement’ (PGG) (IOC 2008). In 2016, the Support 
the Implementation of Good Governance in Sport (SIGGS) project funded by 
the European Union (EU) Erasmus + programme and managed by the European 
Olympic Committees European Union Office introduced a set of indicators 
that built on a previous EU funded project (Zintz & Gérard 2019). They were 
developed to assist national Olympic committees and national sport federations 
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with the implementation of good governance through self-evaluation. Finally, 
the Key Governance Principles and Basic Indicators (KGP) were introduced by 
the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations in the same year 
(ASOIF 2016). The KGP are part of a voluntary monitoring system implemented 
and managed by ASOIF to achieve better governance in Olympic international 
sport federations (Geeraert 2019). In an increasing number of countries, including 
Belgium (Flanders), the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Australia, codes 
and derived indicators are applied by public or sport authorities to induce sport 
federations’ compliance with standards of good governance.
The popularity of indicators of good governance in sport organisations can be 
explained by their potential for knowledge building. They inform policy formu-
lation and decision-making and facilitate advocacy by civil society organisations. 
They do so by providing readily understandable information about performance 
and institutional quality and by alerting policymakers to specific trends and sig-
nificant shortcomings (Coppedge et al. 2011; Espeland & Sauder 2007; Marlier 
& Atkinson 2010; Saisana & Tarantola 2002; Saltelli 2007). This is especially 
useful considering the uncertainty about the status quo of quality of governance 
in different types of sport organisations. From an academic point of view, moreo-
ver, gathering comparative governance data constitutes a necessary step towards 
testing theories about both factors that contribute to good governance and the 
impact of implementing good governance (Coppedge et al. 2011; Gisselquist 2012).
Despite these advantages, the increasing use of governance indicators in sport 
also entails substantial risks. While governance indicators are often perceived 
as certain and objective, in reality they are not. As Sarfaty (2015, p. 123) aptly 
observes, “behind a veil of scientific truth and neutrality, they mask potential prob-
lems”. These problems can be quite severe. Indicators produce powerful knowl-
edge effects—they increase awareness and induce acceptance of specific standards 
and practices, as well as governance effects—they influence decision-making and 
power dynamics (Merry 2016, pp. 4–5). Yet governance indicators tend to lack 
adequate methodological transparency, which leads to “questionable knowledge 
and governance effects” (Nelken 2015, p. 332). Most importantly, however, indi-
cators that are poorly constructed, misinterpreted, manipulated or misused can 
produce flawed knowledge and misguided decisions (Malito, Umbach & Bhuta 
2018; Nardo et al. 2005; Saisana & Tarantola 2002). In other words, indicators of 
good governance might just as well induce bad governance.
What exactly are the risks inherent to the use of governance indicators in 
sport and how, if at all, can they be dealt with? In answering these questions, this 
chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the pitfalls and methodological 
contingencies of constructing indicators and the implications for researchers and 
practitioners. It proceeds as follows. The subsequent section employs the concepts 
of validity and reliability to discuss the methodological dilemmas and tensions 
inherent to the construction of governance indicators and how they apply to 
indicators of good governance in the context of sport. Next, the chapter employs 
these insights to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the NSGO indicators. 
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This brief case study reveals important areas for further research that can aid the 
development of governance indicators in sport but also alerts practitioners to the 
inherent limitations of quantifying (good) governance in sport. The final section 
concludes these insights and explores the way forward.
The construction and use of indicators of good  
governance: A critical discussion
When engaging in a critical discussion of indicators of good governance, it is 
important to clear the conceptual cloud about indicators, composite indicators, 
indices, and benchmarking. An indicator can be defined as ‘a named collection of 
rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected performance of 
different units’ (Davis, Kingsbury & Merry 2012, p. 5). Some common examples 
include a country’s employment rate, a company’s net sales, and an organisation’s 
level of compliance with environmental standards. When quantified, each indi-
cator is represented by a value. The values of these individual indicators can 
subsequently be aggregated and weighted into a ‘composite indicator’, which is 
‘a mathematical combination of individual indicators that represent different 
dimensions of a concept whose description is the objective of the analysis’ (De 
Lombaerde et al. 2011, p. 333). Composite indicators thus summarise complex 
and multi-dimensional realities by combining subindicators into a single number 
or index. An index, in turn, aids comparison of performance (‘benchmarking’) 
across units in one or more measured dimensions of governance (Nardo et al. 
2005; Saisana & Tarantola 2002; Saisana, Tarantola & Saltelli 2005). Recent 
years have seen a proliferation of indicators and indices that measure the gov-
ernance quality of both countries and different types of organisations. But their 
construction and use have not been uncontested.
Scholarly criticism of governance indicators can generally be grouped into two 
categories. A first group of scholars rejects the positivist ontological and episte-
mological assumptions of an objective and measurable social reality upon which 
the construction and use of indicators ultimately rests. Rather than focusing 
on the development of indicators, this group scrutinises the inherently politi-
cal processes through which indicators are developed and used (Astleithner & 
Hamedinger 2003; see also the chapter by Claringbould et al. in this volume). 
A second group of scholars acknowledges the inherent limitations of measuring 
abstract dimensions of (good) governance, but nonetheless holds that assessing 
governance dimensions by measuring “imperfect proxies” is “both feasible and 
informative” (Kaufmann & Kraay 2008, p. 8). This group therefore focuses on 
developing methodologies that turn governance indicators into more accurate 
proxies for the abstract concepts they seek to measure (Gómez-Limón & Sanchez-
Fernandez 2010; Marlier & Atkinson 2010; Nardo et al. 2005). To be clear, this 
chapter follows the reasoning of the second group only. While the reasoning 
of the first group has merit in that governance and its abstract dimensions are 
indeed generally unmeasurable, measuring proxies can still be meaningful, as 
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long as governance indicators’ limitations are kept in mind. The remainder of 
this chapter therefore focuses on the methodological dilemmas and tensions that 
follow from the unavoidable subjectivity inherent to the construction of govern-
ance indicators. While it does not dwell on the political processes that underly 
the development of governance indicators, this issue is briefly addressed in the 
concluding discussion.
An increasingly large body of scholarly work scrutinises the construction of 
particular governance indices and explores the implications of particular method-
ological choices (Arndt & Oman 2006; Malito, Umbach & Bhuta 2018; Thomas 
2010). Concerns about the technical dimensions of governance indicators and 
indices in this literature centre mostly on issues relating to validity and reliability. 
Though a comprehensive review of the existing tools is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, the following demonstrates how more general methodological concerns 
about governance indicators are also prevalent with regard to indicators of good 
governance in sport.
Validity
The first key criticism of governance indicators is their questionable validity. The 
central concern is construct validity, which focuses on whether indicators and 
indices measure what they intend to measure (Thomas 2010). Governance is a 
complex concept for which an agreed definition is lacking. This conceptual ambi-
guity has resulted in various operationalisations which, taken together, incorpo-
rate a diverse mix of macro, meso, micro, cultural, structural, input, process, or 
output factors. Consequently, different governance indices rely on varying criteria 
to assess the governance quality of countries and different types of organisations 
(Gisselquist 2012; Van den Berghe & Levrau 2003).
This diversity is not problematic per se. What is problematic, is that the con-
struction of governance indices rarely rests on a basis of clearly specified concepts 
that are derived from a sound theoretical framework (Gisselquist 2012; Malito, 
Umbach & Bhuta 2018; Thomas 2010). This leads to overlaps and contradictions 
between dimensions and/or indicators, ends-means confusion (i.e. when input 
and process variables are inappropriately mixed with output or outcome varia-
bles), and ideological biases in governance indices (Malito, Umbach & Bhuta 
2018; Nelken 2015). Most importantly, it implies that the producers of these indi-
ces have no basis for arguing that implementing the principles they put forward 
would impact some related variable in any way (Gisselquist 2014; Thomas 2010). 
When it is unclear what they intend to measure and how this correlates with 
other related variables, indicators do not constitute meaningful measurements of 
abstract dimensions of good governance (Thomas 2010).
The recently introduced sets of good governance indicators in sport appear to 
suffer from similar ills. Chappelet and Mrkonjic (2019) observe significant differ-
ences between these sets in terms of conceptual scope and operationalisation. 
They lament that most authors “do not explain why they chose certain principles 
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and not others, where these principles came from, and why they are set out in the 
way they are” (Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2019, p. 11). It thus remains unclear what 
aspects of governance these indicators seek to measure. Even when governance 
dimensions are defined, the theoretical framework that underpins these defini-
tions is often implicit at best. Zintz and Gérard (2019, p. 56), for instance, simply 
note that the SIGGS governance dimensions and indicators were selected “after 
carefully analysing the literature”. In other words, while public discourse is char-
acterised by the axiomatic use of good governance as a cure for the multiple fail-
ures of governance in sport, the expected impact of implementing different sets of 
principles remains ambiguous. This has two particular implications. First, it breeds 
confusion about the meaning of index scores. Pielke et al. (2020), for instance, 
question whether the Sports Governance Observer 2015 indicators accurately 
measure governance. The reason is their different, namely output- oriented under-
standing of (good) governance. Meanwhile, the Sports Governance Observer 
2015 is an instrument designed to assess good governance in international sport 
federations based on an institutional conceptualisation of (good) governance (see 
also the case study below). Second, when the supposed effect of implementing 
particular principles is unclear, the appropriateness of these principles and the 
indicators that measure their implementation is questionable. Principles that are 
regarded as legitimate by some might actually have negative effects on the gov-
ernance (outcomes) of sport organisations.
Reliability
The second major critique of existing governance indicators pertains to their reli-
ability, that is, the extent to which they produce consistent results when applied 
by different people and across different case settings (Sarfaty 2015). Two par-
ticular reliability issues that preclude meaningful comparison emerge from the 
literature on governance indicators. The first issue pertains to the questionable 
reliability of the data that is systematically used to calculate indices that evaluate 
country governance. These data are typically either drawn from national data-
bases or based on perceptions. The quality of the databases varies, and percep-
tions are typically influenced by external factors or changes and variations among 
evaluators (Malito, Umbach & Bhuta 2018). By contrast, corporate governance 
indicators often assess governance quality by triangulating publicly available data 
on firms with information gathered through interviews with executives (Van 
den Berghe & Levrau 2003). This produces more reliable data. Corporate gov-
ernance indices that rely on companies’ self-reporting, however, suffer from self- 
overestimation and concealment (Sarfaty 2015). The second issue that negatively 
impacts the reliability of governance indicators, in both the public and private 
sector, is that they often do not rely on well-defined assessment criteria (Booysen 
2002; Sarfaty 2015). It goes without saying that indicators cannot expected to 
produce consistent data, when there are no uniform measurement guidelines in 
place that can ensure their reliability (Sarfaty 2015, p. 111).
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Similar reliability problems also appear prevalent with regard to governance 
indicators in sport. These indicators are assessed on the basis of data gathered via 
either self-evaluation, coding/analysis of publicly available information, or inter-
views or a combination of these (Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2019; Geeraert 2015, 
2018b; Zintz & Gérard 2019). Self-evaluation is a very useful tool for stimulating 
reflection and learning. Yet it arguably produces the least reliable governance data 
of these three types (Geeraert 2019). When discussing the self-evaluation process 
that underpins the assessment of the SIGGS indicators, Zintz and Gérard (2019, 
p. 58) indeed acknowledge that “some organisations may have overestimated 
their level of good governance”. In addition, governance indicators in sport rarely 
specify precise criteria for measurement (Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2019). This poses 
problems when quantifying or categorising data. For example, ASOIF recognises 
that, when assessing the governance of the summer Olympic international fed-
erations on the basis of the KGP, the scoring criteria “lacked clarity in places” 
(ASOIF 2017, p. 7) such that “in many cases there was room for debate” (ibid, p. 8).
Functionality and transparency
While there is growing awareness of governance assessments’ validity and reliabil-
ity problems, there is no commonly accepted method for attenuating these draw-
backs (Cherchye et al. 2006; Gómez-Limón & Sanchez-Fernandez 2010; Marlier 
& Atkinson 2010; Nardo et al. 2005). A consensus has nonetheless emerged on 
a number of key methodological steps for constructing governance indicators, 
including (1) constructing a theoretical and conceptual framework; (2) select-
ing variables and constructing indicators; (2) devising a data-gathering strat-
egy; (3) weighting and aggregating indicator scores; (4) robustness testing; and 
(5) devising a presentation strategy (Kaufmann, Kraay & Matruzzi 2011; Nardo 
et al. 2005). Yet, even the most ardent proponents of governance indicators stress 
that no measurement of good governance achieves perfect reliability and validity 
and that the construction of indicators inevitably involves a certain degree of 
inherent (methodological) subjectivity (Cherchye et al. 2006).
The literature therefore underscores the importance of functionality and 
transparency as guiding principles for dealing with subjective, methodological 
decisions. Functionality is, in essence, the practicality and usability of an indi-
cator (De Peuter et al. 2007). In other words, when confronted with inescapable 
subjectivity, the researcher should aim to make indicators fit for the intended 
purpose (Cherchye et al. 2006; Nardo et al. 2005). Consequently, trade-offs have 
to be made between validity and reliability on one hand, and functionality on 
the other hand. For instance, while increasing the number of indicators might 
positively affect validity, measurement might become disproportionately cost-
lier and even practically unfeasible. Validity will also suffer when indicators are 
formulated in broad terms, but this may be necessary in order to make them 
applicable to a diverse population of organisations (Astleithner & Hamedinger 
2003). With regard to reliability, well-defined assessment criteria are necessary to 
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achieve consistent results. When indicators of good governance are formulated in 
an overly strict fashion, however, their application risks becoming too formalistic 
(Wymeersch 2006). Some flexibility is warranted, as (sport) organisations should 
have a degree of leeway to implement principles of good governance in accord-
ance with their organisational culture and environmental context. Furthermore, 
consistent results may be essential for meaningful comparison, but arguably less 
important when indicators serve an educational purpose. For instance, broadly 
formulated indicators can be a very useful tool for stimulating debate within the 
context of an informal self-assessment. Indicators that are formulated in an overly 
strict fashion could be less fit for this purpose.
While there may be valid practical reasons for sacrificing some degree of reli-
ability and validity, transparent reporting about the choices made in each of the 
key methodological steps is essential. It informs scholars as well as practitioners 
about the implications of (subjective) choices for the validity and reliability of 
the instrument (Gómez-Limón & Sanchez-Fernandez 2010, p. 1063; Marlier & 
Atkinson 2010, p. 289; Nardo et al. 2005, p. 22). In the absence of transparency 
about data and methodology, it is indeed impossible to assess what index scores 
actually mean. Given the governance effects of index scores, this lack of under-
standing is highly problematical.
Case study: The National Sports Governance Observer
To provide a better understanding of the pitfalls and methodological contingen-
cies of constructing governance indicators in sport, this section critically explores 
the methodological choices that underpin the construction of the NSGO indi-
cators (Geeraert 2018c). This comprehensive set of 274 indicators of good gov-
ernance was the product of a recent project supported by the European Union 
Erasmus+ programme and managed by Danish NGO Play the Game. It measured 
and compared good governance in sport federations across nine European coun-
tries (Geeraert 2018c). Aiming to achieve methodological transparency, the sec-
tion reports on the choices and trade-offs made in three key methodological steps. 
These are (1) constructing a theoretical and conceptual framework; (2) selecting 
variables and constructing indicators; and (3) weighting and aggregating indica-
tor scores. The section ends with a critical reflection on the NSGO indicators, 
specifically in terms of validity, reliability, and functionality.
Theoretical and conceptual framework
The construction of the NSGO indicators followed the three-step approach 
for measuring abstract constructs as outlined by Thomas (2010). The first step 
requires defining governance, good governance, and its sub-components (Nardo 
et al. 2005). Because the NSGO was developed within the framework of a pro-
ject that sought to improve sport organisations’ internal structures, governance 
is defined from a narrow, institutional perspective (Treib, Bähr & Falkner 2007). 
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Institutions are understood here as sets of interconnected rules and practices that 
prescribe behaviour (Keohane 1988). In other words, governance is conceptual-
ised as “a system of rules that shape the actions of social actors” (Treib, Bähr & 
Falkner 2007, p. 4).
Measuring governance, then, implies setting some normative benchmark 
against which the institutional design of organisations can be evaluated. In other 
words, it necessitates a clear conception of what constitutes ‘good’ governance in 
terms of appropriate rules and practices. The NSGO defines good governance as 
the embedding of transparency, democracy, internal accountability and control, 
and societal responsibility in the system of rules and practices that governs sport 
federations. Following Gisselquist, these four dimensions were chosen because 
they are recognisable to both academic and lay audiences, they are interrelated 
yet conceptually distinct, and they have theoretical utility since they build upon 
rich literatures (Gisselquist 2014, p. 517–18).
The second step outlined by Thomas (2010) involves formulating operational 
definitions, which allows translating the four abstract dimensions in observable 
institutional components (Gisselquist 2014, p. 519; Thomas, 2010). These defini-
tions are elaborated in greater detail in Chapter 2 in this volume. Transparency 
refers to institutional arrangements that make information available about an 
actor “allowing other actors to monitor the workings or performance of this actor” 
(Meijer 2014, p. 511). Democracy here entails a system of rules that establishes 
competition (electoral competition between political alternatives), participation 
(affected actors’ influence over collective decisions) and deliberation (fair and 
open debates aimed at mutual understanding) (Coppedge et al. 2011). For the third 
dimension, a narrow and internal perspective on accountability is adopted which 
entails a clear separation of executive, judicial, and supervisory powers on one 
hand, and an internal system that enables independent entities to monitor deci-
sion makers’ compliance on the other hand. Fourth and drawing on the Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) definition by Van Aaken et al. (2013), societal respon-
sibility is defined as the institutionalisation of pro-social behaviour. The notion 
of pro-social behaviour is employed here to capture those activities where sport 
federations employ their private authority to address societal issues related to sport.
Thomas’ (2010) third and final step involves making causal predictions about 
the implementation of the four components of good governance. Following a set 
of rational assumptions that are elaborated in detail in Chapter 2 in this volume, 
it can be hypothesised that the joint implementation of the four components of 
good governance contributes to effective and impartial decision-making that is 
free from abuses of entrusted power for personal gain, to stakeholder trust, and to 
effective deployment of private authority to address societal issues.
Selecting variables and constructing indicators
Operationalising the four abstract dimensions of good governance requires replac-
ing them with “intermediate objectives whose achievement can be observed and 
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measured” (Nardo et al. 2005, p. 5). Following a deductive approach, the NSGO 
indicators were constructed on the basis of the institutional rules and practices 
that best fit or express the four dimensions of good governance (Nelken 2015, 
p. 318). A review of more than 40 sets of good governance principles and rec-
ommendations issued by national governments, international organisations, and 
sport organisations as well as by the non-profit, corporate and cultural sectors was 
carried out. This led to the selection of 46 general practices, rules and procedures 
that fit the definitions of the four dimensions of good governance.
In order to make these 46 broad principles measurable, (sub-)indicators were 
constructed. For the sake of reliability, dichotomous variables were constructed, 
which have only two categories or levels (i.e. yes or no). These variables were 
quantified by giving the ‘yes’ category a value of 1 and the ‘no’ category a value 
of 0. This process resulted in 274 dichotomous indicators of good governance 
that evaluate the implementation of 46 broad principles of good governance, dis-
persed over the four dimensions. To further enhance reliability of the indicators, 
meta-data sheets were developed which explicitly detail the scoring criteria and 
possible data sources.
A three-fold strategy was followed in order to enhance the validity of the indi-
cators. First, in line with the relevant literature, expert advice and feedback was 
sought and incorporated (De Peuter et al. 2007; Nardo et al. 2005). Both the 
selection of the 46 principles and the 274 indicators were informed by focus group 
discussions with Flemish sport federations and discussions with the academics 
and sport federation representatives that were part of the NSGO project. Second, 
the 274 indicators are both rules-based and outcome-based (Kaufmann & Kraay 
2008). Though rules-based indicators are more straightforward to quantify, out-
come indicators are able to capture bureaucratic practices that are not formalised 
but still relatively stable (Keohane 1988). Finally, a pilot study involving a mixed 
sample of small and large federations in nine European countries and Brazil 
ensured that the indicators apply to a broad range of different circumstances in a 
clear and unambiguous manner.
Weighting and aggregating indicator scores
In order to present the data in a meaningful, i.e. comparative way, the individual 
indicator values must be aggregated into one or more ‘composite indicators’. In 
the case of the NSGO, an ‘NSGO index’ score is calculated as follows. First, 
a score is calculated for each of the 46 principles on the basis of the average 
score of the underlying indicators. Second, each dimension (i.e. transparency, 
democratic processes, internal accountability and control, and societal respon-
sibility) is assigned a score on the basis of the average scores of the principles 
that underlie the dimension. Finally, an NSGO index score is calculated on the 
basis of the average score of the four dimensions. Thus, like most composite indi-
cators, the NSGO index, dimension scores, and principles score rely on equal 
weighting. This choice was informed by two considerations. First, the NSGO 
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index scores must be understandable for practitioners and equal weighting is the 
simplest weighting option. Second, weighting is especially subjective where aca-
demic research is still in its infancy (Nardo et al. 2005, p. 31). Equal weighting, 
while inherently subjective in its own right, is in this context arguably the least 
subjective solution.
While aggregation may aid comparison across federations, it is also important 
to ensure an objective comparison. Given that sport federations vary in terms of 
their administrative capacity and the governance-related risks they are subject to, 
the same governance standard cannot apply to all federations (Nardo et al. 2005). 
Three categories of sport federations were discerned on the basis of the samples 
selected by the research partners: small federations with fewer than ten full-time 
equivalent (FTE) employees, mid-sized federations (equal to or more than ten, but 
fewer than 30 FTE employees), and large federations (30 or more FTE employees). 
Accordingly, the indicators were divided into three categories, namely ‘basic’, 
‘intermediate’, and ‘advanced’. When indicators are not applicable, they are sim-
ply not considered in the calculation of scores.
Discussion: The limits of the National Sports  
Governance Observer
The key value of the NSGO is its ability to make a holistic and readily under-
standable diagnosis of potential institutional weaknesses and shortcomings of 
sport federations in four dimensions of good governance. A (modified) traffic 
light scoring system allows for an easily accessible yet nuanced interpretation of 
strengths and weaknesses. In addition, the Observer allows for collecting rela-
tively reliable data that can be used for comparative research or for theory-testing 
purposes.
The instrument should be regarded as a barometer rather than a dogmatic tool 
that provides the ultimate assessment of good governance. Even though the indi-
cators were constructed while paying specific attention to validity and reliability, 
the subjective choices that had to be made in the three steps outlined above are 
highly consequential. A brief, non-exhaustive overview of six particular limits to 
the instrument should suffice to inspire caution.
First, the instrument has a rational-structural bias. This is due to the under-
lying theoretical-conceptual framework’s focus on material-institutional ele-
ments of governance. The NSGO index consequently provides an appreciation 
of the institutional qualities of sport federations in terms of four dimensions of 
good governance. This is the result of a trade-off with functionality: broaden-
ing the conceptual scope would multiply the already high number of indicators. 
However, this means that the NSGO index does not consider cultural–ideational 
(see also the chapters by Girginov and van Eekeren in this volume), personal (see 
also the chapter by Heres in this volume), or systemic (see also the chapter by 
van Bottenburg in this volume) factors. Even though the theoretical framework 
underpinning the indicators predicts a positive correlation between a high NSGO 
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index and organisational outcomes such as impact, effectiveness, or ethical con-
duct, the instrument does not provide a direct measurement of such outcomes.
Second, there is subjectivity involved in the selection of the four governance 
dimensions and the underlying principles and indicators. There is no point in 
denying that the selection of these dimensions is (implicitly) guided by norma-
tive considerations of “what ought to be” (Shapiro 2003, p. 2). These considera-
tions are to some extent culturally inspired (see also the chapter by Girginov in 
this volume), as the four dimensions are in themselves considered “public values” 
in liberal democracies (see also the chapter by van Eekeren in this volume). 
Transparency, democracy, accountability, and societal responsibility may, how-
ever, have a different meaning in non-Western cultures.
Third, like most governance indices, the NSGO index relies on untested the-
oretical assumptions about institutional features (Fazekas, Tóth & King 2013). 
Because a theoretical framework accounts for the dynamics of implementing the 
four dimensions of good governance, achieving a high NSGO index is not mean-
ingless. However, while these assumptions are always ‘true’ in the abstract world 
of theory, rigorous empirical testing is required to assess to what extent they hold 
in real-world circumstances and different (cultural) environments. The reality is, 
however, that the sport governance literature has thus far failed to address the 
impact of the implementation of principles of good governance on organisational 
outcomes (Parent & Hoye 2018).
Fourth, the choice for a total number of 274 indicators constitutes an imperfect 
compromise between practicality and validity. On one hand, the relatively high 
number of indicators arguably hurts the practicality and usability of the instru-
ment. On the other hand, a case could equally be made for including more indi-
cators in order to enhance the validity of the measurement. For instance, a sport 
federation that achieves a high score on the democracy dimension does not nec-
essarily implement all relevant democratic processes (e.g. Coppedge et al. 2011).
Fifth, because there is no objective method for assigning weights, the weight 
of individual indicators and dimensions in the NSGO index is subject to end-
less dispute. In addition, the distinction between small, medium, and large sport 
federations in the construction of the NSGO index is equally subjective. This 
distinction, based on the number of FTE staff employed, is informed by expert 
opinion. As Parent and colleagues argue in their contribution to this book (see 
also the chapter by Parent et al. in this volume), this still constitutes a somewhat 
arbitrary benchmark since it is not based on empirical observation. It has, how-
ever, important implications, since ‘small’ federations are held to a lower standard 
with 66 of the 274 indicators deemed not applicable.
Sixth, because a degree of methodological subjectivity is inescapable, social 
processes likely play a significant role in the selection of indicators, dimensions, 
and weighting methods. There is no denying that this author’s own preconceived 
ideas about good governance, the project involvement of Play the Game as an 
advocacy organisation, the power relations between the project participants, and 
the participants’ attitudes and identities all have, to some extent, influenced the 
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construction of the instrument. Since these processes are largely unconscious, 
transparent reporting about them is nearly impossible, meaning that their impact 
remains indiscernible.
Conclusion
The recent proliferation of indicators of good governance in sport helps to fill 
important knowledge gaps, inform decision-making, and facilitate advocacy. At 
the same time, however, indicators that are poorly constructed, misinterpreted, 
manipulated or misused may induce bad governance. The brief case study of the 
NSGO indicators moreover demonstrates that even when particular attention is 
paid to validity and reliability, necessary trade-offs with functionality and ines-
capable subjectivity renders governance indicators inherently flawed.
For these reasons, it is indeed quite easy to criticise any set of governance indi-
cators. Because abstract governance dimensions are unmeasurable and a fully 
objective and reliable measurement via proxies is impossible, one may even ques-
tion the very existence of governance indicators. In my opinion, measuring gov-
ernance can be meaningful and useful, but no measurement should be treated as 
final step. At the very least, scholars and practitioners should be attentive to sev-
eral issues in order to mitigate the potential risks of using governance indicators.
Scholars have a special responsibility to ensure that risks are minimised and 
known. They should engage in the continuous improvement of existing indicators 
of good governance in sport, paying particular attention to know strategies for max-
imising validity and reliability. Two key areas for improvement regarding validity are 
constructing governance indicators on the basis of a sound theoretical framework 
and assessing the (unintended) impact of the implementation of governance prin-
ciples across sport organisations in different (cultural) settings. There is room for 
diversity, as different indicator sets may have different functional goals, including 
education, advocacy, and inducing compliance. Different governance indices may 
therefore also quantify complementary aspects and dimensions of good governance 
in sport organisations. With regard to reliability, scholars should pay attention to 
developing clear and uniform measurement guidelines. In any case, they should 
report openly about contingent methodological choices and critically assess their 
implications. Yet, even the most transparent methodological reporting would fail to 
reveal the impact of the social and political processes that influence the construction 
and use of governance indicators. There is therefore a need for more critical aca-
demic research into these processes. For instance, on one hand, indicators are often 
used as a legitimation strategy that privileges the status quo. On the other hand, they 
can be important tools for advocacy organisations that seek to delegitimise the status 
quo. Indicators can be manipulated to best serve either one of these aims.
Practitioners should handle governance indicators with care. They can be an 
important part, but they should not be the only component of any governance 
reform strategy. Governance indicators are particularly useful as first avenue to 
analysis of governance, as a way to suss out the situation. Subsequently, a more 
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in-depth investigation and discussion is required to establish the nature and 
severity of any established deficits. In any case, indicators should not provide a 
single rigid template for governance reforms. On one hand, the formalistic nature 
of indicators may induce box-ticking behaviours on the side of sport organisations 
rather than substantial reforms. On the other hand, these organisations should 
have a degree of leeway to implement principles of good governance in accord-
ance with their organisational culture and environmental context. Awareness of 
the inherent shortcoming of governance indicators should also inspire a critical 
attitude towards the interpretation of governance indices. Practitioners should 
enquire about which aspects of governance are quantified by specific indicator 
sets. They should also inform themselves about the shortcomings of specific 
benchmarking instruments and demand transparency about contingent method-
ological choices and their implications.
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A recommended system for promoting 
and safeguarding sport integrity
Lisa A. Kihl
Introduction
Globally, National Sport Governing Bodies (NSGBs), for example in Australia, 
Czech Republic, United Kingdom and United States of America, struggle to pre-
vent and address integrity issues is not a new phenomenon (Kihl 2019). For example, 
during the past five years the Australian National Rugby League has experienced 
numerous on and off-the-field integrity issues including positive doping cases, sal-
ary cap breaches, player disorderly conduct, domestic assault, and sexual miscon-
duct by different actors in several of their clubs, e.g. Cronulla Sharks, Canterbury 
Bankstown Bulldogs, Melbourne Storm, Parramatta Eels (Kinsella 2019). For over 
20 years, Larry Nassar was enabled to sexually abuse more than 300 female athletes. 
Poor governance, ineffective oversight, and cover-ups by the Unites States Olympic 
and Paralympic Committee, USA gymnastics, and Michigan State University all 
contributed to Nassar’s abuse. Whilst in 2019, UK athletics was labelled “the most 
dysfunctional Olympic sport in Britain” following a series of issues related to ques-
tionable leadership and relationships, doping, and substandard safeguard proce-
dures (Ingle 2019, p. 6). The range of integrity violations illustrate the global need 
for NSGBs to rethink how they promote integrity and minimise integrity risks and 
violations by way of good governance and independent policy reforms.
The broad nature of sport integrity requires a multi-lens systems approach to 
promoting integrity and limiting risks and violations. Integrity risks are “condi-
tions and behaviours within an organisation that increase its vulnerability to the 
occurrence of integrity violations” (Molina 2018, p. 873).
Integrity violations include both unethical legal behaviours and activities (e.g. 
abuse of power, code of conduct breaches conflict of interest, gamesmanship, poor 
governance practices, sport code violations) and unethical illegal behaviours 
(e.g. bribery of officials, illegal sport betting, match fixing, money laundering). A 
sport integrity system consists of individuals, institutions, policies, practices, and 
agencies that contribute to fostering and safeguarding the integrity of an NSGB 
(Kihl 2019). The central focus of an integrity system is outlining the components 
and conditions necessary for preventing integrity violations and limiting integrity 
risks in governance and sport competitions.
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This chapter will briefly review sport scholarship on what is known about the 
effectiveness of good governance and policy instruments for addressing integrity 
violations and fostering integrity. The review leads to the conclusion that pro-
moting and safeguarding integrity requires a system that includes sport actors, 
accountability mechanisms, and integrity management. Next, the different com-
ponents that comprise a sport integrity system and their interactions are outlined. 
The chapter concludes with contribution of designing a sport integrity system 
and suggestions for future research.
Description of current practice and 
the problems that this entails
The strategy of choice for academics and sport practitioners for restoring integ-
rity, in general, is to focus on a “Band-Aid response to particular emergencies” 
(e.g. such as doping, bribery, match fixing, sexual assault)” by adopting indi-
vidual policies rather than promoting and safeguarding integrity through a 
coordinated holistic system (Cleret et al 2015; Gardiner et al. 2017, p. 16). As 
such, sport scholars and experts have leaned on two main reactive strategies to 
curb specific integrity violations: (1) implementing good governance principles 
(e.g. Chappelet 2018; Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2013; Geeraert, Alm & Groll 2014; 
Henry & Lee 2004), and (2) developing and implementing different individual 
policies (e.g. anti-doping, manipulation of sport, Safe Sport, concussion, gen-
der equity, anti-racism). After a series of scandals (e.g. corruption and sexual 
assault) in both national and international sport organisations there was a call 
for good governance and extensive contributions to scholarship have been made. 
The literature has drawn from cooperate governance and democratic govern-
ance theory, where a series of national sport good governance publications (e.g. 
Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2013; Geeraert 2018; Henry & Lee 2004) have put forth 
a variety of principles to promote good governance and fight against integrity 
breaches (Chappelet 2018; Di Marco 2019). In the sport governance literature, 
integrity is perceived as a principle of good governance rather than a quality of 
sport and/or sport system. For example, Chappelet and Mrkonjic’s (2013) Basic 
indicators for better governance in international sport lists integrity as a princi-
ple to adhere to in seeking good sport governance. Numerous countries have 
implemented different principles of good governance in their respective NSGBs 
(e.g. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway, and the UK). 
Despite the adoption of these principles, we continue to see integrity risks and 
violations.
In this chapter, I am arguing that sport governance is an internal element of 
an overarching sport integrity system. An integrity system is much broader and 
involves both internal and external mechanisms and actors that aim for high 
integrity of NSGBs. Good governance in sport governing bodies is argued to 
be “the means to the end” in gaining organisational “legitimacy, effectiveness, 
and resistance to unethical practices” (Geeraert 2018, p. 7). However, its precise 
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meaning is contested and the application of the long list of indicators seems 
daunting.
The second approach used to curb corruption is the ratification of independent 
policies (Kihl 2019). As different types of rorting, sexual assault, and harassment 
cases have surfaced, NSGBs have tended to adopt separate policy instruments 
to counteract these unethical and/or illegal activities. For example, anti-doping, 
anti-harassment, betting and crime reporting, equity and diversity, match fixing, 
and Safe Sport are the prevalent policies of many NSGBs. Depending on the 
country, the sport, and the integrity issues that are most pressing influence the 
policies that are implemented. An emerging trend is NSGBs with the financial 
capacity is hiring integrity officers to oversee the implementation of specific pol-
icies. For example, USA NSGBs require a safe sport program and an integrity 
officer whose role is oversee the prevention of sexual assault and harassment. 
Recurrent integrity violations within NSGBs strongly suggest that the various 
policy mechanisms adopted to control violations are inadequate and detached to 
respond to the variety and range of integrity risks and breaches they encounter 
(Kihl 2019).
For example, Australia and Finland have adopted specific sport integrity ini-
tiatives. Sport Integrity Australia is responsible for ‘Safeguarding the Integrity 
of Sport’ with a focus on policy development, intelligence, investigations, edu-
cation and training to counter doping, match manipulations, child safety, and 
protection from harassment. The Finish Center for Integrity in Sports focuses 
on advocating ethical principles in sport that focus on anti-doping, prevention 
of match-fixing, spectator violence, and fair play. Whilst these sport integrity 
initiatives are extremely important and a good first step in safeguarding integrity, 
arguably these programs do not reflect a holistic integrity system. Furthermore, 
there is an emphasis on safeguarding integrity from certain unethical activi-
ties rather than acknowledging the multifaceted nature of sport integrity which 
requires a system approach that both safeguards and promotes integrity. By 
not acknowledging the multifaceted nature of integrity leads to safeguarding 
prioritised unethical behaviours whilst other types of unethical behaviour go 
unchecked and can prosper.
Sampford, Smith and Brown (2005, p. 100) suggested “institutions and relation-
ships, are often weak individually but collectively potentially strong”. Arguably 
the lack of clarity and understanding of the concept of sport integrity (Cleret et al 
2015; Gardiner et al. 2017), along with the reactive governance in applying band 
aid and piecemeal reforms that aim to safeguard integrity requires a radical shift 
in how NSGBs go about doing integrity. To curb the persistent integrity risks and 
violations and promote integrity in NSGBs, requires more than good governance, 
integrity officers, and specific integrity policies and units. Institutionalising and 
sustaining integrity in NSGBs is contingent on a holistic system comprised of 
interdependent and cooperative actors, an internal integrity management infra-
structure, and different internal and external accountability mechanisms (Kihl 
2019; Sampford et al. 2005).
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Description of an alternative approach: 
Sport integrity system
NSGBs are complex organisations (Pedras, Taylor & Frawley 2020) that encounter a 
myriad of integrity concerns. These national governing bodies are multi-levelled and 
endure external and internal environmental influences that generate a variety of 
novel and reoccurring integrity risks and violations commanding thoughtful man-
agement reflection. For example, the current COVID-19 crisis has created unique 
economic conditions, cultural influences, and political pressures on organisations 
regarding athlete well-being, training, and return to play. COVID-19 crisis and the 
related economic crisis has made NSGBs particularly vulnerable to different form 
of corruption including match fixing (in particular Ghost games), money launder-
ing, and transnational crime (Kihl & Ordway forthcoming). Navigating novel and 
reoccurring integrity risks and violations requires more than just good governance. 
Integrity system theory posits a holistic perspective that focuses on the bigger picture 
and considers all the components and conditions necessary to the integrity of a sport 
organisation (Six & Lawton 2013). It “focuses on the connection between various 
components within and outside the organisation, how they are interconnected and 
how they are jointly responsible for the integrity performance of an organisation” 
(Huberts & Van Montfort 2020, p. 454). All components are interrelated, interde-
pendent, and serve as the building blocks to a national integrity system (Pope 2008). 
A national sport integrity system includes actors who are responsible for coordi-
nating and implementing the system, an integrity management infrastructure, and 
different accountability mechanisms (Huberts & Van Montfort 2020).
A sport integrity system is based on the notion that there is no one solution to 
preventing unethical behaviours; rather, it requires “institutionalisation of integ-
rity” by several agencies, actors, laws, regulations, practices, and ethical policies 
(Head 2012, p. 9). For example the International Federation of Association Football 
(FIFA) member associations’ integrity programs possess the independence to create 
and implement their own program. Recognising each countries’ football federation 
is distinctive in terms of its governance system, economics, history, and culture, 
social development; thus allowing each confederation the autonomy to design and 
implement an integrity system based on that it corresponds with their respective 
strategic priorities (FIFA 2020, par. 2). As such, NGSBs have the flexibility to deter-
mine which actors, the type of integrity management infrastructure, and the appro-
priate accountability mechanisms in designing their integrity system.
The internal mechanism of an overall integrity system is an integrity manage-
ment infrastructure (also referred to as ethics management), which is its internal 
operational arm. Ashby’s (1991) principle of requisite variety argues that the com-
plexity of a system dictates the variety of monitoring and controlling systems to 
promoting and safeguarding integrity. An integrity management infrastructure 
has four functions: (a) determining and defining integrity, (b) guiding towards 
integrity, (c) monitoring integrity, and (d) enforcing integrity (Maesschalck & 
Vanden Auweele 2010). Assessing relevant integrity actors and other stakeholders’ 
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perceptions of integrity and what values they aim to espouse in decision making, 
policy making, procedures, and processes is an important first task. This defi-
nition of integrity moulds the overall integrity culture through its mission and 
vision, rituals, symbols, structure, leadership and daily practices. Core integrity 
structures are devised and instruments selected that help promote, monitor, and 
enforce integrity. These include a combination of good governance principles 
(e.g. values-based mechanisms, compliance based mechanisms, structural, envi-
ronment, equity, and political orientated structures and instruments).
Values-based mechanisms and compliance-based mechanisms are the two 
most commonly adopted ethical management orientations used to limit integrity 
risks and violations in sport governance. Values-based mechanisms (e.g. ethical 
codes, values statements, leadership) promote integrity and limit risks by using 
individual intrinsic motivation techniques that’s build moral competence and 
integrity. In combination these techniques build an ethical culture that promotes 
ethical dialogue about integrity concerns, promotion of ethical behaviour, and 
decision making. The promotion of ethical dialogue is critical to high integrity 
management because it is a proactive way to promote integrity and not be reac-
tive to unethical behaviour and thus is a demarcation from good governance. 
Compliance-based mechanisms use formal external control methods to reduce 
risks and violations. Compliance systems commonly entail four formal systems: 
(a) communications of organisational ethical values and principles (e.g. ethics 
committees, mission statements, education and training programs) (Constandt, 
De Waegeneer & Willem 2019; De Waegeneer, Van De Sompele & Willem 2016); 
(b) surveillance (e.g. whistleblower program, an Ombudsman) (Warren, Gaspar 
& Laufer 2014); (c) sanctions and investigations that reward ethical behaviours 
and punish violators (Maesschalck & Vanden Auweele 2010) and (d) formal 
organisational structures (e.g. authority structures, division of labour, good gov-
ernance principles, and level of empowerment) (Treviño & Nelson 2017). In 
addition, environmental practices that adhere to societal expectations regarding 
sustainability and global warming, social equity and political responsibility are all 
key integrity management orientations that may be implemented.
Integrity performance relies on effective internal coherence with instruments, 
structures, and processes all managed as one unit and interconnected across the 
entire NSGB integrity system. Auditing existing core integrity structures and 
instruments is necessary to determine if additional mechanisms need to be added 
to strengthened integrity promotion and safeguarding from risks (e.g. athlete well-
being, racial harassment, financial internal controls). Reinforcing existing instru-
ments and/or implementing additional ones is critical for system coherence and 
effectiveness. A core and vital part of integrity management strategy is instituting 
the correct and quality processes to assure the different instruments are rightly 
implemented. Whilst time consuming, regular integrity management evaluations 
are necessary to appropriately address risks but also proactively address inter-
nal and external environmental forces that may create novel integrity concerns. 
Consequently, the integrity management infrastructure will require modifications 
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(e.g. revising policy documents), changes (e.g. how programs are delivered, mon-
itoring practices, and intelligence sharing), and/or in some cases mending (e.g. 
enhancing the ethical leadership of board members or presidents, mending trust 
with external watch dog agencies and whistleblowers (Hoekstra & Kaptein 2020).
Importance of different forms of accountability
The historical autonomy of sport organisations and persistence of integrity issues 
across NSGBs illustrates their inability to suitably self-regulate and/or generate 
a culture of integrity (Chappelet 2016, 2018; Geeraert 2019). Manoli, Comille 
and Downward’s (2020) research on individuals’ perceptions of sport integrity 
supports this argument. Individuals’ believed that sport was unable to manage 
its integrity and was unmotivated to protect its integrity because of peoples con-
tinued engagement in sport. Good governance principles rely on free and fair 
elections and watchdog groups as the primary means of accountability. The com-
plexity of NSGBs (Pedras et al. 2020) and the breadth and depth of integrity con-
cerns they are confronted with, warrants an integrity system that is dependent on 
several integrated accountability mechanisms to manage and regulate unethical 
behaviour (Heinrich & Brown 2017).
Integrity systems require four types of accountability: vertical accountabil-
ity, horizontal accountability, mutual accountability, and social accountability 
(Heinrich & Brown 2017). Vertical accountability is similar to the democratic 
principle of holding regular, free, fair and transparent elections (Di Marco 2019). 
Vertical accountability alone is deemed insufficient for accountability. Pope 
(2008, p. 19) argued officials escape reelection by an unsatisfied society “through 
a combination of secrecy (so that the electors are unaware of what is transpir-
ing) and the building of systems of patronage” as well as “indulging in short-
term populist acts, which may be to the longer-term detriment of the public”. 
Horizontal accountability represents the separation of powers and involves formal 
institutions who hold the authority to perform checks and balances (Howe & 
Haigh 2016). Integrity institutions (i.e. organisations that have the responsibility 
of integrity) function to oversee the integrity of governing bodies, administrative 
units, and other institutions responsible for integrity operations. There are core 
integrity institutions (e.g. watchdog groups, integrity agencies, law enforcement) 
whose primary role is monitoring. Distributed integrity institutions play an aux-
iliary role of integrity monitoring in addition to their regular core business (e.g. 
governing, statutory bodies). As previously noted, good governance advocates 
tend to focus on vertical accountability and horizontal accountability.
Vertical and horizontal accountability do not sufficiently address the concern of 
‘who guards the guardians’ (Howe & Haigh 2016). Mutual accountability is a means 
for guarding the guardians through a collective set of institutions hold each other 
accountable by means of cross checking, coordination, consistency, and operational 
arm relationships (Sampford et al. 2005). Jurisdictions are defined and relation-
ships are required between a president, governing board, integrity units, and ethics 
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committees to ensure who is performing specific check and balance roles. Effective 
integrity management entails coordination and consistency of sport integrity pol-
icies. Actors carry out these integrity operations by implementing respective sport 
policy processes. Integrity performance entails a system of functioning networks 
where each actor is accountable to one or more actors (Mulgan 2003). Managing 
the various complex integrity relationships is critical in order to nurture relation-
ships rather than creating barriers that can lead to non-cooperation.
Sport integrity systems also require civil society’s buy-in to performing as an 
accountability arm. Societal accountability depends on the civic engagement of 
different actors to use their collective voice to hold NSGB actors accountable (Jayal 
2008). Civil society actors involve private sector actors (e.g. media, sponsors), fans, 
and collective social movements to use their combined power to expose transgres-
sions and place pressure on NSGBs to operate effective integrity systems. “To be 
effective, they have to generate sufficient public pressure to strengthen horizontal 
accountability and to create a credible threat of sanctioning power through the 
mechanism of electoral accountability” (Schatz 2013, p. 171). To date, civil soci-
ety is not shown a consistent commitment to holding NSGBs accountable. Fans, 
sponsors, media, and the general public might display outrage in cases of severe 
unethical behaviour (e.g. athlete acts of sexual violence, administrative abuses of 
power and fraud); however, they do not hold the NSGB accountable and peo-
ple continue to engage (Manoli et al. 2020). Good governance generally includes 
vertical accountability and strong internal accountability and control (similar 
to horizontal accountability). Internal accountability and control do not include 
external accountability institutions (i.e. integrity institutions). Furthermore, good 
governance does not include mutual or social accountability. The strength of a 
NSGB’s integrity system and separates it from good governance is the interplay of 
vertical, horizontal, mutual, and social accountability mechanisms (Schatz 2013).
Application to NSGBs: A sport integrity system
An NSGBs integrity system comprises of three main components: actors, an 
internal integrity management infrastructure (i.e. operational arm), as well as 
external accountability guardians of the NSGBs administration and governing 
board. Components of the NSGBs integrity system and their respective relation-
ships require coherent management to ensure integrity risk containment, includ-
ing appropriate exercises of power. In such a system, depending on the NSGB’s 
governance type (i.e. federated or unitary), NSGBs collaboratively support and 
coordinate with their respective sport network to implement specific measures, 
policies, and practices considered important to ensuring integrity. An NSGB also 
coordinates with the external accountability guards to assure cohesion with the 
internal environment and integrity actors. A sport integrity system is therefore 
multidimensional and elements comprising the system can vary significantly 
depending on the sport governing body, the level in which the elements operate, 
the location (e.g. urban or rural), and the political and economic environments.
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Actors
Several NSGB internal and external actors are responsible for generating and 
guarding integrity. Internal integrity actors oversee and coordinate the integ-
rity management infrastructure as well as harmonising with external actors 
and institutions of the larger integrity system. The governance structure of the 
organisation (i.e. federated or unitary) will influence how the system is managed, 
coordinated, and the nature of accountability. The delineation of their respec-
tive roles and responsibilities is critical in coordinating initiatives at the local, 
regional and/or state levels accord with the overall national system. Furthermore, 
they are responsible for overseeing and managing the different actors administer-
ing the integrity management infrastructure across the system.
External actors (e.g. community, government actors, legal actors, media, spon-
sors and their integrity units, sport betting intelligence agencies) hold horizontal 
and social accountability roles. In the contexts of event management, the public 
sector (e.g. betting monitoring agencies, sponsors, broadcast agencies) will also 
take on mutual accountability roles in the implementation and communication 
of their respective security infrastructures. It is important that NSGBs identify 
actors who are internal and external to the system, as well as define their respon-
sibility and roles at the club, regional, state, and national levels. The effective 
coordination of the various integrity actors within a national system is imperative.
Internal environment
The internal environment includes an integrity management infrastructure that 
is harmonised with the broader national integrity system. An integrity man-
agement infrastructure makes-up the internal environment and contains three 
main components: instruments, structures and processes. The goal of the integ-
rity infrastructure is to institutionalise integrity throughout the NSGB byway of 
official and explicit guidelines that infuse ethical values into day-to-day sporting 
decisions and practices. The management infrastructure is custom built so as to 
parallel the NSGB’s expectations for promoting and safeguarding their integrity 
vision. NSGBs are complex organisations that experience a variety of integrity 
concerns in the governance and delivery of sport; therefore, the integrity infra-
structure will require an array of practices within each component.
External environment
The external environment contains guardians that function as external checks 
and balances. Checks and balances are the mechanisms for guardianship and 
accountability that ensure that local, regional, and national sport governing 
boards operate within legal and social boundaries. External guardians consist of 
an independent regulatory environment and the social environment that serve 
mutual, horizontal and social accountability roles.
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Regulatory environment refers to the laws, regulations, and external regulatory 
oversight agencies that serve to work in coordination with a sport integrity sys-
tem. Standard regulatory watchdogs include law enforcement, state and national 
legislation, government regulations, and specific sport and non-sport regulatory 
oversight bodies including anti-corruption and safe sport agencies. These exter-
nal regulatory agencies play mutual and horizontal accountability functions. For 
example, international anti-corruption agencies include the world anti-doping 
agency, INTERPOL, and government agencies such as the Australian National 
Integrity in Sport Unit who can aid NSGBs in combating corruption in sport. 
Safe sport agencies like the US Center for SafeSport aim to end different forms 
of abuse in sport. Integrity-specific watchdog groups have also emerged including 
organisations such as the Sport Integrity Global Alliance and the Sport Integrity 
Unit, which focus on promoting integrity by providing governance resources and 
leadership.
The social environment (e.g. media, the private sector, and community mem-
bers) serves horizontal, social, and/or mutual accountability roles. In a sport integ-
rity system, private sector agencies generally involve sponsors and sport betting 
monitoring. During sporting events sponsors might play a variety of integrity 
roles including security (e.g. Visa provides secure payment infrastructure), digital 
intelligence (e.g. Samsung). Intelligence is also shared by sport data companies 
(e.g. sport radar) who monitor betting patterns. The main role of the media and 
the community is to be active participants in ensuring NGSB transparency and 
accountability by raising concerns and demanding strong integrity systems.
By accessing public information, the media, in particular, play a critical role 
in social accountability by exposing and calling for acceptable accountability 
for integrity risks and violations. In particular, the media’s reporting on corrupt 
practices such as illegal gambling on sport, match fixing, state doping systems, 
and poor governance practices (e.g. the USOC failure to address numerous cases 
of sexual harassment coaches and/or support staff) have assisted in exposing 
both systematic integrity risks and violations. Equally important is the persistent 
(a) reporting on the lesser so called ‘scandalous’ behaviours and activities not 
just the cases that make good headlines, and (b) scrutiny of NSGBs in that they 
suitably respond to ‘fixing’ the risks and insisting on accountability of individual 
and organisational offenders. Exposing both corrupt and unethical/legal integrity 
violations and cases of a lack accountability to the public pressures NSGBs and 
their partners to be suitably responsive to all integrity breaches and not just the 
sensational corruption cases.
Conditions for effective functioning of components
Ideally, an integrity system promotes integrity and minimises risks by creating 
functional systems, practices, and ethical decision making. An effective system 
requires sufficient capacity (e.g. resources, financial support, individuals) to sup-
port the functioning of the system, and involve coherent institutional cooperation 
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(functional system interactions). Within and across the system, a NSGB ought to 
facilitate necessary human and financial resources to help realise their integrity 
goals. This requires coordination with local clubs and regional and state/provincial 
governing bodies to ensure polices and processes are suitably implemented.
Recognising the potential differences in the structure of NSGB and their 
sport integrity systems, the number and nature of institutions, policies, practices, 
actors, and agencies that make up the system is not prescribed. The country and 
nature (e.g. sport, funding, size, actors, location, and so forth) of the NSGB will 
influence which components are the best fit for an effective integrity system. A 
NSGB could quite possibly select a number of different configurations to achieve 
high integrity. Relevant NSGB stakeholders will need to determine the appropri-
ate configuration of policy, practices and agencies that best suit their mission and 
context. Additionally, given the dynamic context that where sport operates and 
is delivered, the integrity system configuration requires adaptation over time. As 
new integrity risks emerge and integrity breaches occur, the system will require 
some adjustments to address such situations.
Conclusion and implications for research
In this chapter, I have argued that the NSGBs current approach to promoting 
and safeguarding integrity is not working. Scholars and experts perceive the solu-
tion to the persistence of integrity violations is the adoption of good governance 
principles and independent policies to ensure competitions are played honestly, 
athletes are protected, and governing boards engage in ethical behaviours and 
practices. Policy instruments and good governance principles are part of a whole 
integrity system. A sport integrity system entails actors, constructing an internal 
(integrity management infrastructure), and external (regulatory and social) envi-
ronment, and using a range of accountability mechanisms. The complexity of 
NGSBs and the range of integrity concerns (new and previous) calls for integrity 
management to be comprised of different orientations. The effective function-
ing of components that make up a sport integrity system requires coordination, 
capacity building, and ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of the system as 
a whole as well as its individual components. Individual NSGBs will need to 
determine how a sport integrity system is initiated and managed as well as decide 
the criteria for assessing high-performing integrity systems. Providing sufficient 
capacity support for local, regional, and state levels is essential to minimise system 
gaps that undermine overall performance. Last, to promote integrity and limit 
risks and violations NSGBs will need to develop performance targets and moni-
toring systems to evaluate their progress. Carrying out such performance apprais-
als can help build public trust by demonstrating that NSGB leaders are serious 
about integrity, and sport is perceived as being clean, fair, and justly managed.
The proposed sport integrity system provides several opportunities for future 
research. Gaining an understanding of different NSGBs integrity system con-
figurations and how country and sporting culture may influence integrity 
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management, accountability mechanisms and actors is a plausible first step. 
Empirical research that tests the proposed system, and thereby determining nec-
essary adjustments is also an important theoretical contribution. Another impor-
tant line of research is assessing the overall performance of an integrity system. 
Current integrity system literature does not have a reliable assessment design or 
agreement on how to measure system effectiveness (Head, Brown & Connors 
2008; Heywood & Johnson 2017; Huberts 2014). Thus, the first step in assessing 
the system and the performance of integrity systems is generating valid and reli-
able criteria to measure performance. Research that identifies integrity risks of 
a NSGBs system including the coherence, coordination, capacity, instruments, 
structures and processes would provide important theoretical, empirical and prac-
tical contributions. In particular, examining NSGBs coordination of the integrity 
system at local, state/regional, and national levels and how the type of govern-
ance system influences this organisation can contribute broadly to the integrity 
system literature and sport literature in particular. Last, exploring what set of 
instruments as a whole make up an effective integrity management infrastructure 
is important. Research has identified a small number of instruments for ethical 
culture creation (i.e. ethical codes, ethical leadership, and ethics training) (e.g. 
Constandt et al. 2018, 2019; De Waegeneer et al. 2016). Investigating what set of 
integrity instruments as a whole influences integrity management effectiveness is 
key to understanding what ethical mechanisms limit sport integrity risks.
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Good sport governance 
and design archetype
One size doesn’t fit all
Milena M. Parent, Russell Hoye, Marijke Taks, 
Michael L. Naraine, and Benoît Séguin
Introduction
Following a range of cases of corruption and other governance performance issues 
among national and international sport organisations, the international sporting 
world has seen a spate of ‘good’ governance guidelines and indicators presented 
by various government and non-governmental organisations. In addition to the 
binary logic of ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’—in contrast to seeking to improve governance (i.e. 
better governance) as no organisation is governed perfectly—we follow Chappelet 
(2011; Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2013) in seeing ‘good’ governance as being context 
sensitive and therefore difficult to apply universally to all sport organisations of all 
levels. Thus, we will use the term ‘better governance’ for the rest of this chapter.
For more than 15 years, organisations have proposed typologies containing 
three guidelines for better sport governance (e.g. Australian Sport Commission 
2015), four guidelines (e.g. Alm 2019; Council of Europe 2005; European 
Union 2011), five guidelines (e.g. Council of Europe 2004), six guidelines (e.g. 
Australian Sport Commission 2007), seven guidelines (e.g. International Olympic 
Committee 2008; Sport England 2011; Sport and Recreation Alliance 2017; Sport 
New Zealand 2006), 10 guidelines (e.g. United States Olympic Committee 2005), 
11 guidelines (e.g. Union Cycliste Internationale 2004; Wales Sports Council 
2006), and 31 guidelines (e.g. UK Sport 2004).
Some of these guidelines have been suggestions, others have become manda-
tory. For example, the Canadian federal government enacted a new non-profit act 
setting out very clear governance rules and procedures for all national non-profit 
organisations in Canada, and not just in sport; Canadian national sport organi-
sations (NSOs) had to update their governance policies and procedures to follow 
the new Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act (NFP Act) (Minister of Justice 
2017) or face dissolution. In the United Kingdom, any sport organisation request-
ing government funding is required to follow a set of transparency, accountability, 
and financial integrity guidelines (Sport England, n.d.).
There has been a tendency for these organisations to present one view of 
so-called good governance, in effect presenting a one-size-fits-all approach, such 
as the International Partnership Against Corruption in Sport’s (IPACS) decision 
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to produce a single set of good governance indicators and guidelines for sport 
based on the existing set of indicators and standards (IPACS 2019).
On the surface, such efforts are laudable to help combat problems with corrup-
tion, conflicts of interest, financial mishandling, abuse, and so on. But different 
sport organisations have different capacities and different contexts to consider. 
For instance, while it may be legal and appropriate to have board members 
appointed solely for representation purposes (e.g. gender, stakeholder group) in 
other jurisdictions, this cannot be the case in Canada as the NFP Act man-
dates that board members must be elected and skills-based. Of course, Canadian 
NSOs can seek to have representation on their board, but individuals must still 
be elected and fill a required skill-set. Yet, this only applies at the national level. 
Provincial/territorial and local sport organisations in Canada are not beholden to 
the NFP Act’s rules and guidelines.
Therefore, how can a one-size-fit all approach to good governance be appropri-
ate, even if it would make policymakers’ and decision-makers’ lives easier, when 
sport organisations within a country do not need to follow all the same laws? 
Furthermore, sport organisations do not all have the same financial, human or 
material capacity. Additional governance processes and expectations can burden 
already-resource-stretched organisations.
Moreover, even when capacity and/or size are considered, suggested good gov-
ernance indicators use somewhat arbitrary benchmarks, as is the case with the 
International and National Sport Governance Observer projects (Geeraert 2015, 
2018).
A key reason for this issue is that many of these proposed or imposed princi-
ples, guidelines, indicators, and/or codes are typologies, that is, they are theo-
retically-derived. Even if they stem from a review of the existing literature, most 
remain conceptual in nature, and therefore empirically unsupported in relation 
to their efficacy in delivering better governance (Parent & Hoye 2018). Without 
empirical analysis of the indicators, guidelines, and so on, we have no proof that 
they are the right indicators or that they will be effective in improving sport 
organisations’ governance.
As such, an empirically-derived approach to develop good governance princi-
ples is required. Furthermore, this empirically-driven approach should consider 
multiple governance ideal types or archetypes.
Therefore, this chapter will show the value of empirically deriving better gov-
ernance principles. It will demonstrate different factors that can be considered in 
an analysis of governance principles and indicators, as well as offer an example of 
governance archetypes that are empirically derived for Canadian NSOs.
Argument
Fundamentally, we agree with past efforts to determine better governance prac-
tices and indicators of better governance to improve sport organisations’ practices 
and increase their effectiveness and efficiency. We also agree with the idea that 
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society and institutions (e.g. the Olympic Movement) set out a common set of 
guidelines or principles to normatively define better governance, such as account-
ability, transparency and democracy (cf. Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott 2008; 
Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2013; Geeraert 2015, 2018; Parent & Hoye 2018; Zintz & 
Gérard 2019). But, as better governance appears to be context-specific, we take 
issue with the fact most sets of better governance guidelines and/or principles are 
not empirically-grounded.
We conducted a review of academic and grey literatures1 and obtained a 
multitude of suggested better governance indicators. We ran a word frequency 
query in NVivo 11 Plus on the large number of sets of suggested indicators 
(Alm 2019; Association of Summer Olympic International Federations 2020; 
Australian Sport Commission 2007; Australian Sport Commission 2015; Burger 
et al. 2006; Chaker 2004; Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott 2008; Commonwealth 
Games Federation 2006; Council of Europe 2004, 2005, 2012; De Zwart & 
Gilligan 2009; Dutch Olympic Committee*Dutch Sports Federation 2005; 
European Olympic Committee & Fédération Internationale de l’Automo-
bile 2001; European Team Sports Association 2008; European Union 2000; 
European Union 2007; European Union 2011; European Union Expert Group 
on Good Governance 2013; Geeraert 2018; Henry & Lee 2004; Hoye et al. 
2015; International Olympic Committee 2008; Katwala 2000; McNamee & 
Flemming 2005; Mowbray 2012; One World Trust 2007, 2008; Play the Game 
2011; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2012; Sport England 2011; Sport and Recreation 
Alliance 2011, 2017; Sport and Recreation South Africa 2004; Sport New 
Zealand 2006; Taylor & O’Sullivan 2009; Transparency International 2010, 
2011; UK Sport 2004; Union Cycliste Internationale 2004; Union of European 
Football Associations 2008, 2011; United States Olympic Committee 2005; 
Wales Sports Council 2006). Results indicate that most of these sets of indi-
cators are focused on the board of directors, their transparency, accountability, 
responsibility, and corruption issues.
Beyond these more common governance principles seen across different sets 
of guidelines and indicators, the number of proposed guidelines highlights an 
inconsistency in approaches to analysing better governance. By inconsistencies, 
we mean the variations in the number and types of better governance guidelines, 
which makes their interpretation ambiguous and choice of applicability difficult 
(Parent & Hoye 2018). These inconsistencies are exacerbated by the often seem-
ingly arbitrary cutoffs of specific numbers of indicators for a governance princi-
ple and means of measuring these indicators. For busy managers or directors to 
answer governance questionnaires, the number of indicators is often kept to a 
minimum and assessment is done on a simple Likert scale or basic descriptive 
scale (Fowler 2014). That managers and directors usually self-report their govern-
ance efforts is fraught with methodological issues as well (Tacon & Walters 2016). 
Support for these methodological issues can be seen in, for example, Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) obtaining the second highest gov-
ernance score in the Sport Governance Observer rankings (e.g. Geeraert 2015) 
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when it was in the middle of a corruption scandal, albeit while it was also devel-
oping reforms to its governance.
With a few exceptions examining national-level sport organisations aside (e.g. 
Geeraert 2018; Zintz & Gérard 2019), a closer inspection of the sets of guidelines 
and indicators points to these being focused on international federations (IFs). 
IFs have different responsibilities and operational foci compared to sport organ-
isations at other levels of the sportscape. One key difference is that IFs are not 
beholden to a particular government, save, perhaps for the generous Swiss laws for 
those headquartered in Switzerland. In fact, IFs can be considered as masters of 
their sport domain and are the regulators for the lower-level sport organisations. 
Thus, the stakeholder network—and therefore stakeholder pressures, expecta-
tions, and inter-dependencies that drive an organisation to achieve more robust 
and transparent governance—can differ according to the level of the organisa-
tion. In addition, the activities of IF directors and their paid staff who are focused 
on delivering large international events and setting of rules for competition for 
example, differs to the dynamic between the elected board members and paid staff 
of national, provincial, or local level sport organisations who are focused on field-
ing national teams, club development and other more fundamental operational 
matters. The governance context is different; so it follows that the guidelines for 
better governance should also differ between organisational contexts. Funding is 
also an issue; and sport organisations’ minimal resources are maximised for effi-
ciency. As such, better governance principles and indicators may or may not apply 
in the same manner for lower-level sport organisations compared to IFs.
Moreover, the sheer number of guidelines and indicator proposals as noted 
above has flooded the sportscape with options making it hard to know which 
approach is good, better, or best. Which set of guidelines and/or indicators should 
a sport manager favour? An analysis of these different governance indicators is 
therefore needed to clear the path, so to speak. Yet, as Parent and Hoye (2018) 
found in their systematic review of 2,155 studies on better governance principles 
and their impact on organisational performance (however defined by the studies’ 
authors, though always about an organisational outcome), only 0.9% empirically 
examined this relationship.
At the same time, these proposals rest on a fundamental assumption: by fol-
lowing these better governance guidelines, sport organisations’ performance will 
improve. While 19 empirical studies in Parent and Hoye’s (2018) systematic review 
demonstrated a link between board structure and organisational performance, no 
empirically-demonstrated link between any other governance principle or guide-
line and organisational performance was found.
Finally, many governance analyses provide scores and rankings of organisations 
(e.g. ASOIF 2020; Geeraert 2015). While some scores may seem odd—such as FIFA’s 
high scores when in the middle of a corruption scandal—they can also stigmatise 
organisations ranked/scored at the lower end. The assumption in such rankings and 
scorings is that there is one ideal ‘good’ governance type. Yet, with the variations in 
capacity and objectives between organisations, for instance, how can we compare 
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all organisations to the same ideal type? A set of archetypes or range of ideal types 
would be preferable, more representative, fair, and more accurate.
In sum, the sheer number of proposed guidelines/indicators, the inconsisten-
cies between these guidelines/indicators, the questionable transferability between 
organisational levels, the measurement issues, the unsupported assumption of 
better governance leading to organisational performance, and the assumption of 
one ideal good governance type, lead to the need for a different approach. With 
the slew of conceptual pieces, we suggest using an empirical approach to ascer-
tain the key governance principles and indicators that can differentiate between 
organisations and can impact organisational performance (cf. Parent & Hoye 
2018) by looking at an archetypes option for better governance, thereby taking 
the context into consideration. Using an archetype approach will immediately 
address this shortcoming.
Illustrative case—Determining governance-based  
archetypes in Canadian NSOs
To illustrate the value of empirically deriving indicators, we detail our efforts to 
revisit NSO design archetypes and how empirical results can help discriminate 
between indicators.
Design archetypes are useful to compare and contrast organisations and also 
explore organisational change (Hoye et al. 2019), which is necessary for organisa-
tional survival and growth. At the NSO level, Kikulis et al. (1992, 1995) derived 
three design archetypes: the kitchen table, the boardroom, and the executive 
office. These archetypes were derived based on (Kikulis et al. 1992):
• Organisational values defined as the organisation’s orientation (private, volun-
teer, non-profit, and funding source), domain (from mass sport participation 
to high performance sport), organising principles (hierarchy, decision-mak-
ing locus, work done by volunteers vs. professional paid staff), and effective-
ness criteria (e.g. effectiveness, efficiency, membership numbers vs. medals)
• Organisational structure defined as specialisation, standardisation, and 
centralisation.
These criteria highlight legal considerations, financial and human resource 
(HR) capacity, values, complexity (structural aspects, strategic goals, and perfor-
mance aspects). However, they also, arguably, stigmatised NSOs falling into the 
kitchen table archetype given the negative ‘unprofessional’ image of kitchen table 
organisations. For more details on these concepts, the three archetypes and their 
implications for today’s sport organisations, e.g. Hoye et al. (2019).
In today’s sportscape and for an archetype analysis meant to discriminate 
between organisations, the legal consideration is a moot point, as all NSOs are 
private, non-profit organisations. They can, however, differ on potentially all 
other factors. Though innovative at the time, Kikulis et al.’s (1992) factors require 
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some updating in light of the more recent expansion of the better governance 
guidelines/indicators research.
If we had followed the lead of previous governance guidelines/indicators 
research, we would have simply put all these factors together to create a new 
set of archetype factors. However, two issues remain with this approach: (1) we 
would just have a long list of factors, not knowing if any are more important than 
others to add to yet another set of conceptually-defined guidelines and indicators 
to the literature; and (2) we would not have descriptors to populate the factors or 
discriminate between NSOs. For instance, as board characteristics (composition, 
gender representation) and processes have dominated the sport governance liter-
ature, we would have to assume that the nature of the board would be a key part 
of our new set of guidelines and indicators. Likewise, we would assume accounta-
bility, transparency, democracy, and responsibility to be high up on the list. But, 
as our empirical analysis will show, the nature of the board is not a key discrimi-
nating factor, nor is internal accountability processes and procedures.
Method
To empirically ascertain the relative importance of the different factors and 
their ability to discriminate between NSOs, we undertook a landscape survey of 
Canadian NSOs. Fifty-five per cent (n=32) of NSOs listed on the Sport Canada 
website completed an online survey, which included questions related to their 
organisation and governance, as well as questions to address six different potential 
archetype options: (1) capacity, (2) values & complexity, (3) nature of the board, 
(4) funding sources, (5) governance and (6) a combination of the previous. These 
options were based on the governance literature as well as discussions with sport 
governance colleagues around the world. We also conducted follow-up interviews 
to clarify certain answers and examined organisational documents (e.g. strategic 
plans and financial statements, organisational charts, and bylaws).
We first ran descriptive statistics using SPSS and content analysis using NVivo 
to understand the dataset. We then converted the raw data into analysable data 
for each archetype option. Next, we ran cluster analyses using SPSS. Because 
cluster analyses are open-ended analyses, we tried analyses of two, three, four, five, 
and six clusters to determine the best fit for each option.
Results
Organisational values and structure
NSOs ranged from no employees to 58; $140,000 CAD to $24 million CAD 
in budget; four to 15 board members, with zero to 71% of women on the board 
(M=36%, SD=17%). NSOs funding came from public (49.5%), commercial (spon-
sorship and events/hosting; 30.7%), memberships (17.8%), and other (e.g. dona-
tions; 2%) sources.
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Unlike Kikulis et al. (1992, 1995), all NSOs included both mass sport par-
ticipation and high performance aspects in their domain activities and values. 
NSOs were also all private non-profit organisations. Thus, these factors, common 
characteristics among NSOs, no longer discriminated between them as they did 
for Kikulis and colleagues in the early 1990s.
In terms of organising principles, we found NSOs’ volunteer boards focused 
on strategic, long-term decision-making. For 62% of NSOs, the chief executive 
officer (CEO) assisted in this regard. 95% of NSO boards and their CEOs also 
shared financial decision-making responsibilities. In turn, CEOs were respon-
sible for
• Sport-related decision (86% of NSOs),
• Marketing-related decision (81% of NSOs), and
• HR-related decisions (95% of NSOs). Here, 48% of boards also make HR 
decisions or assist in HR decision-making.
Most communications and social media decisions (86%) are made by low-
er-level NSO staff. Thus, there are more policy governance boards than before 
and a greater distinction between governance/strategic and management/opera-
tional actions than in the early 1990s.
Finally, in terms of effectiveness criteria, 75% noted meeting organisational 
objectives, 69% international success, 44% financial results, and 42% member-
ships. Thus, other than meeting organisational objectives, we found little con-
sensus in effectiveness criteria, which could indicate potential discriminant 
behaviour for this factor. However, this also means organisational performance 
definitions vary, even within an organisational field.
Other governance factors
First, in terms of transparency, 100% of NSOs offered reports at their Annual 
General Meeting (AGM), 97% had bylaws and 97% published key documents 
(e.g. strategic plan) on their website for all to see. As such, all Canadian NSOs 
are highly transparent—a key good governance indicator according to the exist-
ing literature. Second, NSOs agreed there were different types of accountability. 
Third, beyond the fact all NSOs now elect their board members, 50% of NSOs 
have stakeholders represented on their board. Many NSOs also involve stake-
holders in branding processes (M=3.27, SD=0.98 on a scale from 1= not at all, to 
5=always) and strategic planning processes (M=3.40, SD=1.33 on a scale from 1= 
not at all, to 5=always). Though this information is useful to get a basic idea of 
the landscape, it does not provide much in the way of a potential analysis of the 
governance situation. While most authors have turned to providing scores and 
rankings from these results, we developed governance archetypes to determine 
different ideal-type options for analysing NSOs without the potential stigma of a 
high or low score.
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Archetypes development
We first examined the simplest option, capacity. Here, capacity focuses on human 
(personnel = number of full-time equivalents or FTEs) and financial capacity. 
After running the different cluster options, we determined that four clusters 
offered the best fit and discrimination. The results highlight we have small, 
medium, large and extra-large capacity NSOs but not much else could be gleaned.
Second, we turned to the Kikulis et al. (1992) factors. Examining only the val-
ues, three clusters were better; examining the different organisational structure 
components, clusters of three or four could work. When combining the values and 
structural components from Kikulis et al. criteria into one analysis, four clusters 
proved best. Thus, this demonstrates how the specific composition of the criteria 
to analyse can significantly change the (empirical) outcome of the analysis. Our 
empirically-derived results demonstrate that: (1) only the organisational values 
of governance, stakeholder engagement, and diversity offer any discrimination 
between groups, as all had sport participation and high performance equivalent 
domains/values; (2) four groups, not three like Kikulis et al. (1992), are a better fit 
and provide clear distinctions between groups; and (3) the traditional description 
of the kitchen table is no longer present in the results. We can also note a deci-
sion-making focus on the board for group 1, compared to a focus on the CEO for 
group 2, a shared focus on the board and CEO for group 3, and a decentralised 
approach for group 4.
Third, we examined the NSOs based on the nature of their boards. Results 
indicated we have small (5 members), medium (8–10 members) and large (14 
members) boards. Also, the bigger the board, the less likely to have women repre-
sented. However, these results did not sufficiently discriminate between NSOs to 
help address our purpose.
Fourth, as funding appeared to be a key differentiator in the Kikulis et al. 
(1992, 1995) archetypes, we examined funding-based clusters, finding again that 
four clusters offered the best fit. Comparing the cluster analyses and the funding 
source dominance, we find commercial revenue sources (specifically sponsorship 
and broadcasting) help differentiate NSOs. Thus, funding appears to help distin-
guish between potential archetypes.
Fifth, we examined different cluster options for various governance principles.
• Performance-based (effectiveness and efficiency) analyses resulted in four 
clusters. We found different foci for effectiveness measures (throughputs 
vs. outputs) between clusters and differing degrees of efficiency or use of 
resources—financial (budget), HR (number of FTEs), and material (in the 
form of the number of headquarters).
• Accountability-based analyses:
• Internal accountability: though three clusters were deemed the best fit, 
NSOs were found to generally follow internal accountability measures 
(all medium to high scores), so no real discriminant power was seen here.
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• External accountability: three clusters were deemed the best fit and 
there appeared to be a range (from none to high) demonstrating poten-
tial discriminant power.
• Transparency-based analyses resulted in five clusters. Contrary to the 
basic descriptive analysis, low to high results were seen across the five 
clusters, demonstrating that transparency may actually be a good factor 
to use for discrimination because we incorporated a range of transparency 
indicators in the exploratory analysis: having stakeholders on the board, 
having transparency as a core value, having transparency in the strategic 
plan, having formal accountability structures, offering public access to all 
organisational documents, offering member-only access to some organ-
isational documents, controlling information, discussing brand issues 
with stakeholders, and using social media to communicate. This finding 
highlights the importance of having multiple measures per governance 
principle.
• Stakeholder participation and democratic-based analyses resulted in four clus-
ters. Like transparency, stakeholder participation is a complex factor found to 
provide good discrimination across clusters when examining the number of 
types of voters for boards of directors, the number of stakeholders dealt with 
formally, the number of stakeholders involved in decision-making, and the 
number of stakeholders involved in brand-based decision-making.
Finally, we combined all above criteria except internal accountability into one 
cluster analysis based on capacity, organisational values and complexity, nature of 
the board, funding, and governance characteristics. This resulted in four groups 
being the best fit. Table 14.1 presents the criteria and general descriptors of the 
resulting clusters. What is critical to see here is that being in the smaller NSO 
group does not mean that the NSO is bad at governance. In fact, these NSOs 
appear to excel at efficiency.
In sum, using an empirical approach to governance guidelines/indicators allows 
us to see that:
• What can be considered better governance behaviour by NSOs depends on 
their ideal type or archetype, which increases comparison fairness (i.e. not all 
to the same single ideal). There are different ways to be good at governance, 
depending on the context.
• The number of criteria chosen for the analysis affects the clustering 
outcome—that is, the determination of the archetypes or ideal types—and 
therefore the analysis of the quality or fit of the NSO’s governance compared 
to its ideal type.
• The specific criteria chosen affect the distribution of NSOs across the clus-
ters, as seen when comparing the n of each cluster between the different 
analyses undertaken.
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• Not all criteria help discriminate between archetypes. As much as internal 
accountability may be lauded in the literature as part of better governance 
practices, in our case, all NSOs undertake internal accountability activities 
and therefore it does not help discriminate between ideal types.
• Using an archetypes approach allows for both structural and procedural aspects 
of governance to be considered when examining better governance options.
Table 14.1 Combined NSO governance archetype criteria and descriptors
Group 1 (n=8) Group 2 (n=8) Group 3 (n=3) Group 4 (n=2)
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Conclusion
The existing governance guidelines and indicators literature demonstrates a 
number of issues, including:
1 The assumption that there is one good governance ideal type for all sport 
organisations;
2 Measurement issues associated with indicators; and
3 The popularity of scoring and ranking organisations to show the better ones 
and those who ‘need improvement’.
As we highlighted in this chapter, an empirical approach to determining key 
governance guidelines/indicators, and the use of an archetype approach to deter-
mine ideal types for more appropriate governance analyses helps address the 
contextual and one-size-doesn’t-fit-all issues by creating ideal types for, in this 
case, NSOs. This approach also addresses the three issues noted in the following 
manner:
1 There is more than one ideal governance type in a given organisational field. 
Canadian NSOs, for instance, have four options to choose from. By using a 
cluster approach, we can let the data tell us the best fitting model (e.g. three 
vs. four vs. five groups; which variables/indicators help to distinguish between 
organisations).
2 By using a combination of data sources (online self-administered question-
naire in combination with interviews and organisational documents), we 
move away from the self-reporting issue and obtain a richer dataset and more 
complete understanding of what is really occurring in these organisations. 
We also used multiple measures per governance principles (e.g. transparency) 
to ensure a more holistic understanding of the reality.
3 By using an archetypes approach, we present organisations with their ideal 
type (archetype) as opposed to giving a score to help them improve their gov-
ernance for their ideal type. Thus, there is no stigmatisation of organisations 
linked to low scores.
Below we detail implications for researchers and practitioners wishing to use this 
empirically derived approach to develop good governance principles and guide-
lines that are specific to their context, as one size doesn’t fit all.
Implications for researchers and potential future directions
The approach outlined in this chapter suggests future research should focus 
on empirically developing and assessing better governance guidelines that are 
germane to the scale and context of the specific sport organisations of interest. 
Researchers should focus on developing and testing guidelines that might have 
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the most impact on influencing director behaviour, are practical, and are focused 
on the organisational capacity of sport organisations to enact the guidelines and 
enable comparison between types and levels (international, national, provincial, 
local) of organisations. As Parent and Hoye (2018) argued, future research in this 
area should also move to assess the impact of an organisation adopting or imple-
menting guidelines on their governance performance so as to develop greater 
understanding of what the governance principles or guidelines are that matter 
most, for what types of sport organisations, and how these principles or guidelines 
affect organisational performance.
As space was limited, only one case, governance archetypes of Canadian 
NSOs, was presented. A next step is to undertake similar studies for organisa-
tions at different levels (e.g. IFs, local) and in different countries, given the con-
text dependence of better governance principles and indicators. Only once this 
empirical work is conducted could researchers conceivably look to develop com-
mon guidelines/indicators across contexts that are empirically-grounded and not 
top-down/theoretically-derived.
Implications for practitioners
Developing a clearer sense of the governance guidelines that take into account 
the organisations’ context will have the most impact on a sport organisation’s 
performance and quality of their governance. It will assist policymakers and 
sport managers make better evidence-based decisions on investments in director 
training, governance reform, and monitoring of governance changes. This will 
also enable sport organisations, all of which face capacity challenges, to invest in 
the governance activities that truly matter and undertake meaningful efforts to 
improve their sport’s governance for the benefit of their stakeholders.
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Chapter 15
The transferability of western 




The literature on the governance of sport has grown exponentially over the last 
two decades (Downing, Leopkey & Smith 2018). This has been fuelled by heu-
ristic concerns to describe and explain the evolving political economy of the 
sporting landscape, and by normative concerns to promote ethically sound, and 
managerially effective, practices in governing sport. However, the scoping review 
by Downing et al. implicitly highlights the western dominated nature of the 
English language literature on sport governance, identifying and reviewing some 
243 articles published in academic journals on the topic between 1980 and 2016. 
A small but significant minority of these relate directly to non-western govern-
ance contexts or practices. The aim of this chapter is therefore to examine the 
significance of cultural differences in the identification and application of princi-
ples of sport governance.
The treatment of sport governance issues in non-western settings has for the 
most part focused on the shortcomings of approaches to sport governance in such 
contexts (e.g. McLeod, Shilbury & Zeimers 2020). The implicit suggestion in 
many such sources is the argument that non-western practices need to undergo 
modernisation, by which is implied the adoption of the professionalisation and 
‘modern’ governance practices of ‘leading’ nations in sport. This is a reflection of 
the modernisation agenda (implicit here in the sport literature, but often evident 
more broadly in social commentary) in which there is an underlying assumption 
that the ‘progress’ achieved and enjoyed within sport governance in the West 
represents the model to be emulated by the non-west. The nature of western gov-
ernance practices is not without its critics, indeed much has been written about 
the shortcomings of such practices in the literature, but there does seem to be an 
assumption that good practice is defined by the ‘developed’ sporting nations of 
the West.
Theories concerning the modernisation of sport, and the inevitable conver-
gence (or the desirability of convergence) of governance systems may be subject 
to the same fundamental critique as modernisation theories more generally. 
Fourie (2012), for example, characterises traditional theories of modernisation as 
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suffering from flawed fundamental teleological assumptions. These include that 
modernisation is a single, unified, homogenising process, with the West providing 
the key points of reference in the ‘onward march of progress’. The teleological 
assumption here is one which predetermines what will count as progress, that is 
the development of the institutions associated with modernity and modernisa-
tion. In generic terms this includes institutions such as liberal democracy, capital-
ism and the bureaucratic state (Fourie 2012, p. 54) such that those societies not 
exhibiting these features might be regarded as not having reached a mature stage 
of modernity. In terms of modernisation specific to sport, equivalent phenomena 
might include the autonomy of sport, commercialisation and sponsorship, and 
transnational regulation in the form of sport-specific bodies such as WADA, and 
generic regulators such as the European Union which represent the institutional 
signposts of modernity to be embraced along the way in the journey towards 
modernity in sport and its governance.
The rejection of such teleological assumptions has been promoted by those 
who have drawn the conclusion that modernity is not a homogeneous phenom-
enon since it will take on different forms (culturally, politically, and/or econom-
ically) in different contexts, and who therefore advocate the notion of ‘multiple 
modernities’ (Eisenstadt 2017) in which different instances of the phenomenon 
of modernity share a ‘family resemblance’ (Wittgenstein 1972) of overlapping 
characteristics rather than a unitary set of features attributable to a single model. 
What this chapter therefore seeks to do is to investigate the distance between 
western and non-western governance prescriptions, and practices and their impli-
cations for the governance of sport.
Meanings of governance
The uses of the term governance are multiple with different denotations (refer-
ring to different concepts or phenomena) and different connotations (drawing 
on different theoretical traditions and perspectives). Bevir (2009) provides a brief 
but well-illustrated map of the governance field, highlighting the range of such 
denotations and their connotative relationships to theory. In particular he locates 
the emergence of a concern with governance, as opposed to government, with 
the New Public Management of the 1990s in which direct provision of services by 
government gave way to forms of enabling of the voluntary and/or private sectors 
to deliver services and desired policy outcomes.
In an early attempt to characterise the dominant themes in governance pol-
icy and research, a distinction was made between what was argued to be the 
three most common and significant uses or conceptualisations of the term sport 
governance in the literature (Henry & Lee 2004).1 The first of these is systemic 
governance, which rejects the characterisation of power in business or policy 
environments as hierarchical, or top-down. Instead, most such environments, 
including those of sport business or sport policy are characterised by the inter-
action of organisations and of groups working in horizontal networks within and 
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across organisations. Such groups might include media interests, major sponsors, 
players’ agents, the major sport clubs and their shareholders in professional sport, 
as well as ‘governing bodies’ such as the IOC or FIFA, with power exercised not 
within a fixed, vertical, hierarchy, but where identifying the sets of actors which 
will be dominant will depend on the nature of the issue being dealt with, and 
the resources available to such actors in specific contexts. Systemic governance 
is thus concerned with the competition, cooperation and mutual adjustment 
between organisations in such transversal systems.
The second major application of the notion of governance is that of corporate, 
or ‘good organisational governance’ which refers to the accepted norms or values 
for the just means of allocation of resources, and profits or losses (financial or 
other) and of the conduct of processes involved in the management and direction 
of organisations in the sport business (Henry & Lee 2004).
The third major application of the term governance in sporting contexts is 
that of ‘political governance’. This relates to the processes by which govern-
ments or governing bodies are characterised as seeking to steer the sport system 
to achieve desired outcomes by, for example, moral pressure, use of financial or 
other incentives, or by forms of licensing, or regulation to foster action by parties 
other than government (or sporting authorities such as governing bodies) to act 
in ways consistent with desired policy outcomes. This analogy of steering rather 
than rowing (Osborne & Gaebler 1992) is associated with the neoliberal distrust 
of state action and subsequent reliance on commercial or third sector agency.
While most of the discussion which follows in this chapter relates in particular 
to the nature of occidental and oriental values in good organisational, or corpo-
rate governance, and problems associated with the transferability of such values 
and prescriptions to non-western contexts, it is worth highlighting some prelimi-
nary points about cultural specificity and issues associated with systemic govern-
ance and political governance, and non-western engagement with the western 
dominated sport system.
Prior to the end of the Cold War systemic governance of sport had tradition-
ally been dominated by a set of core western nations, with a semi-periphery of 
Eastern bloc countries pressing for representation and influence on the global 
sporting stage, and a periphery of countries largely in Africa and Asia, who 
were, for the most part, passive recipients of, rather than participants in, global 
sporting decision-making (Al-Tauqi & Henry 2008). Within the Olympic move-
ment, for example, the overrepresentation of Western Europe, and the United 
States in the IOC and related decision-making bodies, in sponsorship roles, in 
sport media, in hosting major events, and in financial investment in sport, has 
been challenged in ways which have had a profound impact on sport govern-
ance (Amara 2008, 2012). Recently, this has been most evident in the attrac-
tion of rights to host major sporting events in the Gulf states, locations such as 
Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, and perhaps most notably by Qatar’s successful bid 
to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup. This last example is a high profile (and some 
might argue a high risk) attempt to promote national image through a soft power 
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strategy (Brannagan & Giulianotti 2018; Dorsey 2015). Even Saudi Arabia, the 
largest of the Gulf economies with the biggest population, which had, until 
recently, been a relative bystander in terms of sport policy and sport hosting, 
has adopted an explicit use of sport for political purposes. Commentators ascribe 
the country’s recent engagement with sport to ‘sportswashing’: “Saudi Arabia’s 
relatively sudden interest in sport can be construed as a soft power tactic to help 
distract from the kingdom’s ongoing human rights abuses and the Yemen crisis. 
… More recently, Saudi Arabia’s sport-centric lobbying offensive has been the 
result of an urgent need for the kingdom to rebrand itself following the murder of 
Jamal Khashoggi, a US-based Washington Post columnist and Saudi dissident” 
(Zidan 2019).
The arrival of non-western capital investment in European soccer has had a 
profound effect, not simply on those clubs subject to investment—Manchester 
City and Paris St German being perhaps the highest profile cases—but also on 
players’ salaries and transfer fees, and on the development of networks of invest-
ment. Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s purchase of Manchester City was 
the initiation of an ambitious project that has transformed world football. City 
Football Group invested not simply in Manchester City, but launched New York 
City FC, and invested in clubs in Australia, Japan and Spain (Sleightholm 2018). 
Its impact on the nature of inter-club competition (in which oligopolistic trends 
have been reinforced), and on relations between club owners and local fans, 
would have been unimaginable only a decade or so ago, and thus such non-west-
ern actors can now hardly be described as occupying the periphery of systemic 
sporting relations. The systemic governance of professional sport in the 2020s is 
thus of a different order to that which obtained in the 1990s.
In relation to political governance, an issue which is more prominent in 
non-western contexts is that of claims of government interference in the activi-
ties of sporting bodies which challenge sporting autonomy. In particular the IOC 
regularly addresses problems involving government influence on the make-up of 
National Olympic Committees (NOC). Rule 28(9) of the Olympic Charter seeks 
to protect the autonomy of sport, providing for suspension of a NOC where any 
governmental body has hampered the actions of the NOC. Recent examples of 
disputes between the IOC and governments include the suspension of the Indian 
Olympic Association in 2012 for breaching the requirements of the Olympic 
Charter; Iraq in 2008 for government intervention in the workings of its NOC; 
and Kuwait in 2015 over a new sports law which the IOC claimed impacted upon 
the autonomy of the Olympic movement. Such invoking of sanctions in the case 
of state intervention in the workings of a NOC is virtually exclusive to cases 
of nations of the global south. Interestingly, however, no action has been taken 
by the IOC in respect of governments such as Russia, China, and other former 
communist-led states known to exert direct influence on the membership of their 
NOCs.2 These cases of government ‘interference’ in the autonomy of action of 
sporting bodies imply a rejection of a political governance approach of ‘steering’ 
in favour of direct control of decision-making.
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Good corporate governance: Core values 
and the response of the non-west
While the concepts of systemic and political governance of sport might be said to 
be primarily heuristic, explaining the patterns of influence developing in sport, 
‘good’ or ‘corporate’ governance provides a clearly prescriptive approach advocat-
ing the principles or values to be adopted or reflected in governance practices in 
sport. The list of principles of good governance varies to some degree from one 
source to another. For example, while the European Commission (2019) cites the 
basic principles of good governance in sport as ‘integrity’, ‘accountability’, ‘trans-
parency’, ‘democracy’, ‘participation’ and ‘inclusivity’ the European Parliament 
(2017) cites the seven principles, identified in Henry and Lee (2004), namely 
transparency, accountability, democracy, responsibility, equity, effectiveness, and 
efficiency, which overlap to a significant degree in terminology and substance 
with the Commission’s, and Geeraert’s (2015) report of the Sports Governance 
Observer reduces the basic principles to four key dimensions—transparency and 
public communication, democratic process, checks and balances, and solidarity. 
A useful overview of the range of principles cited by 21 different bodies and nine 
academic authors is provided in Chappelet & Mrkonjic (2013).
Perhaps the core question in terms of the transferability or imposition of west-
ern principles and/or values relates to the extent to which there is a convergence 
of governance principles and practice both de jure (in the adoption of principles 
as stipulated requirements) and/or de facto (in the actual practices of organisations 
and individuals in sporting governance). The most widely cited account of pres-
sures placed on institutions, organisations and individuals to conform to estab-
lished organisational practices is the seminal account of DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), who define three modes of isomorphic pressure namely, coercive, mimetic, 
and normative, which operate in a manner which reinforces the position of dom-
inant actors within a particular field (in our case the field of sport governance). 
Coercive measures would include the use of legislative measures, or international 
regulatory frameworks. Mimetic isomorphism is a product of actors following the 
form, style, and modus operandi of other, ‘leading’ organisations operating in the 
field of sport. Normative pressures relate to the impact of formal and informal 
codes of practice advocating values and systems of governance, such as the IOC’s 
Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement 
(IOC 2008).
In contrast to isomorphic factors promoting convergence in governance 
practices, there are also local political, economic and educational factors which 
reinforce localism or cultural specificity of practices. As discussed above the 
political history of a nation state can be reflected in the expectations con-
cerning the relationship between the state and civil society. Path dependency 
(Johnson 2001; Mussagulova 2020) is clearly reflected in post-Soviet history of 
sport governance not simply in issues such as state ‘interference’ in the appoint-
ment of members of NOC related bodies, but also in terms of state control of a 
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corrupt anti-doping system which persisted at least up until the Sochi Olympics 
when WADA identified the state’s role in this practice (McLaren 2016). The 
economic context of sport governance is also a potentially constraining fac-
tor, with some small organisations, such as small NOCs with limited resources, 
unable to perform those governance tasks which are expensive and resource 
intensive, with, for example, some countries being unable to meet the costs 
of drug testing for even a small number of athletes. The impact of education 
(in particular management education), or lack of exposure to it, is noted by 
McLeod et al. (2020) as a factor which can promote convergence or cultural 
specificity. In reviewing sport governance convergence in India, the authors 
identify a perception that “domestic sport management programs are under-
developed in the country, and thus, India is lacking a key mechanism through 
which the importance of good governance principles is typically taught in other 
parts of the world” (McLeod et al. 2020). However, as noted earlier in the find-
ings, many Indians travel abroad to study sport management and thus good 
governance principles, and their impact on sport organisations are transfused 
to India through normative isomorphic pressures emanating from international 
educational networks. Nevertheless, despite this, the lack of established man-
agement education and training programs in the domestic context constitutes a 
significant barrier to convergence.
However, while political and economic factors may be significant influences in 
maintaining the divergence of practices in sport governance, cultural factors may 
provide a more subtle impact. Here we will focus on two examples, namely, the 
practice of guanxi in Chinese society, and more broadly of political clientelism. 
Guanxi is a practice which draws on Confucian thought, locating individuals in 
a set of reciprocal and trust-based, familial and social, and potentially political 
and business, hierarchical relations of obligation, such that guanxi relations can 
play an important role in deciding who will do business with whom. Western 
perspectives on guanxi often link this to corrupt business or political practice 
(Fan 2002). However, the practice of guanxi is not necessarily associated with 
dishonest or unethical practices. It may simply imply taking into account the 
level of trust or confidence one party has in another party’s ability to deliver what 
has been promised (Barbalet 2018). Taking account of such considerations might 
be regarded as common sense, and indeed as an obligation in making sensible 
business judgements.
However, while there is no necessary connection between guanxi and unethi-
cal or corrupt practices, examples of unethical practice in government, in the 
judicial system (Li 2018), in business activity (Chang 2018), and even in the buy-
ing and selling of positions in the military in China (Wang 2016), are widely 
acknowledged. The existence of this phenomenon, and the need to take account 
of it when conducting business, may well undermine the ability of managers de 
facto to respect good governance principles including those promoted by European 
bodies such as the European Commission, or by the IOC in its declaration of the 
basic universal principles of good governance.
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There are two important points to make in response to cultural factors under-
mining the promotion of good governance. The first is that this is not restricted 
to Chinese social and business practices There are equivalent ‘culturally specific’ 
phenomena in other societies—see for example the concepts of ‘blat’ in Russia 
or ‘vruzki’ in Bulgaria (Hsu 2005; Onoshchenko & Williams 2014; Williams 
& Yang 2017) as well as in western societies. In the UK, the existence of ‘old 
boys networks’ is evidenced in, for example, the analysis by Reeves et al. (2017) 
of membership of Britain’s political, law, business, cultural and military elites, 
which highlights that those educated at Britain’s nine top private, fee-paying 
‘public’ schools, “are about 94 times more likely to reach the British elite than are 
individuals who attended any other school” (Reeves et al. 2017, p. 1141).
The second point to make is that any assumption that western de jure gov-
ernance arrangements will inevitably be superior to non-western approaches can 
be seen, in Said’s (1991) terms, as a dangerously orientalist conjecture. We can 
highlight here the failure of major US professional leagues including the National 
Football League and Major League Baseball to adopt the WADA code with the 
consequence that an athlete recording a doping violation can receive a two week 
ban for an offence that would incur a minimum of a four-year ban under WADA 
rules (Morgan 2020).
If we turn to other cases of negative de facto behaviours in sporting govern-
ance, political clientelism (and other related forms of vote buying) are said to be a 
feature of traditional, non-western, rather than modern societies, and thus likely 
to be less evident in the developed economies of the West. Political clientelism 
relates to the exchange of material benefits (good, services, jobs, etc.) provided to 
a client from a political patron in exchange for political support (Allen 2011). A 
study of strategic relations and patterns of sport funding in Greece in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, for example, highlights how changes in elected national govern-
ment from the Greek socialist party PASOK, to the economically liberal New 
Democracy were systematically associated with increased or decreased funding of 
those national sport federations whose president was a member of the incoming 
or outgoing party of government (Henry & Nassis 1999; Nassis 1994). Similar 
patterns of party-based favouritism have been identified in Turkish sport policy 
(Erturan-Ogut & Sahin 2014).
Political clientelism has historically been associated with pre-modern political 
contexts, hence its association with Southern European non-industrial econo-
mies. As a form of political behaviour, clientelism has been expected to decline as 
the development of modernity is associated with allocation of resources in society 
based on modern, ‘rational’, ‘technocratic’ criteria rather than on social obliga-
tions. However, its persistence in modern politics, for example in the context of 
contemporary populist, ethno-nationalist politics of Trump’s presidential election 
campaigns, (Bonikowski 2019), is evident where benefits are selectively targeted 
at the constituencies of supporting those in power.
There are numerous examples of the inappropriate use of clientelistic 
incentives for political gain in modern industrialised economies. High profile 
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examples of clientelism in a modern western state include the resignations 
of two of Australia’s ministers with responsibility for sport, namely Ros Kelly 
from the Keating government in 1994 (Wright 2020), and Bridget McKenzie 
from the Scott Morrison government in 2020 (Murphy 2020), following accu-
sations of the targeting of marginal electoral constituencies in terms of allo-
cation of community sport grants in order to influence the electorate, or ‘buy 
votes’. Such cases demonstrate the unexceptional survival of political self- 
interest in funding decision-making, in place of the use of modern, techno-
cratic, and logically argued principles for financial allocations (Di Francesco 
2020; Smith 1999).
Thus, to summarise there is a variety of de facto and de jure differences in 
relation to governance practices generally, and in relation to sport specifically, 
between, but also importantly within western and non-western societies.
Seeking universal principles of good 
governance across cultures
Is universal agreement around social and political values feasible at all? One of 
the most influential arguments at a macro level of analysis which was evident 
in neo-conservative approaches to policy in the post-Cold War environment 
and which promoted the notion that convergence of values was impossible, was 
Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations thesis’. Huntington argued that with 
the end of the Cold War era, the bi-polar politics of the East-West divide was 
replaced by a world constituted by nine civilisational blocks, Western, Latin 
American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Christian Orthodox, Buddhist and 
Japanese, with multipolar values. Some commentators subsequently promoted 
the view that these blocks sponsor competing and incompatible foundational 
value stances which, at base, are not open to negotiation and hence compromise. 
This position may not be that which Huntington himself intended to convey 
and might be more closely associated with Francis Fukuyama’s characterisation 
of the end of ideological debate in his book The End of History and the Last Man 
(Fukuyama 1993). As Kim and Hodges argue: “Civilisational coexistence is pos-
sible in Huntington’s paradigm, whereas such coexistence seems to be impossible 
in Fukuyama’s because the latter’s paradigm of monocentric diffusion recognises 
no standard of civilisation other than the Western one” (Kim & Hodges 2005, 
p. 217).
There are two fundamental points to take issue with here. The first is that 
the argument that these cultures represent separate, pillarised, value systems is 
unconvincing (Tibi 2001). There is often far more commonality of values across 
these civilisational blocks, than there is within them. So, for example, Muslim, 
Christian, Jewish and secular feminist groups would often have more in common 
across cultures with one another than they would with the conservative patri-
archal values of the male establishment within their own cultures. The notion 
of ‘hermeneutically sealed’ civilisational blocks associated with different value 
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systems, and thus with differences in prescriptions of good governance is thus an 
erroneous oversimplification (Henry 2007).
The second point is that not only are such claims about the separation of civ-
ilisational blocks erroneous they are also dangerous. As Kim and Hodges argue: 
“Fukuyama’s civilisational Paradigm of monocentric diffusion (…) seemingly 
[became] an epistemic basis for the neoconservative foreign policy of the Bush 
administration” (Kim & Hodges 2005, p. 217).
So, from the neo-liberal, neo-conservative wing, support for an account of 
the convergence of political values around neo-liberalism has been generated. 
However, the explanatory force of (and support for) Fukuyama’s argument has 
declined, with events such as 9/11, the financial crisis of 2007–8, the Arab Spring, 
and the failure of militarily enforced ‘democratisation’ of Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Milne 2012). The claimed inevitability of accepting neo-liberal values has thus 
been undermined.
While, from the perspective of the political right, the convergence of values 
around neo-liberalism was described in a teleological narrative, from a leftist per-
spective, a negotiated convergence of values through discourse is promoted in 
the discourse ethics approach developed by Jurgen Habermas (1984, 1990, 1992). 
Indeed, Habermas’s account of how discourse can be employed to foster consen-
sus offers a philosophically sophisticated, but practical and inclusive, approach 
to achieving value consensus that can have clear implications for organisational 
management. Meisenbach (2006) provides an account of a practical case of a 
discourse ethics approach, which has been adapted below for the purposes of 
illustrating its application to decision-making criteria in the context of selec-
tion and application of criteria of good governance for a governing body of sport 
(see Table 15.1).
In this account the selection and application of criteria of good governance, 
and the identification of relevant stakeholders, is undertaken on the basis of 
Habermas’s requirements for the exercising of discourse. Habermas defines dis-
course as any social interaction involving opposing or alternative viewpoints 
aimed at achieving a new rational consensus (Habermas 1995). His discourse 
ethics does not seek to define or prescribe what is ethical (normative ethics), 
but outlines a procedure, which is based in intersubjective communication for 
addressing questions of what is ethical (meta-ethics). That procedure is a form of 
testing norms through practical communication in an inclusive and non-coercive 
rational discourse.
Development of the means of an inter-cultural agreement of what should 
constitute principles of good governance can thus, it is claimed, be drawn from 
Habermas’s discourse ethics approach. The practicalities of generating this means 
of agreement are briefly outlined in Table 15.1, where Meisenbach’s description of 
the steps to be taken in applying a discourse ethics approach to a specific business 
case study, is extended in the middle column of the table to the practical task 
of identifying and defining principles of good governance in a particular (but 
undefined) sporting context. Of course, there are problems in the adoption of 
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this simplified model of decision-making. For example, in the real world, espe-
cially perhaps in inter-cultural discussions, not all participants in the discourse, 
or stakeholders, come to the table with equal resources such that all voices can be 
heard (with the result that principles of governance are for some groups imposed 
rather than discursively agreed). Furthermore, I have argued elsewhere (Henry 
2007) that, while in practical terms universal agreement may be unattainable, 
nevertheless the approach has value in that general consensus among a majority 
might be reached by such a strategy.3
As an example of the practical outcomes that might be obtained. Ghadami 
and Henry (2015) outline in a case study of national governing bodies of sport in 
Iran, the development of a system for establishing local cultural preferences for 
specific criteria of good governance, and for weighting those criteria in a manner 
reflecting local priorities, employing the Analytic Hierarchy Process technique 
developed by Saaty (1980) to evaluate and weight alternatives in decision- 
making. The approach adopted promotes discourse about which governance 




Issues to address at  
each stage
Step 1 Generate an 
utterance or 
potential norm
Specify criteria of good 
governance in sport, e.g. 
gender equity in leadership 
roles in sport organisations.
Defining terms, meaning; 
use of strategic 
ambiguity.
Step 2 Determine who is 
potentially affected 
by the enactment 
of the utterance
Identify stakeholders: 





control and bias in 
selecting stakeholders; 
determining expanding 
circles of those 
affected.
Step 3 Articulate the 
utterance to all 
parties identified 
in Step 2
Articulate the criteria of good 
governance proposed to all 
stakeholders identified: e.g. 
gender equality or equity; 
targets or quotas.
Dialogic articulation of 
utterance; practicality 
in defining conformity 
to norm(s).





All stakeholders engage in full 
and open discussion.
Equal and full 
participation; 
practicality.
Step 5 Make a judgment 
about the validity 
and acceptability 
of the proposed 
utterance or norm
Decision taken in respect of 
application of ethical norms: 
e.g. anticipated norms; means 




Source:  Adapted from Meisenbach (2006, p. 46).
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criteria are important to the local Iranian sporting community; how performance 
by particular sporting bodies might be measured (which operational indicators to 
employ); identifying the level of achievement of particular sporting bodies against 
those indicators; and allowing comparison and ranking of the performance of a 
range of sporting bodies which might be used, for example, for the purposes of 
deciding differentials in levels of financial grant allocations.
Concluding remarks
In the introduction to this chapter we highlighted the connection between argu-
ments concerning the modernisation of sport and the modernisation thesis more 
generally. This was in part to warn against simplistic teleological accounts pro-
moting a picture of an inevitable march towards cultural uniformity around west-
ern models of sport. Of course, with the advent of supranational bodies, or codes 
such as the WADA code, national bodies are required to sign up to the rules (de 
jure) though their local (de facto) conformity with the rules may be variable, but 
with supranational bodies seeking (for example through the Court of Arbitration 
in Sport) to enforce compliance.
However, in discussing this matter we should perhaps seek to avoid falling into 
the habit of the use of binary distinctions, the traditional and the modern; Islam 
and the West; religious and secular world views. Even the governance of sporting 
activities which have developed in particular contexts, such as professional foot-
ball (soccer) manifests considerable variation as a phenomenon (Amara 2003; 
Amara & Henry 2004; Henry, Amara, Liang & Uchiumi 2005), in which local 
features persist and develop in parallel with the impact of globalising (or at least 
non-local) influences, evident in aspects of governance which have undergone 
modernisation. These enduring local diversities alongside the pressure for the 
uniform application of global rules means that the modernisation of sport is lia-
ble to take on subtly different forms in different local contexts which are modern 
but not uniform, supporting in effect a form of ‘multiple modernities’ (Wittrock 
2002). The departure from globalising norms is not simply a feature of ‘modern-
ising’ systems (such as gender inequities in the non-west), it is also a feature of 
‘advanced’ sporting nations, as for example in the US adoption of double stand-
ards in anti-doping policy for American football and baseball as compared with 
Olympic sport. There is thus greater promise to be held out in promoting agree-
ment concerning the processes through which sport governance principles should 
be decided, rather than in the imposition of definitive principles per se.
Notes
 1. Despite the simplicity of the typology, it continues to have an heuristic value as evi-
denced by its subsequent use by a number of authors in reviewing the field since its 
initial introduction (e.g. Bruyninckx 2012; Downing et al. 2018; Winand & Anag-
nostopoulos 2019).
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 2. The explanation for this given by a senior IOC official in conversation with the 
author in May 2007, was that no formal complaints of illegitimate government 
intervention had been received by the IOC in relation to the work of these NOCs.
 3. This promotion of a neo-Habermasian account is of course one with which purist 
‘Universal Pragmatists’ would certainly take issue.
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Chapter 16
Stimulating ethical behaviour 
and good governance in sport
The (non)sense of codes of ethics
Bram Constandt and Annick Willem
Introduction
Codes of ethics are implemented by sport organisations of all kinds—such as (inter)
national sport federations, professional and amateur sport clubs, and local sport 
services—to prevent and counteract unethical behaviour within their organisation 
(De Waegeneer & Willem 2019; Mullane 2015; Walters & Tacon 2018). Since the 
scope of these codes of ethics has steadily increased over the years, they now often 
incorporate provisions on the desired conduct of staff and other stakeholders (e.g. 
with regard to respecting the values of the organisation, outlining conflicts of inter-
est, and setting boundaries for relationships with external partners), on the expected 
good governance practices of the board of directors (e.g. in relation to such principles 
as transparency, democracy, and accountability), and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities and strategies (Maesschalck & Vanden Auweele 2010).
Despite their popularity and increasingly broad scope, uncertainty remains whether 
codes of ethics are really effective (Constandt et al. 2019; De Waegeneer et al. 2016, 
2017; Kaptein 2015, 2021). Whereas some scholars argue that a code of ethics repre-
sents the important foundation, cornerstone, and first tangible step of an organisa-
tional programme on ethics, others refer to the deceptive misuse of codes of ethics as 
a form of hypocritical lip service or window dressing to often falsely convince people 
that the organisation is really preoccupied with ethics (Constandt 2019; Greenbaum 
et al. 2015; Kaptein 2015; Schwartz 2013; Webley & Werner 2008). Whereas codes of 
ethics are frequently adopted by organisations in all types of sectors, these critiques 
further suggest that ethical challenges seem at least as prevalent as before the increase 
in popularity of codes of ethics (Downe et al. 2016; Kaptein 2021).
Codes of ethics should thus not be seen as a panacea to overcome all ethical 
dilemmas and issues within sport organisations (Lavorgna & Di Ronco 2015). 
Nevertheless, one key question remains largely unanswered: how can we make 
sense of ethical codes in sport organisations? In other words, how can codes of 
ethics be developed, implemented, and enforced to ensure that they render (max-
imum) effect? Positioning this question as the central focus of this book chap-
ter, we will present and discuss current theoretical insights (originating from the 
fields of both business ethics and sport management) into codes of ethics in sport, 
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their functions, content, and structural characteristics, and their quality criteria 
and determinants of effectiveness.
Subsequently, we will study the case of the international football (soccer) fed-
eration FIFA (i.e. Fédération Internationale de Football Association) to highlight 
how the organisational policies and aims that are reflected in a code of ethics 
are (not) and could be brought to life in its organisational practices. On the one 
hand, FIFA has regularly been linked with unethical conduct and poor govern-
ance over the course of its long history (Bason et al. 2018; BBC 2015, 2020; Pielke 
2013; Tomlinson 2014). On the other hand, containing 56 pages full of provisions 
on a wide number and different types of desired behaviours and good governance 
principles, FIFA’s code of ethics is (at least in theory) a textbook example of a 
well-written code with a broad scope (De Waegeneer & Willem 2019). Drawing 
on the insights provided by this literature review and the FIFA case, we will con-
clude by highlighting the importance of internal organisational ethical leadership 
and external regulations. In the end, a number of avenues for further examination 
of codes of ethics in sport organisations will be presented.
Theoretical perspectives on codes of ethics  
in sport organisations
Conceptualisation
A code of ethics is a management and compliance instrument that is developed 
and used by an organisation to determine and guide desired behaviours of the 
people involved in (and sometimes also with) the organisation (Kaptein 2021; 
Stöber et al. 2019; Schwartz 2013; Webley & Werner 2008). Terms such as busi-
ness code, ethical code, code of practice, code of conduct, and (good) governance 
code are often used as synonyms for a code of ethics (Kaptein 2021). As an exten-
sive conceptual discussion on the communalities and differences between these 
terms is beyond the scope of this chapter, we will consistently use code of ethics 
throughout the remaining paragraphs. Yet we would like to state that a code of 
ethics has become a sort of container concept for many organisations that seek 
to combine very specific conduct related regulations with often vaguely formu-
lated organisational values and almost technical good governance principles in 
one organisational policy document. Accordingly, many aspects of some so-called 
codes of ethics have in practice little to do with ‘ethics’.
While many definitions of a code of ethics exist, most definitions agree that 
a code of ethics is characterised by four main elements (Kaptein 2021). First, a 
code of ethics is a document that is developed within, by, and for an organisation. 
Therefore, codes of ethics should be seen as a self-regulative tool regardless of 
the fact whether or not an organisation is obliged by law to have a code of ethics 
(Kaptein 2021). Second, a code of ethics is a formal document, that is approved 
and officially confirmed by the main decision-making body of the organisation 
(Kaptein 2021). Third, a code of ethics is prescriptive in terms of behaviour, as it 
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describes how people involved in (and sometimes also with) the organisation 
should behave (Kaptein 2021). Fourth and finally, a code of ethics stipulates these 
desired behaviours in regard to a number of different topics and issues (Kaptein 
2021). For example, a code of ethics of a sport club might entail different sections 
on expected values and behaviours on (e.g. fair play and aggression) and off (e.g. 
gambling behaviours and substance use) the playing field (Constandt 2019).
Functions and types
A code of ethics combines different internal and external functions (Kaptein 2021). 
In a broad sense, a code of ethics operates as both a risk management tool to pre-
vent and deal with ethical issues within the organisation, while it also functions as 
a communication and public relations tool to show people inside and outside the 
organisation where the organisation is standing for in terms of values, norms, and 
principles (Adelstein & Clegg 2016). In addition to these controlling and signalling 
functions, Kaptein (2021) further suggests a number of additional functions. For 
example, a code of ethics might also represent a clarifying (i.e. offering an over-
view of the behaviours that are (not) allowed), guiding (i.e. showing the right way), 
motivating (i.e. inspiring and stimulating people to comply with ethics policies), 
and correcting (i.e. providing people a base to evaluate and judge the organisation 
concerning its accountabilities) function (Kaptein 2015, 2021). In their study on the 
code creation process in a national sport federation in the UK, Walters and Tacon 
(2018) argue that a code of ethics is often adopted to create external legitimacy. 
Nonetheless, once adopted, a code of ethics can also generate internal legitimacy.
When it comes to codes of ethics in sport organisations, three types can be 
identified (De Waegeneer & Willem 2019). First, a so-called sport ethical code is 
directed towards athletes and aims to guide their behaviours on the playing field. 
Second, an off-field ethical code entails regulations and behavioural prescriptions 
outside the playing field, for often different types of stakeholders (De Waegeneer 
& Willem 2019). For example, a code of this type might contain regulations on 
gambling for players, coaches, and referees, or might be focused on the behaviours 
the sport organisation expects from external player agents. Third, an ethical and 
good governance code focuses on the high level decision-making actors within the 
sport organisation, such as the board of directors or the management, and stipu-
lates the behaviours that are desired on their behalf, both in terms of general eth-
ical principles and good governance standards (De Waegeneer & Willem 2019). 
In practice, sport organisations have often only one, often broadly conceptualised 
code of ethics, which focuses on different stakeholders and mixes aspects of dif-
ferent types of codes (Constandt 2019).
Quality criteria
When considering quality criteria for assessing whether a code of ethics makes 
sense (i.e. is effective) in stimulating ethical behaviour and good governance, 
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a distinction is often made between content-related and structural determi-
nants of effectiveness. Studying the content of codes of ethics in sport clubs, 
De Waegeneer et al. (2016) suggest that the use of code statements that focus 
on the consequences of certain behaviours (i.e. a consequentialist oriented 
code), a combination of regulative and inspirational tone and language, and 
the inclusion of clear and explicit guidelines towards board members generate 
a positive effect. Based on these findings, they argue that a code of ethics can 
be more than a regulative tool of compliance, as it can also function as a docu-
ment that inspires people while raising their moral awareness at the same time 
(De Waegeneer et al. 2016).
Next to the content of the code, three other sets of structural characteristics of 
a code of ethics can be identified. First, in terms of the creation of the code, the 
code should be linked to a strategic planning process in which different stake-
holders are consulted. The code should also be revised regularly (i.e. at least every 
two years) (Singh 2011). Second, concerning the implementation of the code, 
the code should be easy to find, communicated broadly to at least everyone that 
has to adhere to the code, and accompanied by ethics training and a hotline 
or helpdesk for questions (De Waegeneer et al. 2017). Third, a code is a ‘tooth-
less tiger’ (e.g. Kaptein, 2021) when the content of the code is not enforced in 
practice. Therefore, the code should contain sanctions for code violations, sup-
port for whistleblowers, and evaluation mechanisms (De Waegeneer et al. 2017; 
Singh 2011).
To date, there is little work that assessed the (non)sense of codes of ethics in a 
sport context based on a longitudinal study design that enables causal claims. In 
their study in football clubs, Constandt and colleagues (2019) examined the effec-
tiveness of ethical codes clubs with a three years’ time horizon. They conclude 
that the motivation to professionalise when installing the code, the involvement 
of sponsors during the code creation, the availability of a helpdesk in the form 
of an approachable board of directors, and the presence of whistleblowing pro-
tection mechanisms all have a positive impact on the ethical climate in football 
clubs. Hence, these results imply that adopting a code is an essential step to create 
a formal organisational program on ethics, while the code itself needs to be sup-
ported by stakeholder management and organisational leadership to render more 
(or even any) effect (Constandt et al. 2019).
Walk the talk? A reflection on the case of FIFA
The international football federation FIFA represents an interesting case to 
study the (non)sense of codes of ethics in stimulating good governance and eth-
ical behaviour in sport. In other words, the case of FIFA can assist the examina-
tion of the potential discrepancy between organisational policies and practices 
regarding the implementation and enforcement of codes of ethics in sport 
organisations. While FIFA was already founded in 1904, the organisation has 
long lacked a code of ethics (first adopted in 2004) and an independent ethical 
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committee (first installed in 2006) (Bayle & Rayner 2018; Lavorgna & Di Ronco 
2015; Tomlinson 2014). This observation has led Tomlinson (2014, p. 1161) to 
conclude that “ethical issues have been peripheral to FIFA’s concerns for most 
of its history”. However, other scholars have reasoned that the 2012 version of 
FIFA’s code of ethics complied strongly with some of the major guiding prin-
ciples outlined in the academic literature (and discussed above). In particular, 
De Waegeneer and Willem (2019) suggested that FIFA’s 2012 version of their 
code of ethics was in line with most quality criteria for codes, such as being com-
municated broadly, revised regularly, containing a mix of deontological (focus-
ing on intrinsic values) and consequentialist (focusing on the consequences of 
behaviours) statements, and offering safe reporting mechanisms as well as whis-
tleblowing stipulations.
Albeit FIFA’s code of ethics can thus be seen as a textbook example of how a 
code should look like in terms of content-related and structural characteristics, its 
most recent versions generated considerable concerns. Moreover, FIFA’s code of 
ethics has not prevented numerous members of its organisation from engaging in 
different corrupt activities (e.g. taking bribes in regard to the allocation of FIFA’s 
2018 and 2022 World Cups) (Tomlinson 2014). Due to ongoing ethical scandals 
and the lack of appropriate and accountable governance responses within FIFA, 
the organisation was considered ‘clinically dead’ by 2015 (ABC 2018; Tomlinson 
2014). Accordingly, the hopes of the international football community were high 
when FIFA’s former president Joseph Blatter—named as a central actor in a num-
ber of corruption investigations by the US and Swiss authorities—was replaced by 
Gianni Infantino in 2016 (BBC 2015; Geeraert 2016). At the same time, a FIFA 
reform committee was charged with drafting the contours of what was then called 
FIFA 2.0 (Bason et al. 2018).
Despite these FIFA 2.0 reform efforts, critiques have continued to target FIFA’s 
alleged lack of ethical and good governance practices ever since, arguing that 
“nothing has changed following the handover from Blatter to Infantino” (Richau 
et al. 2019, p. 6). For example, negative international media attention was again 
directed towards FIFA when the organisation announced its updated code of 
ethics in 2018. Within this new version of their code, FIFA removed all refer-
ences to corruption, introduced defamation towards FIFA as a severe new offense, 
and included regulations that bribery should be discovered within ten years to 
be eligible for prosecution (ABC 2018). As such, with their new code of ethics, 
FIFA made corruption “disappear on paper”, strongly discouraged public critique 
by those bound by the code, and limited the prosecution options towards brib-
ery offenses (ABC 2018). Given the international critique, FIFA reinstalled the 
notion of corruption in the 2019 amended version of their code of ethics, to avoid 
any misunderstanding about FIFA’s stance against unethical conducts in football 
(Palmer 2019).
Despite its efforts to update their organisational ethical policies, scandals con-
tinue to bring FIFA into public discredit (Richau et al. 2019). In 2019, the Swiss 
authorities started a new investigation into a so-called secret meeting between 
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FIFA president Gianni Infantino and the Swiss attorney general Michael Lauber 
in 2017. According to the Swiss prosecutor in charge of the investigation, this 
meeting entailed several criminal offenses, such as breaching official secrecy and 
abuse of public office (Bonesteel 2020). Although Gianni Infantino is still under 
criminal scrutiny himself in this ongoing investigation, FIFA’s ethics committee 
decided in the summer of 2020 that FIFA’s code of ethics had not been violated 
and that some accusations towards their president did not even fall within the 
scope of provisions of the code (BBC 2020). In light of FIFA’s recent history, it is 
clear that having a code of ethics itself is insufficient to generate and sustain an 
ethical culture within the organisation (Downe et al. 2016).
In times in which international sport federations, such as FIFA, are under 
increasing public scrutiny, codes of ethics are often developed by internal legal 
departments and external lawyers who approach a code of ethics exclusively 
as a risk management and compliance instrument (Adelstein & Clegg 2016; 
Constandt et al. 2020). However, an ethical code has more potential than merely 
functioning as regulative document. An ethical code is in essence also a guiding 
document, including general principles that aim to inspire, motivate, and guide 
people to behave ethically (Downe et al. 2016; Kaptein 2021). Nevertheless, the 
way in which many sport organisations are currently approaching codes of ethics 
entails a considerable risk. After all, scholars warn against the occurrence of what 
they call “loophole ethics” (e.g. Kvalnes & Hemmestad 2010) and ‘hiding behind 
the rules’ (e.g. Kihl, 2007). According to these concepts, a code of ethics is often 
used in a way that people consider everything that is not explicitly forbidden by 
the code as allowed, while some tend to neglect their own accountability when 
the code is not completely clear regarding their responsibilities (Constandt et al. 
2020; Jurkiewicz & Giacalone 2016).
Containing simplified descriptions of complex realities, a code of ethics will 
never be completely comprehensive in terms of outlining the desired behaviours 
in all possible situations (Downe et al. 2016). Hence, more efforts than simply 
adopting a code of ethics are needed to use the code as a source of inspiration and 
a driver of positive change. Building on a positive tone and language, the often 
abstract regulations of the code of ethics should be translated into easily imple-
mentable examples and sources of inspiration (Stöber et al. 2019). Leadership (on 
different levels) within the organisation is crucial to ensure that the spirit and 
central message of the code of ethics fully trickles down to all echelons within the 
organisation (Constandt & Willem 2019). In other words, leaders should ‘walk 
the talk’ in terms of showing the way and offering the right example of how to 
interpret the code of ethics (Greenbaum et al. 2015). After all, a code of ethics is 
less likely to generate followership of people in the organisation when these peo-
ple do not believe that their leaders live up to the standards of the code (Stöber 
et al. 2019). This issue seems to be particularly applicable to FIFA, as many people 
do not trust that FIFA’s leadership is really respecting the clearly formulated and 
well-presented principles and expectations of their own code of ethics (Richau 
et al. 2019).
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Conclusion
The need for ethical leadership and external pressure
The above review of the academic literature shows that installing a code of 
ethics is an important—when rooted in sincere motivations—but insufficient 
step to stimulate good governance and ethical behaviour in sport organisations 
(De Waegeneer & Willem 2019; Webley & Werner 2008). A telling metaphor in 
this regard is proposed by Lavorgna and Di Ronco (2015), who argue that a code 
of ethics operates as some kind of placebo in many sport organisations, meaning 
that it tackles symptoms but fails to root out the causes of the problem. Although 
codes of ethics—on its own—will never be able to make unethical behaviour and 
poor governance disappear completely, we believe their utility can be maximised 
when a number of critical points are taken into consideration. In this conclusion 
section, we summarise and discuss these points which relate to elements both 
internal and external to the organisation.
As reflected in the FIFA case, a code of ethics only makes sense when the 
leadership within the organisation actually lives up to the expectations and prin-
ciples of the code of ethics (Downe et al. 2016; Jurkiewicz & Giacalone 2016; 
Kaptein 2015). As role models, leaders are essential when it comes to convincing 
organisational members of the desirability and necessity of adhering to the norms 
and values as outlined in the code of ethics (Kaptein 2021; Stöber et al. 2019). 
Leaders are also required to embed the code of ethics in the culture and climate 
of the organisation (Schwartz 2013; Webley & Werner 2008). To the contrary, 
when leaders do not actually translate the written and theoretical content of the 
code of ethics into the practices of the organisation, the code might be (mis)used 
as a form of window dressing or lip service to falsely convince people that the 
organisation is really concerned with ethics (Constandt 2019; Downe et al. 2016; 
Greenbaum et al. 2015). As such, we support the idea that “the formal adoption 
of a good governance code does not necessarily imply the actual implementation 
of the standards put forward” (Geeraert 2019, p. 522).
The lens of ethical leadership helps to enhance our understanding of this role 
modelling idea. According to the ethical leadership concept and its underlying 
foundations formed by social learning and social exchange theory, leaders should 
embody three roles, i.e. (a) being a moral person (e.g. being honest, reliable, trust-
worthy, fair), (b) promoting ethical behaviour by functioning as a moral manager 
(e.g. implementing clear communication as well as fair enforcement and empow-
erment mechanisms), and (c) carrying out new norms and innovative ways of 
thinking and decision-making by operating as a moral entrepreneur (Kaptein 
2019). Through ethical leadership, the necessary step between developing a code 
of ethics and implementing its content in the culture and practices of the organ-
isation can be taken (Schwartz 2013; Webley & Werner 2008). There is mount-
ing empirical and theoretically supported evidence that ethical leadership—both 
on an organisational and supervisory level—is positively related with an ethical 
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climate in sport organisations (Constandt & Willem 2019; Constandt et al. 2018). 
Nonetheless, the case of FIFA illustrates how the opposite situation might also 
occur. Unethical leadership on the highest levels of an organisation may create an 
unethical climate that erodes the ethical beliefs and behaviours of others on lower 
hierarchical levels within the same organisation (Pielke 2013; Tomlinson 2014).
In practice, ethical leadership can also help to make a code of ethics more 
effective by developing and promoting the code in a clear and inspirational way. 
For example, De Waegeneer and colleagues (2016) have shown that an effective 
code of ethics in sport entails a consequentialist orientation by which clear con-
sequences and sanctions are outlined for code violations. The moral manager role 
of ethical leadership can be instrumental in this regard. While FIFA’s code of eth-
ics is quite clear in terms of the consequences members face for different breaches 
of the code (e.g. in relation to confidentiality and reporting), the same code has 
largely failed to guide FIFA’s members and external stakeholders in a credible way 
over the past years. One of the main reasons for this missed opportunity can be 
found in the negative attention for FIFA’s leadership and top-level organisational 
climate (e.g. BBC 2015, 2020). In addition, the international commotion after the 
removal of the word ‘corruption’ from FIFA’s code of ethics in 2018 illustrates how 
the organisation has neglected to communicate clearly and—as a consequence—
to inspire the global world of football they are both representing and (supposed 
to be) leading.
As evidenced in the codes of ethics literature, key stakeholders (both internal 
and external to the organisation) need to be engaged during code creation and 
revision processes to develop and sustain support for the content of the code 
(Constandt et al. 2019). Ideally, the content of the code is also both regulatory 
and inspirational phrased, while containing explicit guidelines and being easy 
to assess and understand (De Waegeneer & Willem 2019; De Waegeneer et al. 
2016). To further ensure that the code of ethics is no empty box, specific atten-
tion should be dedicated to internal code enforcement (Slaughter et al. 2020). 
In this vein, existing research on codes of ethics in sport organisations points 
to such recommendations as installing an accessible helpdesk for questions and 
developing broadly communicated and available whistleblowing mechanisms 
and support (Constandt et al. 2019). Moreover, the code of ethics should also 
be embedded in a formal and broad organisational programme on ethics, which 
pays attention to such elements as recruiting new employees based on their moral 
awareness and conscientiousness (Slaughter et al. 2020).
Besides these above considerations that aim to foster both the internal crea-
tion, implementation, and enforcement of the code of ethics, external enforce-
ment mechanisms and sanctioning are often required to render maximum code 
effect (Geeraert 2019). As many sport organisations—such as FIFA for at least a 
considerable part of its history—indicate a lack of accountability and a limited 
ability of self-control, external legislation, regulations, and sanctions are needed 
to assess whether the internal practices within the sport organisation under scru-
tiny are really in line with what their code of ethics seems to suggest (Bayle & 
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Rayner 2018; Geeraert 2019; Pielke 2013; Tomlinson 2014). Without hard con-
trols, the positive impact of soft controls such as codes of ethics might be in vain 
(Kaptein 2021). Such external control and pressure is needed to prevent that valid 
critique on their operation is put aside as irrelevant by sport organisations that 
feel untouchable or ‘supreme’ (Tomlinson 2014). For example, the major 2015 
FIFA corruption allegations were only turned into an actual case with broad con-
sequences thanks to the continuous international and multisectoral pressure of 
different legal and political (e.g. a Swiss legal reform on private corruption and 
the interest of organisations such as the FBI and OECD), economic (e.g. major 
sponsors withdrawing their support), and media-related organisations (Bayle & 
Rayner 2018; Richau et al. 2019).
Avenues for future research
Whereas research attention for codes of ethics in the context of sport organisa-
tions has increased over the past decade, much remains to be uncovered about 
their implementation and effectiveness. In general, studies on codes of ethics are 
seldomly based on a sound theoretical base (Kaptein, 2021). Therefore, we advo-
cate forthcoming scholarship to apply a clear theoretical lens to enhance our 
understanding about why codes of ethics in sport are (not) making sense. Specific 
suggestions in this regard are (non) compliance theory (e.g. Geeraert 2019), norm 
focus theory (e.g. Slaughter et al. 2020), and institutional theory, critical discourse 
theory, and normative theories (e.g. Kaptein 2021). Moreover, we advise future 
research to look in-depth into the processes behind the creation and revision of 
codes of ethics in sport. To what extent are different groups of stakeholders con-
sulted and is external pressure taken into consideration? As current scholarship 
often examines codes of ethics in certain isolation of the broader organisational 
environment, we believe there is also much potential in the study of codes of eth-
ics in relation to the broader formal ethics programme (if present) and the culture 
and climate of the organisation (Kaptein 2015).
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The promises and pitfalls of 
codification of governance in 
sport as legitimacy work
Richard Tacon and Geoff Walters
Introduction
Over the last 20 years, there has been a process of ‘codification’ across the non-
profit sport sector in many countries, wherein governments, national sport agen-
cies, or other bodies have introduced codes of good governance (Walters & Tacon 
2018). This is an extension of the broader process of codification that began in 
the corporate sector in the 1990s, following a series of high-profile corporate gov-
ernance failures, and spread to the public sector and non-profit sector in many 
countries (Nordberg & McNulty 2013). In sport, more than 30 governance codes, 
or lists of good governance principles, have been published (Chappelet 2018), 
ranging from early examples of national-level principles (e.g. Australian Sports 
Commission 2005; UK Sport 2004) to more recent sets of international princi-
ples, e.g. the five principles (with ten indicators for each principle) agreed by the 
Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF 2016).
In the UK, which provides the main context for this chapter, there have 
been four codes. The first was developed by UK Sport, in collaboration with the 
Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (UK Sport 2004). The 
second was developed by the Sport and Recreation Alliance in 2011 (and then 
re-issued in 2014) (Sport and Recreation Alliance 2011, 2014). The third, labelled 
a ‘governance strategy’, was issued by Sport England in 2012 (Sport England 
2012), and the fourth, the Code for Sports Governance, was jointly issued by Sport 
England and UK Sport in December 2016 (Sport England/UK Sport 2016). This 
latter code is mandatory for organisations receiving public funding and, in that 
sense, is different to the voluntary codes and sets of good governance principles 
that are published elsewhere.
Research on ‘codification’ in the corporate sector has mostly been at a 
macro-level, looking at whether companies have formally adopted codes of gov-
ernance and what effects (if any) this has had on organisational performance 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra 2004; Seidl et al. 2013). There has been much less 
research at organisational level, looking at why companies have decided to adopt 
codes, or how (if at all) they have implemented their principles. This is also true 
in the public and non-profit sectors. In large part, this is because of the difficulty 
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of gaining access to boards to open up what Leblanc and Schwartz (2007) call the 
‘black box’ of board process.
In sport, while there has obviously been significant research on sport governance 
for a number of years, there was, until recently, very little research specifically on 
codification. This has changed in the last few years. In 2018, we published an arti-
cle examining codification in the UK non-profit sport sector, looking at the role of 
national sport agencies and national governing bodies of sport (Walters & Tacon 
2018). Subsequently, Parent and Hoye (2018) published a systematic review of research 
examining the impact of governance principles on sport organisations’ governance 
practices and performance. Then, Geeraert (2019) examined international feder-
ations’ efforts at self-regulation, drawing on compliance theory, and McLeod et al. 
(2020) examined governance convergence in India, employing institutional theory.
Together, these studies offer valuable insight into various aspects of codifica-
tion at national and international level. However, as all the authors note, there is 
more that needs to be examined. In this chapter, we look at what happens when 
national sport federations formally adopt codes of governance and we seek to ‘get 
at’ this through the theoretical lens of legitimacy and, in particular, the notion of 
legitimacy work. Legitimacy work has been defined as “purposeful activity to shape 
others’ evaluation of something as desirable, proper or appropriate” (Lefsrud et al. 
2020, p. 2). The adoption of a code of governance can be framed as an organisa-
tional practice enacted by a sport organisation to gain legitimacy among particu-
lar stakeholders. We examine this critically, drawing on board members’ accounts 
of the advantages and disadvantages—the promises and pitfalls—of formally 
adopting codes as a legitimising tool.
Adopting a legitimacy perspective should be useful for practitioners. It is always 
important for board members to critically reflect on why they pursue the practices 
they do and what the implications are. For example, if boards decide to adopt a 
code of governance primarily to improve organisational practices, this is likely 
to shape the way they are understood and implemented differently than if the 
primary motivation is to signal things to others in the sector.
In this chapter, we first discuss the concept of legitimacy work in more detail. 
Then, we draw on empirical evidence from two research projects to examine, 
from a legitimacy perspective, why board members in national sport federations 
signed up to codes, what they considered they ‘got’ out of them and how they 
shaped board practices and other aspects of the organisation. Finally, we conclude 
by offering insight into the usefulness of legitimacy work as a concept for under-
standing the actions of sport organisations and the implications this approach has 
for researchers and practitioners.
Theoretical lens: Legitimacy work
Legitimacy, as defined by Suchman (1995, p. 574), is a “generalised perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. 
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In the organisational context, legitimacy work refers to the activities that organ-
isations engage in that support and reinforce a particular course of action that is 
seen by others (both externally and internally) as desirable (Lefsrud et al. 2020). It 
has long been understood that organisations adopt particular structures or ways of 
working not necessarily because they are more efficient or productive, but because 
they confer legitimacy among stakeholders within the institutional environment 
(Meyer & Rowan 1977).
Legitimacy work, as a way of understanding organisational decision-making, 
can be applied broadly to organisational governance. Institutional pressures 
have led to the increasing homogeneity of board structures (e.g. reductions in 
board size and the appointment of independent board members) and board 
practices (e.g. the expectation that boards undergo external evaluations). 
Formally adopting a code of governance can be seen as one way in which an 
organisation seeks legitimacy, demonstrating how the organisation is moving 
along a reform agenda driven by the central narrative underpinning codes of 
governance, namely that they are considered ‘best practice’. This has been 
recognised in the corporate sector: Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) and 
Nordberg and McNulty (2013) both explain how codification brought with it 
the requirement for organisations to demonstrate good governance. Likewise, 
Ebrahim (2010, p. 11), in his analysis of accountability in the non-profit sector, 
argues that the adoption of codes is a way to “send signals of good housekeeping 
to the outside world”.
However, we can also see the role that legitimacy work plays within an organ-
isation. Gaining external legitimacy requires individual actors within an organ-
isation to engage in decision-making behaviour that aligns with the norms and 
expectations of external stakeholders. This behaviour, however, needs to be 
accepted within the organisation, and therefore the process of creating external 
legitimacy also co-exists with internal legitimising around the nature of work 
that individuals undertake within an organisation. This was emphasised by Drori 
and Honig (2013), who argued that the creation of legitimacy is both a process 
of external and internal forms of legitimacy. Internal legitimacy is defined as ‘the 
acceptance or normative validation of an organisational strategy through the 
consensus of its participants, which acts as a tool that reinforces organisational 
practices and mobilises organisational members around a common ethical, strate-
gic or ideological vision’ (Drori & Honig 2013, p. 347).
All of this implies that to understand codification from an organisational per-
spective, we need to understand how and why board members take decisions about 
codes of governance and how (if at all) they influence board practices. Getting 
this ‘insider’ perspective, however, is often difficult. This is why, as Leblanc and 
Schwartz (2007), among others, have argued, governance processes are still some-
thing of a ‘black box’. And even if it is possible to gain access to boards, this does 
not mean that board members will explicitly discuss whether they adopt codes for 
legitimacy and/or other purposes. Nevertheless, we try to do this here, by drawing 
on some relevant empirical evidence. In doing so, we align with Pugliese et al. 
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(2009, p. 301), who argue that we should see boards as “decision-making groups 
whose internal processes and external context should be better understood”.
Adopting codes of governance: Empirical 
evidence from previous research
In order to illustrate the possibilities and complexities of adopting codes of gov-
ernance, the chapter now draws on empirical evidence from two separate research 
projects. The first was a questionnaire survey of board members at sport feder-
ations in the UK (Birkbeck/Moore Stephens 2018). The survey was conducted 
between August and October 2017, with 1,000 individual board members from 
170 sport organisations across the UK invited to respond. The survey asked 
respondents a series of closed and open questions about governance issues, includ-
ing open questions about what they saw as the advantages and disadvantages of 
formally adopting a code of good governance. Ultimately, 102 board members 
from 56 organisations responded, including 85 board members across 40 sport 
federations. For consistency, we draw only on the responses from sport federa-
tion board members. The second research project was an extended case study 
of one sport federation in the UK, carried out between 2011 and 2016, in which 
we conducted non-participant observation at board and committee meetings, 
semi-structured interviews with board members and executive staff and analysis 
of key organisational documents, including organisational strategies, board and 
committee reports, meeting minutes and internal memos (see Tacon et al. 2017; 
Walters & Tacon 2018, for more details).
Advantages of code adoption: Survey research
In the survey, sport federation board members highlighted a number of advan-
tages of formally adopting a code of good governance. The most regularly cited 
advantage was that it would promote consistency across the sector:
In addition, a number of respondents suggested it would drive improvements in 
governance practices:
Consistent, strong governance across all sports.
All sports will comply to the same code and will be professionally run.
Highlighting some areas where our governance could be improved slightly.
It will drive significant improvement in organisations that had poor practice.
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These were, in a sense, predictable responses and they reflect a mainstream 
‘managerial’ view of governance codes. Among these responses, however, were 
a number that discussed very openly how adopting a code constituted a form of 
legitimacy work:
The notion of external legitimacy work was strong here, with many respondents 
focusing on the way it allowed them to demonstrate credibility to external stake-
holders. However, a significant number also discussed the subtler ways in which 
formally adopting a code of governance allowed federations to navigate their own 
internal governance struggles. Some talked about this in general, i.e. across the 
sector:
Others talked about it specifically in relation to their own federation:
There is an important distinction here between voluntary codes of good gov-
ernance, which often have symbolic, legitimising value, and the most recent Code 
for Sports Governance in the UK, which sport federations have to comply to, in 
order to receive funding. It is the mandatory nature of this code (and the threat 
It enables us to demonstrate to our stakeholders that we are aligned to ‘good 
practice’.
Builds confidence in the ability of [the] organisation with funders and partners 
that [the] organisation is fit for purpose.
The Code assists with our own credibility both internally with all our stakehold-
ers and externally with our partners, especially commercial partners.
The Code will facilitate change in some organisations with legacy structures or 
complex constituencies.
For too long, some sports organisations have operated as an ‘old boys’ club’ – the 
new Code brings transparency and accountability. It is long overdue.
A reason to force the board to discuss governance issues that they have previously 
ignored or not deemed a priority.
It has been the catalyst for modernising [our] governance structure. Without the 
potential financial penalties for non-compliance, it is highly unlikely that some of 
the requirements of the Code would have been passed, particularly term limits for 
Council membership.
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of public funding being withheld for non-compliance) that enabled some sport 
federations to push through governance reforms that otherwise might have been 
opposed by existing board members, or the wider membership of the federation.
Disadvantages of code adoption: Survey research
Respondents also discussed the disadvantages of adopting a code of governance 
and it is arguably these responses that best illustrate the complexity of this ‘reform 
strategy’ and the nature of the legitimacy work involved. First, many respondents 
discussed the danger of the code cultivating a ‘tick-box’ approach to governance 
that would crowd out the kind of internal cultural change that actually leads to 
improvements in governance:
Second, several respondents felt that the introduction of this particular Code 
for Sports Governance was partly about ‘legitimacy work’ on the part of the UK 
Government and the national sport agencies, Sport England and UK Sport, i.e. 
a way for them to demonstrate that they were ‘doing something’ about govern-
ance in sport, particularly in large federations, where there have been high profile 
examples of governance failures:
It is important to note this was a marginal view among respondents, but it 
nevertheless highlights the complexity of ‘codification’ and the various types 
In my experience on a range of boards, governance is most effectively improved 
when change comes from within. There is a danger of conforming to a template 
without improving underlying culture and values.
The code feels like a measuring tool. I am concerned that organisations spend their 
time ticking the box rather than addressing the culture and values of the organisa-
tions which, if highlighted as critical to the organisations progress, can address the 
decision making required to embed the code into organisations.
It is a ‘one size fits all’ [approach] that feels very driven by the need for change in 
the governance of one or two major sports and does not recognise the very varied 
landscape that sport organisations operate in. It is also heavily focussed on simple 
numbers in terms of equality on boards and rather pejorative in tone towards sport 
bodies. Competency seems to have been substituted by the word ‘Independent’.
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of legitimacy work involved, both among sport federations themselves and the 
national sport agencies and government departments that all operate in the same 
‘regulatory space’ (Hancher & Moran 1989).
Finally, the strongest responses concerned the potential alienation of sport fed-
eration members that might follow from the prescriptions of the code, particularly 
around the election of ‘independent’ Chairs and board members:
This is a really important issue, both of substance and perception. Formally 
complying with the Code for Sports Governance means that sport federations 
have to abide by particular governance prescriptions—term limits on board mem-
bers, recruitment of independent board members, and so on. And while there 
is evidence, including the comments above, that formally adopting this code 
demonstrates credibility to external stakeholders, including funding bodies and 
commercial sponsors, the argument here from a number of board members is that, 
in doing so, this may well de-legitimise some federations in the eyes of their mem-
bers. This raises a key question about the legitimacy work involved in adopting 
codes of good governance: legitimacy to whom? We discuss this below.
Case study insights
The case study research provided further, in-depth insight into code adoption 
and implementation in the context of one sport federation in the UK. In late 
2011, the board of the federation formally signed up to the Voluntary Code of 
Good Governance for the Sport and Recreation Sector (Sport and Recreation 
For an organisation heavily dependent on unpaid volunteers within its governance 
and service delivery activities:
•  sense that control moving away from the members/volunteers to external 
bodies/individuals with no background in the sport
•  traditional ‘bottom-up’ electoral processes having to be replaced by appoint-
ments with minimal member involvement.
In some areas it runs the risk of disenfranchising the volunteer administrator base 
that NGBs rely on. Reinforces ‘us v them’.
The general thrust is to marginalise volunteers from decision-making and to 
restrict the opportunities for them to advance to the highest levels in the organ-
isation. As a membership organisation, there is a mismatch with a PLC [Public 
Limited Company] governance structure which fits poorly, potentially exacerbating 
difficulty for many National Governing Bodies of Sport (NGBs) of communication 
between the members and the organisation, with the result that there could be an 
increasing alienation between the central organisation of staff and Board from the 
membership.
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Alliance 2011). Initially, at least, this decision appeared to be a form of exter-
nal legitimacy work. For example, at a Governance Committee meeting in April 
2012, one of the independent directors noted that governance was the ‘hot topic’ 
for Sport England and it was important to be seen to be doing something. And at 
a board meeting that year, one of the elected directors emphasised the legitimising 
effects of signing up to a code and employing the language of good governance 
publicly: ‘It helps’, he said, ‘if you speak the same language as your primary funder’.
Over time, however, the board of the federation moved beyond formal adop-
tion towards attempting to use the code to frame their own internal discussions 
and decision-making. For example, in the November 2012 board meeting, the 
Chair argued that the Voluntary Code was ‘something that we can use to navi-
gate ourselves’. One of the chief executives then ran a board exercise, in which 
each board member was asked to state which of the seven principles of the Code 
was most important (in general) and which the federation ought to focus on 
next. This exercise was followed up in subsequent board meetings. In an inter-
view, one of the independent directors explained how this worked as a semi- 
regular practice:
Our observations indicated that the salience of this kind of internal govern-
ance scrutiny, framed by the Voluntary Code, tended to fluctuate over time, and 
commitment varied among board members. Indeed, one of the elected directors 
commented in an interview that “We tend to tick off the individual items, [but] 
some people just sort of zone out during those periods”. Nevertheless, it was clear 
that there were explicit attempts to implement some of the principles of the 
Voluntary Code and it could not be seen only as external legitimacy work.
Furthermore, over the course of the research, it appeared that formally adopt-
ing the Voluntary Code also initiated a kind of internal legitimacy work in the 
federation, whereby board members developed a narrative for themselves about 
how well governed they were as an organisation. For example, in the November 
2012 board meeting, in discussing Principle 4 of the Voluntary Code, concerning 
a ‘Balanced, Inclusive and Skilled Board’, one of the independent directors noted, 
‘We have a skills matrix, which is a strength’. Others agreed. This internal legit-
imacy narrative was bolstered by feedback from external bodies. As the Chair 
said in a subsequent board meeting, “What I heard (…) is that Sport England are 
appreciative of what we’ve done. We’ve done what we said we would do. We are 
seen as one of the better sports”.
We take probably one principle now per board meeting, or every other board meet-
ing and we look at it and we discuss it in the wider context of, do we do this, how 
do we do this, how do we evidence it? Because you have to have that conversation. 
And how does this inform our strategic thinking going forward?
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Having said this, there was no question that the prescriptions of the govern-
ance codes, when issued by the funding agencies, constrained board autonomy. 
This was apparent in tangible and intangible ways. For example, there was a 
long-running plan to make the joint CEOs full members of the board, which was 
formally agreed at the February 2012 board meeting. This would have increased 
the board from 12 to 14 members. However, at the same time, Sport England 
released its governance strategy, On Board for Better Governance, which stated 
that “Ideally the Board size should not exceed 12 members. In exceptional cir-
cumstances where the Board size exceeds this number, the NGB must be able 
to justify this on the basis of organisational effectiveness” (Sport England 2012, 
p. 9). Ultimately, through various board discussions and informal discussions with 
Sport England representatives, it appeared this would not qualify as ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ and so the decision to add the CEOs to the board, despite being 
taken in order to improve organisational effectiveness, was not enacted.
Around the same time, the board was holding a series of discussions to set 
out the organisation’s strategy. Although both the Voluntary Code and Sport 
England’s governance strategy emphasised the importance of organisational 
autonomy, with the board setting the strategy for the organisation, board mem-
bers were highly sensitised to the need to align their strategic priorities with those 
of their main funder, Sport England. As one of the CEOs said in interview:
In this sense, while there was certainly a desire on the part of the board to act 
autonomously, there was a keen recognition of the importance of aligning their 
strategy with the broader strategic direction of the main funder (and code issuer).
Discussion: Legitimacy work and its consequences
Evidence suggests sport federations adopt codes of governance for multiple rea-
sons, including the obvious ‘managerial’ rationale, i.e. to improve their own gov-
ernance practices, and the ‘necessary for funding’ rationale, i.e. when a code is 
a mandatory set of practices that organisations have to adhere to, in order to 
receive funding. But in among these, there is another common rationale: adopt-
ing a code to demonstrate legitimacy to certain stakeholders, often key (potential) 
funding bodies and commercial sponsors. This can be seen as external legitimacy 
work (Lefsrud et al. 2020). But a closer look suggests this can also involve forms 
I mean, there’s that sort of dichotomy of, you know, the message from Sport 
England is that you should first think about what would be good for your sport. 
And then, you know, they should see what parts of that strategy they would fund. 
But we don’t…in truth, we can’t operate like that. We first think about what they’re 
willing to fund.
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of internal legitimacy work (Drori & Honig 2013), whereby action taken is used 
to build or sustain a narrative for organisation members themselves that, in this 
case, the organisation is well governed.
As a ‘reform strategy’, then, adopting a code of governance as legitimacy 
work can bring benefits to the organisation in terms of credibility in the sec-
tor. However, it is not without tensions and contradictions. First, there is the 
question of whether the focus on demonstrating legitimacy through adopting a 
code slows down, or de-emphasises, attempts to actually implement the principles 
themselves. There is, of course, no reason sport federations cannot simultane-
ously attempt to implement codes of governance, while heralding their adoption 
to demonstrate legitimacy. However, too much focus on the legitimising aspects 
may well reinforce a sense among board members that it is formal adoption that 
counts, rather than seeking to embed principles. This is tied up with the con-
cern among many board members that the codification process, in general, can 
transform governance into a ‘tick-box exercise’, crowding out the sense of good 
governance as a set of embedded cultural values within an organisation.
This tension is exacerbated by the evolution of the codification process in some 
countries. In the UK, for example, the most recent Code for Sports Governance 
(Sport England/UK Sport 2016) is mandatory for organisations wishing to receive 
public funding. This raises a significant question: how far can this really be seen 
as a code of good governance, rather than, as some respondents called it, the 
‘terms and conditions of funding’? While the rationale for making it mandatory 
is clearly stated—to seek to mandate good governance across the sport sector—
there is the concern, as one board member commented, ‘that organisations spend 
their time ticking the box rather than addressing the culture and values of the 
organisations’.
There is also the significant question bound up with the notion of adopt-
ing a code as legitimacy work: legitimacy to whom? As many board members 
noted, there is a real danger that by seeking to demonstrate credibility to funders 
and commercial sponsors by appearing more ‘business-like’ in their governance 
arrangements, sport federations are alienating many of their (grassroots) mem-
bers, by de-emphasising the democratic traditions through which people are 
elected from within the sport to govern the sport. This tension has been high-
lighted repeatedly in the academic literature on professionalisation in the non-
profit sport sector (Dowling et al. 2014; Kikulis 2000) and it is one key area that 
highlights the difference between corporate organisations and the kind of mem-
ber-based, volunteer-reliant sport organisations.
In this sense, the legitimacy work involved in formally adopting a code of gov-
ernance, which might seem superficial, quickly becomes a much more nuanced, 
complex process of balancing stakeholder interests and careful discussion, com-
munication and persuasion within particular sports. Over the last few years, Lesley 
Ferkins, David Shilbury and others have published a series of articles examining 
precisely these kinds of governance issues (e.g. Ferkins & Shilbury 2010, 2015; 
Shilbury & Ferkins 2015). While these have not put the concept of ‘legitimacy 
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work’ front and centre, they have explored it as part of the broader issues around 
‘ownership’ in the governance of sport federations.
Conclusion
The first conclusion of this chapter is that codification of governance is here to 
stay in the non-profit sport sectors of many countries and, where it is not already 
present, it is gathering pace. While this has been the case in the UK, with our 
research and empirical analysis based on the level of national sport federations 
in the UK, the fact that there are now codes in multiple countries means that 
the empirical findings from this chapter are likely to resonate with the situations 
and circumstances that other national federations face. Similarly, the growing 
importance of governance within international federations and accompanying 
codes (e.g. ASOIF 2016) means that the findings from this research are also likely 
to resonate with the experiences and pressures faced by international federations. 
Thus, we argue the research is ‘transferable’, primarily to national federations in 
other countries, but also to international federations.
The second conclusion is that, at an organisational level, many boards of sport 
federations decide to adopt codes of governance, initially at least, as a means of 
demonstrating credibility to external stakeholders. This is code adoption as legiti-
macy work. But this is where the plot thickens. Empirical research on codification 
with board members, especially including observation of board and committee 
meetings, is relatively rare. But the evidence here suggests that demonstrating 
credibility to external stakeholders—external legitimacy work—is only one 
aspect. There are also subtler forms of internal legitimacy work going on, as 
well as tensions and contradictions raised by the emphasis on adopting codes to 
demonstrate credibility.
This has implications for researchers and practitioners. For researchers, the 
first implication is quite simply to recognise that, in the area of governance, legit-
imacy work is going on. In that sense, analysis of governance codes that concep-
tualises them only as tools for improvement, or analysis of the adoption of codes 
that conceptualises it only as a rational action to improve the internal workings 
of the organisation, will miss important aspects of why and how board members 
engage with codes. The second implication is to re-emphasise that governance 
is a multi-level phenomenon (Cornforth 2012). The broader insight from this 
chapter is that, when it comes to governance, it can be useful to see the various 
actors, from governments to national sport agencies to individual sport federa-
tions, as operating within the same ‘regulatory space’ (Hancher & Moran 1989), 
in which “interest groups are bound together in relations of exchange and inter-
dependence, yet the way in which these parties inhabit the regulatory space is 
characterised by competition and conflict” (Sharrat et al. 2007, p. 1508). As such, 
national sport agencies themselves can be involved in legitimacy work, introduc-
ing codes (or making them mandatory), in order to position themselves as respon-
sible actors within the regulatory space. The final implication for researchers is 
232 R. Tacon and  G. Walters
methodological: as a number of researchers have pointed out, a key means of 
understanding governance is through ‘insider perspectives’ of board members and 
direct observation of governance practices (Leblanc & Schwartz 2007; Tacon 
et al. 2017).
As for specific further research, Parent and Hoye (2018, p. 22) conclude their 
systematic review of research on the impact of governance principles on sport 
organisations’ governance practices and performance by calling for more research 
on “the capacity and readiness of sport organisations to adopt governance prin-
ciples and what conditions need to be met for sport organisations to be capable 
of adopting and implementing these in order to reap some reward in the form 
of improved governance performance”. Along with this, they argue for more 
research on actual implementation (or non-implementation) of governance prin-
ciples and, most fundamentally, for clearer definitions of governance performance 
and further scrutiny of the presumed relationship between adopting and imple-
menting codes and improved performance. We agree with all of this. However, 
we argue that in pursuing this research agenda, researchers should be sensitised 
to the legitimacy work going on and incorporate it into their theoretical frame-
works, in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of why and how 
board members engage with codes and principles.
We also argue that future research on this topic should include a wide range of 
voices. Our research has looked primarily at the board, privileging board member 
perceptions. Future research should examine the perceptions of other stakehold-
ers: How do members of particular sports perceive the focus on good governance? 
How do funders, who influence the strategic direction of sport governing bod-
ies, construct legitimacy and does this align with how board members construct 
legitimacy? Understanding the perceptions of these two stakeholder groups is 
particularly important to gain insight into tensions that might exist. For exam-
ple, the codification of governance is underpinned by a move towards a more 
‘modern’, professionalised organisation and, as such, there is real potential for ten-
sion between funding bodies pushing the professionalisation of federations and 
members for whom the development of the sport—rather than the business—is 
the highest priority. Given the potential for tension, future research will help to 
provide more theoretical insight into how boards can address multiple accounta-
bilities (Tacon et al. 2017).
While taking a wider group of stakeholders into account is important for theo-
retical development, for practitioners, there are similar implications. Many board 
members of sport federations will already be well aware of the wider political 
context in which codes of governance are issued and many will have been part of 
board discussions about the advantages and disadvantages of formally adopting 
codes of governance. In addition, many will be aware of the tensions involved 
in seeking to implement governance reforms and may well have divergent opin-
ions on the merits of doing so. However, other board members may not be. As 
the drive for independent board members continues, many sport federations are 
deliberately recruiting individuals with little or no background in sport. This 
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means newly recruited board members may have little contextual background 
knowledge about the sector. This chapter, at a basic level, should help to sensitise 
board members to some of the contests for legitimacy that characterise the codi-
fication of governance within non-profit sport. Moreover, it should highlight the 
ongoing need for board members of sport federations to balance multiple stake-
holder interests. While it might seem an ‘easy win’ to formally adopt a code of 
good governance and seek to push through the governance reforms being pro-
moted by governments and national sport agencies as part of the modernisation 
agenda (Tacon & Walters 2016), this can exacerbate divisions within the existing 
structures of sports, which can ultimately harm organisational effectiveness. It is 
a tricky balance to strike, but that is part of the ongoing challenge of governing.
References
ASOIF 2016, ASOIF Governance Task Force (GTF) – 1st Report to ASOIF Council, ASOIF, 
Lausanne.
Australian Sports Commission 2005, Governance principles: A good practice guide for sport-
ing organisations, Australian Sports Commission, Canberra.
Aguilera, RV & Cuervo-Cazurra, A 2004, ‘Codes of good governance worldwide: What is 
the trigger?’, Organisation Studies, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 417–46.
Aguilera, RV & Cuervo-Cazurra, A 2009, ‘Codes of good governance’, Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 376–87. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00737.x
Birkbeck/Moore Stephens 2018, The state of sports governance: Are you leading or lagging?, 
Moore Stephens, London.
Chappelet, JL 2018, ‘Beyond governance: The need to improve the regulation of inter-
national sport’, Sport in Society, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 724–34. doi:10.1080/17430437. 
2018.1401355
Cornforth, C 2012, ‘Nonprofit governance research: Limitations of the focus on boards 
and suggestions for new directions’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,vol. 41, 
no. 6, pp. 1116–35. doi:10.1177/0899764011427959
Dowling, M, Edwards, J & Washington, M 2014, ‘Understanding the concept of profes-
sionalisation in sport management research’, Sport Management Review, vol. 17, no. 4, 
pp. 520–29. doi:10.1016/j.smr.2014.02.003
Drori, I & Honig, B 2013, ‘A process model of internal and external legitimacy’, 
Organisation Studies, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 345–76. doi:10.1177/0170840612467153
Ebrahim, A 2010, ‘The many faces of nonprofit accountability’, in DO Renz & RD Herman 
(eds), The Jossey-Bass handbook of nonprofit leadership and management, 3rd edition, John 
Wiley and Sons, San Francisco, pp. 101–21. doi:10.1002/9781119176558.ch4
Ferkins, L & Shilbury, D 2010, ‘Developing board strategic capability in sport organisa-
tions: The national-regional governing relationship’, Sport Management Review, vol. 13, 
no. 3, pp. 235–54. doi:10.1016/j.smr.2010.01.009
Ferkins, L & Shilbury, D 2015, ‘The stakeholder dilemma in sport governance: Toward 
the notion of “stakeowner”’, Journal of Sport Management, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 93–108. 
doi:10.1123/jsm.2013-0182
Geeraert, G 2019, ‘The limits and opportunities of self-regulation: Achieving interna-
tional sport federations’ compliance with good governance standards’, European Sport 
Management Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 520–38.
234 R. Tacon and  G. Walters
Hancher, L & Moran, M 1989, ‘Organizing regulatory space’, in L Hancher & M Moran 
(eds), Capitalism, culture and economic regulation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 271–300. 
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198765295.003.0005
Kikulis, LM 2000, ‘Continuity and change in governance and decision making in national 
sport organisations: Institutional explanations’, Journal of Sport Management, vol. 14, 
no. 4, pp. 293–320. doi:10.1123/jsm.14.4.293
Leblanc, RW & Schwartz, MS 2007, ‘The black box of board process: Gaining access 
to a difficult subject’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 15, no. 5, 
pp. 843–51. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00617.x
Lefsrud, L, Graves, H & Phillips, N 2020, ‘“Giant toxic lakes you can see from space”: A 
theory of multimodal messages and emotion in legitimacy work’, Organisation Studies, 
vol. 41, no. 8, pp. 1055–78. doi:10.1177/0170840619835575
McLeod, J, Shilbury, D & Zeimers, G 2020), ‘An institutional framework for governance 
convergence in sport: The case of India’, Journal of Sport Management, vol. 35, no. 2, 
pp. 144–57. doi:10.1123/jsm.2020-0035
Meyer, JW & Rowan, B 1977, ‘Institutionalized organisations: Formal structure as myth and 
ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 83, no. 2, pp. 340–63. doi:10.1086/226550
Nordberg, D & McNulty, T 2013, ‘Creating better boards through codification: Possibilities 
and limitations in UK corporate governance 1992-2010’, Business History, vol. 55, no. 3, 
pp. 348–74. doi:10.1080/00076791.2012.712964
Parent, MM & Hoye, R 2018, ‘The impact of governance principles on sport organisations’ 
governance practices and performance: A systematic review’, Cogent Social Sciences, 
vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 1–24. doi:10.1080/23311886.2018.1503578
Pugliese, A, Bezemer, PJ, Zattoni, A, Huse, M, Van den Bosch, F & Volberda, HW 
2009, ‘Boards of directors’ contribution to strategy: A literature review and research 
agenda’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 292–306. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00740.x
Seidl, D, Sanderson, P & Roberts, J 2013, ‘Applying the ‘comply-or-explain’ princi-
ple: Discursive legitimacy tactics with regard to codes of corporate governance’, 
Journal of Management and Governance, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 791–826. doi:10.1007/
s10997-011-9209-y
Sharrat, D, Brigham, B & Brigham, D 2007, ‘The utility of social obligations in the 
UK energy industry’, Journal of Management Studies, vol. 44, no. 8, pp. 1503–22. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00736.x
Shilbury, D & Ferkins, L 2015, ‘Exploring the utility of collaborative governance in a 
national sport organisation’, Journal of Sport Management, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 380–97. 
doi:10.1123/jsm.2014-0139
Sport and Recreation Alliance 2011, Voluntary code of good governance for the 
sport and recreation sector, Sport and Recreation Alliance, London. doi:10.1093/
ww/9780199540884.013.u282702
Sport and Recreation Alliance (eds) 2014, Voluntary code of good governance for the sport 
and recreation sector, 2nd edition, Sport and Recreation Alliance, London. doi:10.1093/
ww/9780199540884.013.u282702
Sport England 2012, Sport England governance strategy: On board for better governance, 
Sport England, London.
Sport England/UK Sport 2016, A code for sports governance, Sport England and UK Sport, 
London.
The promises and pitfalls of codification 235
Suchman, MC 1995, ‘Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches’, 
Academy of Management Review, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 571–610. doi:10.5465/amr.1995. 
9508080331
Tacon, R & Walters, G 2016, ‘Modernisation and governance in UK national govern-
ing bodies of sport: How modernisation influences the way board members perceive 
and enact their roles’, International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, vol. 8, no. 3, 
pp. 363–81. doi:10.1080/19406940.2016.1194874
Tacon, R, Walters, G & Cornforth, C 2017, ‘Accountability in nonprofit govern-
ance: A process-based study’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, vol. 46, no. 4, 
pp. 685–704. doi:10.1177/0899764017691637
UK Sport 2004, Good governance: A guide for national governing bodies of sport, Institute of 
Chartered Secretaries and Administrators, London.
Walters, G & Tacon, R 2018, ‘The ‘codification’ of governance in the non-profit sport 




‘Good’ governance in 
sport strategies
Reforming organisations by adapting 




The corruption scandals that have affected the world of sports since the late 
1990s have profoundly changed the processes and structures of international 
and national sport organisations, such as the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC), the Fédération Internationale de Football (FIFA), National Olympic 
Committees (NOCs) and National Sport Governing bodies (NSGBs). Influenced 
by the expectations of their internal (e.g. members) and external (e.g. European 
Commission) stakeholders, these sport organisations are being asked to comply 
with many and varied principles of ‘good’ governance1 (Chappelet & Mrkonjic 
2019), such as democracy, transparency, accountability, solidarity and checks 
and balances. Although legal proceedings against former or current executives 
or senior managers of International Sports Organisations (ISOs) are still being 
launched (e.g. Jérôme Valcke, former Secretary General of FIFA) and the media 
report evidence of off-the-field corruption, such as the recent case of the United 
World Wrestling (UWW) with the dubious payment of 6.5 million EUR to the 
former president and the German Table Tennis Federation (DTTB) case, which 
raises concerns that World Table Tennis (WTT) has violated principles of good 
governance, the results of benchmark analyses show a relatively positive and 
encouraging picture of compliance with recommended principles. As an illus-
trative example, the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations 
(ASOIF) highlights in its third governance analysis of its member federations 
that almost all its members perform rather well and have improved since the last 
evaluations with a significant increase in the area of transparency (ASOIF 2020).
The first 15 years of investigation into the good governance of sports, begin-
ning with the Salt Lake City scandal in 1998, have been devoted to the crea-
tion of a conceptual and normative bridge between the expectations of diverse 
groups of stakeholders within the sport system, namely European institutions, and 
sport organisations regarding the way they should perform to avoid further cor-
rupt activities. This has been illustrated by numerous initiatives to conceptualise, 
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deconstruct and operationalise the concept into a series of measurable and rela-
tively comparable principles, such as democracy, transparency and accountability. 
Primarily, defining good governance for sports and developing a shared under-
standing has been the focus; however, for the past few years, the analytical focus 
has shifted towards more explanatory and consequentialist investigations on the 
factors that may influence compliance with recommended good governance prin-
ciples. Although ISOs and NSGBs are often compared to monopolistic organisa-
tions (Forster 2006) because they have no equivalent in the system with regards 
to their aim, objectives and degree of specialisation, they still have to position 
themselves in a competitive environment by attracting material and immaterial 
resources and by creating value for their stakeholders. The systemic stress and the 
legitimacy crisis that some of them have undergone, combined with the plethoric 
production of principles and indicators, have led them, with variable geometry, to 
rethink their good governance strategy. From a systemic perspective, the attributes 
of the stakeholder (groups)—whether they are made by specialised organisations 
(e.g. the Institute of Management Development or I Trust Sport) or by multi- 
stakeholder groups (e.g. the EU Expert Group ‘Good Governance’)—the com-
plexity of the sets (Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2019) that often include a very broad 
and wide range of principles and indicators (e.g. 50 recommendations in the case 
of ASOIF) or policy mechanisms, such as steering, monitoring or sanctioning and 
emphasising the role of EU or national law (Geeraert 2016; Mrkonjic 2019), have 
led sport organisations to apply, adapt or block the recommendations to propose 
their own. From an internal perspective, studies show that the degree of autonomy 
(Geeraert, Mrkonjic & Chappelet 2015), the (organisational) culture (Ghadami & 
Henry 2015), the size (Parent & Hoye 2018) and the capacity, knowledge or exper-
tise of the persons involved in the process (Král & Cuskelly 2018; O’Brien et al. 
2019) can play a crucial role in the quest for a successful good governance strategy.
During and after a crisis, many sport organisations, with the IOC at the forefront, 
have included good governance as a fundamental principle in their statutes, have 
created ethics commissions or have adopted specific regulations. Consequently, 
the sport system has experienced the emergence of newly associated functions2, 
such as ‘Ethics and Compliance Officer’, ‘Governance and Compliance Officer’, 
‘Head of Ethics’, ‘Ethics Officer’, ‘Governance Manager’ and ‘Head of Governance’, 
and a stronger control over managerial functions and processes (Chappelet 2017). 
In 2015, as recommended by the Olympic Agenda 2020, the IOC created the 
position of Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer. In 2020, the US Olympic and 
Paralympic Committee (USOPC) appointed former US Assistant Federal Judge 
Holly Shick as its first Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer. These new functions 
can be executive or managerial and strategic or operational and can be integrated 
into different organisational units. Performing a function within a sport organi-
sation requires specific and general, technical or social competencies. The com-
petencies-based view of the board has already attracted the attention of scholars 
by pinpointing, for instance, that a strategically capable non-profit sport board is 
determined by people who can make decisions impartially, have knowledge of the 
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sport, have the necessary skills to monitor progress toward a strategic direction 
or who think and act with a ‘big picture’ mindset (Ferkins and Shilbury 2012). 
At the management level, the competencies that people within governance func-
tions should be equipped with to help the organisation meet the standards is still 
under-investigated, while the literature on sport management competencies shows 
that expectations of sport managers are increasing in light of systemic and envi-
ronmental variations, such as digitalisation or professionalisation (Retar, Plevnik 
& Kolar 2013). Today, sport managers from the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in 
an ISO to the project manager in a NSGB should be equipped with a broad set of 
competencies, such as planning skills, organisational skills or the will to succeed, 
as identified by Wohlfart and Adam (2019).
This contribution puts the organisation at the centre of attention and goes 
beyond board-focused sport governance investigations. It calls for a rethinking 
of the sport organisation by investigating the types of governance structures and 
functions and questioning the management competencies needed to reform a 
sport organisation to meet a good governance strategy. The first section presents 
empirical evidence on the encompassing value and process-oriented quality of 
good governance recommendations. The second section offers a new approach 
to analysing current practice based on sport management competencies. The 
third section reviews a series of examples that emphasises the importance of this 
approach for good governance strategies. The conclusion proposes concrete rec-
ommendations for practice and follow-up research.
The creation of new good governance structures  
and functions in sports
Since the 1980s, organisational theory has made a significant contribution to 
a better understanding of sport organisations, particularly regarding aspects of 
change, effectiveness and efficiency, professionalisation and organisational per-
formance. It has also informed work on organisational governance understood as 
“the structure and process used by an organisation to develop its strategic goals 
and direction, monitor its performance against these goals and ensure that its 
board acts in the best interests of the members” (Hoye & Cuskelly 2007, p. 9). 
Much work on sport governance has largely focused on the strategic direction, 
role, composition or structure of the board (Parent & Hoye 2018) as the body 
that oversees the activities of management. This is due to the strong theoretical 
and cultural influence of the Carver doctrine and corporate governance (i.e. the 
ways in which an organisation/a firm is directed and controlled) in the ‘codifi-
cation’ of governance (Walters & Tacon 2018) and the compliance mechanisms 
installed by National Sports Agencies (NSAs) to monitor the activities of their 
NSGBs in counties such as England with the ‘Code for Sports Governance’ 
(Sport England and UK Sport, 2017) or Australia with the series of ‘(Mandatory) 
Sports Governance Principles’ (Australian Sports Commission 2015, 2020). This 
suggests that the only governance structures and functions within a sport organ-
isation would be those associated with the board, chairman, elected member or 
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independent member, whose appointment modalities may vary according to the 
context (De Bosscher & Sotiriadou 2019). Other approaches extend the analysis 
to the integration and role of the function of the CEO, particularly decision- 
making power (voting or non-voting rights) and the transmission of information 
from the board to management and vice versa.
However, a good governance structure, such as a standing strategic structure, 
does not guarantee successful compliance as many other factors are involved 
(Crawford & Carter 2011). An overview of the different good governance princi-
ples and indicators proposed in the literature shows a more nuanced picture of the 
importance of the role and logics of the board. In 2008, when the IOC proposed 
its Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance for the Olympic and Sports 
Movement, the composition of the executive board only appears in a limited 
way, on selection criteria based on their capacities, skills, leadership, integrity and 
experience (theme 3.1) and the formalisation of their responsibilities compared to 
those of the General Assembly and the administration (themes 2.6 and 4.1) (IOC 
2008). The principles and indicators proposed by researchers over the last 10 years 
follow the same logic. Of the 63 basic indicators for better governance in inter-
national sports proposed by Chappelet and Mrkonjic (2013), only five specifically 
target the board on issues of financial transparency, term limits and age limits 
as well as the representation of women and geographical representation. Of the 
36 indicators of the 2015 Sports Governance Observer (SGO) by Geeraert (2015), 
only seven are directly related to the activities of the board in relation to the 
publication of decisions and information, remuneration, term limits, regularity of 
meetings and gender equity—not to their strategic capability. The same applies 
for the model proposed by the ASOIF Task Force and the 2018 version of the 
SGO (Geeraert 2018); of the 50 principles proposed by the former, 15 relate to 
the board. Just as a sport organisation needs structures and processes to achieve 
its objectives, good governance also comes with a host of new structures, sys-
tems, processes or rules, such as term limits, age limits, a system of anonymous 
whistle-blowing, clear election rules, rules for managing conflicts of interest, a 
risk management system, the publication of activity or financial reports and the 
empowerment of the legislative body. From there, a good governance strategy is 
undeniably driven by the board and its members through their strategic function, 
but the heterogeneous and ambiguous nature of the recommendations implies 
that to meet the expectations placed upon it, it must transform the organisation 
as a whole from the strategic apex to the management and support functions.
Compliance with good governance recommendations is usually driven by 
external stakeholders that need to convince, either reactively or preventively, 
that individual or collective actions, if left unchecked, can damage the image 
and reputation of the organisation and as a result lead to mistrust of current and 
potential partners. Whether rooted in corporate governance or not, it involves 
several mechanisms, including the creation of new ad hoc structures and related 
roles and functions. In 1998, the IOC created the Ethics Commission (Chappelet 
2005) and the IOC 2000 Commission Executive Committee, including former 
United Nations General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali and United States of 
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America Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In 2012, the European Commission 
created the EU Expert Group on Good Governance, including a broad panel of 
experts and decision makers in the field of sports. In 2011, the President of FIFA 
appointed an independent body—the Independent Governance Committee 
(IGC)—and asked criminal law expert Mark Pieth to establish a group of inde-
pendent governance experts and stakeholder representatives to overview and 
support FIFA’s reform process. The purpose of the IGC is to oversee the creation 
and implementation of a framework of good governance and controls to ensure 
the organisation’s integrity with the goal of restoring confidence amongst all stake-
holders of FIFA, with the power and authority necessary to discharge its purpose, 
and if appropriate, to recommend further investigation (IGC 2014). In 2015, the 
same ISO created a Reform Committee chaired by former IOC Director General 
Francois Carrard. The same year, ASOIF created a Governance Task Force chaired 
by its own President, Francesco Ricci-Bitti, and composed of a group of internal and 
external stakeholders of the Olympics sport system, whose duty is to ensure that dis-
cussions on good governance are followed by concrete, transparent and measurable 
actions, to analyse the status quo and to monitor progress with regular reporting 
to its Council and members (ASOIF 2016). These structures, whose existence is 
often constrained by the duration of the legitimacy crisis and the mandate, provide 
recommendations that include the creation of new structures that can include non- 
executive/independent members, such as the FIFA Football Stakeholder Committee 
proposed by the Reform Committee for purposes related to the structure of the game 
and technical matters (FIFA 2020a), the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee, 
which advises, assists and oversees the Council in monitoring FIFA’s financial 
and compliance matters and monitors compliance with the FIFA Governance 
Regulations (FIFA 2020b), the FIFA Nomination Committee (now Compensation 
Sub-Committee), responsible for defining the individual annual compensation 
of executive members as well as that of the Secretary General (FIFA 2020c), and 
the Governance and Review Committees, being specifically assigned to support 
the Council on FIFA governance matters and to conduct tasks, such as eligibility 
checks and independence reviews (FIFA 2020d).
The more process-focused orientation of good governance recommendations 
that are disseminated throughout the organisation and the creation of temporary 
or standing ad hoc structures echo the creation of new governance functions at the 
management level. Interestingly, the role of management in governance reforms 
has often been reduced to an organisational level controlled by the board and illus-
trated by the role of the management/administration and the CEO/Secretary gen-
eral within (e.g. non-voting member) and without (e.g. head of the administration) 
this structure, which is already well-documented in governance literature, and is, 
for example, illustrated by the driving role of Jerome Valcke during the FIFA gov-
ernance reform. Evidence from ISGBs, NSGBs and NSAs shows that the good 
governance rhetoric has also generated new positions and more discrete special-
ised standing structures that assume a diverse range of roles within the organisa-
tion. In other words, management structures or functions can assume governance 
roles in addition to the sole CEO. UK Sport has created a Sport Governance and 
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Organisational Health unit, whose head is namely responsible for working with 
the CEO and assuming day-to-day responsibility for the agency’s own governance, 
including ensuring ongoing compliance with the Code for Sports Governance 
(UK Sport 2018). In 2013, UEFA created the function of Corporate Governance 
Officer (transformed to Corporate Governance and Compliance Officer and 
recently Governance and Compliance Officer), whose current tasks consist of 
overseeing and coordinating UEFA policies in the sphere of governance and com-
pliance as well as ensuring that it takes all reasonable organisational measures 
required to build and implement a modern corporate governance and compliance 
programme and framework and to strengthen its ethical and compliance culture 
(UEFA 2020) in the Executive office. In 2015, as recommended in the Olympics 
Agenda 2020, the IOC created the position of Chief Ethics and Compliance 
Officer, a senior position within the Ethics Committee, whose mission is to ensure 
compliance with ethical principles and good governance and is run by Paquerette 
Girard-Zappelli. FIFA hired financial governance programme managers, who are 
responsible for defining and implementing an audit and compliance framework for 
FIFA development programmes (Think Sport n.d.). In June 2020, the US Olympics 
and Paralympics Committee appointed former US Assistant Federal Judge Holly 
Shick as its first Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer. As part of the Executive 
team, it will lead the compliance team in establishing, implementing and enforc-
ing standards and operations to champion a culture of oversight and accountabil-
ity (Team USA 2020). Accordingly, Table 18.1 presents an overview of structures 
and functions associated with a good governance reform.
This critical review suggests that to remain on the right track set by diverse 
stakeholder expectations, the transformative value of good governance reforms 
penetrates the organisation through different processual, structural and func-
tional channels. Hence, good governance should not be viewed as the classical 
top-down view of directing and controlling the organisation, and management 
performs its financial or moral duties. It also needs to be analysed as the contribu-
tion of a diverse group of internal and external stakeholders that assume different 
roles and functions. The shift from a board-oriented perspective to a more proces-
sual and incremental approach of a good governance driven organisation there-
fore gives more weight and value to the personal competencies of the employees 
involved directly or indirectly in the reform than the sporting excellence and 
outstanding track record that characterise the very few chief reformers mandated 
by the IOC or FIFA or chairs of standing advisory and monitoring structures.
Sport management competencies
Current trends, such as globalisation, professionalisation and digitalisation, have 
transformed the ways in which a manager is expected to perform duties within an 
organisation. The salience of competencies and skills related to planning, organis-
ing, budgeting, staffing, controlling or evaluating within the context of an organ-
isation that applied yesterday is—for some—no longer relevant, especially in the 
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language and the ability to use big data are the most important areas of competen-
cies development within sport organisations in the future. The field of study con-
cerned with the analysis of competencies that are needed for a career in the sport 
industry emerged in the 1970s in light of the first curricula development and educa-
tion programmes in sport management. Beginning with the assumption that sport 
organisations’ aim is primarily to identify and to recruit skilled persons who con-
tribute to meeting their strategic and operational objectives through the execution 
of allocated tasks, it was necessary to develop competency frameworks for students 
that meet the expectations of employers in the sport industry. The importance 
of these instrumental studies have been boosted by national (e.g. Apitzsch 2016; 
Emery, Crabtree & Kerr 2012) or European (e.g. Petry, Froberg & Madella 2006) 
sport labour market studies, and more specifically, by the specificities of sport man-
agement functions, such as a manager of a sports facility, a NSGB or a sports club.
The acquisition of competencies is a means to achieve employability and pros-
perity (European Commission 2016). They are acquired by individuals throughout 
their life trajectories (e.g. primary and secondary socialisation) and are a vector for 
strategic positioning, competitiveness, growth and innovation. As such, they con-
stitute an important strategic dimension for national, European and international 
employment policies, where the challenge is to identify competencies related to an 
occupation, to structure them hierarchically or to question the relevance of com-
petencies to each other (European Commission 2016). This instrumental approach 
has given rise to numerous analyses on the key competencies that an individual 
must have to carry out the tasks entrusted to him or her, which have fuelled the 
debate on the universality, immutability and transferability of these competencies. 
One of the main aims of sport management competencies research is to generate 
categories, such as current and future, core and special, technical and vocational, 
personal and methodological, that are embedded in curricula development.
Studies show that the salience of the competencies expected by the labour 
market varies based on the organisation, position and tasks. For instance, tak-
ing on a leadership role will place more emphasis on leadership or the ability 
to build partnerships, while a more operational role will place more emphasis 
on writing skills. Based on the assumption that the expectations of a sport 
organisation are oriented towards communication, technology and interaction 
in a globalised world, Pedersen and Thibault (2014) assert that key competen-
cies should be sought in leadership and critical thinking. In the first vein, skills 
are based on five types of sport management activities (marketing and sales, 
correspondence, public speaking, community relations and record keeping). 
Each of these activities refers to two clusters of responsibilities, ‘organisational 
management’ and ‘communication management’, which integrate respectively 
nine and ten competencies needed to lead an organisation effectively. In the 
first cluster, a sport manager needs good leadership skills to ensure that subor-
dinates meet the requirements—not necessarily technical skills on data stor-
age. Critical thinking enables managers to justify decisions. In their analysis 
of German sport organisations, Horsch and Schütte (2003) show that public 
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relations, personnel management and knowledge of sport are key. Their analysis 
also confirms the widely held view of the need for a wide range of skills. In their 
analysis of Slovenian sport organisations, Retar, Plevnik and Kolar (2013) show 
the importance of cooperation with individuals, putting knowledge into practice 
and developing a positive working environment. Finally, the most encompassing 
contribution in this field of investigation is from a research project conducted by a 
consortium of European universities (‘New Age of Sport Management Education 
in Europe’) that examines qualification requirements of sport management grad-
uates in four different sectors (non-profit sport organisations, professional clubs, 
public sport sector and private sport businesses). Based on a large set of 72 sport 
management competencies, their findings show a group of core-transversal com-
petencies, such as teamwork, planning skills, oral communication and a desire to 
succeed, and sector-specific competencies (from one to three), such as capacity 
to learn, social intelligence and problem-solving skills (Wohlfart & Adam 2019). 
In most cases, the samples include management positions from the first to the 
senior level (i.e. up to management structures with governance roles), but none 
aim at isolating governance structures and functions.
From sport management to sport governance
People can be considered the most important element in the management of 
sport organisations because they have an impact on specific goals to be achieved 
(Chelladurai 2006). The allocation of skilled Human Resources (HR) to perform 
duties within specialised organisational units is key for purposeful strategic ori-
entations, sound management processes and success. To achieve its objectives 
and to survive in a highly competitive sport system, the organisation must be 
able to rely on HR with different roles, functions and competencies. In parallel to 
structural and attitudinal determinants (e.g. size of the board or accountability), 
evidence from several studies shows that more knowledge-based determinants, 
such as expertise, can play important roles in the quality of governance reforms 
(Geeraert 2019; Král & Cuskelly 2018; O’Brien et al. 2019). From there, the com-
position of the board at the strategic apex of an organisation certainly has a role 
to play in the implementation of good governance strategies. Depending on their 
strategic capabilities, its members will be able to carry and to disseminate the 
message of the need for and usefulness of good governance throughout the organ-
isation. That said, as evidence has shown that it can be more encompassing and 
process-oriented than board-centred approaches, framing and nurturing relative 
structures and functions with management competencies could support sport 
organisations in achieving a successful strategy.
Building on a descriptive analysis of good governance structures and func-
tions of several sport organisations, such as UEFA, FIFA or the Fédération 
Internationale de Hockey (FIH) (e.g. FIH 2018; Think Sport n.d.; UEFA 2020), 
and insights from key lessons from literature on sport management competencies, 
Table 18.2 proposes a tentative list of key sport management competencies that 
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the latter could be equipped with. Members of standing strategic structures, such 
as an executive committee, as a key driver for reform, should be selected on the 
basis of their leadership, decision-making skills, strategic thinking and capacity 
to cope with multiple internal and external stakeholder expectations that influ-
ence the ways in which an organisation is directed and controlled. Chairs of 
experts within temporary steering structures, as the custodians of an independent 
review, should be able steer the reform with independence, expertise and per-
suasion. Chief compliance officers who lead standing advisory and monitoring 
structures should have the capacity to work with specific regulations and should 
have solid concerns for quality enhancement to solve problems related to inter-
nal processes. Secretary Generals or CEOs involved in good governance reforms 
should have the ability to support the board with strategic thinking and com-
munication with board members and heads of management sub-structures and 
should be able to monitor the process throughout the management and operating 
core. To generate horizontal commitment, heads of management sub-structures 
with governance roles should have the ability to communicate and cooperative 
with other sub-structures and should show a strong ethical commitment to the 
cause. Ultimately, to support governance reform from the inside and to monitor 
specific processes, organisation skills, analytical skills and ethical commitment 
are key for management functions with governance roles, such as for a govern-
ance and compliance officer.
Conclusion
Complying with good governance recommendations is a challenge for a sport 
organisation. The areas of compliance are broad and are nurtured by a plethora of 
stakeholders and theoretical frameworks from corporate governance to political 
science. Evidence shows that most of the recommendations induce a complex 
and thorough transformation of the organisation that affects objectives, struc-
tures, processes and people within sport organisations. As a normative concept, 
good governance has the potential to be embedded in the organisational culture. 
The strategic apex shall first recognise that it goes beyond the role of the board, 
and the creation of temporary steering ‘super-structures’ or standing advisory and 
monitoring structures, such as remuneration or nomination committees chaired 
by external and high-profile experts. This mind-set should then lead to a priori-
tisation of good governance within the whole organisation. It should be included 
as a key mission and objective that ultimately permeates the creation of special-
ised management sub-structures and functions with governance roles that are not 
only associated with controlling and monitoring duties.
However, to date, the depth of this process is still under-investigated. Parent and 
Hoye (2018) show that only a handful of studies have been conducted to investigate 
the causes or the extent to which the adoption of specific principles impact out-
comes or the performance of sport organisations. Furthermore, none of the studies 
identified by the authors in their systematic review addresses good governance in 
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sports from a Human Resource Management (HRM) and competency-building 
perspective. An important missing-piece, if we consider that HRM contributes to 
matching the strategic orientation of an organisation with proper allocation and 
performance of tasks. Educating and equipping people with fit for purpose compe-
tencies is then key to ensure effective implementation of a good governance strat-
egy and transform short-term and opportunistic reforms into standard practice. 
Unfortunately, multi-stakeholder initiatives including intergovernmental organi-
sations, governments and sport organisations on the fight against off-the field cor-
ruption are still too much focused on the creation of a (new) conceptual reality 
(how is good governance defined?) and the development of a practical relevance 
(how can good governance be measured?). It is encouraging to see that a handful 
of initiatives, such as the International Partnership against Corruption in Sport 
(IPACS), recommend to put (integrity) awareness/education programmes in place 
(IPACS 2020). But such recommendations are usually hidden by the breadth of the 
sets and lack precision in the light of their consequence on the organisation—in 
terms of resource allocation the publication of statutes on a website is hardly com-
parable with the organisation of education programmes. Therefore, education on 
good governance should get much more attention in international and national 
multi-stakeholder groups. The creation and promotion of specific and hands-on 
joint education programmes built on a good governance competency-framework 
inspired from sport management helps future and current sport managers to 
achieve the good governance strategy of an organisation and, consequently, con-
tributes to the development of a legitimate and trustworthy sport system.
Notes
 1. Quotation marks are used to emphasise the volatile (e.g. period of investigation) 
and normative (i.e. cultural patterns of compliance) properties of good governance.
 2. This contribution focuses on off-the-field or organisational corruption. Structures 
and functions related to on-the-field corruption or match-fixing (e.g. integrity units, 
integrity officer) are not included in the analysis.
 3. The hybrid composition of the ASOIF Governance Task Force suggests that such 
structures could also steer reform from the outside.
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Chapter 19
Research on good 
governance in sport
From puberty to adulthood
Frank van Eekeren
Introduction
This book marks 10 years of research into good governance in sport. The con-
tributions in this book show that various authors from various disciplines have 
started to delve into the theme, and it has resulted in a rich palette of insights, 
ideas and criticism. Gradually, we can speak of a ‘research field’; one that sees not 
only extensive academic publication and debate, but also one that has had a body 
of knowledge with a broad range of empirical findings, theories and perspectives 
emerge from it. At the same time, it is a research field that distinguishes itself 
from many others, in particular because it has a demonstrable and sometimes 
direct impact on practice. This means that researchers bear a great deal of respon-
sibility. After 10 years, it is time to take stock and, on the basis of the contribu-
tions in this book, to ask ourselves at what stage of development this relatively 
young research field is.
The development of a research field in general is not prescribed and does not 
proceed in accordance with any predetermined steps. There are several ways to 
look at the development of a research field and the use of a specific metaphor can 
be helpful in sharpening the view. In this concluding chapter, I will look at the 
research field of good governance in sport using the metaphor of human devel-
opment; from infancy through childhood, through puberty and into adulthood. 
Doing so, will allow me to investigate what steps are needed to further develop 
the research field and to bring it on its way into adulthood.
The first conclusion after reading this book may be that research into good gov-
ernance in sport has transcended childhood. In the early 2010s, the pioneers took 
their first steps from research projects aimed at bringing about practical change in 
the everyday management of sport organisations, which were in turn prompted 
by scandals in international sport federations. Projects such as Action for Good 
Governance in Sport (Alm 2013) and publications on good governance prin-
ciples and measurable parameters (Chappelet & Mrkonjic 2013; Geeraert 2019) 
were therefore aimed at practical applicability. They were also aimed at making 
good governance measurable, so that on one hand, sport federations would be 
stimulated to change (through naming and shaming where necessary) and on the 
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other, so that mutual comparison between sport federations would be possible. 
The acceptance of this academic input by practitioners is remarkably high—by 
no means is every scientific insight being picked up so successfully outside the 
academic community. At the same time, the practical impact of the pioneers’ 
work is also understandable: the knowledge provided is based on the belief in a 
certain degree of manufacturability, and it provides managers in sport and gov-
ernment officials with guidance for their actions.
Since then, the research field has grown. It has grown in size, given the num-
ber of studies, publications, symposia and debates, but also in diversity, given the 
application of different scientific concepts from different disciplines. The authors 
in this book apply different theoretical perspectives, ranging from instrumen-
tal rationality to critical feminism, and theoretical concepts, such as ethical 
leadership and legitimacy work. They use these perspectives and concepts to 
reflect on issues at the global, national and local level: from structural changes 
in international sport federations, such as IOC and FIFA, and the implemen-
tation in national sport governing bodies, such as in Canada and Australia, to 
practical struggles at the local level in a small amateur club in the Netherlands. 
Much of the research in this book focuses on the content, quality and impact of 
structural measures and codes, as these are dominant in current practice. The 
contributions show that practice often proves to be unruly and implementation 
complicated. Based on theory and empiricism, this book exposes weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities of the dominant approaches. The contributions also show that 
there is room for other perspectives and criticism of currently dominant research 
approaches; an insight which is ultimately reflected in the subtitle of this book, 
critical reflections.
These critical reflections coupled with the growth towards full maturity can be 
seen as the characteristics of a research field in its puberty. In this phase of life, it 
is all about the question “who am I?”. Puberty is a developmental stage that entails 
going on a search for one’s own identity, even if it means some degree of rebellion, 
springing from the desire to develop a full-fledged personality that is independent 
from the community in which one grew up (Susman & Rogol 2004). For a human 
being, and arguably for a research field that is meant to reach maturity, this means 
that a (temporary) identity crisis can be part of the development as is the neces-
sity for introspection (cf. Rutgers 2010; Waldo 1968).
In this chapter, I give a first impetus for this introspection, and I indicate a 
direction to take for the path to adulthood based on the contributions in this 
book. First of all, this requires critical reflection on the representativeness of the 
authors and their work for the research field as a whole. After that, the chapter 
analyses the similarities and differences between the authors and the ontological 
and epistemological perspectives they use. The chapter follows with a descrip-
tion of a pathway towards adulthood that does justice to the current identity and 
diversity of the research field and its impact on practice. The chapter ends with 
implications and recommendations for the relationship of the research field with 
its maternal sciences, other fields of science and practice.
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Representativeness of the authors
In order to describe and analyse the development of the research field on the basis 
of this book, it is first of all, important to determine whether the authors in this 
book can be seen as representative of the research field as a whole. Provided that 
the research field is not a delineated whole or a formal entity with clearly identi-
fiable members, it is important to determine whether the authors in this book are 
representative of the researchers working on this topic worldwide because repre-
sentativeness determines the value of the analysis in this chapter: is it only valid 
for the group of authors in the book or also in a broader sense?
Representativeness here concerns both origin and personal backgrounds of 
the authors and their scientific disciplines. The authors in this book originated 
from Europe, the USA, Canada and Australia. Six of them work at the School of 
Governance of Utrecht University; a department that has a tradition of research-
ing social issues in sport with a critical approach. In addition, most authors are 
Caucasian and are mostly either anglophone themselves or gravitate towards 
the anglophone community. This means that researchers from other parts of 
the world are not present and represented to a limited extent in the book. The 
authors in this book come from a variety of academic disciplines. They have a 
background in political sciences, sociology, anthropology, ethics, organisational 
sciences, public administration, management studies, law and economics. At the 
same time, a number of disciplines are left out of the picture. For instance, a 
chapter based on discourse analysis ultimately did not ‘make the cut’ of the book, 
despite the fact that discourse analysis does offer interesting opportunities to ana-
lyse the content of policy and codes and to expose how certain parts are framed. 
Other relevant scientific disciplines and theoretical perspectives have undoubt-
edly been left out of this book, as have been relevant empirical research from 
Africa, Latin America and Asia and unconventional Non-Western cosmologies, 
such as Daoism, Ubuntu and Dharma (Baggini 2018).
In part, these omissions can be traced back to the network we drew from as 
editors and to our invitation policy. At the same time, the book seems to reflect 
the current dominance in science in general and the research field of good gov-
ernance in sport in particular. For instance, the underrepresentation of women 
in science (Catalyst 2020) is reflected in the somewhat unequal male-female ratio 
among the authors in this book. The existing hegemony of Western and English-
speaking researchers in sport is a previously observed phenomenon (Breitbarth, 
Walzel & Van Eekeren 2019). Visible attention to good governance in sport and 
the research into it primarily takes place in so-called Western countries. This can 
be partly explained by the involvement and interest of Western-oriented sport 
organisations and governments in the topic, but also by the available financial 
resources in Western countries and universities for this type of research.
All in all, the authors in this book appear to be a reasonable reflection of the 
current field of research and therefore, statements can be made about the research 
field as a whole and as stands now on the basis of the authors’ contributions in 
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this book. This is done so explicitly without condoning the mentioned hegem-
ony. At the same time, the hegemony and the limited width of the research field 
can be seen as expressions of the development phase in which the field finds 
itself. It can be argued that it is appropriate for a research field in puberty that 
it relates to a relatively small peer group, while an adult research field is more 
broadly oriented.
Similarities and differences between the authors
The previous reflection on the composition of the research field does not imply 
that there is homogeneity in its approach to the subject. Although almost every 
chapter in this book critically observes the current dominant use of universal 
good governance in sport codes and related instruments, and challenges the 
underlying dominant theoretical perspectives of this practice, the authors differ 
in their perspectives and use of concepts to criticise the current practice. They use 
various theoretical perspectives in addition to or against the dominant approach 
(collected in Part I of this book) and different theoretical concepts to arrive at 
ideas about reform strategies (collected in Part II). According to the type of crit-
icism they provide on the current dominant practice and theoretical approaches 
on good governance in sport, four groups of authors can be distinguished.
The first group of authors (with limited representation in this book) criticises 
the quality, reliability and validity of the codes and instruments used. This group 
aims to inherently improve the existing instruments by means of (technical) opti-
misation of indicators. The presence of multiple definitions creates difficulties 
in their attempt to assess what good governance really is and makes it hard to 
generalise the findings of good governance studies (Kjær 2004; Van Doeveren 
2011). The view of this group of authors is that through a rational approach, the 
instrument for promoting good governance is becoming better and more refined. 
They often criticise the current lack of adequate methodological transparency 
of good governance indicators and advocate for developing methodologies that 
turn good governance in sport into more adequate proxies for the abstract 
concept of good governance.
A second group of authors, much better represented in this book, focuses not 
so much on the technique of the existing instruments, but criticises their con-
tent and applicability. These authors aim to provide substantive adjustments 
and argue that instruments should be more focused on context, process and the 
broader system of organisations and actors that influence good governance in 
sport. Just like the first group, this group of authors does not question the use of 
instruments with a generic set of indicators per se, since they are based on the 
common understanding that scholars should use, at least to some extent, valid 
concepts in a systematic way. Instead, they argue especially in favour of research 
on determinants, effects and interactions of good governance principles. More 
concretely, they advocate for a more systemic, archetypical or holistic approach to 
good governance indicators.
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A third group of authors points to the shortcomings and missing elements in 
current practice and states that in addition to the use of codes and instruments, 
attention should be paid to other elements that influence good governance. Their 
reasoning often comes from a specific vision on organisational change and stra-
tegic reform, in which they question the effectiveness of codes and instruments 
and draw attention to less structure-oriented and more process-oriented interven-
tions. Examples of this are the pleas to pay (more) attention to management and 
leadership skills, organisational culture and the implementation process.
A fourth group of authors takes it a step further and asks fundamental 
questions about the desirability of a universalist and instrumental approach 
to good governance in sport. These authors question the existence of neutral 
and value-free knowledge, emphasise the importance of dialogic relationships 
and social interaction, and point to the subjective nature of the phenomenon 
of good governance. They consider good governance in sport as a relative, 
evolving and culturally defined aspiration, while developing good governance 
indicators are seen as an inherently political process. Ignoring existing power 
relationships within and between sport organisations and governments in cur-
rent approaches and, in this example, dominant Western and white male hegem-
ony in current practice and research is very tricky for this group of authors. For 
them, quantification of good governance in sport and developing indicators is 
problematic per se.
Clash between ontological and epistemological perspectives
The four groups of authors mentioned are distinguished from each other accord-
ing to the type of criticism they express in the present book on current practice 
and theoretical approaches on good governance in sport. This provides a first 
insight into the identity of the research field. Nonetheless, a deeper reflection into 
the fundamental academic principles of formulating its criticism fits the intro-
spection necessary for a research field in search of its own identity on its way 
to adulthood. This deeper reflection concerns classic questions such as: which 
elements are seen by researchers as fundamental building blocks of reality (ontol-
ogy) and what is the best way to obtain knowledge about reality (epistemology) 
(Bartley & Radnitzky 1987). To gain a better insight into the identity of the 
research field, it is important to explore the similarities and differences in onto-
logical and epistemological perspectives between the four aforementioned groups, 
based on their present contributions.
In the social and political sciences, two extreme ontological perspectives can 
be distinguished: objectivism and subjectivism (Bartley & Radnitzky 1987; Marsh 
& Furlong 2002). On one extreme, objectivism assumes that social phenomena, 
such as good governance, exist independently of our perception of it. Taking the 
natural sciences as the ideal, objectivists privilege empirical, observable phenom-
ena. A related epistemological concept is positivism, which is based on observable 
and quantifiable research results obtained through objective methods (Bartley & 
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Radnitzky 1987; Mingers 2015). Academics who reason based on this ontological 
and epistemological perspective will argue that the joint implementation of the 
right components of good governance make all the difference. It is this combina-
tion that contributes to effective and impartial decision-making free from abuses 
of entrusted power or personal gain. They assume that good governance can be 
measured objectively and theories as well as deductive research are very impor-
tant in this perspective.
Objectivism and positivism have not been readily accepted in the social and 
political sciences for over 50 years (Giddens 1974; Mingers 2015). Many scholars 
and researchers have never been certain that social sciences easily arrive at true 
accounts of the world, as positivists suggest. As a counter-reaction, the subjec-
tivist ontological perspective is on the other side of the ontological spectrum. It 
assumes that social phenomena and their meanings are continuously constructed 
by social actors. It implies that the social phenomena and social categories are 
not only produced by social interaction but that they are also constantly being 
revised: without social actors there would be no social phenomena, such as good 
governance. A related epistemological concept is social constructivism, which 
states that knowledge is constructed by each person in their own way, strongly 
influenced by the reactions and views within the social environment (Bartley & 
Radnitzky 1987). As a consequence, researchers who take on this perspective do 
not believe in a universalist approach and objective measuring instruments that 
are generally considered to be valid. The use of qualitative research methods is in 
line with this view because one works inductively and is constantly revising the 
theory, just as the social phenomena are constantly being revised.
Not all researchers in social sciences are comfortable with the described 
extremes of the ontological and epistemological spectrum. They opt for a position 
between the extremes and search for resolutions that cohere in comprehensive 
treatments of ontology and epistemology together with an alternative account of 
science (Bhaskar 2013). Examples of this are critical realism, which provides an 
ontology that allows positivism and its empirical realist ontology to be abandoned 
without having to accept strong social constructivism (Fleetwood & Ackroyd 
2004, p. XVI), and constructivist realism, which proposes an alternative ontology 
that accommodates positivism and constructivism and the methods that they 
subtend (Cupchik 2001). These intermediate positions allow researchers to work 
with mixed methods.
Both extreme ontological and related epistemological perspectives are reflected 
in this research field, just like intermediate positions between these two. In their 
contributions to this book, most authors are not explicit about the ontological 
and epistemological perspective behind the approach they criticise or prefer—nor 
have they been asked to do so. It does not even mean that the position they have 
taken in their contribution in this book is used in all their work. Many research-
ers handle different ontological and epistemological perspectives and cannot be 
categorised. Nevertheless, it is striking that the influence of objectivism and pos-
itivism seems to have been dominant, especially in the early years of research on 
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good governance in sport. This can be seen in the search for objective measuring 
instruments and the support from practitioners in the form of developing univer-
sal good governance principles and codes. This perspective can be recognised in 
the first group of authors, as distinguished in the previous section. Criticism from 
this perspective on current research practice mainly concerns the lack of rigour.
Considering the contributions in this book, objectivism seems to no longer be 
dominant in the research field. The fourth group of authors, as mentioned in the 
previous section, criticises the idea that objective measuring is possible and that 
universal principles and codes make sense. In doing so, they are not so much crit-
icising the rigor of the dominant positivist research, but its relevance. They ques-
tion—often implicitly—the previously dominant paradigm and contrast it with a 
subjectivist perspective. According to these authors, the use of good governance 
principles by scholars has produced a veil of objectivity that masks considerable 
discretion on the part of both designers and recipients. From their perspective, 
good governance is a normative concept, as the adjective ‘good’ implies; hence 
its meaning is subject to political decision-making and reflects different organisa-
tional ideologies.
At the same time, not all authors can be unambiguously categorised under one 
of the two stances. The second and third groups of authors, as described in the 
previous section, seem to occupy a middle position. Some authors seem to reject 
positivism, yet nevertheless stick to the ideas about the requirements of theory it 
has espoused. They criticise the lack of consistency, the limited applicability or 
omissions of the current dominant approach, but do not go so far as to contrast 
this with a completely different ontological and epistemological perspective.
Towards adulthood
The previous descriptions and analyses of the research field raise the question of 
how the research field with such a diversity of researchers and perspectives can 
develop towards adulthood. The way forward for a research field is not unam-
biguous. Various research fields or fields of science, such as public administra-
tion (cf. Rutgers 2010), political sciences (cf. Bovens 2016) and organisation & 
management studies (cf. Fleetwood & Ackroyd 2004), grapple with the question 
of how they can develop further. The path to maturity of a research field is not 
infrequently, just like that of a human adolescent, characterised by identity crises, 
in which the question is who or what the research field is and where it is heading 
(Waldo 1968). According to Rutgers (2010), such a crisis is located precisely at 
the interstices of ‘scope’ (what exactly is the subject of study, i.e. where does good 
governance start and where does it end?) and ‘theory’ (what is the importance of 
theory and which theoretical concepts are helpful in this?).
The different answers to questions about scope and theory from the authors 
in this book imply different ideas about the path to maturity for the research 
field. For example, the way forward for objectivism and positivism will focus on 
the clearer formulation of the concept of good governance, the refinement of the 
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theoretical paradigm and the further sophistication of the methodology. When 
this is pursued, the objectively measurable reality of a comprehensive theory 
comes closer and closer. At the other end of the spectrum, from subjectivism and 
social constructivism’s points of view, the further development of the research 
field will focus on what happens behind the veil of objectivity, and research 
instruments, which pay attention to context, process and power relations, should 
be developed and applied. Academics that occupy a position between objectivism 
and subjectivism will probably have views on the way forward aimed rather at 
broadening than deepening the research field. They will be more focused on a 
practical approach than on a fundamental paradigm shift.
Does this mean that the research field is in an identity crisis? This question 
must be answered positively when a mature research field is defined as a homoge-
neous community. In that case, a conflict of direction between objectivists and 
subjectivists will be inevitable and parallel research fields will probably occur. 
There is a fair chance that this will lead to (renewed) dominance of positivist 
research due to the ongoing demand from practice for ready-to-use solutions and 
instruments. As a consequence, other relevant perspectives—also for practice—
will remain underexposed.
Therefore, it seems undesirable to strive for a homogeneous field of research 
from one ontological and epistemological perspective, or for one conceptual 
framework that encompasses all perspectives and refutes all criticisms. A better 
option therefore seems to be embracing the multiformity of the research field. 
When the current heterogeneity of the research field can be seen as a strength 
and not as an identity crisis, then it can be a powerful part of its adult identity. 
It also seems logical to welcome this heterogeneity among approaches, partly 
because good governance in sport is complex and multifaceted; and partly 
because different methodologies will bring different logics of inquiry, different 
criteria of what constitutes acceptable, valid and/or meaningful data and dif-
ferent insights and challenges to theory (e.g. Grix 2002; Robson & McCartan 
2016). It can be argued that the research field has to be pluralistic, multi- and/or 
interdisciplinary if its scholars intend to understand “good governance in sport” 
comprehensively for both academic and practical purposes. This type of adult-
hood does not so much result in a coherent body of knowledge, but points at a 
process of continuously striving for the confrontation of diverging approaches in 
order to better understand some aspect of (what constitutes) good governance 
in sport in reality.
Conclusion and recommendations
The research field ‘good governance in sport’ is still relatively young. It has 
outgrown childhood and seems to be on its way to adulthood. It also can be 
described as a special research field, especially because of the great influence that 
its research has had on policy practice to date. There is a clear impact on sport 
managers and government officials, which means that researchers need to be very 
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aware of the consequences of their research and recommendations in practice. 
The introductory chapter of this book presented two key questions that needed 
to be answered. First, what constitutes good governance in sport and what are 
the instrumental and moral justifications for implementing it? Second, what are 
the challenges, dilemmas and risks associated with both inducing and guiding the 
implementation of good governance in sport and implementing specific practices 
in sport organisations?
The analysis in this closing chapter shows that the answers to these questions 
come from different academic disciplines, theoretical perspectives and a range of 
ontological positions, from objectivism to subjectivism, and that a wide array of 
research methodologies are used. This heterogeneity can be seen as an important 
part of the research field’s identity which leads to nuance and debate as well as 
to different answers to the questions in the introductory chapter. We can safely 
argue that there are no ready-made answers to the question of definition, and 
neither are there blueprints for implementation. No theory or reform strategy can 
be seen or presented as a panacea for all issues with good governance in sport, 
no matter how much practice may be looking for such a remedy. This means that 
researchers bear a great deal of responsibility, precisely because of their impact 
on practice. Taking on this responsibility requires a mature field of research that 
stimulates and facilitates debate and nuance, one that leads to dialogue among 
researchers as well as between researchers and practitioners.
At the same time, the road to adulthood is not paved and is hardly discussed 
among good governance in sport researchers—perhaps because not everyone 
regards ‘good governance in sport’ as a research field yet. But if academics want 
to develop research and knowledge on the topic in general and steer the dialogue 
with practice, it is indispensable to relate explicitly to colleagues who study the 
same topic, stimulate mutual debate and as such are part of this research field. I 
distinguish five recommendations towards a mature research field.
First, it is recommended to embrace and stimulate the research field’s heteroge-
neity instead of striving for homogeneity, even though it is clear that heterogene-
ity is complex; questions such as ‘what binds the research community’, ‘how can 
researchers communicate with each other’ and ‘how can they make use of each 
other’s work’, are not easy to answer. When diversity is not embraced and stimu-
lated, there will be a fair chance that this will lead to the dominance of an objec-
tivist and positivist perspective due to the desire for unambiguously applicable 
instruments in practice. The dominant Western perspective plays an additional 
role in this potential development due to the current interest of Western oriented 
sport organisations and governments in good governance in sport. Other relevant 
perspectives will remain outside the picture, which does not do justice to the 
complexity of the subject. The current research field can be broadened by more 
explicitly inviting researchers from perspectives and disciplines that have not or 
hardly been heard yet. Researchers especially from non-Western countries could 
participate in debates on good governance in sport, and more attention could be 
paid to their research.
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Second, on the research field’s way to maturity, both single loop and double 
loop learning are recommended. On the one hand single loop learning is needed, 
which is aimed at the continuous improvement of a certain scientific methodol-
ogy. This will lead to more rigour in research findings from a particular perspec-
tive. On the other hand, so-called double loop learning is needed (Argyris & 
Schön 1978), aimed at regularly questioning the current scientific paradigms and 
policy frameworks. This type of learning implies reflection on the studies’ ontol-
ogies, epistemologies and methodologies, and stresses the need to reflect upon 
them because there is no agreed upon ‘paradigm’. Ontological, epistemological 
and methodological consciousness helps to critically look at certain approaches 
and enables a better understanding of the criticism on certain approaches. It thus 
stimulates the academic debate and critical thinking within the research field.
Third, as a consequence of the group’s diversity and its interaction with prac-
tice, it is recommended that researchers are more explicit about their disciplinary, 
theoretical, ontological, and epistemological viewpoints for the sake of practition-
ers who receive advice or criticism from academics. Researchers should explain 
in layman’s language to an extra-academic audience of clients and policymakers 
or, more generally, to public opinion what the pros and cons and consequences of 
their perspective are. This is not easy and not all practitioners will be waiting for 
such reflections, but nevertheless, it is important that the extra-academic audi-
ence is enabled to interpret researchers’ recommendations and criticisms.
Fourth, it is recommended that researchers make use of theoretical and prac-
tical knowledge from their maternal sciences. A mature research field does not 
forget the maternal disciplines from which it grew up. Researchers in sport some-
times tend to see sport research as a separate discipline and to limit themselves 
to sport science literature, while in its maternal sciences a lot of relevant theo-
retical and empirical knowledge is available that might also be also applicable in 
the context of sport organisations. This concerns disciplines such as sociology, 
anthropology, economics and law or more specific fields of science, such as public 
administration, political science, organisational studies, change management and 
human resource management.
Fifth, it is recommended that researchers in this field not only make use of 
theory and empiricism from maternal disciplines and specific fields of science, 
but also use specific knowledge from a sport context to contribute to the general 
theory formation in the maternal disciplines and other fields of science. Specific 
characteristics of the sport world, such as the hybrid character with public- 
private organisational features, make the knowledge acquired relevant for broader 
theories on (good) governance and thus applicable to other sectors. This recom-
mendation is therefore also an appeal to this research field to engage in broader 
scientific circles and to publish in non-sport journals, for example.
Finally, I am coming back to the metaphor of human development to interpret 
the current state of affairs in this research field and to distinguish steps towards its 
adulthood. Although comparing the development of a research field with that of 
a human being is flawed in many aspects, there are interesting similarities. One is 
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that it is impossible to say what an adult ought to look like, just as it is impossible 
to describe how exactly a mature research field should look. At the same time, 
development-oriented steps can be distinguished which appear to be valid for 
both humans and research fields, such as introspection, and characteristics of an 
adult life can be described, such as open-mindedness. Therefore, this book with 
critical reflections from so many different angles and perspectives seems like a 
step forward towards this research fields’ adulthood. In fact, perhaps this book is 
not so much an expression of rebellion in puberty, as first suggested in this chap-
ter, but in all its heterogeneity it is already exhibiting a first sign of adulthood.
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